State v. Marvin Matthews ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MARVIN ANTHONY MATTHEWS, )
)
Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9712-CC-00465
)
vs. ) LAUDERDALE COUNTY
)
ALTON HESSON, WARDEN,
Respondent.
) Nos. 5021, 5022
)
)
FILED
March 10, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
ORDER
Appellate C ourt Clerk
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the
judgment of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. The petitioner was indicted on one count of third degree burglary in May
1984, and he subsequently pled guilty to the same. The petitioner has since filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the sufficiency of the indictment entered
against him. The trial court denied relief.1
On appeal, the petitioner argues that the indictment is invalid because it
failed to assert an essential element of the offense and that his conviction, therefore,
cannot stand. At the time of the offense in this case, third degree burglary was defined
as "the breaking and entering into a business house, outhouse, or any other house of
another, other than a dwelling house, with the intent to commit a felony." T.C.A. § 39-3-
404 (1982). The indictment at issue before us charged that the petitioner
did commit the offense of burglary in the 3rd degree by unlawfully,
feloniously and burglariously breaking into and entering THE BUSINESS
HOUSE OF HALLMARK BUILDERS, INC., A CORPORATION with intent
to unlawfully, feloniously and burglariously to steal, take and carry away
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The petitioner filed two petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the trial court challenging the
sufficiency of the indictment in two separate cases, a 1984 third degree burglary conviction and a 1988
larceny conviction. The trial court denied relief in each instance and the petitioner filed notice of appeal
from both judgments. The records were transmitted to this Court and consolidated under the same
docket num ber. In his appellate brief, however, the petitioner only addresses the third degree burglary
case. Accordingly, he has waived any issues pertaining to the larceny matter. Nonetheless , we have
reviewed the entire re cord on appea l and we fin d no reve rsible error in the larcen y case.
the personal property therein contained, the proper goods and chattels of
HALLMARK BUILDERS, INC., A CORPORATION.
This language was sufficient under the law as it existed at the time. The
statutory requirements for an indictment were found in T.C.A. § 40-1802 (now § 40-13-
202 (1997)), which provided simply that:
The indictment must state the facts constituting the offense in
ordinary and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such a
manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended, and with that degree of certainty which will enable the court, on
conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment.
By containing the words found in the language of the statute, the indictment at issue
here sufficiently apprised the petitioner of the offense charged under the law at the
time, and is therefore valid.
The petitioner seems to suggest that the omission of the statutory
language "or any other house of another, other than dwelling house" voids his
conviction. What the petitioner fails to realize, however, is that the statute classifies
those buildings or houses which are subject to third degree burglary. The indictment in
this case charged the petitioner with breaking and entering a building or house
specifically classified by the statute, i.e., a business house. The language the petitioner
claims should have been included in the indictment simply defines the other types of
buildings or houses belonging to the protected class. The petitioner was not charged
with breaking and entering into any other building or house of another. Accordingly, the
petitioner's argument is without merit.
Having reviewed the entire record on appeal, we find that the indictment
at issue meets constitutional and the then-existing statutory requirements, and is
therefore valid. It is therefore ORDERED that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed
in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Enter, this the ___ day of March, 1998.
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___________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
___________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
___________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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