State v. Larry Carr ( 1997 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    APRIL 1997 SESSION
    FILED
    August 28, 1997
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    LARRY D. CARR,                           )    NO. 02C01-9605-CR-00137
    )
    Appellant                          )    SHELBY COUNTY
    )
    V.                                       )    HON. ARTHUR T. BENNET, JUDGE
    )
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                      )    (Post-Conviction)
    )
    Appellee                           )
    )
    FOR THE APPELLANT                             FOR THE APPELLEE
    Harold D. Archibald                           John Knox Walkup
    33 North Front Street, Suite 790              Attorney General and Reporter
    Memphis, Tennessee 38103                      450 James Robertson Parkway
    Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
    Deborah A. Tullis
    Assistant Attorney General
    450 James Robertson Parkway
    Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
    John W. Pierotti
    District Attorney General
    201 Poplar Avenue
    Memphis, Tennessee 38103-1947
    Jennifer Nichols
    Assistant District Attorney General
    201 Poplar Avenue
    Memphis, Tennessee 38103-1947
    OPINION FILED:______
    AFFIRMED IN PART -- DELAYED APPEAL GRANTED
    William M. Barker, Judge
    Opinion
    The Appellant, Larry D. Carr, appeals as of right the Shelby County Criminal
    Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that his trial
    attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We have reviewed the record on
    appeal and find that the Appellant’s trial attorney provided effective assistance of
    counsel through the trial and the appeal to this Court, but failed to advise the
    Appellant of his right to seek permission to appeal his case to the Tennessee
    Supreme Court. Accordingly, we vacate this Court’s opinion entered on February 16,
    1994, and re-enter the opinion so that the Appellant may file an application for
    permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme pursuant to Rule 11 of the
    Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We affirm the trial court in all other
    respects.
    The Appellant, while on parole for aggravated robbery, was arrested and
    charged with another instance of aggravated robbery. After a trial on the merits, a jury
    found the Appellant guilty as charged. The trial court later sentenced him to ten years
    imprisonment. The Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court and we affirmed.
    State v. Larry D. Carr, C.A.A. No. 02C01-9204-CR-00075 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson,
    Feb. 16, 1994). On July 8, 1994, the Appellant filed this petition for post-conviction
    relief. On December 15, 1995, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court filed a
    memorandum denying the Appellant’s petition.
    The Appellant argues that his constitutional right to the effective assistance of
    counsel was violated. In reviewing an appellant’s Sixth Amendment claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine whether the advice given
    or services rendered by the attorney are within the range of competency demanded of
    attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 
    523 S.W.2d 930
    , 936 (Tenn. 1975). To
    prevail on a claim of ineffective counsel, a petitioner “must show that counsel’s
    representation fell below an objective standard or reasonableness” and that this
    performance prejudiced the defense. There must be a reasonable probability that but
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    for counsel’s error the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland
    v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687-88, 692, 694, 
    104 S. Ct. 2053
    , 2064, 2067-68, 
    80 L. Ed. 674
     (1984); Best v. State, 
    708 S.W.2d 421
    , 422 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).
    The Appellant claims that his attorney insufficiently investigated his case by
    failing to interview potential witnesses. The evidence in the record clearly shows that
    the Appellant’s attorney sufficiently investigated this case. The Appellant’s attorney
    reviewed the State’s file and then sent an investigator to take statements from the
    State’s key witnesses. She also investigated potential defense witnesses suggested
    by the Appellant, but those witnesses either were unavailable or did not cooperate.
    Moreover, the Appellant failed to introduce the testimony of any witnesses at the post-
    conviction hearing. Without such testimony, we are unable to review the Appellant’s
    claim that he was prejudiced. See Wade v. State, 914 S.W.2d 97,102 (Tenn. Crim.
    App. 1995); Black v. State, 
    794 S.W.2d 752
    , 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
    The Appellant also claims that his lawyer prejudiced his defense by introducing
    police lineup photographs of the Appellant to the jury. The Appellant’s lawyer did
    introduce three or four police lineup photographs, but she did that to attempt to prove
    that the State’s key witness had erroneously identified the Appellant as the robber.
    Tactical decisions, such as this one, are not subject to post-conviction challenges.
    Hellard v. State, 
    629 S.W.2d 4
    , 9 (Tenn. 1982). Moreover, all information on those
    pictures that suggested that the Appellant had committed prior crimes was deleted.
    The Appellant has failed to show prejudice
    The Appellant next claims that his trial attorney was inefficient because she
    failed to file a motion to suppress a police report which allegedly contained conflicting
    and erroneous information. The Appellant failed to introduce a copy of the police
    report into the record and, therefore, we are unable to review his claim that he was
    prejudiced.
    Finally, the Appellant argues that his counsel failed to advise him of his right to
    seek second tier appellate review to the Tennessee Supreme Court and that he
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    should be granted a delayed appeal. The State concedes that this argument has
    merit and we agree.
    After the Appellant’s attorney completed her representation of the Appellant
    and was permitted to withdraw, she sent him a letter advising him that she was
    withdrawing and that if he wanted to appeal he had three years to file a petition for
    post-conviction relief. She did not advise him that he could file a petition asking for
    permission to appeal his case to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
    Rule 14 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee requires
    attorneys withdrawing from further representation of indigent defendants to notify them
    in writing:
    (1) that counsel does not intend to file an Application for Permission to
    Appeal and that leave of Court is being sought to withdraw; (2) that the
    defendant may file a pro se Application for Permission to Appeal with the
    Clerk of the Supreme Court if filed within sixty (60) days after entry of
    final judgment in the Court of Criminal Appeals; (3) the date on which the
    Court of Criminal Appeals opinion was released; and (4) the date on
    which an Application for Permission to Appeal is due.
    Rule 14, Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.
    Minimum compliance with this rule is necessary to protect defendants’ due
    process rights. State v. Brown, 
    653 S.W.2d 765
    , 767 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). When
    a defendant is denied second tier appellate review by no fault of his own, he is entitled
    to a delayed appeal. Pinkston v. State, 
    668 S.W.2d 676
    , 677 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1984).
    The Appellant’s trial counsel failed to notify the Appellant of his right to seek
    second tier review. Therefore, we grant the Appellant the right to seek a delayed
    appeal from the Tennessee Supreme Court. Accordingly, we vacate our judgment of
    February 16, 1994, and reinstate it as of the date of the release of this opinion.
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    __________________________
    WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    __________________________
    JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
    __________________________
    DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
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