Randy Dale Hill v. State ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
MARCH 1999 SESSION
July 30, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
RANDY DALE HILL, * C.C.A. # 01C01-9806-CR-00273
Appellant, * DAVIDSON COUNTY
V. * Honorable Cheryl Blackburn, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Habeas Corpus Dismissed)
Appellee. *
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
RANDY DALE HILL JOHN KNOX WALKUP
TDOC# 245286 Attorney General & Reporter
B.M.C.X.-M.C.
P. O. Box 20 KIM R. HELPER
Wartburg, TN 37887-2000 Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
VICTOR S. (TORRY) JOHNSON III
District Attorney General
ROGER MOORE
Assistant District Attorney General
Washington Square, Suite 500
222 Second Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED: _______________
AFFIRMED
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
Judge
OPINION
The petitioner, Randy Dale Hill, appeals the dismissal of his petition for
habeas corpus. In 1995, the petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to one count of
aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony. The Criminal Court of Dickson County
sentenced him as a mitigated offender to eight years in either the Tennessee
Department of Correction (TDOC) or the Dickson County workhouse, and the
petitioner began service in the workhouse. The TDOC subsequently advised
him that he could not serve in the workhouse. In 1998, the petitioner filed a writ
of habeas corpus with the Criminal Court of Davidson County, alleging that
improper sentencing merited habeas corpus relief. The post-conviction court
dismissed the writ without a hearing. The petitioner appeals, asserting that (1)
the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed the writ without a hearing,
because that writ alleged grounds for relief, and (2) the sentence imposed by the
trial court was void. The petitioner’s second issue comprises a claim regarding
the plea agreement: He asserts that since he entered his plea anticipating
service in the workhouse, an option precluded by statute, that plea was not
knowing and voluntary. We AFFIRM the dismissal of the writ.
BACKGROUND
The petitioner was indicted for one count of aggravated child abuse and
for one count of aggravated sexual battery. The petitioner alleges that he
pleaded nolo contendere to the aggravated child abuse charge only because the
state agreed to his serving in the workhouse. The technical record reflects such
an agreement: The judgment sentenced him to either the TDOC or the
workhouse; and the petitioner’s waiver of trial and request for acceptance of plea
states that he would serve in the workhouse and that the state would nolle
prosequi the remaining charge.
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Approximately six months later, the TDOC advised the petitioner that he
could not serve in the workhouse. The petitioner objected to transfer to the
TDOC. He allegedly filed a petition for post-conviction relief but voluntarily
dismissed that petition while recovering from an injury incurred during
incarceration. The Criminal Court of Davidson County dismissed the petitioner’s
writ for habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing, finding that writ failed to
state a ground for relief.
ANALYSIS
The petitioner asserts that (1) the post-conviction court erred by
dismissing his writ for habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing and (2) his
writ properly challenged the sentence because the trial court, lacking subject
matter jurisdiction, entered a void sentence. Tennessee statutes codify the
common-law remedy of habeas corpus relief, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101
to -130, as “an extraordinary remedy to secure the release, by judicial decree, of
persons who are restrained of their liberty . . . ,” Bateman v. State, 194 S.W.2d
336, 337 (Tenn. 1946). “[T]he office of the writ of habeas corpus is to test the
legality of the imprisonment or restraint of one who is being illegally detained,”
and “the only relief that can be given a prisoner in a state habeas corpus
proceeding is release.” State v. Warren, 740 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1986). “A writ of habeas corpus is to correct the denial of fundamental
constitutional rights.” State v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tenn. 1968).
The trial court sentenced the petitioner to eight years in the workhouse.
Absent certain provisions inapplicable to the instant case,
all convicted felons sentenced after November 1, 1989, to
continuous confinement for a period of one (1) year or more shall
be sentenced to the department of correction.
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Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-314(a). The imposed eight-year sentence could not
be served in the workhouse, but the petitioner’s appeal fails to allege facts
sufficiently establishing that the sentence was void. See Weatherly v. State, 704
S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).
Every application for writ of habeas corpus does not merit a full
evidentiary hearing. See Weatherly, 704 S.W.2d at 732. Only those petitions
alleging facts that, if true, render a petitioner’s conviction constitutionally void
merit a hearing. See id. An application for writ of habeas corpus may be
dismissed by the trial court if the application does not indicate that the conviction
is void. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109.
Therefore, the application must sufficiently allege that a judgment is void,
not merely voidable. Habeas corpus relief is available in Tennessee only when
the face of a judgment or record of the proceedings indicates that the “convicting
court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a
defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Archer v.
State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). “It is generally true . . . that a
judgment imposed by a trial court in direct contravention of express statutory
provisions regarding sentencing is illegal . . . .” State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d
226, 228 (Tenn. 1987). In the instant case, the trial court’s sentencing the
petitioner to the workhouse, although improper, did not directly contravene
express statutory provisions. The Code specifically anticipates and legitimizes
such sentences:
After November 1, 1989, if a court sentences or has sentenced a
defendant to a local jail or workhouse when such court was not
authorized to do so by this chapter, it shall be deemed that such
sentence was a sentence to the department, and the commissioner
of correction shall have the authority to take such a defendant into
the custody of the department.
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Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-314(a).
The petitioner further asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary
because he believed that he could serve his sentence in the workhouse and was
promised that option for the duration of incarceration. A criminal defendant’s
guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary. See Boykins v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969). Otherwise, that plea violates due process and is void. Id. A
defendant’s guilty plea involves three significant federal constitutional rights:
(1) The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment.
(2) The right to trial by jury.
(3) The right to confront one’s accusers.
State v. Neal, 810 S.W .2d 131, 135 (Tenn. 1991). The record must clearly show
a defendant waived these rights. See id. Subsequent Tennessee case law
“expressly expanded the advice requirements” and mandated an “inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea” when a trial court accepts a guilty plea. Id. at 135-36.
Therefore, Tennessee law requires the trial court’s “ensuring that the defendant
is aware of all consequences of a guilty plea and that the plea is . . . intelligently
and voluntarily entered.” Id. at 136.
Pertinent case law indicates that habeas corpus relief is not the proper
procedure for remedying a guilty plea which was allegedly not knowing and
voluntary. In Archer v. State, No. 03C01-9108-CR-00245 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed
Feb. 21, 1992, at Knoxville), the defendant asserted that the trial court did not
advise him of his constitutional rights prior to his entering five guilty pleas.
Although “a court may lose jurisdiction in the course of the proceeding due to its
failure to afford the accused the due process of law,” only those constitutional
violations “so fundamental as to render the judgment void may be attacked by
the writ.” Id. This Court held that validity of guilty pleas could not be challenged
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in a habeas corpus proceeding because any error in a trial court’s accepting a
guilty plea renders the conviction voidable, not void. Id.
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that “examination of the
history of the writ of habeas corpus in Tennessee leads . . . to the conclusion
that the reach of the Great Writ is severely restricted in this state and would, in
almost all instances, preclude consideration of challenges to the voluntariness of
guilty pleas in such proceedings.” Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 158. Therefore, we do
not view habeas corpus as the appropriate means of addressing the petitioner’s
concern. The proper procedure for relief in this case is a petition for post-
conviction relief. See id. Although this Court may treat a petition for habeas
corpus as a petition for post-conviction relief, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-
205(c), the applicable one-year statute of limitations has expired, see Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the post-conviction court is AFFIRMED in that the
petitioner did not allege facts sufficiently establishing that his sentence is void.
Further, the applicable statute of limitations bars this petition from
consideration under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
____________________________
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, Judge
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CONCUR:
_______________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, Judge
_______________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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