Kimberly Street v. State ( 1998 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE         FILED
    JUNE 1998 SESSION
    July 29, 1998
    Cecil W. Crowson
    Appellate Court Clerk
    KIMBERLY SUTTON STREET,            )
    )    NO. 01C01-9707-CC-00250
    Appellant,                   )
    )    RUTHERFORD COUNTY
    VS.                                )
    )    HON. J.S. DANIEL,
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                )    JUDGE
    )
    Appellee.                    )    (Post-Conviction)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                      FOR THE APPELLEE:
    CHARLES R. RAY                          JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    211 Third Avenue North                  Attorney General and Reporter
    P.O. Box 198288
    Nashville, TN 37219-8288                ELLEN H. POLLACK
    Assistant Attorney General
    Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    WILLIAM C. WHITESELL, JR.
    District Attorney General
    303 Rutherford Co. Judicial Bldg.
    Murfreesboro, TN 37130
    OPINION FILED:
    AFFIRMED
    JOE G. RILEY,
    JUDGE
    OPINION
    The petitioner, Kimberly Sutton Street, appeals the denial of her petition
    for post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court of Rutherford County. The
    petitioner contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to alter the
    conditions of her appeal bond; therefore, the alteration resulted in “punishment.”
    She contends that serving the original sentence imposed by the trial court would
    violate her constitutional right against double jeopardy. The judgment of the trial
    court is AFFIRMED.
    I.
    The petitioner was convicted by a jury in Rutherford County of possession
    of marijuana, possession of valium, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
    driving under the influence, second offense. She was sentenced to concurrent
    terms of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days. The sentences were to
    be served on supervised probation after ninety (90) days served in confinement.
    The petitioner filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. The
    petitioner remained on bond while she appealed to this Court. While the appeal
    of petitioner’s convictions was pending, she was indicted in Sumner County for
    various drug offenses. The District Attorney General of Rutherford County on
    May 2, 1996, filed a motion to revoke the petitioner’s bond. A hearing was held
    on May 21, 1996, and the trial court issued an order amending the conditions of
    the petitioner’s release. The petitioner’s bond was raised $4,000. She was also
    “placed on supervised probation,” required to remain free of illicit drugs, ordered
    to submit to drug screenings, and had to comply with a 7:00 p.m. curfew. The
    petitioner also alleges the “Draconian” measure of placing an electronic
    monitoring device around her ankle was foisted upon her.
    2
    This Court subsequently affirmed the petitioner’s convictions. State v.
    Kimberly Sutton Street, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9508-CC-00257, Rutherford County
    (Tenn. Crim. App. filed September 19, 1996, at Nashville). The Tennessee
    Supreme Court denied permission to appeal in an order filed March 3, 1997.
    The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief
    alleging, inter alia, that the increased conditions of her bond constituted
    punishment for double jeopardy purposes; therefore, she had already served her
    sentence. The trial court dismissed the petition without a hearing, and the
    petitioner appealed.
    II.
    The defendant alleges that the trial court’s modification of her bond was
    made without jurisdiction and constituted punishment, causing her to “more than
    serve the original sentence imposed by the trial court.” We respectfully disagree.
    A.
    A defendant may be admitted to bail pending appeal by the trial court
    where the judgment was rendered, by this Court, or by the Tennessee Supreme
    Court. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-113
    (a)(1). Any of the above courts, judges or
    justices thereof, may increase or reduce the amount of bail required pending
    appellate review. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-113
    (a)(3). If a court finds it
    necessary, a defendant as a condition of release on bail may be required to
    submit to supervised probation and have reasonable restrictions placed upon
    her activities, movements, associations and residences. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40
    -
    3
    11-116(b)(2), (3).1
    Thus, the petitioner’s contention that a trial court does not have
    jurisdiction to alter or modify bail after notice of appeal is without merit. Indeed,
    an application for alteration of bail is one of the few instances where both the trial
    and appellate courts retain concurrent jurisdiction. Raybin, Tennessee Criminal
    Practice and Procedure, § 33.104 (1985); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 8(a).
    B.
    We also reject the petitioner’s argument that the alteration of bail
    constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes. To be put in jeopardy, a
    defendant must be “subject to ‘criminal prosecution’ and put to trial.” United
    States v. Grisanti, 
    4 F.3d 173
    , 175 (2nd Cir. 1993). A bail revocation hearing
    serves a regulatory function rather than a criminal function. State v. Pennington,
    
    952 S.W.2d 420
    , 422 (Tenn. 1997)(citing United States v. Grisanti, 
    supra).
    Regulatory or remedial purposes do not implicate double jeopardy. 
    Id.
     at 422-
    23.
    C.
    The actions of the trial court altering conditions of the defendant’s release
    were appealable to this Court in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 8(a). See
    
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144
    . The appropriateness of the modification could
    have been reviewed at that time. The petitioner failed to avail herself of this
    opportunity.
    1
    If a person admitted to bail on appeal is indicted for or convicted of a
    felony while on bail, the bail “shall be revoked.” 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11
    -
    113(a)(4)(emphasis added). It appears the petitioner was extended mercy by the
    trial court since the statute mandates revocation.
    4
    For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
    _________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    __________________________
    CURWOOD WITT, JUDGE
    __________________________
    LEE MOORE, SPECIAL JUDGE
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01C01-9707-CC-00250

Filed Date: 7/29/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014