State v. James Usery ( 2010 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    SEPTEMBE R SESSION, 1998
    FILED
    August 4, 1999
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,        )   C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9805-CC-00154
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    )
    Appellate Court Clerk
    Appellee,            )
    )
    )   WEAKLEY COUNTY
    VS.                        )
    )   HON. WILLIAM B. ACREE
    JAMES NORMAN USERY,        )   JUDGE
    )
    Appe llant.          )   (Certified Q uestion— Search Wa rrant)
    ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
    CIRCUIT COURT OF WEAKLEY COUNTY
    FOR THE APPELLANT:             FOR THE APPELLEE:
    GARRY BROWN                    JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    P.O. Box 505                   Attorney General and Reporter
    Milan, TN 38358
    PETER M. COUGHLAN
    Assistant Attorney General
    425 Fifth Avenu e North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    THOMAS A. THOMAS
    District Attorney General
    ALLEN STRAWBRIDGE
    Assistant District Attorney General
    P.O. Box 218
    Union City, TN 38261
    OPINION ON REMA ND FILED ________________________
    REVERSED; CONVICTION VACATED
    DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
    OPINION ON REMAND
    This certified question of law was remanded to us by the Tennessee
    Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of its opinion in State v. Stevens, 
    989 S.W.2d 290
     (Tenn. 1999), clarifying when the presumption of reliability may be
    triggered by an affidavit pledging informa tion gathe red from a “citizen info rmant.”
    Upo n revie w of the court’s decision in Stevens, we modify our opinion to reflect
    our decision that the affidavit sworn in this case fails to me et the stan dard to
    realize a presu mption of reliability. The refore, we reverse th e order o f the trial
    court overruling the mo tion to suppress, vacate the Defendant’s conviction, and
    dismiss this case.
    In the original opinion of this Court, penned by former Judge Paul G.
    Summers, we upheld the validity of the search based upon information provided
    in the affid avit sworn by Lieutenant Joey Radford of the Greenfield Police
    Department. That affidavit recounted,
    A citizen informant has bee n in the residenc e in the past 72 h ours
    and has directly witnessed white powder substance, green plant
    mate rial, paraphernalia, weapons, and contraband associa ted with
    the use of controlled substances. This citizen informant is familiar
    with controlled substances.
    In addition, Radford checked a box next to the language, “The affiant has
    received informa tion from a reliable citize n inform ant.”
    In Tennessee, when an a ffidavit sw orn to p rocure a sea rch wa rrant is
    supported by information provided by a confidential informant, a finding of
    probable cause requires a factual showing of (1) the basis of knowledge of the
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    informa nt, and (2) the reliability or veracity of the inform ation or the informa nt.
    See State v. Jacu min, 
    778 S.W.2d 430
     (Tenn. 1989) (adopting the former federal
    jurisprudence of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S . 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United
    States, 
    393 U.S. 410
     (1969)).        However, the law of our state recognizes a
    distinction between information provided by citizen informants and by the type of
    profes siona l, compensated informant from the “criminal milieu”—presuming the
    former informa tion inhere ntly reliable. State v. Melson, 
    638 S.W.2d 342
     (Tenn.
    1982). To be entitled to this presum ption of a heightened degree of reliability, the
    face of the affida vit must demo nstrate that the inform ant is n ot a “crim inal”
    informa nt, but rathe r a conce rned citize n.
    Relying on Melson and its proge ny, we affirme d the e xistenc e of pro bable
    cause sufficient to s upport th e warran t in this case . See State v. James Norman
    Usery, No. 02C01-9805-CC-00154, 1998 W L 8323 54 (Te nn. Crim . App.,
    Jackson, Dec. 2, 1 998). Ho wever, in ligh t of the Tennessee Supr eme Cour t’s
    opinion in State v. Stevens, 
    989 S.W.2d 290
     (Tenn. 1999), we conclude that the
    affidav it does n ot establish probab le cause due to its failure to satisfy the second
    Jacu min prong, veracity or reliability of the informant or the information.
