Johnson v. State ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
DECEMBER SESSION, 1998 FILED
February 2, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
DEXTER JOHNSON, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
) No. 03C01-9707-CR-00241
Appellant )
) HAMILTON COUNTY
vs. )
) Hon. Douglas a. Meyer, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Writ of Habeas Corpus)
Appellee )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Dexter Johnson, Pro Se John Knox Walkup
T.H.S.F. Attorney General and Reporter
P.O. Box 1050
Henning, TN 38041 Ellen H. Pollack
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Dexter Johnson, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's
summary dismissal of his pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus. On
February 11, 1994, the appellant entered guilty pleas to the offenses of first degree
murder for the death of Donald Sirhan; first degree murder for the death of Renaldo
Crawford; criminal attempt to commit first degree murder; and criminal attempt to
commit aggravated robbery. The appellant received two life sentences for the
murder convictions, twenty-five years for the attempted murder conviction and six
years for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction. These sentences were
ordered to be served concurrently. The appellant is currently incarcerated at the
West Tennessee High Security Facility in Lauderdale County. 1
On March 5, 1996, the appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus
in the Hamilton County Criminal Court alleging "ineffective assistance of counsel."2
On March 6, 1996, the trial court found the appellant's claims were not appropriate
for habeas corpus relief and dismissed the appellant's petition. The appellant
appeals this decision.
Initially, we note that, "[t]he mere fact that an appellant designates a pleading
as a petition for habeas corpus relief does not, however, mean that the jurisdiction
of the habeas corpus statutes has been properly invoked. If the petition is, in fact, a
request for relief that may be granted only pursuant to the post-conviction statutes, a
court may properly treat that petition as a petition for post-conviction relief and apply
the appropriate . . . statute of limitations to its filing." Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d
1In Tennessee, a "prisoner" must submit an application, in the form of a petition, for the
issuanc e of a writ to th e court m ost con venient in loc ation to the "p risoner." See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 29-21-105 (1980).
2
More specifically, he contends (1) that his plea was involuntarily entered because he was
on "powerful tranquilizers . . . that . . . made him paranoid" when the offenses were committed and
(2) that trial counsel failed to properly investigate his charges.
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157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). The appellant's claim of ineffectiveness is an appropriate
ground for post-conviction relief. However, because this petition was filed after May
10, 1995, it is governed by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995, which
permits the filing of only one petition for post-conviction relief. Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-30-202(c) (1995). A previous petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed
upon the merits with the dismissal being affirmed by this court on February 6, 1996.
See Johnson v. State, No. 03C01-9503-CR-00088 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville,
Feb. 6, 1996), perm. to appeal dismissed, (Tenn. Nov. 9, 1998).3 Thus, this is the
appellant's second petition for post-conviction relief and the trial court was precluded
from treating the appellant's petition as one for post-conviction relief.
In Tennessee, a state writ of habeas corpus, as opposed to a federal writ, will
issue only when the conviction is void because the convicting court was without
jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant or that a defendant's sentence has
expired and the petitioner is being illegally restrained. See Archer, 851 S.W.2d at
164. A void judgment is one which shows "upon the face of the judgment or the
record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered" that the convicting
court was without jurisdiction. Id. It is undisputed that the Criminal Court of
Hamilton County had subject matter jurisdiction of the criminal charges referred to in
the indictments and the authority to enter judgments of conviction against the
appellant for these crimes. See State v. Nixon, 977 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1997), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1998) (lack of jurisdiction refers to subject
matter jurisdiction). Moreover, it is undisputed that the appellant's sentences of life
imprisonment have not expired. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court's summary dismissal of the
3
In the appe llant's first p etition , he a sse rted th at his guilty ple as w ere c ons titution ally
deficient because (1) they violated Boyk in, (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709(1969)) , and (2) b ecaus e he wa s me ntally incom petent.
3
appellant's petition is affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
___________________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
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