Alicia Shayne Lovera v. State ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    FILED
    AT KNOXVILLE
    January 4, 2000
    OCTOBER SESSION, 1999              Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    ALICIA SHAYNE LOVERA,               *
    *     C.C.A. No. 03C01-9901-CC-00030
    Appellant,                    *
    *     SEVIER COUNTY
    vs.                                 *
    *     Hon. REX H. OGLE, Judge
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                 *
    *     (Post-Conviction)
    Appellee.                     *
    For the Appellant:                  For the Appellee:
    Douglas A. Trant                    Paul G. Summers
    Attorney for the Appellant          Attorney General and Reporter
    900 S. Gay Street, Suite 1502
    Knoxville, TN 37902                 Ellen H. Pollack
    Assistant Attorney General
    Criminal Justice Division
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Alfred C. Schmutzer, Jr.
    District Attorney General
    Sevier County Courthouse
    125 Court Avenue, Suite 301-E
    Sevierville, TN 37962
    OPINION FILED:
    AFFIRMED
    David G. Hayes, Judge
    OPINION
    The appellant, Alicia Shayne Lovera, appeals from the trial court’s denial of
    her petition for post-conviction relief. In November 1994, the appellant was charged
    with the first degree premeditated murder of her husband Kelly J. Lovera. A Sevier
    County jury found the appellant guilty of the offense charged. Prior to the
    sentencing hearing, the appellant, pursuant to a negotiated plea with the State, pled
    guilty to first degree murder in return for a sentence of life with the possibility of
    parole. The appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, inter
    alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The petition was amended following
    appointment of counsel. After a hearing on the petition, the Sevier County Criminal
    Court dismissed the petition. This appeal follows.
    After review of the record, we affirm.
    Background
    On November 6, 1994, United States Park Rangers located a Jeep at the
    bottom of a one hundred foot embankment on U.S. Highway 441. Inside the Jeep,
    they discovered the body of the deceased, Kelly J. Lovera. The deceased had
    multiple wounds to the head. An investigation ensued resulting in the arrest of the
    appellant and Brett Rae, the co-defendant in this case and the alleged lover of the
    appellant.
    The appellant and her co-defendant were jointly tried. A jury found both the
    appellant and her co-defendant guilty of first degree murder. Although the death
    penalty was not sought, the State had provided notice that it was seeking a
    sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On the morning of the sentencing
    2
    hearing, the appellant entered into an agreement with the State which provided that
    she would plead guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a sentence of life with
    the possibility of parole. In return, the State relinquished the right to seek a
    sentence of life without parole. The judgment form also reflects that the appellant
    waived her right to file either a direct appeal or a collateral post-conviction attack of
    her conviction.1
    On March 12, 1997, the appellant filed the instant petition for post-conviction
    relief. The petition may be generally summarized as alleging (1) trial counsel was
    ineffective for failing to advise her of issues viable for direct appeal of her conviction;
    (2) her plea was coerced and involuntary; and (3) that her conviction is void as
    violating the protection against double jeopardy.2
    A hearing was held on the petition on December 17, 1998. The appellant
    testified that she was originally represented by retained counsel, who “did absolutely
    no preparation for almost nine months.” After retained counsel was permitted to
    withdraw, the court appointed the Office of the Public Defender as substitute
    counsel. The appellant explained that she only met with the public defender
    “several times.” She admitted that “I know he tried to get it delayed so that he could
    have more time to prepare. As far as what he actually did to prepare I’m not
    knowledgeable enough to know exactly what he did.” The appellant continued to
    provide illustrations of her counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness including, his advice
    encouraging her to testify at trial, his failure to object to hearsay testimony, and his
    failure to prepare for the sentencing hearing. She conceded that counsel did advise
    1
    Neither a tran scrip t of the guilty ple a hea ring n or a c opy of the p lea ag reem ent is
    prov ided in the re cord on ap pea l.
