James v. Ball ( 1996 )


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  •      IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    MAY 1996 SESSION             FILED
    June 10, 1996
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,         )
    ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9511-CR-00353
    Appellee,              )
    ) Shelby County
    V.                          )
    ) Honorable Carolyn Wade Blackett, Judge
    )
    LEONARD A. FOX,             ) (Simple Assault; Reckless Endangerment)
    )
    Appellant.             )
    FOR THE APPELLANT:             FOR THE APPELLEE:
    James V. Ball                  Charles W. Burson
    Attorney at Law                Attorney General & Reporter
    217 Exchange Avenue
    Memphis, TN 38105              John R. Collier
    Assistant Attorney General
    Joseph S. Ozment               Financial Division
    Attorney at Law                500 Charlotte Avenue
    217 Exchange Avenue            Nashville, TN 37243-0496
    Memphis, TN 38105
    John W. Pierotti
    District Attorney General
    Rhea Clift
    Asst. Dist. Attorney General
    201 Poplar Avenue, Third Floor
    Memphis, TN 38103
    OPINION FILED: ___________________
    VACATED AND DISMISSED
    PAUL G. SUMMERS,
    Judge
    OPINION
    The appellant, Leonard A. Fox, was convicted of simple assault and
    reckless endangerment. He was sentenced to 11 months 29 days for assault
    and three years for reckless endangerment. His sentences were ordered to run
    concurrently. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain
    a conviction for assault, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a
    conviction for reckless endangerment. The state concedes his first issue. As to
    the appellant's remaining issue, we find the evidence insufficient to sustain a
    conviction for reckless endangerment. We vacate and dismiss.
    FACTS
    The appellant's indictment on the charge of reckless endangerment read
    as follows:
    . . . did unlawfully and recklessly, by use of a deadly weapon, to wit:
    a pistol, engage in conduct which placed other persons, whose
    identities are to the Grand Jurors aforesaid unknown, in imminent
    danger of death or serious bodily injury. . . .
    The indictment stemmed from the appellant's acts of discharging a pistol into the
    air or up into a tree.1 There was no testimony that anyone was either in the tree
    being fired upon or outside the apartment building in the immediate vicinity of the
    appellant.
    ANALYSIS
    Reckless endangerment is proscribed in 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-103
    (1991 Repl.). The statute provides that:
    (a) A person commits an offense who recklessly engages in
    conduct which places or may place another person in imminent
    danger of death or serious bodily injury.
    1
    W itnesses informed the police that they saw the appellant "shooting in the air."
    -2-
    (b) Reckless endangerment is a Class A misdemeanor; however,
    reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon is a Class
    E felony.
    
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-103
    . Accordingly, reckless endangerment is couched
    in terms of risk to another person produced by one's conduct. This Court has
    previously recognized the potentially "absurd" and "unreasonable" results that
    may arise from permitting prosecution of one discharging "a weapon under any
    circumstances where any other human being might possibly be present or where
    a stray bullet might possibly strike another person." State v. Culbertson, No.
    03C01-9412-CR-00449, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 30, 1995).
    We find the appellant's mere discharge of a weapon into the air or up into
    a tree top did not "place another person in imminent danger of death or serious
    bodily injury." Merely discharging a gun, standing alone, is not sufficient to
    constitute commission of reckless endangerment. See People v. Richardson, 
    97 A.2d 693
     (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953) (holding discharge of gun into air does
    not constitute reckless endangerment). The discharge must create an imminent
    risk of death or serious bodily injury to some person or class of persons. The
    state's proof has fallen short of this requirement. The judgment of the trial court
    is, therefore, reversed.
    The judgments of conviction as to both indictments are vacated and
    dismissed.
    -3-
    _____________________________
    PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
    CONCUR:
    _____________________________
    DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
    _____________________________
    PAUL R. SUMMERS, Special Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9511-CR-00353

Filed Date: 6/10/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014