John McDonald v. State ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE        FILED
    NOVEMBER 1998 SESSION
    December 8, 1998
    Cecil W. Crowson
    Appellate Court Clerk
    JOHN McDONALD,                      )
    )    NO. 01C01-9711-CR-00529
    Appellant,                    )
    )    DAVIDSON COUNTY
    VS.                                 )
    )    HON. J. RANDALL WYATT, JR.,
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                 )    JUDGE
    )
    Appellee.                     )    (Post-Conviction)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                       FOR THE APPELLEE:
    JOHN McDONALD, Pro Se                    JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    #125039                                  Attorney General and Reporter
    P.O. Box 5000
    Mountain City, TN 37683-5000             TODD R. KELLEY
    Assistant Attorney General
    Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    VICTOR S. JOHNSON III
    District Attorney General
    KATY NOVAK MILLER
    Assistant District Attorney General
    222 - 2nd Avenue North
    Washington Square, Suite 500
    Nashville, TN 37201-1649
    OPINION FILED:
    AFFIRMED
    JOE G. RILEY,
    JUDGE
    OPINION
    Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his motion to re-open petition for post-
    conviction relief. He claims that the 1987 indictment for aggravated rape and
    aggravated sexual battery under which he was convicted failed to vest jurisdiction
    in the trial court as per State v. Hill, 
    954 S.W.2d 725
    (Tenn. 1997). After a thorough
    review of the record provided, we find this claim to be without merit and AFFIRM the
    decision of the trial court.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Petitioner was indicted for aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery
    in 1987. A jury convicted him of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the
    judgments became final in June 1990. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction
    relief in April 1997, which was dismissed by the trial court on July 21, 1997. On
    August 13, 1997, he filed a motion to re-open the petition. This motion, likewise,
    was dismissed. This appeal followed.
    RECORD ON APPEAL
    It is the appellant’s duty to prepare a record which conveys a fair and
    accurate account of what transpired with respect to the issues which form the basis
    of the appeal in order to allow for a meaningful appellate review. Tenn. R. App. P.
    24; State v. Oody, 
    823 S.W.2d 554
    , 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). This appeal is
    essentially based upon sufficiency of the indictment, yet petitioner failed to include
    a copy of the indictment in the record. We are, therefore, unable to provide
    appellate review.
    STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
    2
    Petitioner has yet another procedural problem. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-
    102 (repealed 1995) allowed petitioners three years from the date of final action of
    the highest state appellate court in which to file for post-conviction relief. The Post-
    Conviction Procedure Act of 1995 did not grant petitioners seeking post-conviction
    relief an additional year for filing petitions that were already barred by the statute of
    limitations prior to May 10, 1995. State v. Carter, 
    952 S.W.2d 417
    , 420 (Tenn.
    1997).
    In the case under review, this Court affirmed petitioner’s convictions and
    sentences on March 1, 1990. The Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on
    June 4, 1990. Thus, his petition was time-barred as of June 1993. The 1995 Act
    does not grant petitioner a reprieve from this limitation. Furthermore, none of the
    exceptions to the statute of limitations apply. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b).
    Nevertheless, assuming petitioner’s claim was not time-barred, it would still
    be without merit. Petitioner failed to allege any grounds that would entitle him to
    have the original petition for post-conviction relief re-opened as required by Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a).
    STATE V. HILL
    Petitioner challenges the validity of his 1987 indictment. Without a valid
    indictment, there can be no jurisdiction and no prosecution. Dykes v. Compton, __
    S.W.2d __, __ (Tenn. 1998). However, we conclude the alleged language in the
    indictment was sufficient.
    As derived from the trial court’s order, the indictment presumably reads in
    part:
    “Count one . . . defendant ‘unlawfully, and feloniously did commit the
    offense of aggravated sexual battery by engaging in unlawful sexual
    contact to wit: touching of the genital area . . . [of the victim] . . . and
    the said [victim] was a child less than (13) thirteen years of age. . .’”
    “Count two . . . defendant ‘with force and arms . . . unlawfully, and
    feloniously did engage in sexual penetration, to wit, anal intercourse,
    of [the victim], a child less than 13 years of age. . .’”
    A review of this language convinces us that the indictment met all constitutional
    3
    requirements as delineated in 
    Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 726-27
    . Therefore, petitioner’s
    claim is without merit.
    OTHER ISSUES
    On appeal the petitioner raises other issues; to wit: the validity of the
    indictment based upon non-Hill issues, improper sentencing and the denial of
    exculpatory evidence. These issues were not raised in the trial court and are
    waived. See Butler v. State, 
    789 S.W.2d 898
    , 902 (Tenn. 1990).
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing, the trial court’s dismissal of petitioner’s motion to
    re-open petition for post-conviction relief is AFFIRMED.
    ____________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ____________________________
    PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
    ____________________________
    L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01C01-9711-CR-00529

Filed Date: 12/1/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014