    2
    Included within the petition are numerous claims of error, including but not limited to:
    (1) The appellant was questioned by police after she requested counsel; (2)
    Bruton violations; (3) Brady issues; (4) failure to grant change of venue; (5)
    prosec utorial m iscondu ct; (6) failure to object to h earsay; (7 ) denied rig ht not to
    testify; (8) trial counsel misstated facts; (9) search warrant invalid; (10)
    unconstitutional search of her person; (11) range of punishment jury instruction.
    3
    her that issues regarding the search of her apartment could be raised on appeal in
    addition to challenging the results of the “Luminol” test introduced at trial which
    established the presence of blood at the crime scene.
    With regard to her guilty plea, the appellant stated that, when first
    approached by counsel about the possibility of a plea immediately following the
    jury’s verdict, she informed counsel that she “couldn’t answer him . . .she couldn’t
    even think much less give him an answer.” The next morning, when counsel again
    questioned the appellant about the plea, she responded that “I thought I probably
    ought to keep whatever rights I had left. . . .” The appellant stated, that counsel
    informed her that the State had new evidence against her and that if she accepted
    the plea bargain she would be able to see her children within the next ninety days.
    She averred that trial counsel informed her that she “would probably do eighteen”
    years on a sentence of life with the possibility of parole and that she later discovered
    that she would have to serve a minimum twenty-five years before reaching parole
    eligibility. The appellant conceded that she agreed to accept the plea agreement,
    however, she did “not really” understand that she was relinquishing her right to a
    direct appeal, post-conviction relief, and habeas corpus relief. She admitted that
    she understood that she was pleading guilty to the offense although she had been
    found guilty by a jury, specifically she inquired if she could plead no contest instead
    of pleading guilty. The appellant admitted that the trial court informed her of her
    rights, including her right to appeal. She stated that, in hindsight, she “gained
    absolutely nothing” from her plea and that “[she] would have been a whole lot better
    off to let you all give me life without parole, because then I wouldn’t have waived all
    my rights.”
    On cross-examination, the State elicited from the appellant that she was an
    honor student in high school and, after graduating, attended college for one and
    one-half years. She conceded that her trial counsel filed an interlocutory appeal on
    4
    the search and seizure issue and that he had informed her that this issue was
    meritorious for appeal.
    The appellant’s trial counsel testified on behalf of the State. Counsel stated
    that, after being appointed to represent the appellant, he met with her “on numerous
    occasions” to discuss her case, specifically on the issue of her testifying. Counsel
    stated that he “never told her she had to testify” and that “[s]he never told [him] she
    did not want to testify.” Indeed, he remarked that the appellant “always did want to
    get up and tell her side of the story.” Counsel explained that, after the guilty verdict
    had been returned by the jury, he discussed a plea agreement with the State
    wherein the appellant would agree to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole
    in exchange for waiving the right to challenge the conviction on appeal. When he
    presented the offer to the appellant, counsel reviewed “specific issues” that were
    cognizable on appeal. The appellant agreed to relinquish her right to appeal in
    exchange for accepting a sentence of life with parole. Counsel informed her that
    “an earliest eligibility for parole [was] at twenty-five years.” As an additional
    condition of her acceptance, although not specifically a part of the plea, an
    arrangement was made for the appellant to visit with her children on at least one
    occasion within ninety days following entry of her plea. Counsel stated that the trial
    court also clearly advised the appellant of the effect of her plea for future challenges
    to the conviction.
    Regarding potential aggravating and mitigating proof for the sentencing
    hearing, counsel remarked:
    . . .we discussed this was a difficult case to mitigate after the jury had
    rendered their judgment. It’s unlike most other cases I’ve ever dealt
    with where you’ve got an obvious explanation for you client’s behavior
    and somehow you can explain that to the jury.
    But basically, you know, we had prepared, were prepared to present
    evidence of course of the untimely and unfortunate death of Brent Mills
    who she was very close to as well as other evidence regarding her, the
    person she was. That was presented, a lot of it, in the guilt/innocence
    5
    phase, as to just what an outstanding person she was particularly in
    high school as I remember. And we had teachers of hers in high
    school that would testify as to her outstanding character in high school.
    Her current employer at the time just prior to her incarceration that
    would testify as to her good character, that she was a good worker and
    that sort of thing.
