State v. Chester Lebron Bennett ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
JUNE SESSION, 1999 July 28, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt
Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) No. 03C01-9810-CR-00346
Appellee )
) HAMILTON COUNTY
vs. )
) Hon. Stephen M. Bevil, Judge
CHESTER LEBRON BENNETT, )
) (Sentencing)
Appellant )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Ardena J. Garth Paul G. Summers
District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
Donna Robinson Miller Erik W. Daab
Asst. Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
701 Cherry Street, Suite 300 Criminal Justice Division
Chattanooga, TN 37402 425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
William H. Cox III
District Attorney General
Claire H. Brant
Asst. District Attorney General
600 Market Street, Cts. Bldg.
Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Chester LeBron Bennett, pled guilty to five counts of criminal
exposure to HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus), a class C felony. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-109(a)(1) (1997). 1 The plea agreement provided that the
appellant’s sentences would run concurrently; however, all other sentencing issues,
including the length and manner of service of the sentences, were submitted to the
trial court for determination. The trial court sentenced the appellant to five four-year
sentences to be served in the Department of Correction. He appeals from these
sentences contending that the trial court should have granted him an alternative
sentence, specifically, probation or community corrections.
After review, we reverse and remand for consideration of sentencing
alternatives.
Background
The appellant’s convictions arise from five separate, consensual, and
unprotected sexual encounters with the female victim between the dates of April 29,
1997, and May 3, 1997. In April 1997, the appellant began dating the victim, a long-
time friend. The victim subsequently found some medication that the appellant left
at her home. When she questioned him about the medication, the appellant
informed her that it was part of his treatment for lung cancer. Shortly thereafter, the
victim doubted the appellant’s explanation and contacted a pharmacist. The
pharmacist informed her that the medication was for treatment of HIV/AIDS. The
victim confronted the appellant with the information and he finally admitted that he
was HIV positive.
1
This offense provides that, “A person commits the offense of criminal exposure of
ano ther to HIV w hen , kno wing that s uch pers on is in fecte d with HIV, suc h per son kno wing ly
engag es in intim ate con tact with an other.”
2
At the sentencing hearing, the appellant, a thirty-one year old high school
graduate, testified that he contracted HIV through a sexual relationship with a former
girlfriend who failed to tell him of her infection with the virus. After donating blood in
August of 1996, the appellant was informed of his HIV positive status. The
appellant admitted that he did not inform the victim of his HIV infection because
“[he] didn’t want to deal with the rejection.” Additionally, he explained that, at the
time of the sexual encounters, he was in denial regarding his infection with HIV.
Shortly after these offenses were committed, the appellant married Allene
Bennett. Prior to their marriage, the appellant informed her that he was infected
with HIV and that criminal charges were pending against him. He has two children
from a previous marriage and two step-children from his present marriage. Before
his arrest for these offenses, the appellant was regularly employed as a shipping
clerk with an excellent work record. However, due to the present offenses, the
appellant lost his job and has been unable to find further employment. The
appellant’s criminal history consists of three assault convictions each respectively in
1985, 1988, and 1996.
The proof at the sentencing hearing additionally revealed that, as a result of
his HIV infection and the instant offenses, the appellant voluntarily sought
assistance from Chattanooga Cares, an AIDS resource center. Since his arrest, he
admits that he has been severely depressed and has attempted suicide twice. He
admitted himself to Valley Psychiatric Hospital for treatment. Moreover, the
appellant receives continuing psychiatric care from Family and Children Services.
He reiterated his remorse for his actions and his concern for the victim. Several
members from the Chattanooga Cares Center testified that the appellant is now
“positive” in his attitude and has become a responsible person in dealing with his
HIV status. The court also heard supportive testimony from the appellant’s wife in
addition to receiving numerous letters of support from family members. Although
3
the State presented no proof, it did advise the court that the victim tested negative
for HIV shortly after the parties’ last sexual encounter and was again found negative
in a retest six months later.2
In imposing a penitentiary sentence, the trial court observed:
[O]ne of the reasons for incarceration is to avoid depreciating the
seriousness of the offense, I think to do anything other than to require
[the appellant] to be incarcerated would be saying to the public out
there, “If you’ve got HIV and you’re infected, it’s okay to have sex with
someone else and not tell them because if you are caught when you
do it, than what’s going to happen to you is if you’re taking care of
yourself and you’re participating in the programs then you’ll probably
get placed on probation” . . .
And so in order to avoid the seriousness of this offense as a
deterrence and also because of the fact that [the appellant] has shown
in the past by committing acts of assault on other persons that he has
a disregard for the feelings and concern and the welfare of other
people, I think that the proper sentence would be to serve four years
and I’m going to order that it be served in the Department of
Correction.
Analysis
Our legislature has recognized that not every person convicted of a felony
should be imprisoned and that this state does not have the physical capacity or the
financial resources to incarcerate every felon in the penitentiary. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-102(5) (1997). In furtherance of these legislative acknowledgments,
the General Assembly has presumptively removed from confinement standard
offenders convicted of class C, D, or E felonies who do not possess criminal
histories evincing a clear disregard for the law; who have not committed the most
serious offenses; and whose past efforts at rehabilitation have not failed. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(5) and (6). The goal of effective rehabilitation as an
integral part of the sentencing process is repeatedly underscored within our
2
The victim did not testify at the sentencing hearing, according to the State, based upon
her con cerns f or privacy a nd em barras sme nt.
4
sentencing laws as is the encouragement and promotion of alternative sentencing
options. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102(3)(c); 40-35-103(6) (1997).
