Cyril v. Fraser ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
AUGUST 1996 SESSION
FILED
Feb. 27, 1997
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9510-CR-00305
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellee, * SHELBY COUNTY Appellate Court Clerk
VS. * Hon. Joseph B. Dailey, Judge
JOE A. HENSON, * (Aggravated Burglary)
Appellant. *
For Appellant: For Appellee:
On appeal: Charles W. Burson
Walker Gwinn Attorney General & Reporter
Assistant Public Defender
Cyril V. Fraser
At trial: Counsel for the State
William Moore 450 James Robertson Parkway
Assistant Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493
201 Poplar Avenue
Suite 2-01 David C. Henry
Memphis, TN 38103 Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue
Of counsel: Third Floor
A.C. Wharton, Jr. Memphis, TN 38103
Shelby County Public Defender
OPINION FILED:_____________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Joe A. Henson, was convicted of aggravated burglary.
The trial court imposed a Range III sentence of fourteen years.
In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was
insufficient. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
About 9:00 P.M. on May 20, 1994, the victim, Kwame Williams,
returned to his residence to find his front door open. A man the victim identified as
the defendant "was coming out." The victim grabbed the defendant, demanding to
know what he was doing inside. The defendant answered that he was looking for
Vicky Jones, a cousin to the victim, who had moved out of the Williams residence
about a month before. The defendant was able to break free from the victim's grasp
and fled; his shirt was ripped in the process. The victim instructed a neighbor to call
police and then chased the defendant about a block. He described the defendant
as "a black male, [with a] low haircut, [and] ... a green shirt." When the victim
inspected the interior of the residence, he found that nothing had been taken but
that his television, which he always left on, had been unplugged. The front door
appeared to have been "kicked in"; there was a "footprint [on the door] and the
hinges were off." About twenty-five minutes later, the victim identified the defendant
who was by then in the custody of police.
A few minutes after the report of the burglary, Police Officer Thomas
Tynes responded to a call from a residence in the same neighborhood. The
defendant, who was not known by the occupant, was on the roof of the house; the
defendant explained to officers arriving at the scene that he had sought refuge from
several people who had been "fighting and chasing" him. When Officer Tynes
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learned that the altercation had begun at the residence of the victim, he suspected
the defendant had committed the burglary.
The defendant claims that the state was unable to prove that he had
entered the residence without the effective consent of the owner or that the
defendant intended to commit a theft therein. Both elements are essential to the
offense. The state, of course, insists that the proof was sufficient. It argues that
there was circumstantial evidence that the defendant entered the residence with the
intent to commit a theft.
A "person commits burglary who, without the effective consent of the
property owner ... [e]nters a building ... with intent to commit a felony or theft...."
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(1). A burglary committed under Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-14-402(a)(1) is a Class D felony. When a habitation, "any structure ...
designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons," is involved, the
burglary is aggravated and a Class C felony. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-401, -403.
On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence, and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom. State v.
Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1978). The credibility of the witnesses, the
weight given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence are
matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the trier of fact. Byrge v. State, 575
S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). A criminal conviction can be set aside only
when this court finds that the "evidence is insufficient to support the finding by the
trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).
The proof by the state was that there had been a forced entry of the
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residence and that the television, which had been left in operation by the victim
during the time of his absence, had been unplugged. By all appearances, the
victim's return to his residence interrupted the defendant's plans. In our view, the
jury was entitled to infer from this evidence that the defendant intended to commit a
theft or other felony inside the residence. Certainly, there is no requirement that a
burglar be successful in consummating the theft in order to be guilty of the burglary.
See e.g., Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237 (Tenn. 1973). Clearly, a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of aggravated burglary
beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence of the defendant's guilt satisfies the
standard prescribed. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
__________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
William M. Barker, Judge
_______________________________
Jerry L. Smith, Judge
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