State v. Joe Jackson ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JULY, 1998 SESSION
FILED
November 9, 1998
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) No. 02C01-9707-CR-00252
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellee ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
) Shelby Coun ty
vs. )
) Honorable Joseph B. Dailey, Judge
JOE E. JACKSON, )
) (Theft of a motor vehicle)
Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
A.C. WHARTON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Shelby County Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
DIANNE THACKERY CLINTON J. MORGAN
Assistant Public Defender Counsel fo r the State
(At trial) 425 Fifth Ave . North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Bldg.
W. MARK W ARD Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Assistant Public Defender
(On appeal)
Suite 2-01, 201 Poplar Ave. WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
Memphis, TN 38103 District Attorney General
DAVID HENRY
Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Ave., Suite 301
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED: ____________________
AFFIRMED
CURW OOD WITT
JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Joe E. Jackson, appeals from his convictions in the
Shelby County Criminal Court for unlawfu lly and knowingly obta ining a moto r vehicle
valued at more than a thousand dollars but less than ten thousand dollars and for
unlawfully and knowingly exercising control over the same vehicle.1 The trial court
entered judgment only on the first count of the indictment and sentenced the defendant
to serve twelve years in the De partment of C orrection as a ca reer offender. In this
appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient
to identify him beyond a reasonable doubt as the person who committed the offense
and (2) that the jury’s dual finding s of guilt violate dou ble jeopardy princip les. W e
affirm the defendant’s conviction for theft under the first count of the indictment and
dismiss the second co unt.
On July 31, 1996, Joyce Carter parked her automobile, a 1993 Buick
Century, in the parking lot at her place of employment. At about 3:00 p.m., Rodney
Jenkins, a fellow employee, who was leaving work, watched as two men left the
parking lot in Carter’s vehicle . Jenkins reco gnized the autom obile as belon ging to
Joyce Carter, and he knew Carter’s husband. The Buick passed within eight feet of
Jenkins, and he paid particular attention because he realized that the driver was not
Carter’s husband. He described the driver as a black male weighing about 165 to 185
pounds with a light brown com plexion and w earing a dark colored T-shirt and a white
hat. The next day the police recove red the autom obile. Although it had been “burnt
to a crisp,” the police were able to identify it through its VIN number, and Carter
recognized so me of her be longings whic h had not bee n comple tely destroyed.
Approxim ately one mon th later, on Augus t 30, 1996, som e of Carter’s
co-workers noted that two strang e men we re walking aroun d in the parking lo t and
pointing to various cars. Jenkins went to the parking lot to observe the men, and he
recognized one of them as the man who drove Carter’s au tomobile out of the parking
1
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-10 3 (1997).
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lot. When the police arrived, Jenkins positively identified the defendant as the person
who had prev iously remov ed Carter’s autom obile from the lot.2
The grand jury returned a two count indictment. In the first count, the
indictment charged that on July 31, 1996, the defe ndant “ did unlawf ully and knowing ly
obtain property, to wit: a motor ve hicle . . . without the effec tive consent of Joyce
Carter with intent to deprive the owner thereof. . . .” The second count charged the
defendant with unlawfully and k nowingly exercis ing control over the same vehicle. The
jury found the defe ndant guilty on both counts of the ind ictment.
First we consider wh ether the eviden ce presented at trial is sufficient to
prove beyond a reaso nable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the
offense ch arged in the indictm ent.
In Tenness ee, appellate co urts give great weigh t to the result reached
by a jury in a criminal trial. A jury’s verdict approved by the trial judge accredits the
state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. State v. Williams, 657
S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn
therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Because a verdict
of guilty removes the presum ption of innoce nce and repla ces it with a presumption of
guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of dem onstrating why the ev idence is
insufficient, as a matter of la w, to support the verd ict. State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d
913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Our standard of review when the sufficiency of the evidence
is questioned on appeal is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319, 99 S. Ct. 278 1, 2789 (1979 ).
2
The appellan t did not testify nor did he o ffer any evidenc e on his
behalf.
3
The identity of the accused as the person who committed the offense for
which he is on trial is a ques tion of fact for the jury. State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d
188, 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 81); Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1978). The record before us indic ates that Rodney Jenkins stood within eight
feet of the defendant during daylight hours. He testified that he paid particular
attention to the driver of the vehicle when he realized that the m an was not the o wner’s
husband. He was able to describe the driver as a black male with a light brown
complexion who was wearing a dark T-shirt and a white hat with some w riting on it.
A month later, Jenkins again saw the defendant in the same parking lot. He was
wearing the same hat and Jenkins recognized him at once. The arresting officer
testified that Jenkins identified the defendant without hesitation. Jenkins also
positively identified the defendant at trial. Ques tions of c redibility are f or the jury, and
the jury believed Jenkin s’ testimony. W e find that the evide nce is sufficie nt for a
rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the
man who drove the stolen Buic k from the pa rking lot. See State v. Williams, 623
S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (victim’s testimony, by itself, is su fficient to
support a conviction); State v. Livingston, 607 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1980) (eyewitness identification suf ficient to suppo rt conviction).
In his second issue, the defendant contends that his two convictions for
theft violate double jeopardy principles. The state agrees that only one conviction may
stand.
The grand jury indicted the defendant bo th for unlawfully and k nowingly
obtaining a motor vehicle belonging to Joyce Carter and for unla wfully and knowin gly
exercising control over that same motor vehic le. The jury found the d efendant gu ilty
on both counts. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court
and both counsel agreed that one of the convictions had to be dismissed. The trial
court, however, was reluctant to dismiss either charge because he was uncertain
which count should be retained and which should be dismissed. The record before us
contains only one judgment. According to this judgment, the defendant was convicted
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on count one of theft of property valued at more than $1000 in violation of Tennessee
Code Ann otated section 3 9-14-103.
W e agree that the second count should be dismisse d. The evidenc e in
the record is s ufficien t to prove b eyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
“unlawfully and unknow ingly obtained a motor vehicle worth more than a $1000 but
less than $10,000 without the consent of Joyce Carter, the owner,” and that he acted
with the intent to deprive the owner of her au tomobile.
Accord ingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction for theft of property
valued at more than $1000 but less than $10,000 as charged in the first count of
Indictment No. 96-13935. The disposition of the second count of that indictment was
never reflected in a judgme nt. The second count is dism issed.
_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
CURW OOD WITT, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
______________________________
ROBERT W . WEDEMEYER, Special Judge
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