Adrian Waite v. State ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE August 25, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
JULY 1999 SESSION Appellate C ourt
Clerk
ADRIAN WAITE, * C.C.A. # 03C01-9809-CR-00343
Appellant, * HAMILTON COUNTY
VS. * Hon. Stephen M. Bevil, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. *
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Tom Landis, Attorney Paul G. Summers
Suite 327 Attorney General and Reporter
744 McCallie Avenue
Chattanooga, TN 37403 Todd R. Kelley
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Second Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Mark A. Hooton
Assistant District Attorney General
Third Floor
Hamilton County-City Courts Building
Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED:__________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Adrian Waite, appeals the trial court's denial of post-
conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the defendant
was denied the effective assistance of counsel prior to entering a guilty plea. We
find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On May 13, 1993, the petitioner entered pleas of guilt to second
degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed consecutive
sentences of twenty years and six years, respectively. On November 16, 1995, the
petitioner filed this petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that because his trial
counsel was ineffective, his guilty pleas were neither knowingly nor intelligently
made. More specifically, he contended that the pleas were made under duress and
that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the charges, failed to develop a
strategy of defense, and otherwise failed to comport with the standards required of
the profession.
The trial court summarily dismissed the petition and, on appeal, this
court reversed, holding as follows:
Before there can be a preliminary dismissal ..., the
statute requires the trial court to assume "as true" the
facts alleged by the petitioner. Here, the petitioner,
notwithstanding the contents of the transcript of his guilty
pleas, contended that his submission to the charges was
brought about through "duress," "false promise," and
"coerced help." He asserted that, as a result of these
improper influences, his pleas were neither knowingly nor
voluntarily entered; he insisted that but for the deficient
representation of his counsel, he would not have
conceded his guilt to the charges.
Those allegations, of course, may be exceedingly difficult
to prove. Yet, even when it is unlikely that a petitioner
could adequately establish the violation of his
constitutional rights, the new post-conviction statute
contemplates and due process requires that he at least
be afforded the opportunity. The transcript is indeed
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persuasive evidence that the pleas were freely,
voluntarily, and intelligently made; the content of the
petition, if taken as true, does, however, raise potential
grounds for relief.
Adrian Waite v. State, No. 03C01-9602-CR-00083, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
at Knoxville, March 11, 1997).
On remand, counsel was appointed for the petitioner, amendments
were filed, and an evidentiary hearing was conducted. The claim for relief is based
in great measure on a May 6, 1993, hearing wherein the trial court convened to
consider the submission of a guilty plea. At that proceeding, the petitioner initially
refused to answer questions and ultimately denied any participation in the murder.
The trial court adjourned without approving the proposed plea agreement. A week
later, the petitioner acknowledged that he had stabbed the victim, Angela Ransom,
and that he wanted to accept the plea agreement. At that time, the petitioner
assured the trial judge that he had been neither forced nor threatened to accept the
plea and expressed a full understanding of the consequences of his plea. He also
stipulated that he had attacked a second victim, Jolene McClendon, causing slight
bodily injury. As a part of the agreement, a rape charge was voluntarily dismissed
by the state.
At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner's mother, Shirley Waite,
testified that she had attempted to persuade the defendant to plead guilty based
upon the advice of his trial counsel, Brenda Siniard. On cross examination, Ms.
Waite acknowledged that she had not been present during the submission hearing
on May 13, 1993. Maxine W. Smith, the grandmother of the petitioner, also
testified. She recalled that the she had also persuaded the petitioner to plead guilty
for fear that he might either receive a life sentence or face the death penalty on the
murder charge. Ms. Smith was also not present at the submission hearing.
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The petitioner testified that he was innocent of the crimes. He stated
that he pled guilty because his trial counsel failed to interview witnesses who might
testify on his behalf. He testified that his relatives had asked him to plead guilty and
that his trial counsel had advised that the trial judge would not accept a guilty plea
unless he acknowledged having stabbed the victim. The petitioner claimed that he
was merely following his counsel's advice, despite his strong disagreement and did
so only because he was "so shaken up."
Trial counsel recalled that the petitioner had been charged with first
degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault. She testified that the
petitioner had waived a potential conflict of interest so that she could serve as
defense counsel. Trial counsel acknowledged that she recommended acceptance
of the guilty plea due to her belief that if the petitioner chose a trial, it was likely that
he would be found guilty of first degree murder. She contended that she had
conducted an adequate investigation before suggesting acceptance of the offer
made by the state and that she had conducted an in depth review of the file of the
prosecution. Trial counsel claimed that the only hesitancy exhibited by the petitioner
before his plea of guilt related to the length of the proposed sentence, not any claim
of innocence.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined
that the pleas had been knowingly and voluntarily entered. The trial court observed
that none of the evidence offered during the evidentiary hearing contradicted the
content of the transcript of the submission hearing. It found "nothing in the record to
support [the] allegation that there was ineffective assistance of counsel or that there
was any pressure on [the petitioner] to plead guilty." The trial court specifically
accredited the testimony of trial counsel over that offered by the petitioner.
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In order for the petitioner to be granted post-conviction relief on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must establish that the advice given
or the services rendered were not within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases and that, but for his counsel's deficient performance, the
results of his trial would have been different. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930(Tenn. 1975); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). This two-part
standard, as it applies to guilty pleas, is met when the petitioner establishes that, but
for his counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
The burden is on the petitioner to show the evidence preponderates
against the findings of the trial judge. Clenny v. State, 576 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1978). Otherwise, the findings of fact made by the trial court are conclusive.
Graves v. State, 512 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
The content of the record does not preponderate against the findings
made by the trial judge. In our view, that the petitioner followed the advice of his
grandmother, his mother, and his trial counsel does not mean that the plea was
involuntary. In fact, that kind of collaboration suggests that the pleas were
knowingly and intelligently made, after a careful consideration of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the charges. That an aggravated rape charge was
dismissed by the state as a part of the agreement and that the first degree murder
charge was reduced to second degree murder indicates some benefit from the
efforts of trial counsel and the thoughtful participation of the petitioner before his
acknowledgment of responsibility for each of the crimes. In summary, the evidence
does not preponderate against the conclusions made by the trial judge.
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Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________
David H. Welles, Judge
_____________________________
Joe G. Riley, Judge
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