State of Tennessee v. Daniel Hickman ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                                                          10/24/2022
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    May 24, 2022 Session
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DANIEL HICKMAN
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
    No. 108343 Steven Wayne Sword, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. E2021-00662-CCA-R3-CD
    ___________________________________
    Defendant, Daniel Hickman, appeals his convictions for criminally negligent homicide and
    especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective 27-year sentence. On
    appeal, Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions;
    (2) the trial court erred in excluding evidence supporting the defense theory that a third
    party committed the offenses in violation of Defendant’s right to present a defense; (3) the
    trial court erred in admitting the entire audio recording of Defendant’s interview with
    police and photographs taken of Defendant during the interview; (4) the trial court erred in
    admitting testimony regarding a prior suspect’s willingness to take a polygraph
    examination; (5) the jury improperly considered a lesser included offense for especially
    aggravated robbery in violation of the trial court’s sequential jury instructions; and (6) the
    cumulative effect of the errors deprived Defendant of his right to a fair trial. Upon
    reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, oral arguments and the applicable law, we affirm
    the judgments of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE AYERS,
    J., joined. JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, P.J., not participating.1
    Chelsea C. Moore (on appeal); and Keith Lowe (at trial), Knoxville, Tennessee, for the
    appellant, Daniel Hickman.
    1
    Judge Williams, the Presiding Judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals, died on September 2,
    2022. The members of this panel of the Court acknowledge Judge Williams’s steadfast leadership, sharp
    wit, and overall positive influence on the judiciary during his many years of service to Tennessee. He will
    be greatly missed by all of his colleagues.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Leslie
    Nassios, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    Evidence Presented at Trial
    According to the evidence presented at trial, Defendant and his co-defendants,
    Morgan Ward, Chelsea Lauderdale, and Amber Hill, devised a plan to rob the victim,
    William Lake Aaron. The victim was a drug dealer who was known to keep a large amount
    of cash and drugs in his home in Knoxville, Tennessee. During the evening hours of May
    28, 2015, Defendant entered the victim’s home hiding a tool in his sleeve, while the co-
    defendants remained in Morgan’s car parked outside the home. Defendant struck the
    victim multiple times on his head, killing him, and took cash and drugs from the home.
    Defendant and the co-defendants divided the cash and drugs and fled to Jacksonville,
    Florida. Ward and Hill subsequently returned to Knoxville, and Defendant and Lauderdale
    fled to Michigan where they were apprehended by police. Defendant and the co-defendants
    were charged with felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was tried
    separately from the co-defendants. The defense at trial was that the victim’s son, John
    Nichols, committed the offenses.
    The Discovery of the Victim’s Body
    The victim sold marijuana and pills out of his home to select friends and generally
    required them to call him before coming to his home to purchase drugs. One of the victim’s
    customers was Defendant’s grandmother, Evelyn Baumann, and several of the victim’s
    friends testified to seeing Defendant at the victim’s home with Ms. Baumann on multiple
    occasions. The victim also loaned friends money on occasion and maintained a list of those
    who owed him money and the amounts on a board in his bedroom
    Richard Denton testified that the victim maintained a safe in his bedroom but that
    he was unaware of what items the victim kept inside the safe. The victim generally kept a
    large amount of cash on his person, and Richard Denton had warned the victim to keep his
    cash “out of sight.”
    Matthew Denton, Richard Denton’s son, testified that the victim would go into his
    bedroom whenever someone came to his home to purchase drugs, and Matthew Denton
    was “pretty sure” the victim kept the drugs in the bedroom. The victim placed a hasp with
    -2-
    a padlock on his bedroom door. Whenever someone came to his home who he did not trust
    and who was outside his circle of select friends, he locked the bedroom door.
    The victim’s friends who testified at trial considered the victim to be peaceful or
    passive, and they did not believe he owned a gun. The victim told Richard Denton that he
    did not own a gun and that he was unable to purchase a gun due to a prior conviction.
    Rather, the victim relied on his two dogs for protection. The victim had a large dog that
    remained on the victim’s front porch and a small dog that had “the run of the house.”
    On May 28, 2015, at around 3:30 p.m., Matthew Denton and his girlfriend, Christy
    Birdwell, visited the victim at his home, and Matthew Denton testified that the victim
    appeared “like his regular self.” Around 7:00 or 7:30 p.m., Billy Holder visited the victim
    at his home and they watched television for “[a] couple hours.” Mr. Holder testified that
    the victim was wearing a black t-shirt, suspenders, brown khaki shorts, socks, and shoes.
    The victim sat on a couch located next to the front door, and his small dog sat beside him.
    He did not have his bedroom locked when Mr. Holder was there. Mr. Holder did not know
    what the victim kept in his safe or where the victim kept his drugs and his money. Mr.
    Holder said the victim sometimes kept a large amount of money in his pockets. Mr. Holder
    did not recall the victim receiving any telephone calls that he did not answer. Mr. Holder
    completely shut the front door when he left the house. The victim remained on his couch
    watching television. Mr. Holder did not know whether the victim was expecting anyone
    else that night.
    The victim spoke to Leonard Branner during the late afternoon hours of May 28th
    about meeting the following day to help a friend move furniture. When Mr. Branner did
    not hear from the victim on May 29th, Mr. Branner believed the victim recruited another
    friend to help move the furniture. Matthew Denton began calling the victim on the morning
    of May 29th to purchase marijuana from him, but the victim did not answer his calls.
    Matthew Denton contacted a mutual friend, who stated that the victim was supposed to
    meet the friend at 10:00 a.m. but failed to do so.
    Matthew Denton and Ms. Birdwell were unable to reach the victim, and they went
    to his home. Matthew Denton approached the door to knock and saw that the door was
    ajar and was not latched. The television was “blasting,” and Matthew Denton could not
    see or hear the victim’s small dog, which generally went to the window and barked
    whenever Matthew Denton and Ms. Birdwell came to the victim’s home. Matthew Denton
    called Richard Denton, who did not live far from the victim. Richard Denton stated that
    the victim was diabetic, had a missing toe, and was known to fall. Richard Denton
    instructed Matthew Denton to come to his home and drive him to the victim’s home.
    -3-
    Richard Denton, Matthew Denton, and Ms. Birdwell entered the home where they
    found the deceased victim lying face down on the living room floor by a couch. A pool of
    blood was beside the victim. Richard Denton noticed that the victim’s bedroom door had
    been kicked open and that the “padlock was knocked off the door[.]” He believed that
    someone robbed the victim. He heard the victim’s small dog barking from the bedroom
    located in the back of the home. He said that the dog usually had “the run of the house”
    and that the victim would have placed the dog in the back bedroom if someone was present
    in the home who believed the dog would bite. After they exited the home, Ms. Birdwell
    called 911, and they waited for the police to arrive. According to the CAD report, Ms.
    Birdwell called 911 at approximately 3:55 p.m.
    Testimony of Co-Defendant Chelsea Lauderdale
    Chelsea Lauderdale testified that in 2015, she was 21 years old and had suffered
    from a drug problem for about four years. She consumed methamphetamine, pills, and
    “anything [she could] get her hands on.” In 2015, she was on probation for a felony theft
    conviction in Jefferson County and continued to violate the terms of her probation through
    her drug use. The court ordered her to a rehabilitation facility, but her treatment was
    unsuccessful. She was released from the facility in May 2015. In late May 2015, she
    moved into the apartment of her cousin, Cody Smith, in Knoxville where she began using
    drugs again.
