State of Tennessee v. Austin Drummond ( 2016 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    Assigned on Briefs October 6, 2015
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. AUSTIN DRUMMOND
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County
    No. 14232     Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge
    No. W2014-02553-CCA-R3-CD - Filed May 25, 2016
    _____________________________
    Defendant, Austin Drummond, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury with one
    count of aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the
    offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve ten years in the Department of
    Correction. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient
    to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Having carefully reviewed
    the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial
    court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CAMILLE R.
    MCMULLEN and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.
    Kortney D. Simmons, Jackson, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Austin Drummond.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Tracy L. Alcock, Assistant
    Attorney General, James G. (Jerry) Woodall, District Attorney General; and Jody
    Pickens, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    Background
    On July 31, 2013, Candice Barham was working the late shift as the First Assistant
    Manager of the Circle K convenience store located on the corner of Highland and
    University Streets in Jackson. At approximately 12:30 a.m., a white male later identified
    as Defendant entered the store. He was wearing a hat and a black oversized t-shirt with a
    white graphic on the front of the cartoon character “Stewie” from the television show
    Family Guy. Ms. Barham thought that Defendant‟s behavior was suspicious as he
    walked down every aisle of the store and watched her. She explained that at that time of
    night, customers usually “know what they came for. They come, they get what they were
    going to get and they leave.” Ms. Barham asked Defendant if she could help him find
    anything, and he replied, “No, I‟m just looking. I got the munchies.” She testified that
    Defendant was in the store for a total of three to four minutes.
    When Ms. Barham turned to look out the window into the parking lot, Defendant
    walked behind the register. When she turned back around, he was standing within two
    feet of her. Defendant then pointed a pistol at Ms. Barham and ordered her to “[o]pen the
    drawer. I‟m not fu - - - - g playing with you. Open the drawer.” Ms. Barham testified
    that at that point, she felt threatened and feared for her life. She opened the cash register
    and stepped back. Defendant reached into the drawer and took the bills that were in the
    till. He also lifted the till to see if there was any money underneath, but it was empty.
    Defendant appeared to be upset that there was no additional cash and said, “Man, ya‟ll
    tripping.” He repeated the statement three times as he left the store. Ms. Barham
    testified that Defendant took a total of forty-four dollars out of the register. As the First
    Assistant Manager, it was her responsibility to exercise custody and control over the
    money.
    After Defendant left, Ms. Barham locked the doors and called police. As she was
    locking the door and on the phone with the 911 dispatcher, Ms. Barham saw two police
    officers, who were regular customers, pull into the parking lot. Ms. Barham motioned to
    the officers that there had been a robbery. She told them that Defendant ran past the
    officers after he exited the store. The officers got back into their patrol car and drove after
    Defendant. Ms. Barham later told police that the robber was a white male, twenty to
    thirty years old, wearing black clothing. She was unable to identify Defendant from a
    photographic lineup because his “picture looked different.” Ms. Barham identified
    Defendant in the courtroom as the man who robbed her on July 31, 2013. She explained
    that it was different seeing Defendant in person as opposed to seeing the photograph of
    him.
    Ms. Barham identified a video recording of the robbery from the Circle K‟s
    surveillance system. She identified Defendant several times on the video. The video
    showed Defendant entering the Circle K at 12:32 a.m. and walking through the candy
    isle. It also showed Defendant robbing Ms. Barham and then exiting the store at 12:35
    a.m. Ms. Barham identified Defendant in the video holding a pistol in his right hand as
    he approached Ms. Barham.
    Officer Joshua Vincent of the Jackson Police Department testified that he and
    Officer Mullins pulled into the Circle K store on July 31, 2013, at approximately 12:30 to
    2
    12:35 a.m. When they arrived Officer Vincent saw a white male, approximately six-feet
    tall weighing 150-170 pounds, and wearing dark clothing and a baseball hat, running out
    of the store. He also saw Ms. Barham waving at the officers. Officer Vincent testified
    that he and Officer Mullins approached the locked front door of the store. Ms. Barham
    informed them that the man who ran past them had robbed her. The officers immediately
    issued a BOLO (be on the lookout) for the man. They searched for the person for twenty
    to thirty minutes but could not find him.
    Officer Joseph King of the Jackson Police Department testified that he was the
    crime scene technician dispatched to the robbery scene at the Circle K. He spoke with
    Ms. Barham who told him that Defendant touched the cash register and the front door.
