State v. Robert Pugh ( 2000 )


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  •           IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON            FILED
    JANUARY 2000 SESSION
    March 17, 2000
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,             *   No. W1999-01260-CCA-R3-CD
    Appellee,          *   SHELBY COUNTY
    VS.                             *    Honorable Joseph B. Dailey, Judge
    ROBERT E. PUGH,                 *    (Aggravated Robbery)
    Appellant.         *
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                  FOR THE APPELLEE:
    A. C. WHARTON, JR.                  PAUL G. SUMMERS
    District Public Defender            Attorney General & Reporter
    W. MARK WARD                        J. ROSS DYER
    and                                 Assistant Attorney General
    MICHAEL JOHNSON                     425 Fifth Avenue North
    Assistant Public Defenders          Nashville, TN 38103
    201 Poplar Avenue
    Memphis, TN 38103                    WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
    District Attorney General
    AMY P. WEIRICH
    Assistant District Attorney
    201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 301
    Memphis, TN 38103-1947
    OPINION FILED: _______________
    AFFIRMED
    JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
    Judge
    OPINION
    The defendant, Robert E. Pugh, appeals from his Shelby County jury verdict
    of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced as a Range I offender to twelve years
    in the Department of Correction. Now on appeal, the defendant asserts as his sole
    issue the sufficiency of evidence. After careful review, we AFFIRM the judgment
    from the trial court.
    BACKGROUND
    On April 26, 1996, Joseph Oliver, a co-manager at a Wendy’s restaurant on
    1593 Union Avenue in Memphis, Tennessee, was robbed at gunpoint. He testified
    that he left the restaurant for the First American Bank on Union Avenue at
    approximately 3:30 to 4:30 p.m. to get coins for the restaurant. When he left the
    bank, he noticed that a car was following him. The car followed him to the Wendy’s
    and pulled behind him. Oliver testified that the car could have been a Chevrolet
    Malibu and thought that the vehicle was maroon or a similar color. The vehicle
    approached him as he left his vehicle. An individual leapt from the car with a
    revolver and demanded money. He threw the money on the ground and the
    individual took it.
    At trial, Oliver testified that on the day of the robbery he identified the
    defendant from a lineup. Further, he identified the defendant in court the day of the
    trial. He also identified a gun introduced in evidence as being similar, if not the
    same, gun used against him in the holdup. Finally, Oliver testified that, after the
    robbery, he entered the restaurant and activated the holdup alarm to which police
    vehicles responded.
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    Mark Rewalt, of the Memphis Police Department Crime Scene Unit, testified
    that he examined a Chrysler, the car the defendant abandoned after police pursuit,
    on April 26, 1996, for fingerprints. He testified that he obtained two latent prints,
    one from the driver’s side door and one from the back driver’s side door, and
    preserved those prints on the appropriate card medium. He identified those latent
    prints for the jury.
    Cham Payne, an officer of the Memphis Police Department Crime Scene
    Unit, testified that he located and preserved latent prints from the hood of the
    vehicle, a Chrysler LeBaron. He also obtained a latent print from an empty beer
    bottle found in the floorboard of that vehicle. Again, Officer Payne identified the
    cards containing those latent prints in court.
    Jerry Sims, a latent fingerprint examiner for the Memphis Police Department,
    identified these four prints as belonging to the defendant.
    Lieutenant Hollis W. Hightower, an investigator on the robbery squad the day
    of the robbery, stated that he interviewed the defendant and, after advising him of
    his rights, took a statement from the defendant in which he admitted to committing
    the robbery. The defendant stated that the car used in the robbery was his brown
    1981 Chrysler LeBaron. Further, the defendant explained, on the day of the
    robbery, he located Dwayne Jones on the streets of Memphis and at that point, the
    two agreed to commit a robbery.1 The defendant stated that he used a .32 caliber
    revolver, purchased on the street, to rob Oliver at the Wendy’s. He testified that
    approximately ten minutes after the robbery he and Dwayne Jones were pursued
    1
    Dwayne Jones was arrested on the day of the robbery in the Chryslar Lebaron described
    above.
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    in the Chrysler by the police. When stopped, he leapt from the car and escaped.
    Later that same day, he was arrested and identified as the robber.
    ANALYSIS
    The defendant’s only presented issue asserts that insufficient evidence
    supports the verdict against him. The defendant was convicted of aggravated
    robbery. The relevant statues, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401(a) and § 39-13-402(1)
    read:
    Robbery. --
    (a) Robbery is the intentional or knowing theft of property from the
    person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.
    Aggravated Robbery. --
    (a) Aggravated robbery is robbery as defined in § 39-13-401:
    (1) Accomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any
    article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably
    believe it to be a deadly weapon. . .
    Although the defendant suggests that this Court reweigh and reevaluate the
    evidence, our standard of review on sufficiency claims is well-established. When a
    defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence on a jury verdict, our standard of
    review is whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319
    (1979). Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value
    to be given the evidence as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are
    resolved by the trier of fact, not this Court. See State v. Tuttle, 
    914 S.W.2d 926
    ,
    932 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Nor may this Court reweigh or re-evaluate the
    evidence. See State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn. 1978). On appeal,
    the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all
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    inferences therefrom. Id. Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of
    innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden
    in this Court of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict
    returned by the trier of fact. See State v. Tuggle, 
    639 S.W.2d 913
    , 914 (Tenn.
    1982).
    This Court must now determine if sufficient evidence supports this conviction
    under the pertinent statutes. At trial, the state entered the defendant’s signed
    statement, in which he described the robbery, a description consistent with the
    victim’s description. This inculpatory statement is a confession. See Helton v.
    State, 
    547 S.W.2d 564
    , 567 (Tenn. 1997) (A confession is a statement by an
    accused admitting that he engaged in conduct constituting a crime.).
    The corpus delicti of a crime may not be established by a confession alone.
    See Ashby v. State, 
    124 Tenn. 684
    , 
    139 S.W. 872
     (1911). The corpus delicti of a
    crime requires that the state prove two elements: (1) that a certain result has been
    produced, and (2) that the result was created through criminal agency. See State
    v. Ervin, 
    731 S.W.2d 70
    , 71-72 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). The elements of corpus
    delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence. Id. at 72. Furthermore, the
    question of whether the state has sufficiently proven the corpus delicti is a question
    for the jury. Id. at 71. “Only slight evidence of the corpus delicti is necessary to
    corroborate a confession and thus sustain a conviction.” See Ervin, 731 S.W.2d at
    72 (emphasis added). See Taylor v. State, 
    479 S.W.2d 659
    , 661 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1972).
    Having reviewed the record and the evidence presented to the jury in this
    case, we disagree with the defendant’s proposition that insufficient evidence exists.
    Instead, we conclude that a rational trier of fact considering the evidence, including,
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    but not limited to, the defendant’s confession, could have concluded beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the defendant committed aggravated robbery. Besides the
    confession:
    (1) The defendant was identified from a lineup as the robber;
    (2) The defendant was identified at the trial;
    (3) The revolver recovered from the defendant was described as
    being similiar to the weapon used in the robbery; and
    (4) The defendant’s fingerprints were recovered from a vehicle similar
    in description to the robbery vehicle and connected to the robbery.
    From all this, we find sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict.
    ________________________________
    JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, Judge
    CONCUR:
    _______________________________
    DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
    _______________________________
    ALAN E. GLENN, Judge
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