    Lauderdale testified that she grew up with Defendant, Ward, and Hill, who was also
    a cousin through marriage. Lauderdale and Defendant, who had recently returned from
    Florida, were in a relationship at the time of the offenses. Lauderdale testified that on May
    28, 2015, she, Ward, Hill, and Defendant went to the victim’s home to purchase marijuana.
    Defendant entered the victim’s house, while Lauderdale, Ward, and Hill remained outside,
    and Defendant had marijuana with him when he exited the house. They returned to Mr.
    Smith’s apartment where they began discussing ways to obtain money to purchase more
    drugs. Lauderdale said they discussed “car popping” where they would steal items left in
    unlocked cars. Defendant stated that the victim had a large amount of money and drugs
    and would be an easy person to rob.
    Lauderdale stated that sometime between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m., Defendant used
    Lauderdale’s cell phone to call the victim. Defendant and the co-defendants went outside
    of Mr. Smith’s apartment where Defendant and Ward began discussing means of protection
    if something were to occur during the robbery. Lauderdale testified that Defendant and
    Ward went to the trunk of Ward’s Honda car where Defendant retrieved a long metal item
    with a “circle end” and slid the item up the sleeve of his jacket. Lauderdale was unsure
    what the item was. They went to the victim’s home in Ward’s car.
    -4-
    Lauderdale testified that they arrived at the victim’s home around dusk when the
    sun was beginning to set. Ward parked his car on the side of a road near the victim’s home.
    Defendant exited the car, walked across the street, knocked on the victim’s door, and was
    allowed inside by someone who Lauderdale did not see. While Defendant was inside the
    home, the co-defendants remained inside the car and discussed the drugs that they hoped
    to obtain. After 15 to 20 minutes, Defendant exited the victim’s home and walked at a fast
    pace to the car. Lauderdale stated that once Defendant entered the car, he appeared “kind
    of anxious” and nervous. He told Ward, “Let’s go,” and Ward drove away while squealing
    tires and “flooring it basically.” When asked whether Defendant was carrying anything,
    Lauderdale replied, “At that point in time[,] I d[id] not know that he dropped it back down
    beside him.” She stated that the object had been in Defendant’s sleeve. Although
    Lauderdale knew that Defendant had a weapon when he entered the victim’s house, she
    stated that she believed that Defendant was going to enter the victim’s home, take the
    victim’s drugs, and leave.
    Lauderdale testified that Defendant returned with drugs in a pill bottle and
    “[t]housands” of dollars in cash, some of which was wrapped in black bands. Lauderdale
    began sorting the drugs. She stated that because it was dark outside and difficult to see,
    the four of them decided to find a place where they could sort the drugs. Ward drove them
    to a river off of Thorn Grove Pike in Knoxville. Lauderdale stated that she had
    accompanied Ward to the location on a prior occasion but that only Ward knew how to
    find the location. While Lauderdale and Hill remained in the car to sort the drugs, Ward
    and Defendant walked to the river. Lauderdale stated that although she did not “exactly”
    know why Ward and Defendant walked down to the river, she was aware that Defendant’s
    weapon was no longer in the car and believed they had taken the weapon with them.
    Once Ward and Defendant returned to the car from the river, the group divided the
    money equally. Lauderdale and Defendant decided to combine their money into one lump
    sum. They returned to Mr. Smith’s apartment, and Lauderdale gave Mr. Smith $100.
    Lauderdale explained that she felt obligated to give Mr. Smith money because he had
    allowed her to stay at his apartment and he needed the money.
    Lauderdale testified that she, Defendant, Ward, and Hill discussed where they
    should go. Defendant stated that he knew people in Florida, and they decided to go to
    Jacksonville Beach. They rode in a cab to the Greyhound bus station where they purchased
    bus tickets to Jacksonville, Florida. They then went to Walmart where they used money
    taken from the victim to purchase clothing, cell phones, and hygiene products. Lauderdale
    and Defendant each purchased a silver Samsung cell phone at a cost of approximately
    $1,000 each. The group rented a motel room located within walking distance of the bus
    station. Lauderdale stated that she first noticed blood on Defendant’s hands when she tried
    to hold Defendant’s hand but he would not allow it due to the blood.
    -5-
    Defendant and the co-defendants left on a bus for Florida around lunch on May 29th.
    Following a layover in Atlanta, Georgia, they arrived in Jacksonville on May 30th, rented
    a motel room on Beach Boulevard, and went to the beach. Lauderdale used her newly
    purchased cell phone to post photographs on her Facebook page of the group taken while
    at the bus terminal and on the beach. Lauderdale acknowledged that they enjoyed
    themselves at the beach and did not discuss what happened to the victim. They were using
    drugs and partying. Lauderdale testified that at that time, her primary focus was “getting
    high” and how and when she was going to “get [her] next high.” She stated that Defendant
    also was enjoying himself on the beach and “didn’t seem too worried about anything.”
    After Ward and Hill went out together one night, Lauderdale and Defendant went to a strip
    club and returned to the motel room with a stripper named Katie. When Ward and Hill
    returned to the motel room, they were angry because Lauderdale and Defendant had spent
    a large amount of money. After arguing, Ward and Hill left, and Lauderdale believed they
    returned to Knoxville. Lauderdale denied that Ward drove her to Savannah, Georgia.
    Lauderdale stated that she passed out later that night after she ingested a large
    amount of drugs and smoked synthetic marijuana. Katie, who also had access to the money
    obtained during the robbery, called the police. Lauderdale awoke to police officers and
    firemen standing around her. She refused their services, and the owner of the motel told
    Lauderdale and Defendant that they had one hour in which to leave. Lauderdale and
    Defendant packed whatever they could fit into a small backpack. They left behind several
    articles of clothing, including the jacket that Defendant wore on the night of the offenses.
    Lauderdale and Defendant walked to an abandoned house where they remained for
    the next “little bit.” They had spent all of their money “going out every night, going to
    bars, doing drugs,” and Defendant had been purchasing synthetic marijuana. Defendant
    slept on park benches on some nights, and Lauderdale panhandled for money to purchase
    food and synthetic marijuana for Defendant. Lauderdale eventually contacted Defendant’s
    mother in Michigan, who arranged to purchase two bus tickets to Michigan for Defendant
    and Lauderdale.
    Lauderdale recalled a telephone call between Defendant and his grandmother in
    Knoxville during which Defendant was upset and stated, “Mamaw, that hurts me. . . . That
    really gets to me, because that was—he would help me out a lot. He was really—I was
    really close to him.” After the telephone call, Defendant told Lauderdale that he thought
    he had killed a man but that he was unsure. Lauderdale stated that she did not realize
    Defendant was referring to the victim until after they were arrested. She acknowledged
    that they went to the victim’s home to commit a robbery and that Defendant exited the
    home with drugs and money. She stated that the group never discussed the robbery while
    they were in Florida. She acknowledged that she had not cared about what happened to
    -6-
    the victim, that she was focused on taking drugs, and that she “wasn’t worried about how
    [Defendant] got them.”
