State v. Royce Lane ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
APRIL 1997 SESSION
October 30, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
ROYCE LEE “DINO” LANE )
) No. 02C01-9604-CC-00133
Appellant, )
) Dyer County
v. )
) Honorable Joe G. Riley, Judge
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction)
)
Appellee. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Vanedda Prince Charles W. Burson
P.O. Box 26 Attorney General of Tennessee
Union City, TN 38281 and
Clinton J. Morgan
Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
C. Phillip Bivens
District Attorney General
and
James E. Lanier
Assistant District Attorney General
113 S. Mill Ave.
P.O. Box E
Dyersburg, TN 38024
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton
Judge
OPINION
The petitioner, Royce Lee “Dino” Lane, appeals as of right from the Dyer
County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. The
petitioner is presently in the Department of Correction serving an effective sentence of
twenty-six years for his 1991 convictions for second degree murder, criminally negligent
homicide and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of the second
degree murder. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, that his due process rights were violated because the jury was allowed to
see him in shackles, and that the reasonable doubt jury instruction allowed the jury to
convict him based on a lower standard of proof than is constitutionally required. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In 1991, the petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, criminally
negligent homicide and unlawful possession of a firearm during the second degree
murder. The petitioner was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive
sentences of twenty-two years, two years and two years, respectively. This court
affirmed his conviction. State v. Royce Lee “Dino” Lane, No. 02-C-01-9102-CR-00011,
Dyer County (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 1992), app. denied (Tenn. May 26, 1992)
(concurring in results only).
On April 20, 1995, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief. Counsel was appointed, and the petition was amended. The petition alleges that
the petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel
failed to conduct a prompt investigation of the facts and interview and subpoena
witnesses. It alleges that counsel was ineffective because when he learned that the
preliminary hearing tape was inaudible, he failed to secure for impeachment purposes
the testimony of Darren Devault, a newspaper reporter who was present at the
2
preliminary hearing. The petition alleges that counsel was ineffective by failing to move
to withdraw as petitioner’s counsel in order to testify as a witness to the preliminary
hearing testimony. The petition claims that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective
for failing to preserve and to raise on appeal the issue of whether the petitioner was
denied due process of law by being exposed to the jury while wearing shackles. The
petition alleges that the reasonable doubt instruction allowed the jury to convict him
based on a lesser standard of proof than constitutionally required.
At the post-conviction hearing, Marty Taylor testified that he sat as a juror
on the petitioner’s case. He stated that he saw the petitioner in shackles but he could
not remember the time or the duration that the petitioner was in the shackles. He said
that he did not know why the petitioner was in shackles but that it had no bearing on his
decision as to the petitioner’s guilt or innocence. He stated that he did not believe that
the shackles were discussed during deliberations. He did not recall the trial court
asking him whether he saw the petitioner in shackles.
Gloria Brady, a juror on the petitioner’s case, testified that she believed
that she saw the petitioner in shackles. She did not recall the trial court discussing the
shackles with the jury. She said that the shackles would not have affected her decision
relative to the petitioner’s guilt or innocence. She stated that the shackles were not
mentioned during deliberation.
Lisa Wheeler testified that she was working as a convenience store clerk
in Finley, Tennessee, at the time of the offenses. She stated that she remembered a
black man coming into the store at night asking for directions to return to Forrest Street
in Dyersburg. She said that the man was drunk and disoriented. She said that the
man’s pants were torn and his hands and arm had blood on them. She testified that
3
the petitioner’s attorney did not contact her about the incident. She stated that she
received a letter from the petitioner in 1994 asking her about the incident.
On cross-examination, Ms. Wheeler testified that she could not state for
sure that the petitioner was the person she saw that night. On redirect examination,
she stated that she connected the incident to the petitioner after reading about the
offenses in the paper. She said that she did not report the incident.
The petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he could not recall specifically
whether the jurors saw the petitioner wearing shackles or whether he objected. He said
that the trial court ordinarily placed a box around defense table to shield from the jury’s
view shackles worn by a defendant. The petitioner’s counsel testified that he and his
investigator met with the petitioner many times before trial. He said that he called as
defense witnesses all of the people requested by the petitioner. He said that he would
not have hesitated to contact other witnesses had the petitioner notified him of their
existence. He said that the petitioner told him that he had stopped at a convenience
store for directions. Counsel could not remember whether he had contacted anyone
from the store, but he conceded that he did not interview anyone that worked for a
store.
