State v. William E. Gothard, III ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE June 22, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
APRIL 1999 SESSION Appellate C ourt
Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) NO. 03C01-9707-CR-00290
Appellee, )
) HAMILTON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. DOUGLAS A. MEYER,
WILLIAM E. GOTHARD III, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. )
) (Arson of Personal Property;
) Fraudulent Insurance Claim)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
ARDENA J. GARTH PAUL G. SUMMERS
(On Appeal) Attorney General and Reporter
District Public Defender
ERIK W. DAAB
DONNA ROBINSON MILLER Assistant Attorney General
(On Appeal) Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
Assistant Dist. Public Defender 425 Fifth Avenue North
701 Cherry Street, Ste. 300 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Chattanooga, TN 37402-1910
WILLIAM H. COX III
A. CHRISTIAN LANIER III District Attorney General
(At Trial)
Lindsay Street, Ste. 150 C. LELAND DAVIS
Chattanooga, TN 37403-3457 CALDWELL HUCKABAY
Assistant District Attorneys
General
600 Market Street, Ste. 310
Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED IN PART; MODIFIED IN PART; REMANDED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
Defendant, William E. Gothard III, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of
the offenses of arson of personal property, a Class E felony, and filing a fraudulent
insurance claim over $10,000 in value, a Class C felony. He also pled nolo
contendere to the offense of failing to appear, a Class E felony. The trial court
sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of one and four years for arson of
personal property and filing a fraudulent claim, respectively, and one year
consecutive for failure to appear. In this appeal the defendant presents the following
issues:
1. whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
convictions;
2. whether the trial court erred by excluding testimony
relating to an alleged bribe of a witness and other
impeachment testimony;
3. whether the trial judge and prosecutor committed
misconduct so as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial; and
4. whether the defendant was properly sentenced.
After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the conviction for filing a
fraudulent insurance claim over $10,000 must be MODIFIED to filing a fraudulent
insurance claim over the value of $1,000 and the sentence reduced accordingly. The
case must also be REMANDED to correct a clerical error. In all other respects, the
judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
FACTS
Defendant was the owner of a 1983 Bluebird school bus and was under
contract with Hamilton County to provide transportation services for students. On
September 29, 1995, the bus was extensively damaged as a result of a fire. The
defendant contended that the fire started as a result of a transmission fluid leak. He
filed an insurance claim with State Farm for the “value of bus.” A specific monetary
amount was not set forth on the affidavit relating to the vehicle fire.
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The fire occurred while the bus was on a public road. Representatives of the
fire department and Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department discovered a puddle of
transmission fluid approximately 100 feet from the location of the bus. Burned paper
debris was discovered near the fluid, indicating an intentional attempt to set fire to the
fluid. Two empty transmission fluid bottles were discovered just across a fence
approximately 25 feet from the fluid. Similar bottles of transmission fluid were found
in the bus.
The fire department chief, arson investigator for the Sheriff’s Department, as
well as an independent fire investigator retained by State Farm, all reached the same
conclusion. The origin of the fire was in the front passenger compartment of the bus
at floor level. All three agreed the fire did not start within the engine compartment or
on the underside of the bus as contended by the defendant. The independent fire
investigator testified the fire was of “incendiary” origin, meaning that it was
intentionally set. Photographs of the damaged school bus corroborate their
testimony.
An investigator from State Farm testified that the defendant made a claim for
the value of the bus. The investigator further testified that the defendant “[i]n his
examination under oath, he -- I don’t have a copy of that at hand. He claimed
between [$25,000] and $30,000 I believe at one time.” The investigator further
testified that he determined the fair market value of the bus in good condition to be
just under $7,400. Due to the investigation indicating arson, State Farm made no
offer of payment on the claim.
Several acquaintances of the defendant, including three fellow bus drivers,
testified on behalf of the defendant. Each indicated they had seen the bus emit
considerable smoke at some time prior to the fire. Two of the witnesses testified they
had also seen a flame or flash just prior to the fire. The defendant did not testify.