    Lauderdale and Defendant rode a bus to Saginaw, Michigan, and went to the home
    of Defendant’s mother and step-father. On the following day, June 16, 2015, the police
    came to the home, arrested Lauderdale and Defendant, and transported them to the Saginaw
    County Jail. Lauderdale later waived her rights and was interviewed by Investigator
    Jeremy Maupin of the Knoxville Police Department (“KPD”). She said she was sober
    during the interview but acknowledged that she did not tell Investigator Maupin the entire
    truth regarding her involvement in the robbery. She explained that she was afraid and was
    trying to protect herself and Defendant. She admitted to Investigator Maupin that she was
    aware of the planned robbery and that Defendant took a weapon into the house. However,
    she did not tell Investigator Maupin the truth about what happened to the weapon. She
    later accompanied Investigator Maupin to the area near a river where Ward drove following
    the offenses to show the investigator where the weapon could be located.
    Lauderdale testified that at the time of trial, she was charged with felony murder
    and especially aggravated robbery. She explained that she was testifying because she was
    told that if she offered truthful testimony, “the murder charge [would] be dropped.” She
    was aware that the State had only agreed not to pursue the felony murder charge, that there
    were many lesser included offenses of felony murder, and that she was still facing the
    especially aggravated robbery charge.
    On cross-examination, Lauderdale testified that even though she had a significant
    drug problem at the time of the offenses, was taking a large number of pills, and was “high”
    about 90 percent of the time, she was able to recall the events. She acknowledged that she
    told the investigators that she was so “stoned” that she did not know what occurred during
    that time and that she was lucky to remember her name. She also told the investigators that
    she had taken about $700 worth of drugs on the day in which she was released from the
    rehabilitation facility and another $700 worth of drugs on the following day. She testified
    that while her statement to the investigators was “an exaggeration,” she “stayed messed
    up” during that period. She stated that she had been stealing to feed her drug habit and that
    she likely would have done just about anything to obtain drugs, including lying.
    Lauderdale said she was sober when she spoke to the investigator because she did
    not have any money or any other way to obtain pills while in Michigan. She was aware
    that she was facing a murder charge when she spoke to the investigator and acknowledged
    that she was willing to lie to him to stay out of jail. She maintained that at the time of trial,
    she was no longer willing to lie to stay out of jail and that she was testifying truthfully. She
    acknowledged that before she discussed the events in detail during the interview, the
    investigator told her that he believed she had remained in the car during the robbery, which
    -7-
    was beneficial to her. Lauderdale testified that she lied to the investigator when she stated
    that she believed the group was only going to the victim’s home to purchase marijuana.
    She agreed that she told the investigator that the group went to the victim’s home to rob
    him only after the investigator told her that he believed their intended purpose of going to
    the home was to rob the victim.
    Lauderdale testified that when the group initially went to the victim’s house on the
    day of the offenses, they did so without first calling the victim. Before going to the victim’s
    house for the purpose of robbing him, Defendant called the victim while still at Mr. Smith’s
    apartment. Lauderdale stated that after Defendant called the victim, she, Defendant, Ward,
    and Hill remained at Mr. Smith’s apartment for 20 to 25 minutes and gathered their
    possessions to leave. Lauderdale estimated that she took ten minutes to gather her purse
    and bag of drugs, explaining that she was an “IV user” and had to gather her “needles and
    stuff up and put them away.” After exiting the apartment, Ward and Defendant remained
    at the trunk of Ward’s car for five to ten minutes before they drove to the victim’s home,
    which was an estimated ten-minute drive. Lauderdale was not “a hundred percent positive”
    that they arrived at the victim’s home about one hour after Defendant called him and did
    not know what time they arrived. She did not see Mr. Holder at the victim’s home.
    Lauderdale testified that Defendant remained inside the victim’s home for 15 to 20
    minutes. Defendant was the only person who entered the home, and Lauderdale did not
    know what occurred inside the home. She agreed that Defendant took a weapon inside the
    home, and she recalled telling the investigators that the weapon could have been a tire tool
    based on its appearance but that she was unsure what the weapon was. She described the
    weapon as having “a circle at the end” with a hole in the circle and a “rod that holds it
    together.” She stated that the weapon was not a tire iron or a wrench but that it could have
    been a “normal wrench.” She was unsure whether any blood was on the tool after
    Defendant exited the victim’s home. Lauderdale initially told the investigator that she did
    not know what happened to the weapon. However, “within the last two weeks” prior to
    trial in 2018, she told investigators about the river where the weapon was discarded. She
    explained that she did not inform investigators in 2016 because she was still trying to
    protect Defendant and herself. She explained that she did not tell investigators in 2017
    because she was pregnant and “was more concerned about getting [her] life in order.”
    Lauderdale testified that when the investigator asked her about Defendant’s
    emotional state after leaving the victim’s home, she responded that Defendant was acting
    as he normally did. She agreed that the investigator told her that it was more beneficial for
    Defendant if he was upset and that her testimony was that Defendant was, in fact, upset
    after leaving the victim’s home.
    -8-
    Lauderdale said she took “a whole hand full” of the pills that Defendant brought
    from the victim’s home. She did not know the exact amount of money that Defendant took
    from the victim’s home but estimated that the amount was in the “[t]housands.” She agreed
    that she told the investigator that Defendant took $20,000 from the victim’s home. The
    group spent the money in just a few days by going to bars and clubs and purchasing a large
    amount of drugs and alcohol.
    Lauderdale agreed that between the time that she initially spoke to investigators and
    her testimony at trial, her version of the number of trips they had taken to the victim’s
    home, her stated purpose for going to the victim’s home, what she recalled about the events,
    and what happened to the weapon had changed. She acknowledged that her murder charge
    likely would not be dismissed if she told the State that she did not remember the events or
    that she only went to the victim’s home to purchase marijuana. She maintained that her
    testimony regarding the events was truthful “[t]o the best of [her] knowledge” and that her
    knowledge did not derive from the statements of the investigator or others.
    On redirect examination, Lauderdale agreed that toward the end of the interview,
    she admitted to the investigator that the group went to the victim’s home to commit a
    robbery, that Defendant took an item or tool into the house with him, and that Defendant
    returned with the tool. She clarified that her testimony regarding the timing in which the
    group arrived at the victim’s home was based on the lighting outside and not on the actual
    time.
    Crime Scene Investigation
    KPD Investigator Tim Riddle and Investigator Jeremy Maupin investigated the
    victim’s death. Investigator Riddle conducted the investigation at the crime scene, arriving
    at the victim’s home around 4:15 p.m. on May 29, 2015. He observed no signs of forced
    entry at the front door. He entered the home and found the victim lying face down in a
    pool of blood on the living room floor in front of a couch. A large amount of blood was
    on top of the victim’s head and on the floor, and the victim’s hands were tucked underneath
    him. Investigator Riddle observed evidence of a struggle, including beer bottles turned
    over and paper scattered across the floor. He believed the victim’s death was a homicide.
    He testified that the victim was in full rigor mortis, which suggested that the victim had
    been dead for several hours.
    An officer rolled the victim over and searched his pockets, locating an identification
    card, a Kroger’s card, a food stamp card belonging to Matthew Denton, some marijuana, a
    receipt from Kroger dated May 28th at 4:21 p.m., and $2,806 in cash. Some of the cash
    was secured by a band, and Investigator Riddle testified that “[a]pparently, [the victim]
    kept a lot of money in his home.” He said, “I think the consensus was he kept a lot of
    -9-
    money in his home. He kept money on him, but there was money in that home as well.”