Counsel testified that the petitioner told him that he had sustained an
injury to his hand during a fight with Michael Holder, the victim of the criminally
negligent homicide. He said that he reviewed the petitioner’s medical records. He
conceded that he did not depose the petitioner’s treating physician, although the
medical evidence could have corroborated the petitioner’s testimony that he had been
injured in a fight with Holder and that the petitioner acted in self-defense.
4
Regarding the preliminary hearing tape, the petitioner’s counsel testified
that at trial, Bernard Cork testified that he had heard a hostile conversation between the
petitioner and Edward Dennis, the second degree murder victim, and that the petitioner
told Dennis before shooting him, “You’re going to get it, you punk.” He said that Cork
was a key state witness because he was the only eyewitness of the shooting of Dennis.
Counsel testified that he intended to introduce the preliminary hearing tape for
impeachment purposes to show that Cork had made a prior inconsistent statement at
the preliminary hearing that he had not heard any of the conversation between the
petitioner and Dennis. He said that he learned that the tape was inaudible, and he tried
to subpoena Darren Devault, a news reporter who was present at the preliminary
hearing. He said that Devault had told the petitioner that he remembered Cork
testifying at the preliminary hearing that he had not heard any of the conversation. He
stated that when he contacted Devault, Devault agreed to come to court and to testify
accordingly. Counsel testified that Devault did not testify at trial because he invoked his
reporter privilege and the procedure for obtaining his testimony was not followed. He
said that given Devault’s cooperation, he did not believe it necessary to follow the
statutory requirements for securing testimony of a news reporter. He stated that he did
not consider withdrawing as the petitioner’s counsel in order to testify on his behalf.
Relative to the petitioner’s medical records, counsel testified that he
questioned the petitioner on direct examination about his injuries. The petitioner
testified that on the night of the offenses, he had been in a fight with Holder and had
broken his hand when he hit Holder on the head. He said that he broke two knuckles
and dislocated a knuckle, requiring that he wear a cast for five weeks. The petitioner
was not cross-examined about his injuries.
The petitioner testified that he remembered wearing shackles in front of
the jury, but he could not recall at what point it occurred. He conceded that it was not
5
the entire trial. He stated that counsel told him to keep his feet still while he was
wearing the shackles. He said that there was no box around the table where he was
sitting. The petitioner acknowledged that the two jurors who saw him in shackles stated
that it did not have any effect on their guilty verdict.
The petitioner stated that he told his counsel that he had gone to a
convenience store after shooting Holder. He conceded that he had told counsel that he
did not know the name or the exact location of the store because he was lost and
upset. He said that he told counsel that he had asked for directions to get back to
Dyersburg to Forrest Street. He stated that he gave to counsel the directions that were
given to him by the female clerk at the store. He believed that the store could be
located by following the directions in reverse order. The petitioner could not remember
the exact directions given to him by the clerk and he could not find the store again. He
said that he learned of the name of the store approximately three years after trial when
church members visited him in jail. The petitioner testified that he gave his counsel the
names of the witnesses that were called to testify in his behalf. Regarding his injuries,
the petitioner testified that he told his counsel about the injury to his hand and that he
had been treated at Dyersburg Hospital.
Lyman Ingram, the prosecutor at the petitioner’s trial, testified that he did
not remember much about the petitioner’s trial. He conceded that it was possible that
the jury saw the petitioner in shackles when the jury returned a verdict because the
petitioner was probably shackled during deliberations. He did not remember whether
an objection was made regarding the petitioner wearing shackles. He stated that the
trial court was generally very conscientious about the issue of the jury seeing a
defendant wearing shackles.