Based upon the testimony, the jury convicted the defendant of arson of
personal property, a Class E felony, and filing a fraudulent insurance claim over the
value of $10,000, a Class C felony. This appeal followed.
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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions.
Although we agree the evidence is insufficient to classify the fraudulent claim as
exceeding $10,000, we reject defendant’s contentions in all other respects.
In Tennessee, great weight is given to the result reached by the jury in a
criminal trial. A jury verdict accredits the state's witnesses and resolves all conflicts
in favor of the state. State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994); State v.
Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). On appeal, the state is entitled to the
strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may
be drawn therefrom. Id.; State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).
Moreover, a guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence which the appellant
enjoyed at trial and raises a presumption of guilt on appeal. State v. Grace, 493
S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). The appellant has the burden of overcoming this
presumption of guilt. Id.
Where sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question for an
appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime or crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Abrams, 935 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tenn. 1996). The weight and credibility of the
witnesses' testimony are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the triers of fact.
State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d
1, 19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
This Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the state. The
state’s evidence was that the fire was intentionally set in the front passenger
compartment on the floor. The circumstantial evidence corroborated this theory.
Transmission fluid with burned paper debris was found near the bus. Two empty
bottles of transmission fluid were found nearby. A visual examination of the bus
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reveals that the fire was not on the underside of the bus. The state further
established that the defendant filed an insurance claim based upon the fire.
It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses. The jury
obviously determined that the defendant intentionally set the fire and sought
insurance benefits. The evidence was more than sufficient to support this
determination.
However, we conclude the evidence is not sufficient to support the
classification of the fraudulent insurance claim in an amount over $10,000. The filing
of a fraudulent insurance claim falls under the statutes relating to theft and “is
punished as in the case of theft.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-133. The classification
or seriousness of the penalty for theft depends upon the value of the property or
services. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-105. If the value of the property is at least
$10,000 but less than $60,000, it is a Class C felony. Tenn. Code Ann. §39-14-
105(4). If the value of the property is at least $1,000 but less than $10,000, it is a
Class D felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-105(3).
The defendant’s affidavit of claim does not indicate a specific monetary
amount, but rather seeks the “value of bus.” The only testimony in the record giving
any support to the state’s theory is the testimony of the investigator for the insurance
company who stated, “I believe at one time” that defendant claimed between $25,000
and $30,000. The investigator further testified that the fair market value of the bus
was just under $7,400. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(36)(A)(defining “value”
as the fair market value of the property at the time and place of the offense). We,
therefore, conclude that the evidence is insufficient to establish the Class C felony
amount of $10,000 or more. The proof does establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the value of the property was over $1,000; therefore, we reduce the classification
of the offense to a Class D felony.
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BRIBERY OF WITNESS
Defendant contends the trial court erred in disallowing two witnesses to testify
concerning their observations just outside the courtroom of an alleged payment by
one prosecution witness to another prosecution witness. Under the circumstances,
we conclude there was no reversible error.
The state’s witnesses indicated that the battery was not on the bus after the
fire and had apparently been removed by the defendant prior to the fire. The wrecker
operator testified that he saw no one remove the battery at the scene or thereafter.
In a jury-out hearing two witnesses indicated they observed the Sheriff’s
Department arson investigator give something to the wrecker operator just outside
the courtroom after the wrecker operator testified. One witness indicated it was
something “green” but could not say it was money. The other witness indicated that
it was, in fact, money.
After an extended discussion, the trial judge advised defense counsel that the
testimony would not be allowed before the jury at that time; however, he might allow
it later in the trial. Subsequently, defense counsel advised the court that “we’re just
not going to go into that area.” Since the trial court had deferred a final ruling on this
issue and defendant chose not to attempt to present the testimony, defendant is
entitled to no relief. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a).
IMPEACHMENT TESTIMONY
In a related issue defendant contends one of the above witnesses was also
prohibited from testifying that the insurance company investigator, while recording an
interview with her, would turn off the recorder and tell her to answer questions a
certain way. The trial court found the proposed testimony immaterial. Defendant
contends the testimony was proper to impeach the investigator who had testified.
