State v. Monroe Davis ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
JUNE 1997 SESSION July 2, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
MONROE E. DAVIS, )
) NO. 02C01-9607-CC-00242
Appellant, )
) LAUDERDALE COUNTY
VS. )
) Hon. Joseph H. Walker, Judge
JIMMY HARRISON, WARDEN, )
) (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus)
Appellee. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
MONROE E. DAVIS, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
West Tennessee High Security Attorney General and Reporter
Post Office Box 1050
Henning, TN 38041-1050 WILLIAM DAVID BRIDGERS
LISA A. NAYLOR
Assistant Attorneys General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
ELIZABETH T. RICE
District Attorney General
302 Market Street
Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Monroe E. Davis, appeals the order of the Circuit Court of
Lauderdale County summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He
is presently serving sentences of 20 years for second degree murder and one (1)
year for larceny. According to his petition, he was convicted and sentenced on
October 6, 1989. Because he cannot demonstrate that the judgments convicting
him are void or that his sentence terms have expired, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
I
Initially, we note that the state correctly points out that petitioner’s notice of
appeal was untimely filed. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) requires that a notice of appeal
should be filed “within 30 days from the date of entry of the judgment appealed
from. . .” The order denying the petition was entered January 25, 1996. Notice of
appeal was filed on July 8, 1996. However, in the interest of justice we waive the
filing requirements and review the petition on the merits. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a).
II
In his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
35-501 allows the judicial branch to impose indeterminate sentences in direct
contravention to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-211 which prohibits indeterminate
sentences. His argument rests on the fact that the Board of Paroles has the power
to grant or deny parole upon a defendant’s eligibility for release. Thus, he argues
that the sentences he received are void.
Although Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-211 prohibits indeterminate sentences,
the sentences imposed upon Davis are not indeterminate. The mere fact that the
Board of Paroles may grant or deny parole does not convert a determinate sentence
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into an indeterminate one. Parole does not cause the sentence to expire or
terminate but is merely a conditional release. See Doyle v. Hampton, 207 Tenn.
399, 340 S.W.2d 891 (1960); Joe Thomas Baker, Jr. v. State, C.C.A. No. 01C01-
9604-CR-00129 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed February 20, 1997, at Nashville); Terry
Merrell v. State, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9604-CR-00147 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed
February 20, 1997, at Nashville). This issue has no merit.
III
Petitioner also contends that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501 is an
unconstitutional delegation of power by the legislature to the judicial branch by
allowing courts to determine a defendant’s sentencing range. He claims that by
doing so, the courts are determining how much time a defendant must serve before
becoming eligible for parole. Therefore, because parole is an executive function,
he argues that this sentencing scheme violates the separation of powers doctrine.
The authority to grant paroles is not judicial in nature but is administrative.
Woods v. State, 130 Tenn. 100, 169 S.W. 558 (1914). However, “it has long been
recognized that it is impossible to preserve perfectly the theoretical lines of
demarcation between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government. . . There is necessarily a certain amount of overlapping. The three
departments are interdependent.” Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn.
1975)(citations omitted); see also In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tenn. 1995).
This is particularly so in our criminal justice system. See Underwood, 529 S.W.2d
at 47. Accordingly, we find that a trial court’s determination of sentencing range
does not infringe upon the powers of the executive branch. See Steve L. Bryant v.
State, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9605-CR-00190 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed April 24, 1997, at
Nashville). This issue is without merit.
IV
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Habeas corpus relief in criminal cases is limited to those instances where the
petitioner’s conviction is void on its face, or he is being held beyond the expiration
of his sentence. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. 1993). Davis has not
shown that the judgments convicting him are facially void or that his sentence terms
have expired. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was properly dismissed.
We conclude that the petitioner's claims do not show that his judgments are
void or that his sentences have expired, making habeas corpus relief inappropriate.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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