State v. Adrian White ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MAY 1998 SESSION
FILED
July 8, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9710-CR-00384
Appellee, )
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. ARTHUR T. BENNETT,
ADRIAN WHITE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (First-Degree Murder)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
BRETT B. STEIN JOHN KNOX WALKUP
236 Adams Ave. Attorney General & Reporter
Memphis, TN 38103
ELIZABETH T. RYAN
WAYNE CHASTAIN Asst. Attorney General
66 Monroe, Suite 804 John Sevier Bldg.
Memphis, TN 338103 425 Fifth Ave., North
(Trial Only) Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
District Attorney General
THOMAS D. HENDERSON
JENNIFER NICHOLS
Asst. District Attorneys General
201 Poplar St., Suite 301
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY,
Judge
OPINION
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of
aggravated robbery. 1 In this appeal as of right, he argues that the trial court erred in
allowing the State to read the indictment to the jury and in instructing the jury on
“reasonable doubt.” Finding no merit in either of these arguments, we affirm.
The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to
read the indictment to the jury. The defendant has failed to include a transcription of the
reading of the indictment in the record on appeal. Consequently, we cannot determine
whether the State merely read the indictment verbatim, which is “an appropriate and
proper procedure,” State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Tenn. 1993), or whether the
State made the sort of improper comments regarding an indictment admonished in State
v. Onidas, 635 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1982). As such, meaningful review of this issue is
precluded.
Next, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury
on the meaning of “reasonable doubt.” The jury instruction in question reads as follows:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common
sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in this
case. It is not necessary that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond all
possible doubt, as absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to
convict of any criminal charge. A reasonable doubt is just that -- a doubt
that is reasonable after an examination of all the facts in this case. If you
find the state has not proven every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.
This instruction is identical to T.P.I. (Crim.) 2.03(a) (4th ed. 1997), the pattern jury
instruction on “reasonable doubt” that was written when the constitutionality of T.P.I.
1
The defenda nt appealed only as to his conviction for first-degree murder.
2
(Crim.) 2.03 (4th ed. 1997), was questioned. See T.P.I. (Crim.) 2.03 cmt. 2 (4th ed.
1997). We find no indication in the record that the defendant requested a different
instruction defining “reasonable doubt” or that the defendant objected to the instruction
as given, rendering the defendant’s argument waived in the absence of plain error. State
v. Cravens, 764 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tenn. 1989). Here, we find no error at all, let alone
plain error, as this Court has already determined that T.P.I. (Crim.) 2.03(a) is
constitutionally adequate. State v. Jose Holmes, 02C01-9505-CR-00154, Shelby County
(Tenn. Crim. App. filed December 10, 1997, at Jackson).
We find no merit to either of the defendant’s arguments. Accordingly, we
affirm his conviction and sentence.
_______________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
______________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
3