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Regardless of the propriety or impropriety of the ruling, defendant was not
prejudiced. The investigator primarily testified about the amount of the claim made
by the defendant. This Court has reduced the classification of the offense. Thus,
even if the trial court should have allowed such evidence, the error would, at most,
be harmless. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).
MISCONDUCT
Defendant contends he was denied a fair trial as a result of the trial judge and
prosecuting attorney repeatedly advising certain witnesses in a jury-out hearing of the
possibility of perjury charges. Firstly, we note that this issue was not raised in the
written motion for new trial and is, therefore, waived. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e).
Although counsel orally moved to amend his motion to include this issue, the record
does not contain a written request or order allowing the amendment. See Tenn. R.
Crim. P. 33(b). Nevertheless, we will address the issue on its merits.
The trial court conducted an extensive jury-out hearing relating to the proposed
testimony of two defense witnesses. It is apparent that the trial judge and the
prosecuting attorney were unimpressed with the credibility of the allegations.
Defense counsel was admonished by the trial judge and the prosecuting attorney of
his ethical obligations not to present perjurious testimony. The two witnesses were
also at various times cautioned that they were under oath and/or advised of “the
potential if you should testify falsely.”
In State v. Schafer, 973 S.W.2d 269, 278 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), this Court
found that multiple threats of prosecution for perjury by the state and trial court and
repeated declarations by the trial court that the witness was untruthful mandated a
new trial. This Court found prejudice to the defendant as the witness subsequently
changed his testimony. Id. Although a trial court may admonish a witness suspected
of untruthfulness of the significance of lying under oath, the trial court should not
declare its belief of untruthfulness and threaten the witness with prosecution to such
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a degree that the witness changes his or her testimony to the detriment of the
defendant. Id; see also State v. Dwight Miller, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9708-CC-00300,
Haywood County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed December 29, 1998, at Jackson).
The facts and circumstances of the case at bar do not reach the magnitude
of Schafer and Dwight Miller. We also note the questioning and warnings did not
take place in the jury’s presence. However, the repeated questioning and warnings
by the trial court do appear to have crossed the line. Nevertheless, the defendant
has suffered no prejudice. One of the witnesses testified before the jury in
confirmation of his earlier jury-out testimony. Although the other witness was not
called to testify before the jury, her jury-out testimony was of no real benefit to the
defendant. Therefore, defendant is entitled to no relief. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).
SENTENCING
Defendant contends the trial court erred by enhancing the fraudulent insurance
claim sentence by one year above the minimum, erred in ordering consecutive
sentencing, and erred in denying alternative sentencing. Although we reduce the
fraudulent insurance claim conviction from a Class C felony to a Class D felony, we
also enhance the sentence by one year above the minimum. We affirm the
imposition of consecutive sentences and affirm the denial of alternative sentencing.
A. Standard of Review
This Court’s review of the sentence imposed by the trial court is de novo with
a presumption of correctness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). This presumption
is conditioned upon an affirmative showing in the record that the trial judge
considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances. State
v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). If the trial court fails to comply with the
statutory directives, there is no presumption of correctness and our review is de novo.
State v. Poole, 945 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1997).
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If no mitigating or enhancement factors for sentencing are present, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c) provides that the presumptive sentence shall be the
minimum sentence within the applicable range. See State v. Lavender, 967 S.W.2d
803, 806 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1991). However, if such factors do exist, a trial court should start at the minimum
sentence, enhance the minimum sentence within the range for enhancement factors
and then reduce the sentence within the range for the mitigating factors. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-210(e). No particular weight for each factor is prescribed by the statute,
as the weight given to each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court as long as
the trial court complies with the purposes and principles of the sentencing act and its
findings are supported by the record. State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tenn.
1986); State v. Leggs, 955 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v.
Santiago, 914 S.W.2d 116, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
35-210 Sentencing Commission Comments.
B. Length of Sentence
Defendant challenges his four-year sentence on the Class C felony of filing a
fraudulent insurance claim. Since we have reduced the offense to a Class D felony,
a new sentence must be determined. This Court will determine the sentence. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(c)(2).