    Officer King testified that he lifted a fingerprint from the left front door of the store, and
    he also lifted three fingerprints from inside the cash register. He drew a diagram of the
    register and marked the area where the prints were lifted.
    Investigator Aubrey Richardson of the Jackson Police Department, Major Case
    Unit, testified that he investigated the robbery that occurred on July 31, 2013. He also
    asked William Roane, a latent fingerprint examiner with the Jackson Police Department,
    to assist with the case. Investigator Richardson was given the names of Shawn Bruin and
    Defendant as possible suspects in the robbery, and he asked Mr. Roane to compare the
    prints lifted by Officer King with those of the two men. Investigator Richardson also
    took still photographs from the video surveillance of the robbery, and he obtained a
    photograph of Defendant that had been taken on June 14, 2013. In the photograph,
    Defendant had a beard, mustache, and longer hair. This differed from his appearance at
    trial. Investigator Richardson showed a photographic lineup to Ms. Barham on August 1
    or 2, 2013, but she was unable to identify anyone from the lineup as the individual who
    committed the robbery. Mr. Roane reported that the prints did not match those of Shawn
    Bruin.
    William Roane, an expert in the area of latent print identification and examination,
    testified that he compared the fingerprints lifted by Officer King from the Circle K with
    those of Defendant. He determined that a print lifted from inside the cash drawer of the
    register was made by Defendant‟s left ring finger and “no other.” Mr. Roane testified
    that another latent fingerprint examiner with the Jackson Police Department, Aimee
    Oxley, conducted an independent analysis and verified his findings.
    Analysis
    I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Defendant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction
    for aggravated robbery. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the State failed to prove that
    3
    anything was taken from Ms. Barham‟s person and that the State failed to produce the
    weapon used during the aggravated robbery. Defendant also argues that the State failed
    to prove that he was the perpetrator of the aggravated robbery. We conclude that the
    evidence is sufficient to support Defendant‟s conviction.
    “Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and raises a
    presumption of guilt, the criminal defendant bears the burden on appeal of showing that
    the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.” State v. Hanson, 
    279 S.W.3d 265
    , 275 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Evans, 
    838 S.W.2d 185
    , 191 (Tenn.
    1992)). When this court evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the State is
    entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
    may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Davis, 
    354 S.W.3d 718
    , 729 (Tenn. 2011)
    (citing State v. Majors, 
    318 S.W.3d 850
    , 857 (Tenn. 2010)). When a defendant
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review applied by this court is
    “whether „any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.‟” State v. Parker, 
    350 S.W.3d 883
    , 903 (Tenn. 2011)
    (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979)). Similarly, Rule 13(e) of the
    Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure states, “Findings of guilt in criminal actions
    whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to
    support the finding by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence,
    circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Sutton, 
    166 S.W.3d 686
    ,
    691 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Hall, 
    976 S.W.2d 121
    , 140 (Tenn. 1998). The standard of
    review for sufficiency of the evidence “„is the same whether the conviction is based upon
    direct or circumstantial evidence.‟” State v. Dorantes, 
    331 S.W.3d 370
    , 379 (Tenn. 2011)
    (quoting State v. Hanson, 
    279 S.W.3d 265
    , 275 (Tenn. 2009). The jury as the trier of fact
    must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses‟
    testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 
    245 S.W.3d 331
    , 335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 
    575 S.W.2d 292
    , 295 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1978)). Moreover, the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence
    and the inferences to be drawn from this evidence, and the extent to which the
    circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence are questions
    primarily for the jury. 
    Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379
    (citing State v. Rice, 
    184 S.W.3d 646
    , 662 (Tenn. 2006)). When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this court
    shall not substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. 
    Id. The identity
    of the perpetrator “is an essential element of any crime.” State v.
    Rice, 
    184 S.W.3d 646
    , 662 (Tenn. 2006). The perpetrator‟s identity “may be established
    solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence.” State v. Lewter, 
    313 S.W.3d 745
    , 748
    (Tenn. 2010).
    4
    A person commits aggravated robbery who commits a robbery with a deadly
    weapon. T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a)(1). Robbery “is the intentional or knowing theft of
    property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.” 
    Id. § 39-
    13-401(a). “A person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of
    property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the
    owner‟s effective consent.” 