    The victim was wearing cargo shorts, and the cash was found in multiple pockets.
    Investigator Riddle testified that the failure of the perpetrator to search the victim’s pockets
    was indicative of someone who was “in a hurry” and failed to conduct a thorough search.
    He also stated that the victim, who was lying face down, was a “pretty good size guy,” and
    that someone of smaller stature would have found it difficult to roll the victim over in order
    to search his pockets.
    Investigator Riddle observed blood spatter or castoff on the walls and the ceiling in
    the living room. He explained that castoff results when a perpetrator strikes another with
    a blunt object multiple times, causing a victim’s blood to transfer to the blunt object and
    then from the blunt object to the walls and ceiling as the blunt object continues in motion.
    A large area of blood was on the couch. Gray hair, matching the victim’s hair color, along
    with blood and “goo,” which Investigator Riddle believed to be castoff, was on a table near
    the bedroom door. The temperature inside the home was 68 to 70 degrees, which
    Investigator Riddle described as “pretty chilly” for that time of the year. An area of blood
    spatter was on the walkway outside the front door. Investigator Riddle testified that the
    blood could have dripped off the perpetrator’s hand or the weapon used in the offense.
    Investigator Riddle testified that the bedroom door appeared to have been kicked in
    or otherwise forced open with a shoulder. A hasp with a padlock had been above the door
    handle; the hasp was still connected to the door frame; and the padlock was still locked.
    The door handle had been knocked off the door, and officers located it under the bed.
    Officers entered the victim’s bedroom and located a black bag to the left of the entry
    containing marijuana that had not yet been ground. Investigator Riddle testified that some
    of the dresser drawers were opened, which indicated that someone had been looking
    through the drawers. Officers located muscle relaxers inside some of the drawers and cash
    and a checkbook inside the bedroom. Investigator Riddle observed blood transfer on a
    sheet on the victim’s bed where it appeared that someone who had blood on his or her
    person transferred that blood to the sheet. Officers located an open safe inside the bedroom
    that contained a large amount of marijuana. A total of three to four pounds of marijuana
    was found throughout the house, including in the safe, on top of the safe, and in a small
    bag in the bedroom. Officers located assorted pills or narcotics, including muscle relaxers,
    throughout the home and prescriptions issued to the victim. Investigator Riddle was unsure
    whether the perpetrator took any pills from the home and stated, “I don’t know if—what
    all was taken, as far as drugs.”
    Officers located a dry-erase board inside the victim’s bedroom that listed the first
    names of various individuals, along with dollar amounts. Officers later identified the full
    names of those listed on the dry-erase board, including Defendant, Mr. Branner, Mr.
    Nichols, Mr. Holder, Matthew Denton, Richard Denton, Mr. Childress, and Ms. Birdwell.
    - 10 -
    Officers collected the victim’s cordless phone and cell phone, and Investigator Riddle
    reviewed the call log on the cordless phone and made notes. Officers also recovered a
    ledger and a handwritten call list, which Investigator Riddle believed listed the first names
    of all those with whom the victim dealt. Officers utilized the call list in identifying those
    who called the victim during the day of the victim’s death.
    Investigation of John Nichols
    Investigator Maupin participated in 20 or more interviews in investigating the
    victim’s death and conducted a neighborhood canvas. Investigator Riddle spoke to Melvin
    Ramsey, the victim’s neighbor, who noted the amount of traffic that entered and exited the
    victim’s home. However, the investigators were unable to locate an eyewitness who saw
    anything suspicious occur on the night of the victim’s death.
    Investigator Maupin stated that he interviewed Mr. Holder, who was the last person
    other than Defendant to see the victim alive. Investigator Maupin explained that because
    everyone had to be treated as a suspect until the investigators were able to eliminate them
    as suspects, he was “pretty hard” on Mr. Holder and attempted to “call him out” on his lies
    and inconsistencies. Mr. Holder remained “true to his statement,” and the investigators
    released him following his interview because they did not believe he was the perpetrator.
    Investigator Maupin later spoke to Mr. Holder at his home and asked him to describe the
    clothing that the victim was wearing that night before Mr. Holder left the victim’s home.
    Mr. Holder described the victim’s black t-shirt and khaki shorts.
    Investigator Maupin also interviewed Mr. Branner, who described the victim as an
    “old school drug dealer” or someone who “stays under the radar.” Investigator Maupin
    learned that the victim only sold drugs to a close-knit group of family and friends and that
    the victim required that the person call before going to his home. Investigator Maupin
    determined that the perpetrator was someone the victim knew and stated that since he saw
    no evidence of forced entry into the home, he believed the victim allowed the perpetrator
    to enter the home. Investigator Maupin also learned that the victim generally had a large
    amount of money with him.
    Investigator Maupin testified that Mr. Nichols became a person of interest after
    others reported that Mr. Nichols had a drug problem and had previously stolen from the
    victim. Mr. Branner testified at trial that when police officers asked him whether he knew
    of anyone who might have wanted to injure the victim, he responded, “John,” which was
    John Nichols, although Mr. Branner was not aware of Mr. Nichols’s last name at the time.
    Mr. Branner was aware that Mr. Nichols may have been the victim’s son and that the victim
    treated him like a son. Mr. Branner stated, however, that the relationship between the
    victim and Mr. Nichols was not always friendly and that Mr. Nichols was a drug addict
    - 11 -
    who had previously stolen from the victim. Mr. Branner also stated that the victim
    remained close to Mr. Nichols even after Mr. Nichols had stolen from him. Mr. Holder
    likewise testified that he recalled one occasion during which Mr. Nichols took a television
    and DVDs from the victim, which the victim later retrieved from Mr. Nichols.
    Within the first few days of the investigation, Investigator Maupin and Investigator
    Riddle located Mr. Nichols and his girlfriend at their home. The investigators informed
    Mr. Nichols that they discovered the victim injured in his home and asked Mr. Nichols to
    come with them to the police department for an interview. Investigator Riddle testified
    that Mr. Nichols asked him whether he believed a home invasion occurred, but Investigator
    Riddle did not believe he would have disclosed that a home invasion occurred at that point.
    Investigator Maupin explained that he and Investigator Riddle did not inform Mr. Nichols
    of the victim’s death because they wanted to record Mr. Nichols’s reaction when he heard
    the news and they did not want to give Mr. Nichols time to think of a statement in response
    to the news.
    Mr. Nichols agreed to an interview, and investigators drove him to the police
    department where he waived his rights and agreed to speak to the investigators. The
    investigators placed Mr. Nichols in an interview room that had both audio and video
    recording equipment, and Mr. Nichols was alone in the room for a period of time.
    Investigator Riddle agreed that at that time, he had not yet told Mr. Nichols that a robbery
    had occurred, that the victim had been beaten “within an inch of his life,” or that the victim
    had been killed.
    Investigator Maupin testified that Mr. Nichols did not appear to be under the
    influence of drugs or alcohol and that he appeared to understand the investigators’
    questions. Investigator Maupin stated that Mr. Nichols was calm and concerned about the
    victim and that he tried to be cooperative. Mr. Nichols was not cooperative about his prior
    drug use, which Investigator Maupin said was not uncommon. Mr. Nichols shielded the
    fact that he had purchased drugs from the victim, and Investigator Maupin believed Mr.