The trial court applied the following mitigating factors: the crime did not cause
or threaten serious bodily injury, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(1); the defendant was
suffering from a mental condition reducing his culpability, Tenn. Code Ann. §40-35-
113(8); and the defendant has rendered significant community and charitable service,
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(13).
The trial court noted that the defendant had a prior conviction for theft and has
failed to file income tax returns, thereby finding the defendant had a previous history
of criminal convictions or criminal behavior. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1). We
also note that defendant exhibited criminal behavior by willfully failing to appear at his
original sentencing hearing. A sentencing court can consider criminal behavior which
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occurred prior to the sentencing hearing, regardless of whether the criminal behavior
occurred before or after the commission of the offense under consideration. State
v. Burl Jarrett, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9710-CC-00418, Hardeman County (Tenn. Crim.
App. filed August 21, 1998, at Jackson).
The range of punishment for a Range I standard offender for a Class D felony
is from two to four years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(a)(4). Just as did the
trial court, we enhance the sentence one year above the minimum. Therefore, the
sentence shall be three years for filing a fraudulent insurance claim over $1,000.
C. Consecutive Sentencing
Defendant contends the trial court erred in ordering his one-year sentence for
failure to appear to run consecutively to the other two sentences. The state
concedes that none of the statutory factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115
applies and confesses error. We respectfully disagree with both the defendant and
the state.
Although the trial court erroneously noted that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
115(b)(6) applied, the Assistant District Attorney General reminded the trial court of
the applicability of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-609. This statute specifically provides
that a sentence for failure to appear “may be ordered to be served consecutively to
any sentence received for the offense for which the defendant failed to appear.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-609(f). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering this sentence to be served consecutively. See State v. Scotty Ray Haynes,
C.C.A. No. 01C01-9706-CC-00227, Bedford County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed March
27, 1998, at Nashville); State v. John David Rankin, Jr., C.C.A. No. 03C01-9511-CC-
00369, Sullivan County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed August 19, 1996, at Knoxville).
D. Alternative Sentencing
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing.
Again, we disagree.
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Under the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, trial judges are
encouraged to use alternatives to incarceration. An especially mitigated or standard
offender convicted of a Class C, D or E felony is presumed to be a favorable
candidate for alternative sentencing options in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6).
A court may also consider the mitigating and enhancing factors set forth in
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-113 and 114 as they are relevant to the § 40-35-103
considerations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b)(5); State v. Boston, 938 S.W.2d
435, 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Additionally, a court should consider the
defendant’s potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation when determining if an
alternative sentence would be appropriate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5); State
v. Boston, 938 S.W.2d at 438.
The trial court noted the defendant’s persistent untruthfulness and failure to
accept responsibility for his criminal act. The defendant exhibited no remorse. We
also note defendant’s prior criminal behavior.
In determining a defendant’s suitability for total probation, the trial court may
properly consider credibility, remorse, and candor as they reflect upon potential for
rehabilitation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5); State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d
158, 160 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Dowdy, 894 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1994). The trial court is in a better position than this Court to determine defendant’s
credibility and remorse. Considering these factors as well as defendant’s prior
criminal behavior, we are unable to conclude that the trial court erred in its denial of
alternative sentencing.
This issue is without merit.
CLERICAL ERROR IN JUDGMENT
We note that the judgment of conviction for the offense of arson of personal
property contains a clerical error in that the judgment indicates the offense is a Class
11
D felony. Upon remand, the trial court shall enter an amended judgment reflecting
this offense to be a Class E felony rather than a Class D felony.
CONCLUSION
The conviction for filing a fraudulent insurance claim over $10,000 shall be
modified to filing a fraudulent insurance claim over $1,000, a Class D felony, with a
sentence of three years in the Department of Correction. The trial court shall enter
an amended judgment. The trial court shall also enter an amended judgment
reflecting that arson of personal property is a Class E felony rather than a Class D
felony. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
____________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
____________________________
NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE
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