    After hearing closing argument of respective counsel, the trial court stated its
    findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record:
    . . .[T]he issue is whether or not she knowingly and voluntarily waived
    her rights to appeal and agreed to a life sentence as opposed to life
    without parole. At that juncture right or wrong she stood guilty of First
    Degree Premeditated Murder. The evidence that had gone into the
    trial of this case was overwhelming against her. She was caught in lie
    after lie and in all candor the Court would have to say that her memory
    at least is pretty selective as she sits here today. She says that she
    didn’t understand this and she didn’t understand that but she was the
    one that brought up about a nolo plea to her attorney. The Court finds
    she is very intelligent, that she knew what was going on.
    ...
    Prior to taking this plea agreement,. . . this Court went through those
    rights very specifically with Mrs. Lovera and asked her and gave her
    every opportunity to discuss with the Court those issues. And she said
    certainly in there that [counsel] had done the best that he could. . . .
    ...
    But to say . . . that [counsel] should have guaranteed her any outcome
    on appeal certainly is not correct. . . .[I]n effect it is asking [counsel] . . .
    to be a fortune teller. And unfortunately for Mrs. Lovera she had to
    make a decision then. She had to either go to a hearing on life without
    parole or take a life sentence. . . . I am satisfied that she understood
    what was going on. Obviously she wasn’t happy . . . but happy is not
    what first degree murder trials are about. She made some tough
    choices both during the trial, she got caught in some very horrendous
    lies that destroyed her defense. And she comes back in here today
    and tries to lie again.
    ...
    And it is clear that Mrs. Lovera always has a lot to say but she has
    always got caught up in her own misstatements and she has here
    today. Her evidence is not credible as to what she says [counsel] did
    or did not tell her. The Court finds that [counsel] has been very
    credible and did everything that he could do. He fully advised her of
    her right to appeal. She and I discussed that and she waived her
    rights to appeal. She and I discussed that and she waived her rights
    to appeal in exchange for a life sentence and that’s what she got.
    The Court finds that the petition for post-conviction relief and or
    habeas corpus is completely without merit and the same is hereby
    dismissed . . . .
    6
    Analysis
    I. Waiver of Right to Post-Conviction Remedies
    As part of the appellant’s guilty plea, she agreed to waive her right to both a
    direct appeal of her conviction and her right to pursue post-conviction remedies.
    Obviously from the posture of this case, this waiver provision was not enforced
    against the appellant as she did seek post-conviction relief. Thus, the initial inquiry
    before this court is whether this proceeding was properly entertained by the trial
    court and, subsequently, whether this cause is properly before this court. After
    consideration of constitutional principles, we conclude that this case is properly
    before this court.
    Although a criminal defendant may waive the right to a direct appeal as part
    of a plea agreement,3 we conclude today that a defendant may not waive his or her
    right to post-conviction remedies as part of a plea agreement. But see State v.
    John Joseph Villaneuva, C.C.A. No. 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, May 30,
    1991), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Jan. 6, 1992) (upholding waiver of right to
    raise ineffective assistance of counsel claim in post-conviction proceeding). Post-
    conviction proceedings are significantly different from a direct appeal. Unlike a
    direct appeal, a post-conviction proceeding provides a means of collaterally
    attacking the constitutional validity of a conviction. See generally 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-203
     (1997). And, although, generally, a guilty plea entered on the
    3
    Plea bargains are contractual in nature and therefore, the “negotiated plea represents a
    bargained for quid pro quo.” See Unite d Sta tes v. Esc am illa, 
    975 F.2d 568
    , 571 (9 th Cir. 1992 ).
    Thu s, a p rovis ion in th e plea agre em ent w aiving the d efen dan t’s righ t to pu rsue a dire ct ap pea l is
    a barga ined for ele men t of the agr eem ent. See United States v. Gonzalez, 
    981 F.2d 1037
     (9 th Cir.