    Nichols was shielding this information because he thought that the victim was still alive.
    Mr. Nichols eventually admitted to some marijuana use, agreed to submit to a buccal swab,
    and allowed the investigators to search his cell phone. Investigator Maupin testified that
    once he informed Mr. Nichols of the victim’s death, Mr. Nichols appeared shocked,
    became upset, and cried different times throughout the interview. Mr. Nichols said that he
    believed he was the victim’s biological son and that the victim had treated him like a son.
    Investigator Maupin testified that he noticed that Mr. Nichols had scratches on his
    arms and that although many of the scratches appeared old, one scratch was “reddish” and
    appeared to be a fairly recent injury. Mr. Nichols reported that he worked in landscaping,
    which investigators were later able to confirm, and he explained that he sustained the
    - 12 -
    scratches while transporting debris and branches in a wheelbarrow. Mr. Nichols allowed
    the investigators to photograph the scratches.
    Investigator Maupin obtained through a search warrant the cell tower location
    information for Mr. Nichols’s cell phone from May 28 to the early morning house of May
    29, 2015. Investigator Maupin testified that according to the records, Mr. Nichols was not
    around the victim’s home during that period. Investigator Maupin stated that the records
    showed that Mr. Nichols remained at home on the night of May 28th except one time period
    during which he went to a location that was not close to the victim’s home. The next
    morning, Mr. Nichols went to Blount County to complete a landscaping job.
    On cross-examination, Investigator Maupin testified that Mr. Nichols’s cell phone
    records showed that his last call on the night of the victim’s homicide was at 7:27 p.m. and
    that Mr. Nichols did not receive another call until the next morning. Investigator Maupin
    agreed that the cell tower data did not show the location of Mr. Nichols’s cell phone during
    the time period in which Investigator Maupin believed the victim was killed. Investigator
    Maupin also agreed that the cell tower data from Mr. Nichols’s cell phone did not exclude
    Mr. Nichols as a suspect. Although officers obtained a buccal swab from Mr. Nichols, his
    DNA was never tested against the DNA obtained from the crime scene.
    On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Investigator Maupin how Mr.
    Nichols’s demeanor during the interview affected the investigator’s decision about Mr.
    Nichols’s involvement in the victim’s homicide. Investigator Maupin testified that he did
    not believe Mr. Nichols was involved “based on his body language and things he said” and
    explained that Mr. Nichols “was willing to come back [the following] Monday to do a
    polygraph, just wanted to clear his name and was really anxious for us to find the killer.”
    On recross-examination, Investigator Maupin testified that a polygraph examination was
    never administered to Mr. Nichols. Investigator Maupin stated that although he was not
    allowed to testify regarding the results of a polygraph examination, he was not aware that
    he was prohibited from making any reference to a polygraph examination. The State
    conceded that polygraph evidence was not admissible.
    The Investigation into Defendant and the Co-Defendants
    Investigators obtained the victim’s telephone records and call logs from the victim’s
    telephone and researched the telephone numbers of those who called the victim on May
    28, 2015. According to the records and logs, at around 6:27 or 6:28 p.m., on May 28th,
    the victim received a call from a number that Investigator Andrew Olson later determined
    belonged to Chelsea Lauderdale. Investigator Olson was able to match the number to
    Lauderdale’s Facebook profile. He also researched the police records management system
    and found a report referencing Lauderdale and listing the same telephone number.
    - 13 -
    Investigator Maupin examined Lauderdale’s Facebook page where she posted
    photographs of herself and three others at what appeared to be the local Greyhound bus
    station. She also posted photographs of the same group at a beach in Jacksonville, Florida.
    Investigator Maupin stated that “it was interesting to me the fact that you call our victim
    on the night that he was murdered, and now you’re on a bus, and now you’re at the beach.”
    He made efforts to identify the three people who accompanied Lauderdale to Florida. He
    learned of someone named “DJ,” who he determined was Defendant. Investigator Maupin
    used the photograph from Defendant’s driver’s license to positively identify him in the
    photographs on Lauderdale’s Facebook page. Investigator Maupin employed a similar
    procedure in identifying Ward and Hill.
    Investigator Maupin interviewed various family members of Defendant,
    Lauderdale, Ward, and Hill, including Ms. Baumann, Defendant’s grandmother. When
    Investigator Maupin interviewed Ms. Baumann, he was unaware of her connection to the
    victim but later learned of the connection through his interviews with others. He noted that
    according to the victim’s telephone records, Ms. Baumann called the victim three times on
    May 23rd and once on May 27th of 2015.
    Once Investigator Maupin learned that Ward and Hill returned to Knoxville on a
    bus, he began “Facebook stalking” them. On June 10, 2015, Investigator Maupin located
    Ward at his residence, and Ward agreed to go to the police station for an interview. Ward
    waived his rights and agreed to submit a DNA sample. Investigator Maupin stated that
    although he obtained DNA samples from several individuals, testing by the Tennessee
    Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) only positively identified the victim’s DNA at the scene.
    Officers searched Ward’s car but found no traces of blood.
    Based upon Investigator Maupin’s interview with Ward, Investigator Maupin and
    other officers returned to the victim’s home to search for a weapon used by Defendant upon
    entering the home. Officers searched the home and a field near the home for two days.
    One officer located and collected a piece of rebar in the field. Investigator Maupin showed
    the rebar to the medical examiner who performed the victim’s autopsy, and she stated that
    the rebar could be the weapon. Investigator Maupin stated that the rebar was later
    determined to have no evidentiary value as there were no traces of blood on the rebar and
    it appeared that the rebar had been buried in the ground for some time. Officers were
    unable to locate the weapon, and Investigator Maupin stated that Ward “straight out lied
    about that weapon.” Ward was arrested and charged with felony murder.
    Investigator Maupin testified that while attempting to locate Hill, he received
    information that she had overdosed and was hospitalized. When he arrived at the hospital,
    Hill was unconscious, and he requested that a hold be placed on her and that he be notified
    - 14 -
    once she regained consciousness. However, medical personnel later released Hill from the
    hospital without first notifying Investigator Maupin. Investigator Maupin eventually
    located Hill and spoke to her. She was arrested and charged with felony murder. The
    charges against Hill and Ward were still pending at the time of Defendant’s trial.
    Investigator Maupin stated that he learned through family members that Defendant
    and Lauderdale were planning to go to Detroit, Michigan. Officers with the United States
    Marshall’s Services and the Michigan State Police assisted in locating Lauderdale and
    Defendant at the home of Defendant’s mother in Saginaw, Michigan. After officers took
    Lauderdale and Defendant into custody, Investigator Maupin and a KPD sergeant searched
    the home and collected clothing and documents. Investigator Maupin stated that he located
    a bus ticket from Jacksonville to Michigan, “corroborating the fact that they did flee from
    there.” Defendant’s mother informed officers that she had purchased bus tickets for
    Defendant and Lauderdale.