    Id. § 39-
    14-103.
    Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove that “anything was taken from
    the person of Candice Barham.” He asserts that Defendant did not touch or threaten Ms.
    Barham and that the money taken on July 31, 2013, did not belong to Ms. Barham. He
    also notes that the State did not produce any weapon used in the offense. In the light
    most favorable to the State, the proof at trial showed that during the early morning hours
    of July 31, 2013, Ms. Barham was working as the First Assistant Manager of the Circle K
    convenience store located on the corner of Highland and University Streets in Jackson.
    As the First Assistant Manager, it was her responsibility to exercise custody and control
    over the money in the cash register. The proof showed that Ms. Barham is an employee
    of the Circle K Convenience Store. Ms. Barham testified that when she turned to look
    out the window into the parking lot, Defendant walked behind the register. When she
    turned back around, he was standing within two feet of her. Defendant then pointed a
    pistol at Ms. Barham and ordered her to “[o]pen the drawer. I‟m not fu - - - - g playing
    with you. Open the drawer.” Ms. Barham testified that at that point, she felt threatened
    and feared for her life. She opened the cash register and stepped back. Defendant
    reached into the drawer and took the bills that were in the till. He also lifted the till to see
    if there was any money underneath, but it was empty. Ms. Barham testified that
    Defendant took a total of forty-four dollars out of the register. Although the State did not
    introduce a pistol at trial, Ms. Barham testified that Defendant pointed a pistol at her, and
    she identified Defendant in the video holding an object in his right hand as he approached
    her. Ms. Barham identified the object as a pistol.
    Defendant also argues that the State failed to prove that he was the individual who
    committed the aggravated robbery. Ms. Barham identified Defendant in the courtroom as
    the person who robbed her on July 31, 2013, at the Circle K Convenience Store. Ms.
    Barham admitted that she could not identify Defendant from the photographic lineup that
    she was shown after the robbery because Defendant looked different in the photograph.
    Investigator Robinson confirmed that Defendant looked different in the courtroom than
    he did in the photo. In the photograph, Defendant had a beard, mustache, and longer hair.
    After the robbery, Ms. Barham described Defendant‟s clothing to police, and Officer
    Vincent saw a man, who Ms. Barham identified as the person who robbed her, run out of
    the Circle K wearing the same clothing that Ms. Barham had described. At trial, Ms.
    Barham identified Defendant several times in the surveillance video. Mr. Roane, an
    5
    expert in the area of latent print identification and examination, testified that he compared
    the fingerprints lifted by Officer King from the Circle K with those of Defendant. He
    determined that a print lifted from inside the cash drawer of the register was made by
    Defendant‟s left ring finger and “no other.” Mr. Roane testified that another latent
    fingerprint examiner with the Jackson Police Department, Aimee Oxley, conducted an
    independent analysis and verified his findings.
    Therefore, we conclude that evidence existed that reasonable minds could accept
    that Defendant committed the offense of aggravated robbery.
    II. Length of Sentence
    Defendant challenges the length of his sentence for the Class B felony of
    aggravated robbery. He contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider certain
    mitigating factors.
    Appellate review of the length, range, or manner of service of a sentence imposed
    by the trial court are to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a
    presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 
    380 S.W.3d 682
    , 708 (Tenn. 2012). In
    sentencing a defendant, the trial court shall consider the following factors: (1) the
    evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence
    report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4)
    the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and
    information offered by the parties on enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any
    statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to sentencing
    practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; (7) any statement by the appellant in his own
    behalf; and (8) the potential for rehabilitation or treatment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-
    35-102, -103, -210; see also 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 697-98
    . The burden is on the appellant
    to demonstrate the impropriety of his sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401,
    Sentencing Comm‟n Cmts.
    In determining a specific sentence within a range of punishment, the trial court
    should consider, but is not bound by, the following advisory guidelines:
    (1) The minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the
    sentence that should be imposed, because the general assembly set the
    minimum length of sentence for each felony class to reflect the relative
    seriousness of each criminal offense in the felony classifications; and
    6
    (2) The sentence length within the range should be adjusted, as
    appropriate, by the presence or absence of mitigating and enhancement
    factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114.
    T.C.A. § 40-35-210(c).
