Roy Howard v. State , 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
DECEMB ER SESSION, 1998 March 17, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9802-CC-00079
)
Appe llant, )
)
) ANDERSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JAMES B. SCOTT, JR.
ROY L. HOWARD, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Direct Appeal - Motor Vehicle
) Habitual Offende r)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
CHRISTOPHER VAN RIPER JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Stuart & Van Riper Attorney General and Reporter
300 Market Street, Suite 200
Clinton, TN 37716 ELLEN H. POLLACK
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243
JAMES N. RAMSEY
District Attorney General
JAN HICKS
Assistant District Attorney
Room 127, Anderson Co. Cou rthouse
Clinton, TN 37716
OPINION FILED ________________________
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
OPINION
On May 2, 1997, the State filed a petition in the Anderson County Criminal
Court in which it sought to h ave Appe llee Roy L. Howard declared a motor
vehicle habitual offender pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55-10-
601, et seq. The trial court conducted a hearing on the petition on November 7,
1997, and the court subsequently denied the petition by an order dated February
11, 1998 . The S tate ch alleng es the trial cou rt’s den ial of its petition. After a
review of th e record , we mu st reverse the judgm ent of the tria l court.
FACTS
On January 1 and January 8, 1996, Appellee was cited for driving on a
suspended license. On Janu ary 9, 1996, Appellee pled guilty to both of these
offenses. Appellee was also cited for driving on a suspended license on August
25, 199 6, and h e pled gu ilty to that offens e on N ovem ber 26, 1 996.
On May 2, 1997, the State filed its petition to have Appellee declared a
motor vehicle habitual offender. On October 10, 1997, while th e petitio n was still
pending before the trial court, the Tennessee Department of Sa fety app arently
accep ted mo netary fee s from A ppellee a nd reinsta ted his drivin g privileges .
On November 7, 1997, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Sta te’s
petition. The trial court denied the petition by an order dated February 11, 1998.
Although the trial court’s order contains no findings and no explanation of why the
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petition was denied, the transcript of the hearing indicates that the trial court
denied the petition because the Department of Safety had reinstated Appe llee’s
driving privileg es after he paid a fee .
The State filed a notice of ap peal on Fe bruary 23, 1998. On March 10,
1998, Appellee filed a motion in which he asked the trial court to amend the
judgmen t and mak e additional findings o f fact. On April 3, 1998 , the trial court
denied Appellee’s motion after it concluded that because the State had already
filed notice of appeal, the trial court had no jurisdiction to amend the judgment or
make additiona l findings of fa ct. 1
ANALY SIS
The State contends that the trial c ourt er red wh en it dism issed the Sta te’s
petition mere ly because the Department of Safety accepted fees from Appellee
and reinstated his driving privileges. We agree.
Under Ten ness ee Co de An notate d sec tion 55 -10-6 03, a m otor ve hicle
habitual offender is:
Any person who, during a three-year period, is convicted in a Tennessee
court or courts of three (3) or more of the following offenses; any person
who, during a five-yea r period , is convicted in a Ten nesse e court o r courts
of three (3) or more of the following offenses; or any person who, during
1
Appellee conten ds that the trial court erre d when it determ ined that it did n ot have ju risdiction to
consider his motion. We conclude that the trial court was correct. The jurisdiction of this Court attaches
upon the filing of a notice of appe al and, thus , the trial court los es jurisdic tion. See State v. Pendergrass,
937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996). Therefore, “[a]s a general rule, the trial court may not hear motions
filed subsequently to the filing of the notice of appeal.” State v. Tony Craig Woods, No. 01C01-9606-CR-
00238, 1997 WL 602865, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept. 30, 1997). In addition, the findings that
Appellee asked the trial court to mak e, such as an ex press f inding that th e Dep artme nt of Safe ty
reinstated Appellee’s driving privileges after Appellee paid a fee, would have had no impact on the
decision in this case.
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a ten-year period, is convicted in a Tennessee court or courts of five (5) or
more of the following offenses; provided, that if the five- or ten-year period
is used, one (1) of such offenses occurred after July 1, 1991:
....
(x) A violation of § 55-50-504, relative to driving on canceled,
suspe nded, o r revoked license . . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2)(A) (1998). In addition, section 55-10-613
provides that “if the court finds that [the] defendant is an habitual offender, the
court shall make a n order directing that such person shall not operate a motor
vehicle on the highw ays of this state and that such person shall surrender to the
court all licenses to operate a moto r vehicle up on the h ighways of this state .”
Tenn. Crim. A pp. § 55 -10-613 (a) (1998 ). The period during which a motor
vehicle habitual o ffende r is prohibited from obtaining another driver’s license
must be a t least three years. Te nn. Code Ann. § 55-1 0-615 (199 8).
It is evident that under section 55-10-603, the sole criteria to be used by
a trial court in de terminin g wheth er a defe ndant is a motor vehicle habitual
offender is whether or not the defendant has been convicted of the required
number of specified offenses during the prescribed time period. The actions of
the Department of Safety are comp letely irrelevan t to this deter mination . See
State v. Loden, 920 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (“A statute giving
a judge the right to prohibit certain individuals from driving motor vehicles for
certain periods is not related to nor dependent upon sections giving the
Departm ent of Safety the po wer to grant, revok e, or suspen d licenses.”).
Appellee contends that because the Department of Safety accepted money
from him and reinstated his driving privileges, the State should be estopped from
seeking revocation of his lice nse u nder th e Mot or Ve hicle Habitua l Offende r Act.
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“Generally spea king, th e doc trine of e stopp el is not favore d und er our la w.”
Sexton v. Sevier C ounty, 948 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citations
omitted). In fact, “very exceptional circumstances are required to invoke the
doctrine against the Sta te and its governm ental subdivisions.” Id. (citations
omitted). Further, “[e]stoppel is appropriate against government agen cies on ly
when the age ncy indu ced the party to give up property or a right in exchange for
a promise.” Elizabethton H ous. & De v. Agency, Inc. v. Price, 844 S.W.2d 614,
618 (Tenn . Ct. App . 1992) (c itations om itted). There is no proof in the record that
the State ind uced A ppellee to do anyth ing. There is absolutely no proof in the
record that the D epartm ent of Sa fety ever promised Appellee that if he paid a fee,
his driving privileges would be permanently restored. Further, Appellee did not
give any money to the Department of Safety until after he knew that the State had
filed the petition to have him declared a motor vehicle habitual offender. Under
these circumstances, the doctrine of estoppel has no application to this case.
Appellee also contends that this Court should dismiss this case because
the issue o f decla ring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender became moot
after the Department of Safety restored his driving privileges. The concept of
mootness deals with the circum stances that ren der a case no longer justiciable.
McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). A moot case
is one tha t has lost its characte r as a pre sent, live co ntroversy. Id. A cas e will
gene rally be considered moot if it no longer serves as a means to provide relief
to the preva iling party. Id. As previously stated, the actions of the Department
of Safety are completely irrelevant to the question of whether Appe llee sh ould be
declared a motor vehicle habitual offender. Thus, it is obvious that this case
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involves a live controversy that can serve as a means to provide relief to the
State. In sh ort, this case is not mo ot.
In conclus ion, we ho ld that the trial court erred when it dismissed the
State ’s petition merely because the Department of Safety accepted money from
Appellee and reinstated his driving privileges. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court and we remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
____________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
___________________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR. JUDGE
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