    Investigator Maupin and a KPD sergeant interviewed Lauderdale on June 16, 2015,
    at the jail in Saginaw. Investigator Maupin advised her of her constitutional rights and
    stated that she did not appear to be under the influence of an intoxicant and that she
    appeared to understand his questions. She consented to providing a DNA sample and to a
    search of her cell phone, which was a new Samsung Galaxy S3. Investigator Maupin stated
    that the same type of cell phone also was recovered from Defendant. Investigator Maupin
    testified that during the interview, Lauderdale was “kind of relaxed” and that although she
    showed signs of nervousness, she had “like a[n] ‘I don’t care’ attitude,” and that she “kind
    of giggled a lot” and “made light of things.” Investigator Maupin said Lauderdale “was
    proven to be a liar from the first part of the interview. She was giving me information that
    I didn’t believe was true.” During the interview, her demeanor changed, and she became
    more serious.
    After interviewing Lauderdale, Investigator Maupin and the sergeant interviewed
    Defendant. Although the interview room had video recording equipment, the audio
    recording equipment was not functional at the time. Investigator Maupin used his cell
    phone’s audio recorder to record the interview. He advised Defendant of his rights, and
    Defendant signed the form waiving those rights. Investigator Maupin stated that Defendant
    did not appear to be intoxicated and appeared to understand the questions. Investigator
    Maupin testified that Defendant “came in kind of hostile,” and was “a little angry, very
    rude,” and “[v]ery argumentative.”
    The audio recording of the 22-minute and 35-second interview, during which
    Defendant went on multiple rants littered with cursing, was played for the jury.
    Investigator Maupin informed Defendant that he had been charged with first degree murder
    and advised him of his rights, and Defendant waived his rights and agreed to speak to
    - 15 -
    Investigator Maupin. Defendant asked, “[W]ho did I supposedly kill? And about what
    day did I kill them on?” Investigator Maupin asked him when he left the state, and
    Defendant replied that he was “here” as of May 26th “because I ain’t gonna lie, I smoke
    weed. Let’s keep it 100.” Defendant asked whether the officers were there about the
    victim. Investigator Maupin confirmed that they were, and Defendant responded that the
    victim was a family friend and was like a father to him. Defendant stated that the victim
    sold marijuana to him and that he had last purchased marijuana from the victim on May
    26th. Defendant said he had to call his grandmother “to get his weed cleared through this
    man. Otherwise, there is not point in stopping over ‘cause he’s not going to answer the
    f***ing door.”
    Defendant told the investigator that on May 26th, Ward drove Defendant and his
    girlfriend to Savannah, Georgia, where Defendant was paid to work on a car for someone.
    Defendant said that he and Lauderdale returned to Knoxville on the morning of May 29th,
    that he retrieved his clothing and other belongings from his grandmother’s home and a
    friend’s home, and that he and Lauderdale purchased cell phones from Walmart. He said
    that on the night of May 29th, he rode a bus to Jacksonville, Florida. He stated that his
    mother later called him and told him that she had purchased a home in Michigan that she
    did not like, that Defendant could have the house, and that she would purchase another
    house for herself. She then purchased a bus ticket to Michigan for Defendant.
    When Investigator Maupin mentioned May 28th, Defendant interrupted and stated
    that his grandmother told him that on May 28th, the victim was beaten in the head and
    brutally murdered. Defendant asked why he was being charged for the victim’s “f***ing
    murder.” Investigator Maupin responded that he had spoken to the co-defendants and that
    he knew that Defendant went with them to the victim’s home in Ward’s car to commit a
    robbery and that Defendant owed the victim money. Defendant denied that he owed money
    to the victim. Investigator Maupin stated that he knew that Defendant entered the victim’s
    house alone while armed with a tool. Investigator Maupin told Defendant that he believed
    “things went south” and an accident occurred.
    Defendant requested an attorney, and Investigator Maupin responded, “Okay.”
    Without any further questioning or prompting by Investigator Maupin, Defendant
    continued with a statement “hypothetically” and “off the record” because he would “deny
    ever saying this.” He stated, “Let’s hypothetically say that man had been cracked out of
    his mind or on some type of drugs that I’m not sure of.” He continued, “And let’s just say
    when I asked that man to loan me the $100 I showed up over there to pick up . . . that man
    drew weapons.” Defendant stated, “I’m pretty sure we can put the rest of the f***ing story
    together here. . . . I’m not going no further because technically that’s . . . even through I’m
    sitting here saying this off the record this never f***ing happened.” Defendant maintained
    that he would never injure “that man” and that Ward and Hill were known as “junkies,”
    - 16 -
    and he laughed. He continued by stating that a “junkie” would not be allowed to testify
    because the “junkie” can be “knocked off as far as credit.” He stated the only other two
    people left were he and his girlfriend, both of whom maintained that they were not in
    Tennessee when the victim was killed.
    Investigator Maupin told Defendant that he could not ask Defendant any additional
    questions since Defendant requested counsel. Defendant affirmed that he wanted an
    attorney because “this is bulls**t. It ain’t because I’m guilty.” Defendant asked whether
    the death penalty was available in Tennessee. When the sergeant responded in the
    affirmative, Defendant asked, “How are they doing it now? Lethal injection or still old
    sparky?” The sergeant can be heard in the recording calling someone and stating that they
    were ready to leave. However, Defendant continued talking, stating that he knew a
    recording device was in the room, and the sergeant told him that the device was “right
    there.” Defendant told the officers that they wasted their time coming to the area.
    Investigator Maupin replied that it was worth Defendant’s being arrested and going to
    prison for the rest of his life. Defendant asked whether the officers were relying upon the
    statements of “junkies” and a “strung out robbery boy.” He stated that “hearsay” would
    not “hold up in court,” especially when the evidence would show that he was in another
    state when the victim was killed.
    One of the officers can be heard in the recording taking photographs, and two
    photographs of Defendant taken during the interview were entered as exhibits as trial. In
    both photographs, Defendant is sitting in a chair with his legs stretched out. One
    photograph shows Defendant with each arm stretched across an adjoining chair, and the
    other photograph depicts Defendant smiling while holding both of his thumbs up.
    When Defendant noted that the officers were still recording, he stated,
    This is for all of Knoxville . . . f*** y’alls county. That’s all I got to say . . .
    f*** Knoxville. . . . F*** it. I’m already going to jail so I might as well have
    fun at it. . . . At least I get to Knoxville and beat this bulls**t a** case. . . .
    And if I don’t then Knoxville officially got their f***ing wish. They got to
    put another mother f***ing Hickman behind bars.
    Investigator Maupin said that when “we do that,” it would not bring the victim back, and
    Defendant maintained that he did not kill the victim. Defendant continued by stating that
    the co-defendants could say “what the f*** [they] want” and that “I really don’t give two
    flying f***s. I didn’t do the f***ing crime. That’s all there is to it. . . . And unless they
    got more than just hearsay[,] as far as f***ing evidence[,] they can shove that s**t up they
    a** anyway.” Defendant made disparaging statements about the Knox County judicial
    system and the KPD. He stated that even if he went to prison, he would file “appeal after
    - 17 -
    appeal.” He also stated that if he had a choice between life in prison and the death penalty,
    he would choose the death penalty and that he hoped “it’s old sparky too.”
    Defendant asked Investigator Maupin if he was recording the interview on his
    personal cell phone, and Investigator Maupin responded that he was using his work cell
    phone. Defendant stated that Investigator Maupin likely took his work cell phone home
    with him, and Investigator Maupin said he also took his cell phone to Michigan. Defendant
    went on another rant, stating in part,
    I’m pretty sure you could [take] that motherf***** to bumf*** Egypt too.