    Although the trial court should consider enhancement and mitigating factors, the
    statutory enhancement factors are advisory only. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114; see
    also 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 701
    ; State v. Carter, 
    254 S.W.3d 335
    , 343 (Tenn. 2008). Our
    supreme court has stated that “a trial court‟s weighing of various mitigating and
    enhancement factors [is] left to the trial court‟s sound discretion.” 
    Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345
    . In other words, “the trial court is free to select any sentence within the applicable
    range so long as the length of the sentence is „consistent with the purposes and principles
    of [the Sentencing Act].‟” 
    Id. at 343
    (emphasis added). Appellate courts are “bound by a
    trial court‟s decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed in a
    manner consistent with the purposes and principles set out in sections -102 and -103 of
    the Sentencing Act.” 
    Id. at 346.
    The applicable sentencing range for a Range I offender convicted of a Class B
    felony is 8 to 12 years. T.C.A. § 40-35-112(a)(2). The trial court imposed a sentence of
    ten years for Defendant‟s conviction of aggravated robbery.
    The trial court stated on the record its findings regarding applicable enhancement
    and mitigating factors. Concerning enhancement factors, the trial court stated:
    As far as enhancing factors, of course, the juvenile records referred to in
    the presentence report, the history as to this Defendant, but while
    incarcerated for this offense, of course, he committed the act of
    vandalism. That is evidenced in the record at this point, Exhibit 2. He
    does have the prior juvenile adjudications for assault and resisting arrest.
    If you review the presentence report, and there‟s been no contest to its
    accuracy, he had a tendency to flee on occasion. He would run when
    they were about to apprehend him. That‟s referenced more than one
    time. And in fact, it‟s referenced in the testimony in this case through
    the father, Mr. Drummond. And I know it‟s difficult for the family. The
    father is here. But this Defendant did flee to Daytona Beach, Florida
    after this incident.
    T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1) and (16). The trial court did not find any specific mitigating
    factors applicable to Defendant. However, the trial court stated: “There is a catch all, I
    think Number 13, any factors consistent with the purpose of the chapter. I might consider
    7
    the young age of this Defendant who‟s now 18 years of age, but that would be the only
    thing I could think of that would apply.” T.C.A. § 40-35-113(13). More specifically,
    Defendant argues that the trial court “considered the Defendant‟s juvenile records, the
    vandalism conviction received during pretrial incarceration, the presentence report and
    the jail conversation recorded after Defendant was convicted but refused to thoughtfully
    consider the Defendant‟s age or anything else.” Defendant further asserts that trial court
    failed to consider his mental health as a mitigating factor.
    In Bise our supreme court held:
    We hold, therefore, that a trial court‟s misapplication of an enhancement
    or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the
    trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005. So
    long as there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and
    principles of sentencing, as provided by statute, a sentence imposed by
    the trial court within the appropriate range should be upheld.
    
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706
    (emphasis added). In its conclusion, the supreme court pointed
    out that in sentences involving misapplication of enhancement factors (even in those
    cases where no enhancement factor actually applies) the sentences must still be affirmed
    if the sentences imposed are within the appropriate range, and the sentences are in
    compliance with statutory sentencing purposes and principles. 
    Id. at 710.
    Our General Assembly has enacted twenty-five (25) statutory sentencing
    enhancement factors; however, they are not binding upon the trial courts. T.C.A. § 40-
    35-114 (Supp. 2015). The standard of review established in Bise provides that the
    minimum sentence can be imposed even if the trial court correctly applies all twenty-five
    enhancement factors, or the maximum sentence imposed even if no statutory
    enhancement factors are applicable, as long as the sentence is within the correct range
    and the sentence complies with other sentencing purposes and principles. Accordingly,
    appellate review of enhancement factor issues is arguably superfluous when reviewing
    the length of a sentence.
    Having reviewed the record before us, we conclude that the trial court clearly
    stated on the record its reasons for the sentences imposed, and Defendant‟s sentence is
    within the appropriate range. The record reflects that the trial court considered the
    purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. Defendant argues that the trial court
    failed to consider his age and mental health as mitigating factors. However, even if this
    court agreed with Defendant‟s assertions, we would still lack grounds to reverse
    Defendant‟s sentence. Therefore, the trial court‟s imposition of a sentence of ten years
    for aggravated robbery is presumed reasonable.
    8
    Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, PRESIDING JUDGE
    9