State v. Victor Jordan ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
SEPTEMBER 1999 SESSION
October 6, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
VICTOR V. JORDON, )
) NO. 02C01-9710-CR-00409
Appellant, )
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JAMES C. BEASLEY JR.,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
PEGGIE SHORT-BOHANNON PAUL G. SUMMERS
P.O. Box 3194 Attorney General and Reporter
Memphis, TN 38173
PATRICIA C. KUSSMANN
Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
District Attorney General
PAULA WULFF
Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 301
Memphis, Tennessee 38103-1947
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
OPINION
Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the
trial court ordered petitioner to serve a sentence of fifteen years at 85% as a Range
I standard offender. Petitioner now alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and
argues that the plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered. Upon a complete
review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against
the post-conviction court's findings that counsel was effective and the plea
voluntary. Thus, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the petition.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner was charged with first degree murder. Attorney Brett Stein was
retained on petitioner's behalf at the General Sessions level and appointed by the
Criminal Court.
On January 13, 1997, petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder
pursuant to a plea agreement. He was sentenced as a Range I standard offender
to fifteen years at 85%.
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief,
alleging the plea was neither knowing nor voluntary due to ineffective assistance of
counsel. The post-conviction court appointed counsel and subsequently conducted
an evidentiary hearing. It found the allegations to be without merit and entered an
order denying relief. This appeal followed.
II. BACKGROUND
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On April 5, 1996, petitioner had an altercation with the victim at the
Whitehaven Community Center. Petitioner shot the victim three times with a .45
caliber pistol.
A. Guilty Plea
At the guilty plea hearing, petitioner acknowledged to the trial court that he
was agreeing to a Range I sentence of fifteen years. The court specifically advised
petitioner that he would be required to serve 85% of that sentence. Petitioner
acknowledged that he understood.
The trial court advised the petitioner of his rights pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim.
P. 11. The petitioner indicated he understood the court's explanation of these
various rights. Petitioner told the court his plea was voluntary and indicated
satisfaction with attorney Stein's representation.
B. Post-Conviction Hearing
1. Petitioner’s Testimony
Petitioner testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that attorney
Stein met with him only two times prior to the guilty plea. He testified that, on the
day trial was scheduled to begin, attorney Stein advised him to plead guilty to
second degree murder in exchange for the fifteen-year sentence. Petitioner claims
attorney Stein told him that, due to potential credits, he would be released in 4½ to
5½ years. He claims he wanted to go to trial, but attorney Stein was not prepared.
Petitioner maintains counsel failed to contact witnesses who could corroborate his
claim of self-defense. Petitioner testified that if attorney Stein had been prepared,
he would have chosen to go to trial. He also testified that if he had known he would
be required to serve 85% of his sentence, he would not have accepted the plea
agreement.
2. Attorney Stein's Testimony
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Attorney Stein, the only other witness at the post-conviction hearing, testified
that he never advised petitioner he would be released within 4½ to 5½ years. He
was prepared to go to trial, and the witnesses petitioner wanted him to contact had
been subpoenaed to testify for the state. Attorney Stein further testified that he
suggested petitioner accept the state's offer of fifteen years for second degree
murder because a jury might reject the theory of self-defense.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Post-Conviction
The trial judge's findings of fact on post-conviction hearings are conclusive
on appeal unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Butler v. State, 789
S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990); Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 341 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1995). This Court may not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence, nor substitute
its inferences for those drawn by the trial judge. Massey v. State, 929 S.W.2d 399,
403 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1990). The burden of establishing that the evidence preponderates otherwise
is on petitioner. Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997).
B. Effective Assistance of Counsel
This Court reviews a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
standards of Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975), and Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The petitioner
has the burden to prove that (1) the attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2)
the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant so as to deprive
him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Goad v. State, 938
S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996); Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994);
Butler, 789 S.W.2d at 899.
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), the
Supreme Court applied the two-part Strickland standard to ineffective assistance of
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counsel claims arising out of a guilty plea. The Court in Hill modified the prejudice
requirement by requiring a defendant to show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370; Hicks v. State, 983
S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App.1998).
When a petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to discover, interview, or
present witnesses in support of his defense, these witnesses should be presented
by the petitioner at the evidentiary hearing. Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757; see also
Scott v. State, 936 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). As a general rule,
this is the only way the petitioner can establish that (a) a material witness existed
and the witness could have been discovered but for counsel’s neglect in the
investigation of the case; (b) a known witness was not interviewed; (c) the failure to
discover or interview a witness inured to his prejudice; or (d) the failure to have a
known witness present or call the witness to the stand resulted in the denial of
critical evidence which inured to the prejudice of the petitioner. Black, 794 S.W.2d
at 757. Neither the trial court nor this Court can speculate on what a witness’
testimony might have been if introduced by counsel. Id.IV. CONCLUSION
The outcome of this post-conviction matter was primarily dependent upon
whether the post-conviction court believed the testimony of petitioner versus that of
his trial counsel. The post-conviction court accredited the testimony of trial counsel.
The post-conviction court’s order indicated that trial counsel had practiced law for
thirty-five years and described him as “one of the most experienced attorneys at the
criminal bar.” It further stated that “[trial counsel] is very conscientious about his
representation of clients in the eyes of potential post- conviction problems.” Finally,
the post-conviction court concluded:
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[T]here was no proof offered that the witnesses petitioner wanted to
call would have said anything to assist his defense... [P]etitioner
freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and without threats or pressure entered
a negotiated guilty plea, after receiving effective representation of
counsel.
Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel should have contacted witnesses to
corroborate his claim of self-defense is without merit. No such witnesses testified
at the post-conviction hearing. We can not speculate on what they would have said.
Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757.
The evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s
findings. Thus, we AFFIRM the decision of the post-convicition court dismissing the
petition for post-conviction relief.
_______________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
___________________________
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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