    1992). T his provisio n is enfor ceable a s long as the waive r is know ing and vo luntary. See State
    v. McKissack, 917 S.W .2d 714, 715 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1995) (footnote omitted). See, e.g., United
    State s v. M arin , 
    961 F.2d 493
    , 496 (4 th Cir. 1992 ); United States v. Bolinger, 
    940 F.2d 478
    , 480
    (9 th Cir. 1991).
    7
    competent advice of counsel will be held to waive the majority of the fundamental
    protections afforded by the Constitution,4 a guilty plea cannot waive jurisdictional
    defects. Additionally, a guilty plea cannot waive those constitutional challenges to
    the resulting conviction if the plea itself was not knowingly and voluntarily entered
    upon competent advice of counsel. If post-conviction remedies could be waived, a
    defendant would be precluded from challenging an involuntary guilty plea or one
    entered upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. It would be unconscionable and
    against the public policy of this state to insulate a conviction from such challenges.
    Accordingly, we hold that the portion of the judgment in the case sub judice waiving
    the appellant’s right to make application for post-conviction relief is void and
    unenforceable. See, e.g., Majors v. State, 
    568 N.E.2d 1065
    , 1067-1068 (Ind. Ct.
    Ap. 1991); Hood v. State, 
    890 P.2d 797
    , 798 (Nev. 1995). Cf. United States v.
    Astacio, 
    14 F. Supp.2d 816
    , 818-819 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding, even where a
    defendant has waived his statutory right to bring a § 2255 motion, he may
    nonetheless raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the voluntariness
    of the guilty plea) (citing United States v. Wilkes, 
    20 F.3d 651
    , 652- 653 (5 th Cir.
    1994); United States v. Pruitt, 
    32 F.3d 431
    , 432-433 (9 th Cir. 1994); United States v.
    Abarca, 
    985 F.2d 1012
    , 1014 (9 th Cir. ), cert. denied, 
    508 U.S. 979
    , 
    113 S.Ct. 2980
    (1993)).
    II. Effect of Guilty Plea
    Preliminary to our review of the voluntariness of the guilty plea, we address
    the precise posture of this case. Based upon her entry of a guilty plea following a
    jury verdict, the appellant argues that her conviction violates the protections against
    4
    A guilty plea made voluntarily, understandingly, and knowingly effectively constitutes a
    waive r of th e con stitutio nal rig hts a gains t com puls ory se lf-inc rim inatio n, the right to conf ront o ne’s
    accusers, and the right to trial by jury, and, except under limited exceptions, the right to direct
    appea l. See gene rally Tenn. R. Crim . P. 11(c); 37(b)(2).
    8
    double jeopardy. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
    1, Section 10 of the Tennessee Constitution protects the accused (1) against a
    second prosecution after an acquittal; (2) against a second prosecution after
    conviction; and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense. State v.
    Denton, 
    938 S.W.2d 373
    , 378 (Tenn.1996). Double jeopardy becomes a factor only
    when the defendant faces retrial or multiple punishments for the same crime.
    Accordingly, the appellant’s argument based on the constitutional protection against
    double jeopardy is without merit.
    There are no limitations under the Tennessee Constitution, Criminal Code, or
    Rules of Court which would per se prohibit the entry of a guilty plea after a jury
    verdict had been returned.5 A guilty plea is in itself a conviction and is conclusive as
    to the defendant’s guilt. Thus, under the circumstances before us in this case, we
    construe the appellant’s subsequent entry of a guilty plea to effectively supercede
    the jury verdict of first degree premeditated murder. 6 Cf. Haskins v.
    Commonwealth, 
    500 S.W.2d 407
    , 408-409 (Ky. App. 1973). But see Daye v.
    Commonwealth, 
    467 S.E.2d 287
    , 289 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (entry of guilty plea after
    jury verdict is moot). The effect of the guilty plea is to nullify, for all practical
    purposes, the guilt phase of the trial. Thus, when examining her guilty plea for
    constitutional infirmities, the reviewing court places the appellant in the same
    posture as if she had not proceeded to trial.
