State v. Willie Cole ( 2010 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE              FILED
    JANUARY 1999 SESSION
    March 2, 1999
    Cecil W. Crowson
    Appellate Court Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                   )
    )   C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9801-CR-00006
    Appellee,                )
    )   DAVIDSON COUNTY
    VS.                                   )
    )   HON. SETH NORMAN,
    WILLIE ANDREW COLE,                   )   JUDGE
    )
    Appellant.               )    (Expunction)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                        FOR THE APPELLEE:
    WILLIE ANDREW COLE                        JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    R.M.S.I. Unit 6-B                         Attorney General & Reporter
    7475 Cockrill Bend Ind. Rd.
    Nashville, TN 37209-1010                  ELIZABETH B. MARNEY
    Asst. Attorney General
    John Sevier Bldg.
    425 Fifth Ave., North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    OPINION FILED:____________________
    AFFIRMED
    JOHN H. PEAY,
    Judge
    OPINION
    The petitioner filed several petitions in Davidson County for expunction of
    public records. Each petition addressed a separate charge for which the petitioner was
    acquitted, for which no true bill was returned, or that was dismissed prior to trial. By order
    dated November 18, 1997, the trial court denied each of the petitioner’s petitions, stating,
    “After diligent search the Clerk of the Criminal Court is unable to locate any charges
    which can be identified as the warrants set out in the petitions. The [case] numbers set
    out in the petitions are alien to any system used by that office.” The petitioner now
    appeals to this Court.
    First, the petitioner argues that the trial court’s order should be reversed and
    this case remanded for expunction because the trial court had no discretion to deny his
    petitions. The petitioner correctly argues that expunction of records pursuant to a proper
    petition is not a matter of discretion. State v. Liddle, 
    929 S.W.2d 415
    (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1996); see T.C.A. § 40-32-101(a). The order on review, however, reflects that the trial
    court did not deny the petitioner’s petition as a matter of discretion. Rather, the trial court
    denied the petitioner’s petitions because the records relating to the charges to which the
    petitioner referred could not be found. If the records cannot be found, they cannot be
    expunged. The petitioner notes in his appellate brief that he referred to the files he
    wanted expunged by the numbers he found on an FBI “rap sheet” found in his prison file.
    Apparently, these numbers do not correlate with the numbering system used by Davidson
    County. If the petitioner wants the public records relating to certain charges expunged,
    then he should refile a petition listing the case numbers used by the clerk of the criminal
    court and any other information that will help the clerk locate the files he wishes to be
    expunged.
    2
    As a corollary matter, the petitioner notes in his appellate brief that the full
    record was not transmitted to this Court. Specifically, the petitioner complains that four
    of the five petitions he filed do not appear in the record on appeal. Because of this, the
    petitioner requests that the clerk’s office be ordered to submit the entire appellate record
    to this Court so that we may properly consider all issues presented. Given the nature of
    the trial court’s order, this is not necessary. Even if all five petitions were included in the
    appellate record, the petitioner is not entitled to expunction of documents that cannot be
    located because the information the petitioner supplied was insufficient to locate the
    documents to which he referred. Thus, even assuming the appellate record is in fact
    incomplete, it does not preclude our full and meaningful review of this case.
    The petitioner also contends on appeal that he “should receive a full refund
    of the court costs which he has endured.”           According to the petitioner, the clerk
    repeatedly returned his petitions to him unfiled, so he filed a petition for writ of mandamus
    on October 10, 1997, to compel the clerk to file his petitions. The petitioner also claims
    that on November 17, 1997, he filed a petition with the Tennessee Supreme Court for the
    appointment of special counsel to rule on his petitions. He claims that filing this petition
    cost him one hundred fifty-two dollars and seventy-five cents ($152.75).          The record
    reflects that one day later, on November 18, 1997, the trial court entered an order
    denying his petitions. The petitioner claims he should be reimbursed for the cost of filing
    a petition with the Tennessee Supreme Court because under T.C.A. § 40-32-101(a), the
    person requesting expunction shall not be charged for the cost of the expunction and
    because, according to the petitioner, the trial court and/or the clerk’s office “intentionally”
    failed to inform him that the trial court had denied his petition until August 25, 1998, when
    3
    he received the appellate record in this case.1
    Evidence to substantiate the petitioner’s claims does not appear in the
    record. Because this Court is not a fact-finding court, we decline to address any issue
    regarding reimbursement before it is properly presented to the trial court.
    We affirm the trial court’s order denying the petitioner’s petitions for
    expunction. The petitioner is free to refile a petition to expunge any records he wishes
    to be destroyed, but he would be well-advised to provide as much accurate information
    regarding the charges as possible so as to aid in the location of the records. The
    petitioner is also free to address the issue of reimbursement at such time.
    _______________________________
    JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
    CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
    ______________________________
    THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
    1
    The petitioner notes the trial court’s November 18, 1997, order reflects that a copy of the order
    was sent to “W illie And ew C arter ,” not “ W illie And rew C ole,” w hich ma y expla in wh y he did not tim ely
    receive a copy of the trial court’s order, if that was in fact the case.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01C01-9801-CR-00006

Filed Date: 12/1/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014