State v. Chris Teffeteller ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE July 30, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
MARCH 1999 SESSION Appellate C ourt
Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 03C01-9803-CC-00114
Appellee, * BLOUNT COUNTY
VS. * Hon. D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Judge
CHRIS RUBLE TEFFETELLER, * (Aggravated Burglary and Theft)
Appellant. *
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Julie A. Martin, Attorney John Knox Walkup
P.O. Box 426 Attorney General and Reporter
Knoxville, TN 37901-0426
(on appeal) Clinton J. Morgan
425 Fifth Avenue North
Mack Garner Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor
District Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493
419 High Street
Maryville, TN 37804 Charles Carpenter
Assistant District Attorney General
Blount County Courthouse
363 Court Street
Maryville, TN 37804
OPINION FILED:__________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Chris Ruble Teffeteller, entered pleas of guilt to
aggravated burglary and theft in excess of $1,000.00. The trial court imposed a
Range I, four-year sentence for aggravated burglary and a Range I, three-year
sentence for the theft. After serving six months in jail, the defendant was allowed to
spend the remainder of each of the sentences in the community corrections
program.
In this appeal of right, the single issue presented by the defendant is
whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant the entire sentence to be served in
the community corrections program. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
On or about April 26 of 1997, the defendant entered the residence of
the victim, Lillard Earle Ailor, and stole furniture, appliances, tools, building supplies,
a bicycle, and a boat trailer. The victim saw the defendant leaving the scene and
noted his license plate number. Afterward, the defendant turned himself in to the
authorities.
While admitting his crimes, the defendant blamed his actions on
serious marital difficulties arising from his drug and alcohol addiction. He explained
that he was not living at home, had no place to go, and was stealing in order to
support his addiction.
At the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant, age thirty-three,
was married and had two children. While he had dropped out of high school, he
had obtained a GED and had worked primarily in construction. Since his arrest, the
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defendant had obtained a commercial driver's license and had developed plans to
become a truck driver. He had a history of heavy drinking since he was a teenager
and usually consumed about one case of beer per day. By the time of these
offenses, his cocaine habit cost between $400.00 and $500.00 per week. Theft was
his source of income. After the commission of these crimes, the defendant
voluntarily sought inpatient treatment for his addiction. A drug screen about a week
before the sentencing hearing had yielded negative results.
The defendant had several prior offenses, many of which were drug
and alcohol related. His record included public intoxication, three convictions for
driving under the influence, possession of marijuana, driving on a revoked license,
harassment, two misdemeanor thefts, and two third degree burglaries. Since his
arrest, a domestic altercation with his wife resulted in his guilty plea and a fine. The
trial court, in pertinent part, ruled as follows in ordering sentences one year above
the minimum and denying immediate probation or community corrections:
The enhancing factor that I used in raising this from the
minimum was the record of past convictions and criminal
activity. I considered the fact that this didn't involve any
personal injury in mitigation....
In deciding whether it should be served on release
or in confinement, split confinement, periodic
confinement, Community Corrections, [or] Department of
Correction[], I looked at the nature of the offense, looked
at your record, listened to your testimony, [and]
considered the fact that you've been back in treatment
since these happened back in April of [19]97.
I have tried to evaluate your situation as far as
rehabilitation and likelihood of re-offending. That's a
mixed bag. You went through treatment, that is in your
favor. You've been working, that is in your favor. You
committed a misdemeanor assault several months down
the road. That's definitely not in your favor. Your history
is not in your favor.
Because the defendant's criminal behavior had extended over a period
of fourteen to fifteen years, the trial court determined that a sentence absent some
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period of confinement would depreciate the seriousness of the offenses. A six-
month sentence to jail followed by a community corrections program was deemed to
be the appropriate alternative sentence.
The defendant now argues that because he had been candid about his
involvement in the offenses and had taken positive steps towards his rehabilitation
from his addiction, the trial court should have granted immediate release on
community corrections. He insists that he can stay out of trouble so long as he
remains on the "sobriety wagon." He argues that jail overcrowding is rampant and
that should have been given more consideration by the trial judge.
When a challenge is made to the length, range, or manner of service
of a sentence, it is the duty of this court to conduct a "de novo review ... with a
presumption that the determinations made by the court from which the appeal is
taken are correct." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). This presumption is
"conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court
considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances."
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The Sentencing Commission
Comments provide that the burden is on the defendant to show the impropriety of
the sentence.
Our review requires an analysis of (1) the evidence, if any, received at
the trial and sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of
sentencing and the arguments of counsel relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the
nature and characteristics of the offense; (5) any mitigating or enhancing factors; (6)
any statements made by the defendant in his own behalf; and (7) the defendant's
potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210.
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In calculating the sentence for felony convictions committed before
July 1, 1995, the presumptive sentence is the minimum within the range if there are
no enhancement or mitigating factors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c) (1990)
(amended July 1, 1995 to provide that the presumptive sentence for a Class A
felony as the midpoint in the range). If there are enhancement factors but no
mitigating factors, the trial court may set the sentence above the minimum. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d). A sentence involving both enhancement and mitigating
factors requires an assignment of relative weight for the enhancement factors as a
means of increasing the sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210. The sentence
may then be reduced within the range by any weight assigned to the mitigating
factors present. Id.
Especially mitigated or standard offenders convicted of Class C, D, or
E felonies are, of course, presumed to be favorable candidates "for alternative
sentencing options in the absence of evidence to the contrary." Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-35-102(6).
Among the factors applicable to consideration for an alternative
sentence are the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's criminal record,
social history and present condition, and the deterrent effect upon and the best
interest of the defendant. State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 285 (Tenn. 1978). The
purpose of the Community Corrections Act of 1985 was to provide an alternative
means of punishment for "selected, nonviolent felony offenders in front-end
community based alternatives to incarceration." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-103. The
community corrections sentence provides a desired degree of flexibility that may be
both beneficial to the defendant yet serve legitimate societal aims. State v. Griffith,
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787 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tenn. 1990). That the defendant meets the minimum
requirements of the Community Corrections Act of 1985, however, does not mean
that he is entitled to be sentenced under the act as a matter of law or right. State v.
Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). The following offenders are
eligible for community corrections:
(1) Persons who, without this option, would be
incarcerated in a correctional institution;
(2) Persons who are convicted of property-related, or
drug/alcohol-related felony offenses or other felony
offenses not involving crimes against the person as
provided in title 39, chapter 2 [repealed], parts 1-3 and
5-7 or title 39, chapter 13, parts 1-5;
(3) Persons who are convicted of nonviolent felony
offenses;
(4) Persons who are convicted of felony offenses in
which the use or possession of a weapon was not
involved;
(5) Persons who do not demonstrate a present or past
pattern of behavior indicating violence;
(6) Persons who do not demonstrate a pattern of
committing violent offenses; and
(7) Persons who are sentenced to incarceration or on
escape at the time of consideration will not be eligible.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106(a).
In Ashby, our supreme court encouraged the grant of considerable
discretionary authority to our trial courts in matters such as these. 823 S.W.2d at
171. See State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986). "[E]ach case must be
bottomed upon its own facts." Taylor, 744 S.W.2d at 922. "It is not the policy or
purpose of this court to place trial judges in a judicial straight-jacket in this or any
other area, and we are always reluctant to interfere with their traditional discretionary
powers." Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 171.
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Here, the trial court carefully considered each and every factor before
imposing a sentence. In our view, the sentence is fair and just under the
circumstances and gives recognition to the defendant's efforts towards
rehabilitation. A jail term of six months under these circumstances is entirely
appropriate.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________
Norma McGee Ogle, Judge
_____________________________
Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
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