    5
    The provision in Rule 11 requiring notice to the court of the existence of a plea
    agreem ent prior to trial is n ot a bar to e ntering a g uilty plea but rath er, “subs ection (e) (5) . . .
    permits the trial judge to impose reasonable pretrial time limits on the court’s consideration of plea
    agreements, a practice which will allow maximum efficiency in the docketing of cases proceeding
    to trial on pleas of not guilty.” See Advisory C omm ission Co mm ents, Te nn. R. C rim. P. 11 .
    6
    It is without doubt that plea bargaining is an important and widely utilized tool of the
    crimina l justice syste m for resolving p rosecu tion quick ly and econ omic ally. See Blackledge v.
    Allison, 
    431 U.S. 63
    , 
    97 S.Ct. 1621
     (1977). By entering into a plea agreement, a defendant
    admits guilt of the substantive offense often, as in the present case, in excha nge for a more
    lenient sen tence. T he cou rts mu st enforc e the def endan t’s prom ise, unless otherwis e show n to
    be involuntary or unknowingly entered, in order to carry out the policies that underlie plea
    bargain ing. See gene rally People v. Fearing, 
    442 N.E.2d 939
    , 941 (Ill. App. 1982).
    9
    III. Post-Conviction Claims
    Based upon our ruling that the appellant’s conviction for first degree murder
    stems from her plea of guilty to that offense rather than from a jury verdict, our
    review is limited to the voluntary nature of the plea and the ineffective assistance of
    counsel regarding the plea. Specifically, in her petition, the appellant alleges that
    double jeopardy bars her conviction and her plea was involuntary because counsel
    had failed to advise her of the waiver of her constitutional rights, counsel failed to
    inform her of viable issues for appeal, counsel misinformed her as to her parole
    eligibility date, counsel failed advise her of and failed to prepare for a sentencing
    hearing, and she was coerced into entering the plea out of fear of not being able to
    visit with her children.
    A trial court’s findings of fact in a post-conviction hearing are conclusive on
    appeal unless the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings.
    See Butler v. State, 
    789 S.W.2d 898
    , 899 (Tenn. 1990); Clenny v. State, 
    576 S.W.2d 12
    , 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 
    441 U.S. 947
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 2170
    (1979). Allegations of deficient performance of counsel and possible prejudice to
    the defense are mixed questions of law and fact. See State v. Brenda Anne Burns,
    No. W1996-0004-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. at Jackson, Nov. 8, 19990 (for publication).
    Although we perform a de novo review of the issue, the appellant must still establish
    his or her allegations by clear and convincing evidence. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40
    -
    30-210(f) (1997).
    Once a guilty plea has been entered, effectiveness of counsel is relevant only
    to the extent that it affects the voluntariness of the plea. In this respect, such claims
    10
    of ineffective assistance necessarily implicate the principle that guilty pleas be
    voluntarily and intelligently made. See North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 31, 
    91 S.Ct. 160
    , 164 (1970).
    In Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 
    106 S.Ct. 366
     (1985), the United States
    Supreme Court addressed the issue of alleged involuntary guilty pleas resulting from
    erroneous or negligent advice by trial counsel. The result reached was the
    formulation of a merger of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance and the
    traditional requirements for a valid guilty plea. The Strickland test provides that, to
    prevail on a claim of ineffective counsel, the defendant must establish that (1) the
    services rendered by counsel were deficient and (2) he/she was prejudiced by the
    deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 2064 (1984); Cooper v. State, 
    849 S.W.2d 744
    , 746 (Tenn. 1993). As
    applied to guilty pleas, the first prong, deficient performance remains the same, i.e.,
    counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that reasonably
    competent counsel would provide under similar circumstances. See Baxter v. Rose,
    
    523 S.W.2d 930
    , 936 (Tenn. 1975); Walton v. State, 
    966 S.W.2d 54
    , 54-55 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. 1997). However, the prejudice requirement focuses on whether
    counsel’s ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill v.
    Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. at 58
    , 
    106 S.Ct. at 370
    . In other words, in order to satisfy the
    prejudice requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
    probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would
    have insisted on going to trial. Id.; See also Walton, 
    966 S.W.2d at 55
    .