6
Wanda Pachall, a court reporter testified that she recorded the trial
proceedings. A portion of the tape was played for the court relative to the polling of the
jurors regarding whether they saw the petitioner in shackles. The tape reflects that the
petitioner was wearing shackles during jury deliberations. During jury deliberations, the
jury returned to the courtroom to ask a question. After the jury left the courtroom, the
petitioner’s counsel advised the trial court that the petitioner was wearing shackles in
the presence of the jury. The trial court responded that the issue would be dealt with
after the jury rendered its verdict. The tape shows that following the rendering and the
acceptance of the verdict, the trial court asked the jurors under oath whether they had
seen the petitioner wearing shackles. Initially, no jurors responded affirmatively. When
individually questioned, Juror Mark Fair answered “Yes,” but stated that neither he nor
any other juror discussed it during deliberations. The juror stated that seeing the
petitioner in shackles did not affect his decision that the petitioner was guilty of the
crimes. Jurors Taylor and Brady responded negatively when asked by the court
whether they saw the petitioner in shackles.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction
relief. It concluded that the petitioner had failed to show that he was entitled to post-
conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It determined
that the petitioner advised counsel that he had been to a convenience store, but the
petitioner did not know the name of the store or where the store was located. The trial
court held that counsel could not be faulted for failing to discover a potential witness. It
determined that counsel’s performance was not deficient given the fact that he called
approximately fifteen witnesses to testify on behalf of the petitioner and called all
potential witnesses suggested by the petitioner.
Relative to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
introduce the medical records, the trial court concluded that the petitioner had failed to
7
establish prejudice because other proof was introduced regarding his hand injury. It
determined that the petitioner testified at trial that he had broken his hand during a fight
with the victim, and the petitioner’s testimony was not contradicted. The trial court held
that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s failure to
obtain the testimony of the news reporter. It determined that the petitioner did not show
that the news reporter’s testimony would have impeached Cork’s testimony. It also held
that counsel was not deficient for not moving to withdraw as counsel.
The trial court also held that the petitioner was not entitled to post-
conviction relief based on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel for failing to raise on appeal the claim that the petitioner’s due process rights
were violated when the jury saw him wearing shackles. It found that while the jury was
deliberating, leg restraints were placed on the petitioner. It determined that the jury
returned to the courtroom to ask a question, and unknown to the court, the shackles
remained on the petitioner. The court stated that when asked under oath, one juror
stated that she had seen the petitioner in shackles but that it was not discussed during
deliberations and that it had no effect on her guilty verdict. The court held that
appellate counsel was not deficient for failing to raise the issue on appeal because the
petitioner had failed to show a reasonable probability that the issue would have had
merit on appeal.
The court denied post-conviction relief based on the petitioner’s claim that
the reasonable doubt jury instruction violated his due process rights. It held that the
reasonable doubt jury instruction was a proper statement of the law.
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel. He argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to secure
8
the testimony of a news reporter after learning that the preliminary hearing tape was
inaudible and failing to withdraw as counsel to testify on the petitioner’s behalf, (2)
failing to investigate and present evidence that on the night of the shootings, the
petitioner stopped at a convenience store to ask for directions, and (3) failing to
investigate and to present medical proof of the petitioner’s injury to his hand and arm
that occurred during an altercation with the victim. The state responds that the
petitioner has failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice. We agree.
The burden was on the petitioner in the trial court to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the factual allegations that would entitle him to relief.
Brooks v. State, 756 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). On appeal, we are
bound by the trial court's findings of fact unless the evidence in the record
preponderates against those findings. Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1990).
In this respect, when a claim is made of the ineffective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the burden is upon the petitioner to show (1) that
counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial in terms
of rendering a reasonable probability that the result of the trial was unreliable or the
proceedings fundamentally unfair. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-72, 113 S. Ct. 838,
842-44 (1993). The Strickland standard has been applied, as well, to the right to
counsel under Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Melson, 772
S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).
In Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), our supreme court
decided that attorneys should be held to the general standard of whether the services
rendered were within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
9
cases. Further, the court stated that the range of competence was to be measured by
the duties and criteria set forth in Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir.
1974), and United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Also,
in reviewing counsel's conduct, a "fair assessment of attorney performance requires
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; see
Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) (counsel's conduct will not be measured
by "20-20 hindsight"). Thus, the fact that a particular strategy or tactic failed or even
hurt the defense does not, alone, support a claim of ineffective assistance. Deference
is made to trial strategy or tactical choices if they are informed ones based upon
adequate preparation. See Hellard, 629 S.W.2d at 9; DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1201.
Relative to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
investigate and present evidence that the petitioner stopped at a convenience store on
the night of the offenses to ask for directions, we hold that counsel’s performance was
not deficient. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that counsel cannot be faulted
for failing to locate a potential witness when the petitioner could not remember the
name of the store, the location of the store, or the directions to the store.
