State v. Lamont McDonald ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
NOVEMBER 1998 SESSION
December 30, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) NO. 01C01-9708-CR-00383
Appellee, )
) DAVIDSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. THOMAS H. SHRIVER,
LAMONT McDONALD, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Motion to Reduce Sentence)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
KARL DEAN JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
JEFFREY A. DeVASHER TIMOTHY BEHAN
ROSS E. ALDERMAN Assistant Attorney General
Asst. Public Defenders Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
1202 Stahlman Building 425 Fifth Avenue North
211 Union Street Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Nashville, TN 37201-5066
VICTOR S. JOHNSON III
District Attorney General
KYMBERLY HAAS
Assistant District Attorney General
Washington Square Building
222 Second Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Lamont McDonald, appeals the trial court's denial of his
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(b) motion to reduce sentence. He originally pled guilty to
second degree murder and received an agreed sentence of twenty-three (23)
years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant claims the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Finding no abuse of discretion,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
Although indicted for first degree murder, the defendant pled guilty on
April 23, 1997, to second degree murder. He entered into plea negotiations and
agreed to a twenty-three (23) year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. 1
On June 10, 1997, the defendant timely filed a Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(b)
motion. The defendant's motion requests his sentence be reduced to twenty
(20) years. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. Defendant now
contends his sentence should be reduced based upon his "spotless institutional
record, his desire to obtain vocational and computer training, his age, his lack of
a prior record, and the harshness of his sentence when compared to those of his
co-defendants who entered negotiated pleas."
II.
Under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(b), a sentence may be reduced if the trial
court determines it is in the “interests of justice.” See Committee Comment. In
1
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i) provides that those committing second
degree murder on or after July 1, 1995, are ineligible for parole and can only
receive sentencing credits not to exceed 15%. This offense was committed
January 11, 1995; therefore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i) is not applicable.
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contrast to the de novo standard of review applicable to sentencing appeals
perfected under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d), appeals of Rule 35(b)
decisions are reviewed simply to determine if there has been an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. State v. Irick, 861 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1993). A trial court should not modify an agreed sentence imposed from a
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) guilty plea absent unusual and unforeseen post-
sentencing developments. State v. McDonald, 893 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1994).
The defendant's attempts at rehabilitation are admirable. Likewise, his
youth and lack of prior criminal involvement are positive factors. However, his
co-defendant who actually fired the fatal shot received a life sentence. Even
though the two other co-defendants received sentences substantially less than
the defendant’s sentence, their involvement was much less than the defendant’s
involvement. Thus, defendant’s sentence does not appear unduly harsh. In the
final analysis, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the motion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
_________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
____________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
____________________________
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
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