    Generally, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in
    by courts reviewing ineffective assistance challenges to convictions obtained
    through a trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. at 59
    , 
    106 S.Ct. at 370
    . Indeed, the focus
    is not only upon the actual “error” committed by counsel, but whether had counsel
    acted competently (1) would counsel have changed his recommendation as to the
    11
    plea or (2) would the competent performance have been likely to change the
    outcome of a trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. at 59
    , 
    106 S.Ct. at 370-371
    .
    In the present case, the post-conviction court concluded that the appellant
    received the competent assistance of counsel and, consequently, entered her plea
    knowingly and voluntarily. A trial court’s findings of fact in a post-conviction hearing
    are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence in the record preponderates against
    those findings. See Henley v. State, 
    960 S.W.2d 572
    , 578-79 (Tenn. 1997); Clenny
    v. State, 
    576 S.W.2d 12
    , 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 
    441 U.S. 947
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 2170
     (1979).7 The appellant has failed to include the transcript of prior
    proceedings, specifically a transcript of the guilty plea proceeding, in the record
    before this court. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). This Court, therefore, is precluded
    from conducting an appropriate review on appeal. See State v. Ballard, 
    855 S.W.2d 557
     (Tenn.1993). Accordingly, "[i]n the absence of an adequate record on
    appeal, this court must presume that the trial court's rulings were supported by
    sufficient evidence." State v. Oody, 
    823 S.W.2d 554
    , 559 (Tenn. Crim. App.1991).
    Additionally, in evaluating the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea,
    the United States Supreme Court held, "[t]he standard was and remains whether the
    plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
    action open to the defendant." North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. at 31
    , 
    91 S.Ct. at 164
    . In making this determination, the reviewing court must look to the totality of
    the circumstances. State v. Turner, 
    919 S.W.2d 346
    , 353 (Tenn. Crim. App.1995),
    perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1996). See also Chamberlain v. State, 
    815 S.W.2d 7
    Notwithstanding this general rule, in State v. Brenda Anne Burns, No. W1996-00004-SC-
    R11-CD (T enn. at Jackson, No v. 8, 1999) (for publication), our supreme court held that “[c]ases
    that involve mixed questions of law and fact are subject to de novo review.” (citing Harries v.
    State , 958 S.W .2d 799, 802 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1997)). Specifically, the supreme court
    determined that issues involving alleged deficient performance of counsel and possible prejudice
    to the defe nse are mixed question s of law an d fact. See State v. Brenda Anne Burns, No.
    W1996-00004-SC-R11-CD. Although we perform a de novo review of the issue, the appellant
    mus t still establish his o r her allega tions by clea r and co nvincing e vidence . See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210
    (f) (1997).
    12
    534, 542 (Tenn. Crim. App.1990), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1991). Indeed, “a
    court charged with determining whether ... pleas were "voluntary" and "intelligent"
    must look to various circumstantial factors, such as the relative intelligence of the
    defendant; the degree of his[/her] familiarity with criminal proceedings; whether
    he[/she] was represented by competent counsel and had the opportunity to confer
    with counsel about the options available to him[/her]; the extent of advice from
    counsel and the court concerning the charges against him[/her]; and the reasons for
    his[/her] decision to plead guilty, including a desire to avoid a greater penalty that
    might result from a jury trial.” Blankenship v. State, 
    858 S.W.2d 897
    , 904
    (Tenn.1993).
    With these criteria considered, we conclude that the record supports the trial
    court’s findings that counsel had informed the appellant of her right to appeal
    (including possible issues for appeal), provided relevant sentencing information, and
    properly advised her regarding the waiver of her constitutional rights. The record
    supports the trial court’s conclusion that the appellant’s guilty plea was knowingly
    and voluntarily entered upon the competent advice of counsel.
    After a full consideration of the record, we conclude that the appellant has
    failed to establish either prong of the Hill v. Lockhart test. For these reasons, we
    affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    ____________________________________
    DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
    13
    CONCUR:
    _______________________________________
    JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
    _______________________________________
    DAVID H. WELLES, Judge
    14