Julius Goodman v. State ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY SESS ION, 1999 May 17, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
JULIUS GOODMAN, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9807-CR-00252
)
Appe llant, )
) JOHNSON COUNTY
V. )
)
HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN, ) HON. LYNN W. BROWN, JUDGE
and STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee. ) (HABEAS CORPUS)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JULIU S GO ODM AN, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Northeast Correction Complex #91453 Attorney General & Reporter
P.O. Box 5000
Mountain City, TN 37683 ELLEN H. POLLACK
Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
JOE C. CR UM LEY, J R.
District Attorney General
114 Alf Taylor Road
Johnson City, TN 37601
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
Julius Goodman, the Petitioner, appeals the dismissal of his petition for
habeas corpus relief. In 1985, the Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated rape and was
sentenced to forty (40) years im prisonm ent in the H aywoo d Cou nty Circuit C ourt.
On February 13, 1998, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, asserting
that the indictment for aggravated rape was invalid as it did not contain th e requisite
mens rea. The trial court dismissed the petition based upon the issue not being
ame nable to habeas corpus relief. On March 25, 1998, the Petitioner filed a motion
to recon sider th e dism issal an d to am end h is petition for habeas corpus relief. In the
amen dmen t, Petitioner stated that the District Attorney failed to sign the indictment
sent to the grand jury and such failure rendered the indictment against him void.
This motion was also denied by the trial court, and Petitioner appeals on the ba sis
of this den ial. We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
It is a well-established principle of law that the remedy of habe as co rpus is
limited in its nature a nd sco pe. Archer v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157, 161 -62 (Tenn.
1993); Passarella v. State , 891 S.W .2d 619 , 626 (T enn. C rim. App . 1994). In
Tennessee, habe as co rpus re lief is ava ilable o nly if “ ‘it appears upon the face of the
judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered’ that
a convic ting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or
that a defendant’s sentence of imprisonm ent or other restraint ha s expired.” Archer,
851 S.W .2d at 1 64. Th e petitio ner ha s the b urden of esta blishing either a void
judgment or an illegal confinem ent by a preponderance of the evide nce. Pass arella,
891 S.W.2d at 627 (citation om itted). Moreover, where a judgment is not void, but
is merely voidable, such judgment may not be collaterally attacked in a suit for
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habeas corpus relief. Id. Withou t a valid indictment, there can be no jurisdiction and
no pros ecution. Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W .2d 528 (Te nn. 1998). “[T]he valid ity
of an indictment and the efficacy of the resulting conviction may be addressed in a
petition for habeas corpus when the indictment is so defective as to d eprive the court
of jurisdic tion.” Id. at 529. Therefore, this case is properly before our court in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
Petitioner first argu es tha t his con viction is void becau se the ap propriate mens
rea for the offense of aggravated rape was not included in the language of the
indictment. At the time of the offense in April 1985, Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39-2-603 defined aggravated rape as “unlawful sexual penetration of another
accompanied by . . . force or coercion . . . used to accomplish the act and the
defendant is armed with a weapon or any article used o r fashione d in a ma nner to
lead the victim re asona bly to believe it to be a weapon.” This language was
sufficient un der the law as it existed a t that time.
This indictment was issued prior to the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of
1989, and th e Crim inal Code did not contain a provision similar to § 39-11-301(c)
(1989). The only statuto ry requiremen ts for an indictmen t were found in § 40-1802
(now § 40-13-202 (1990)), which provided as follows:
The indictment mus t state th e facts cons tituting th e offen se in ordinary
and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such a manner
as to enable a person of common unde rstand ing to k now w hat is
intended, and with that degree of certainty wh ich will enab le the cou rt,
on con viction, to pro nounc e the pro per judg ment.
How ever, g enera lly stated an ind ictme nt is valid if it provides sufficient information
(1) to enable the accused to know the accusation to which an answer is required, (2)
to furnish the court adequate basis for the entry o f a prope r judgm ent, and (3) to
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protect the accused from double jeopardy.” State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727
(Tenn. 1997). While Hill was prosecuted under the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act
of 1989, its a nalysis is as relevant to crimes committed unde r the 19 79 Ac t as it is
to those co mm itted unde r the 198 9 Act. Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d at 530.
Just as in Hill, the mental state in the case sub judice is easily inferable from the
condu ct alleged in the indictm ent. Id.
As the indictment against Petitioner contained the words found in the
language of the statute that he had “unlawful sexual penetration” of the victim
contrary to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-2-603, the indictment meets the
requirem ents of sufficiently apprising the Petitioner of the offense charged under the
law at the tim e. Petitione r’s issue is w ithout me rit.
Petition er’s second argument addresses the alleged failure of the prosecutor
or district attorney to sign the indictment. Petitioner is correct that the District
Attorney is required to sign the indictment some where o n the indic tment. See Steve
Carro ll v. Howa rd Carlton , Warden, No. 03C01-9611-CR-00420, slip op. at 2,
Johnson Coun ty (Ten n. Crim . App., a t Knoxville, January 21, 1998) (No Rule 11
application filed) (citations omitted). However, our review of the indictment indicates
that it was, in fact, signed by the District Attorney Ge neral at the bottom of the third
page of a three-page indictment. The six (6) counts within the indictme nt were
cons ecutive ly numb ered, with counts (1), (2) and (3) on the first page, counts (4) and
(5) on the se cond p age, co ncluding with count (6) on the third page . It is reas onab le
to interpret his signature as intending to cover all six (6) counts contained in the
three-pa ge indictm ent. Id., slip op. at 2. T his issue is also witho ut merit.
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After finding Petitioner’s issues to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of
the trial cou rt.
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THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
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JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
___________________________________
L. T. LAFFERTY, Senior Judge
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