State v. Christopher Snodgrass ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
APRIL SESSION, 1999
FILED
May 5, 1999
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) No. 02C01-9810-CC-00325
Appellate Court Clerk
Appellee )
) HARDIN COUNTY
vs. )
) Hon. C. Creed McGinley, Judge
CHRISTOPHER WAYNE )
SNODGRASS, ) (Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender)
)
Appellant )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Guy T. Wilkinson Paul G. Summers
District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
Richard W. DeBerry Patricia C. Kussmann
Asst. District Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
117 Forrest Avenue North Criminal Justice Division
Camden, TN 38320 425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
G. Robert Radford
District Attorney General
John W. Overton, Jr.
Asst. District Attorney General
P. O. Box 484
Jackson TN 38372
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Christopher Wayne Snodgrass, pled guilty to violation of the
Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender's Act, a class E felony. The trial court imposed a
sentence of eighteen months confinement in the Department of Correction.1 On
appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying a community
corrections sentence.
BACKGROUND
The appellant was declared a motor vehicle habitual offender by order of the
Hardin County Circuit Court on May 15, 1991. In 1994, the appellant was convicted
of violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender's Act and received a one year
sentence to the Department of Correction. Following his release from confinement,
he received a gunshot wound to the head resulting in paralysis to his arm. The
appellant moved to Florida in early 1995 and continued to reside in that state until
March of 1998. Due to the gunshot wound, he was unable to work so he ". . . just
kind of piddled around." While in Florida the appellant applied for and was issued a
driver's license. In March of 1998, the appellant returned to the state of Tennessee.
He related that he was unaware that his Florida driver's license was ". . . no good
in Tennessee until [he] got pulled over . . . and . . . carried . . . to jail." On June 1,
1998, a state trooper stopped the appellant for driving with expired tags on his
vehicle. After discovering that the appellant was driving in violation of the court's
order of May 15, 1991, the appellant was again charged as a motor vehicle habitual
offender.
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The negotiated plea agreement provided a sentence recommendation of eighteen
mon ths. The man ner of se rvice of the senten ce was subm itted to the trial co urt for its
determination.
2
The presentence report revealed that the appellant is thirty-four years old and
dropped out of school in the ninth grade. Currently, he is unemployed and receiving
a monthly income based upon his disability. The presentence report indicates three
prior convictions for driving under the influence and two convictions for driving on a
revoked license all occurring in 1989 and 1990. The appellant testified that he
stopped drinking four years ago.
The trial court denied community corrections and imposed a full term of
incarceration for the appellant. As grounds for the denial, the trial court observed,
This is not the first time he’s been convicted of this particular crime, so
ignorance really is no excuse.
The prior record consists of driving offenses, including the prior
felony conviction of violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender
statute. And on the record in front of the Court, the Court finds that
that weighs against the presumption for the eligibility for alternative
sentencing.
Having been through this entire situation before as he was in
1994, the Court finds that it’s inexcusable to go out and intentionally
violate the same law again. Therefore, a prior felony record as well as
prior driving offenses, the Court finds he’s not eligible for alternative
sentencing.
The appellant now seeks review of this sentence.
The appellant’s sole challenge on appeal is the denial of a community
corrections sentence. Review by this court of the manner of service of a sentence is
de novo with a presumption that the determination made by the trial court is correct.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (1997). This presumption only applies if the record
demonstrates that the trial court properly considered the relevant sentencing
principles. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). In the case before
us, the record makes such a showing. Accordingly, we apply the presumption.
Initially, we must determine whether the appellant is a suitable candidate for
alternative sentencing. As the appellant was convicted as a Range I standard
offender of a Class E felony, he is entitled to the presumption of alternative
sentencing absent evidence to the contrary. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(5), (6)
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(1997). However, this presumption may be rebutted by “evidence to the contrary.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6); see also State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 454
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Guidance as to what constitutes evidence to the contrary
may be found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1) (A-C). If it is shown that the
appellant has a long history of criminal conduct, that the appellant has not been
rehabilitated with less restrictive methods, or that confinement is necessary to avoid
depreciating the seriousness of the offense or to provide an effective deterrence to
others, alternative sentences may be denied. Id. See also Bingham, 910 S.W.2d at
454 (citing Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169). Finally, the defendant's potential or lack of
potential for rehabilitation should be considered in determining whether he should
be granted an alternative sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5). The
appellant contends that he has demonstrated his potential for rehabilitation by taking
the required classes to receive a driver's license in Florida.
In the instant case, the trial court found that the presumption for an
alternative sentence was rebutted by the appellant’s prior record of driving offenses.
We agree. The record demonstrates that the appellant has one prior conviction for
this same offense and five misdemeanor driving offenses. Measures less restrictive
than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the
defendant. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(C). Moreover, this appellant has
shown blatant disregard for the laws of this State by continuing to drive his vehicle
after loss of his driving privilege. We conclude that the record contains more than
sufficient “evidence to the contrary” to rebut the presumption favoring the alternative
sentencing option of community corrections.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
_______________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
_______________________________________
L. T. LAFFERTY, Senior Judge.
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