    Or y’all could probably, definitely take it to I just really don’t give a f***.
    Followed by two cups of really don’t give a f***. So the more you record
    me, probably the worst I’m fixing to get. So the more you keep me on
    camera, the more I’m fixing to for real show my a**. . . . Y’all definitely
    have a reason to be charging me for something then. ‘Cause I’m gonna flip
    all these g*****n tables over. I’m gonna flip this f***ing room upside down
    before these police can get in here.
    Defendant stated that if the recording of the interview “comes up in the evidence,” he is
    going to “f***ing roll right there in the courtroom” and “hit the f***ing floor laughing.”
    An unidentified person is heard asking whether the officers were still in the
    interview room, and the sergeant responded that they were ready to leave. Defendant
    continued maintaining that he did not kill the victim and that they would be in court “every
    f***ing day . . . every f***ing month . . . every f***ing year. This will be a repeated
    f***ing process.” When Investigator Maupin stated that the officers were paid by the hour,
    Defendant said, “I don’t get paid regardless, so either way I just don’t give a f***.” He
    then made several remarks about the condition of the jails in Knox County. He told an
    unidentified person to return him to his cell. The person told Defendant that he hoped
    Defendant was not “giving them a problem,” and Defendant replied, “Oh God no. If that’s
    giving them trouble. . . .”
    Officers also obtained a recording of a call between Defendant and his grandmother
    made on December 23, 2016, while Defendant was in jail, and the recording was played
    for the jury. Defendant told his grandmother that he read the statements given by the co-
    defendants and that Lauderdale “threw [him] under the bus worse than all of them.”
    Defendant stated that he was “not going down” for the victim’s homicide. He asked his
    grandmother to contact his attorney and the investigators and to tell them that he is willing
    to make a deal and state what occurred. He maintained that he was not involved but that
    he knew what was occurring. He also maintained that he did not kill the victim and that
    - 18 -
    when he left the victim’s home, the victim was shooting at him and cursing him. Defendant
    stated that although he “did do some other s**t,” he did not kill the victim.
    Investigator Maupin made efforts to corroborate the information provided by
    Lauderdale during her interview. He stated that officers were able to corroborate that
    Defendant and the co-defendants knew each other, that they were at Mr. Smith’s apartment;
    that none of them had any money at that time, that they left in Ward’s black Honda, that
    Defendant had previously purchased drugs from the victim, and that Defendant knew the
    victim through his grandmother. Investigator Maupin said Lauderdale admitted that the
    telephone number that appeared in the victim’s telephone records and was linked to her
    Facebook account belonged to her.
    Investigator Maupin testified that Lauderdale informed him that the group went to
    the victim’s home around dusk or sunset, and Investigator Maupin’s research revealed that
    the historical sunset for May 28, 2015, was 8:44 p.m. He noted that based on the
    information taken from the victim’s telephones and obtained from telephone records, the
    victim did not make any calls or answer anyone who called him after 8:00 p.m. When the
    victim was found, he was still wearing the clothes that he had been wearing when Mr.
    Holder was at his home. The blood around the victim had darkened and hardened, and the
    victim’s body was cold and stiff, which Investigator Maupin believed established that the
    victim was in the later stages of rigor mortis.
    Investigator Maupin stated that he learned through the interviews of co-defendants
    and others that a tool was involved and that Defendant returned with the tool when leaving
    the victim’s home. Investigator Maupin said that Lauderdale’s testimony regarding the
    description of the tool was consistent with the description that she provided in her
    statement. Investigator Maupin noted that Lauderdale stated that blood was on Defendant’s
    hand and that “we can agree with that for the fact that the crime had a lot of castoff. So
    there was probably gonna be some blood on . . . the suspect.” Investigator Maupin
    corroborated Lauderdale’s statement that approximately $20,000 was taken from the
    victim’s home “through another codefendant’s testimony” and that the group had money
    upon returning to Mr. Smith’s apartment. Investigator Maupin stated that the cell tower
    information for Lauderdale’s cell phone showed that she was in the eastern area of Knox
    County where she stated the tool used by the Defendant was discarded. Investigator
    Maupin later learned through the prosecutor and Lauderdale’s attorney that Lauderdale was
    willing to show investigators the location where Defendant and Ward discarded the
    weapon. She directed investigators to Seven Islands Bird State Park located in east Knox
    County, but the investigators did not recover the weapon.
    Officers went to the Greyhound bus station in Knoxville to verify that the
    photographs of the bus station posted on Lauderdale’s Facebook page were from that
    - 19 -
    particular bus station. Officers secured video recording from the bus station and had
    photographic still shots made from the video. The still shots showed the group at the bus
    station in Knoxville on May 29th at 10:58 a.m.
    Investigator Maupin was able to corroborate Lauderdale’s statement regarding the
    group’s trip to Florida. Through “a couple of their statements,” he identified the motel
    where the group stayed as the InTown Suites. He called the manager, who confirmed that
    the group had been at the motel. The manager reported that the group had been kicked out
    of the motel room and that any of their belongings remaining in the room had been
    discarded. Investigator Maupin obtained a copy of the motel bill from the manager.
    According to the bill, the group arrived on May 30th and paid for the room through June
    6th. The room was registered under Ward’s name, and the additional guests were listed as
    Defendant, Lauderdale, and the stripper who returned with Defendant and Lauderdale one
    night.
    Investigator Maupin recalled Lauderdale telling him about Defendant’s throwing a
    wallet to Ward in the front seat of Ward’s car. Investigator Maupin later received a call
    from the victim’s brother-in-law about an envelope that had been mailed to the victim but
    did not include a return address. The envelope contained the victim’s driver’s license, a
    credit card, and various medical and insurance cards, all of which are generally stored in a
    wallet. Investigator Maupin was not able to determine where those items had been
    discarded.
    Investigator Maupin obtained Lauderdale’s cell phone records and cell tower
    records showing the cell towers utilized by the cell phone on the day of the offenses. He
    acknowledged that the cell tower records only showed a general area where the cell phone
    was located. He noted that during the periods in which Lauderdale maintained she was at
    Mr. Smith’s apartment, her cell phone was utilizing a cell tower in South Knoxville where
    his apartment was not located, but Investigator Maupin explained that based upon his prior
    experience investigating crimes in that area, this was the cell tower generally utilized by
    cell phones in the area of Mr. Smith’s apartment. Investigator Maupin stated that the cell
    tower information showed movement of Lauderdale’s cell phone after the call to the victim.
    At 9:18 p.m. on May 28th, her cell phone utilized a cell tower near the Midway exit on the
    interstate outside of Knox County. Investigator Maupin explained that when Lauderdale
    was showing him the location where the weapon was discarded, she acknowledged that the
    Midway exit was one path that could be used to reach the area. Lauderdale’s cell phone
    utilized a cell tower moving back toward Knoxville at around 9:30 p.m. and a cell tower
    around Mr. Smith’s apartment at 10:12 p.m. Her cell phone then utilized cell towers in the
    area of the bus station and Walmart.