It should now be fundamental that, if the State wishes to confine a defendant
statutorily entitled to the presumption of alternative sentencing, it bears the burden
of presenting evidence showing that:
(A) The defendant has a long history of criminal conduct and
confinement is necessary to protect society; or
(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of
the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective
deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or
(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or
recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). In the present case, the State has failed to
establish sufficient evidence to the contrary to necessitate a sentence of total
confinement.3 Additionally, the trial court’s imposition of incarceration based upon
“depreciating the seriousness of the offense” and “deterrence” rests entirely upon
the appellant’s guilt for his offenses. Accordingly, the trial court erred by not
considering available alternatives to a sentence of total confinement.
Although the issues of “deterrence” and “depreciating the seriousness of the
offense” have exhaustively been addressed by the appellate courts of this state with
unmistakable clarity, we find it necessary to again address these concerns. In State
v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 170-171 (Tenn. 1991), our supreme court held, “[t]he
finding of deterrence cannot be conclusory only but must be supported by the
proof.” The court reasoned that reliance upon deterrence as to the sole grounds for
denying an alternative sentence “would defeat the whole concept of [an alternative
sentence]” as deterrence is a factor uniformly present in every case. Reliance on
3
W e not e tha t the a ppe llant’s three mis dem ean or co nvictio ns fo r sim ple as sau lt, two o f
which oc curred over ten yea rs ago, fa ll short of co nstituting “a lon g history of c riminal c onduc t”
and, thus , do not we igh in favor o f confine men t. See Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-103(1)(A).
5
this factor is no more realistic or reasonable than denying probation on grounds that
the defendant committed a crime. Id. at 170. In accordance with Ashby, we have
repeatedly held that, before a trial court can deny alternative sentencing on the
grounds of deterrence, there must be some evidence contained in the record that
the sentence imposed will have a deterrent effect upon similar future crimes within
that particular jurisdiction. See State v. Zeolia, 928 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1996). In the present case, no evidence was presented relative to the need for
deterrence. We are confident that the granting of an alternative sentence in the
present case will not unravel the moral fabric of Hamilton County. Indeed, it would
appear unlikely that the imprisoning of an obscure indigent defendant will have little,
if any, deterrent effect upon those likely to commit similar crimes in the future.
Additionally, beginning with State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1991), this court has repeatedly held that, “[i]n order to deny an
alternative sentence based upon the seriousness of the offense, ‘the circumstances
of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking,
reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree” and
the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than
confinement.” See also State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 455 (Tenn. Crim.
App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1995). In Hartley, this court reasoned that,
“once the legislature has specifically authorized the use of sentencing alternatives to
confinement for a particular offense, trial courts may not summarily impose a
different standard by which probation is denied solely because of the defendant’s
guilt for that offense.”4 Hartley, 818 S.W.2d at 374.
In addition to the trial court’s findings in contravention of Ashby and Hartley,
the court neglected to consider proof presented by the appellant supporting his
4
Altho ugh the re cord has f ailed t o est ablish the fa cts o f this c ase to be so es pec ially
violent, horrifying or excessive as to outweigh the presumption of alternative sentence, this is not
to say that the circumstances of every case involving criminal exposure to HIV can never be so
espec ially violent, horrifying or e xcess ive as to de ny a sente nce of c onfinem ent.
6
potential for rehabilitation.5 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5). In State v.
Zeolia, 928 S.W.2d at 461, applying the statutory provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-35-210(b)(5),6 this court held that the trial court may look to statutory mitigating
and enhancing factors for guidance in determining the defendant’s rehabilitative
potential or lack thereof. In those cases involving an offender who is presumptively
entitled to an alternative sentence, the potential for rehabilitation must always be
weighed and considered before determining that a sentence of confinement should
be imposed.
Inherent in every sentence involving release into the community are the
following valid concerns
(1) whether there is a substantial risk that during the period of release
the offender will engage in additional criminal conduct; and
(2) whether the offender is likely to respond affirmatively to
participation in a rehabilitation program and/or imposed conditions of
release.
After weighing the sentencing considerations of Section 103 against relevant
mitigating and enhancing factors evidencing rehabilitative potential and the above
two concerns, we cannot conclude that the State has presented evidence sufficient
to rebut the presumption favoring an alternative sentence.
As previously recognized trial courts are encouraged to impose rehabilitative
alternative sentencing options where permitted by statute. Our obligation upon
appellate review is to act in furtherance of legislative intent embraced in the statutes.
5
We do note that, in determining the appellant’s length of sentence, the trial court applied
the following non-enumerated mitigating circumstances: (1) the appellant exhibits some remorse;
(2) he has an excellent work record and is actively seeking employment; (3) he has informed
pote ntial e mp loyers of his healt h sta tus to his de trim ent; a nd (4 ) he h as th e sup port o f his fa mily
and relatives. These factors are also supportive of the appellant’s potential for rehabilitation.
6
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b)(5) provides “to determine the specific sentence and the
approp riate com bination of senten cing altern atives . . . the trial co urt shall co nsider . . . (5) . . .
[E]nhan cing and mitigating factors. . . .”
7
Conclusion
Accordingly, this case is remanded to the trial court in order to allow
consideration of appropriate alternative sentencing options including split
confinement, community corrections 7 and probation coupled with the imposition of
reasonable conditions relating to release.
________________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
_____________________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
7
The S tate incorre ctly argues on appe al that the ap pellant is not e ligible for a com mun ity
corrections sentence. Eligibility for a community corrections sentence was specifically addressed
by this court in State v. Boston, 938 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (reciting special needs
criteria relevant to placement in comm unity corrections program).
8