    In Stevens, officers obtained a search warrant based upon the following
    attested information:
    An adult conce rned c itizen so urce w ho is
    believed to be credible and liable [sic] and who resides
    in Henry Co unty and ha s family ties to Henry C ounty
    has told the affiant that they had seen
    methamphetamine being stored and cooked within 72
    hours prior to the swearing of this affidavit at the above
    stated residenc e. The citizen to ld the affiant that they
    had seen se veral flask [sic ], tubes, hot plate [sic] and
    several jugs sat [sic] up in the rear room of the
    -3-
    residence. The citizen told the affiant of the cooking
    process they had seen and the affiant having
    knowledge of the cooking process, believed the citizen
    to be reliable and truthful in their [sic] information. The
    citizen ask [sic] for n o paym ent for their [sic]
    information and acted on civic duty. Based on the
    above stated information the affiant believes that
    Williams is cooking and storing methamphetamine at
    the said resident [sic].        The citizen source was
    furnished with the finished product of what they [sic]
    had seen being cook ed an d imm ediate ly turned o ver to
    Officer Wyrick and Officer Eaker. The product was
    field tested and product was found to be
    methamphetamine. The affiant asked that the search
    warrant be valid up to 48 hours for securing and
    execu tion of the search warrant to allow D.E.A.
    participation from agents outside the state.
    Stevens, 989 S.W .2d at 292 (qu oting the affidavit). The su preme co urt found this
    language insufficient to trigger the Melson presumption of reliability, noting that
    “[t]he affidavit c ontain ed on ly conclusory allegations that the informant was a
    ‘concerned citizen source,’ ‘acted on civic duty,’ and ‘ask [sic] for no payment for
    their [sic] information.’” 
    Id. at 294
    . Furtherm ore, stated the court, “There is no
    explanation as to why the citizen was in the house while methamphetamine was
    being cooked and/or why the citizen was ‘fu rnishe d with th e finish ed pro duct.’ .
    . . The unexplained circumstances warrant caution in determining whether the
    informant is a pre sumptively reliable citizen .” 
    Id.
    Regarding an informant who is present while narcotics are being
    manufactured or packaged, for example, the Stevens court relied on the following
    passage from Professor LaFave:
    [A]s a general proposition it is an informant from the
    criminal milieu rather than a law ab iding c itizen w ho is
    most likely to be present under such circumstances.
    This is not to suggest that a person giving information
    about the location of narco tics may never qualify as a
    citizen-informer, for it is sometimes possible to show
    with particularity how a law-abiding individual
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    happened to come upon such knowledge. Rather, the
    point is that in such a case it should not be deemed
    sufficient that the police have alleged in a rather
    conclusory fashion that the person was “an individual
    who is neither a paid nor habitual inform ant,” “a
    respo nsible citizen of utmost character and integrity” or
    “a reputable member of the community.” Perhaps a
    more particularized showing of the law-abiding n ature
    of the per son su pplying the informa tion will suffice.
    
    Id. at 294-95
     (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search an d Seizure § 3.4(a) (3d ed.
    1996) (first emphasis added in Stevens) (seco nd em phas is in orig inal) (footnotes
    omitted in Stevens). After deciding that the Melson standard did not apply, the
    supreme court h eld that under a tradition al Jacu min standard, the affidavit was
    sufficie ntly reliable to esta blish p robab le cau se to s uppo rt the se arch w arran t in
    that case. Id. at 295. The court based its finding of reliability on the allegation
    that a positive field test was p erforme d on the narcotics given to th e informant.
    Id.
    In the case at bar, the information indicating that the informant was a
    “citizen-infor mant” does not meet the standard for a presumption of reliability
    according to Stevens. Lieutenant Ra dford provided n o more tha n concluso ry
    allegations that the informa tion was fu rnished by a “citizen -informa nt know n to
    the affiant.” In addition, the lieutenant gave no explanation why the informant had
    been present in Defendant’s residence and privy to the exis tence o f white
    powder, drug paraphernalia, green plant material, weapons, and contraband
    associated with controlled substances.
    Furthermore, resortin g to a tra ditiona l Jacu min analysis of veracity or
    reliability, we find no alle gation simila r to that m ade in Stevens which would
    factually ind icate the reliability of the inform ant or the informa tion. The veracity
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    prong therefore has not been satisfied; and the search wa rrant iss ued in this
    case, pursuant to which the principal evidence in this case was seized, was not
    supported by probable cause.
    Therefore, we must reverse the order of the trial court overruling the motion
    to suppress. We vacate the Defendant’s conviction and remand this case to the
    trial court for dism issal of the in dictme nt base d upon lack of pro bable ca use to
    suppo rt the searc h warran t.
    ____________________________________
    DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    (Not Participating)____________________
    PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
    ___________________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9805-CC-00154

Filed Date: 12/1/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014