Relative to the remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we
need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient because the
petitioner failed to establish prejudice. The approach to the issue of the ineffective
assistance of counsel does not have to start with an analysis of an attorney's conduct.
If prejudice is not shown, we need not seek to determine the validity of the allegations
about deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. At the
post-conviction hearing, the petitioner did not establish that either the news reporter’s
testimony or the petitioner’s counsel’s testimony would have impeached Cork’s
10
testimony given at trial. Thus, no prejudice has been shown. The petitioner also failed
to establish prejudice from counsel’s failure to introduce medical evidence of his injuries
because evidence of his injuries was introduced through other means, and the
evidence was not contradicted. We conclude that the petitioner did not receive the
ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
The petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by holding that the
exposure of the petitioner to the jury while wearing leg restraints violated his due
process rights. We note that the issue as raised by the petitioner on appeal is subject
to waiver because it was not raised on direct appeal. See T.C.A. § 40-30-112(b)(1)
(repealed 1995); House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 714 (Tenn. 1995). However, the
petitioner raised the claim in his petition as one relating to the ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue, and the trial court addressed the issue as
such. Therefore, we will also address the issue as a claim relating to the ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.
In Willocks v. State, 546 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976), this court
held that there is a legal presumption against the necessity of in-court physical restraint
and that the burden falls on the state to make a clear showing of the necessity for such
restraint. Id. at 821-22. Shackling is considered inherently prejudicial to the defendant
unless there is a clear showing of necessity. Id. at 822. In this respect, the trial court
(1) should conduct a hearing, (2) must state upon the record its reasons for ordering
physical restraints, and (3) must give adequate instructions that the restraint of the
defendant should in no way affect their decision. Id. Shackles must be the least
drastic security measure reasonably to suffice. Id. Constitutional harmless error
analysis applies when a defendant’s due process rights are violated by the use of in-
court physical restraints. State v. Thompson, 832 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1991).
11
Initially, we note that at the time of the trial, counsel was only made aware
of one juror who acknowledged seeing shackles. That juror stated that it was not
discussed during deliberations and had no effect upon his individual verdict. Our
assessment of counsel’s conduct should not be viewed in hindsight in terms of there
now being three jurors who say they saw leg restraints on the petitioner. Given what
was known to counsel at the time of the trial, we do not believe it was deficient
performance not to pursue this issue on appeal.
In this respect, we also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the
petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that the issue would have had merit on
appeal. The shackling of the petitioner in the presence of jurors occurred only for a
short period of time while the jury was deliberating. When the jury returned to the
courtroom to ask a question, one to three jurors saw the petitioner wearing leg
restraints. However, each juror stated under oath that the physical restraints were not
discussed during jury deliberation, and each juror said that the shackling did not affect
his or her individual decision regarding the guilt of the petitioner. Under all of the
circumstances existing at the time of the trial and presently, we conclude that the juror
or jurors viewing the petitioner shackled for a short period of time while the jury was
deliberating was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the petitioner
did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel by counsel’s failure to raise the
issue on appeal.
III. REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION
The petitioner asserts that the reasonable doubt instruction given by the
trial court allowed the jury to convict him based upon less proof than constitutionally
required. The trial court gave the following reasonable doubt instruction at the
petitioner’s trial:
The state has the burden of proving the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden never
shifts but remains on the state throughout the trial of the case.
The defendant is not required to prove his innocence.
12
Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an
investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after
such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty
of guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a captious,
possible, or imaginary doubt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not
demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but
moral certainty is required as to every proposition requisite to
constitute the offense.
See T.P.I. - Crim. 2.03 (3d ed.). This is a correct statement of the burden of proof
required for criminal trials in Tennessee. See Hardin v. State, 210 Tenn. 116, 355
S.W.2d 105 (1962); Nichols v. State, 877 S.W.2d 722, 734 (Tenn. 1994); State v.
Sexton, 917 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); Pettyjohn v. State, 885 S.W.2d
364, 366 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Therefore, the instruction was properly given, and
the use of the instruction did not violate the petitioner’s due process rights.
In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
David G. Hayes, Judge
William M. Barker, Special Judge
13