    - 20 -
    Lay Testimony and the Victim’s Autopsy
    Timothy Allison, Lauderdale’s brother who also grew up with Ward and Defendant,
    testified that on May 27, 2015, he and Mr. Ward were installing a motor into a black Honda
    Accord with “green striping” on the hood and green wheels, which Ward had recently
    purchased. On the following day, they were going to a store in Ward’s car when Ward
    received a call from Defendant. After the call ended, Mr. Allison told Ward that he was
    “dumb if he went and got him.” Mr. Allison explained that he knew Defendant and that
    “[h]e’s crazy.” After Mr. Allison and Ward returned from a store, Mr. Allison went to
    another location to repair a car, and he then did not see Ward and Lauderdale for a period
    of time. Mr. Allison recalled that at some point, Lauderdale called him, stated that she was
    in Florida and wanted to return to Knoxville, and requested money. Mr. Allison told her
    that he did not have any money.
    Cody Smith, Lauderdale’s cousin, testified that on May 28, 2015, he allowed
    Lauderdale to stay at his apartment. Lauderdale was with Defendant, who Mr. Smith
    overheard stating that he needed to make money to take care of Lauderdale. Later that
    evening, Defendant and the co-defendants left in Ward’s black Honda car, and they
    returned later that night while Mr. Smith was sleeping on his couch. Mr. Smith stated that
    Lauderdale gave him two one-hundred dollar bills. The group asked Mr. Smith about the
    price of a Greyhound bus ticket to Florida, and Mr. Smith told them that he did not know.
    Defendant and the co-defendants then left the apartment.
    Dr. Darinka Mileusnic-Polchan, an expert in forensic and anatomic pathology,
    testified regarding the autopsy of the victim conducted by Dr. Amy Hawes, who was
    unavailable to testify at trial. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan reviewed the autopsy report,
    photographs, and the scene investigation where investigators with the forensic center went
    to the crime scene to obtain information relevant to the autopsy. She testified that the
    victim’s cause of death was due to blunt force trauma to his head, resulting in cranial
    cerebral injuries where his skull was fractured and his brain was injured.
    Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan noted a cluster of six lacerations, representing at least six
    different strikes to the victim’s head. She stated that some of the lacerations were
    “branching” or “split more,” which could indicate that the victim was struck more than
    once in the same location. She stated that, thus, the victim could have sustained more than
    six blows to his head. The victim sustained one frontal head injury, but the majority of the
    injuries were located above his left ear and toward the back of his head. Dr. Mileusnic-
    Polchan noted areas of deep linear lacerations surrounded by abrasions and testified that
    the object used to inflict the blows was narrow, elongated, and heavy. She also noted two
    distinct circular fractures, which indicated that the object used also had a rounded end.
    - 21 -
    Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan testified that blood staining was on the victim’s shirt and
    shorts with a small amount on his socks and shoes. While some blood stains were on the
    left side of the victim’s shorts, the majority of the blood stains were on the front of his
    shorts around the groin area. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan stated that the distribution of the blood
    in the groin area of the shorts was in a “triangular fashion,” which indicated that the victim
    was likely sitting when the bleeding began. She also stated that the blood staining on the
    couch was consistent with the victim’s being attacked while in a seated position and then
    sliding or falling onto the floor. She did not note many defensive injuries, explaining that
    the victim had two minor scratches which may have occurred when the victim collapsed
    from the sitting position on the couch to the floor.
    Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan testified that the victim was 61 years old, was five feet, nine
    inches tall, and weighed 231 pounds. He suffered from diabetes and hypertension.
    According to the toxicology results, he had a small amount of marijuana in his system.
    Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan estimated the victim’s time of death as between 8:00 and
    10:00 p.m. on May 28, 2015. She stated that the victim had lividity on the front of his
    body, which was consistent with his lying facedown for some time. Once the victim was
    rolled over, some of the lividity remained in that most of the blood stayed at the front of
    the victim’s body, and this continued lividity meant that the victim had been lying
    facedown in the same position for 12 to 24 hours. The victim’s body was refrigerated at
    the medical examiner’s office between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. on May 29th, which slowed the
    changes to the victim’s body. At the time of refrigeration, the victim’s body showed signs
    of epidermal skin slippage where the skin on the front of his body had begun to detach or
    peel. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan stated that fixed lividity and skin slippage do not occur prior
    to 24 hours after death unless the body is exposed to extreme temperatures. She said that
    if the room temperature where the victim died was between 68 and 72 degrees, lividity and
    skin slippage would never occur prior to 24 hours of death. At the time of the autopsy on
    the morning of May 30th, the victim was in full rigidity, which begins dissolving between
    36 to 48 hours after death.
    On cross-examination, Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan testified that weight and diabetes,
    which result in circulation issues, could affect the rate of lividity and the time in which it
    becomes fixed. She agreed that she focused more on skin slippage and lividity rather than
    the condition of the internal organs in determining the time of death, explaining that using
    the condition of the internal organs to determine the time of death is especially unreliable
    in adults. She acknowledged that the victim could have died “a couple of hours” prior to
    8:00 or 9:00 p.m. on May 28th. She explained that although “none of this is really precise,”
    “the skin slippage at room temperature will never happen in less than 24 hours, period,”
    unless the victim was severely septic, which he was not. She estimated that the victim
    would have died at 8:00 p.m. on May 28th for the skin slippage to have occurred but that
    - 22 -
    information from anyone who was with the victim from 6:00 to 10:00 p.m. would be
    helpful to her determination.
    On redirect examination, Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan agreed that based upon the
    postmortem changes to the victim’s body, the time of death fell within the window of 8:00
    to 10:00 p.m. on May 28th. She testified that the victim would not have been able to speak
    to his assailant after receiving the head injuries. She stated that the victim would have lost
    consciousness, but death would not have been instantaneous.
    Defense Proof
    Christy Birdwell testified that she attended a cookout at the victim’s home on
    Memorial Day prior to the victim’s death. She recalled that Mr. Nichols and his girlfriend
    also attended the cookout and that Mr. Nichols became angry when he misplaced a pill.
    Ms. Birdwell stated that whenever Mr. Nichols and his girlfriend went to the victim’s
    home, the victim locked his bedroom door and that the victim “kept it locked at all times.”
    The victim also placed his small dog in another room because Mr. Nichols’s girlfriend did
    not like the dog jumping on her.
    Kenneth Childress, a friend of the victim, testified that when women, such as Mr.
    Nichols’s girlfriend, came to the victim’s home, the victim would place his small dog in
    another room and tell Mr. Childress that women did not like the dog jumping on them. The
    victim also locked his bedroom door on some occasions when people came to his home.
    Mr. Melvin Ramsey, the victim’s neighbor, testified that he told a police officer that
    on the morning prior to the discovery of the victim’s body, he saw the victim standing
    inside the front doorway of the victim’s home. Mr. Ramsey stated that he was no longer
    certain that he saw the victim that morning.
    The defense also presented testimony from a forensic scientist with the TBI that
    only the victim’s DNA was found at the scene and that no blood was found in Ward’s car.
    At the conclusion of the proof, the jury convicted Defendant of criminally negligent
    homicide as a lesser included offense of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery
    as charged in the indictment. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed
    consecutive sentences of two years for criminally negligent homicide and 25 years for
    especially aggravated robbery, for an effective sentence of 27 years. Defendant filed a
    motion for new trial, which the trial court denied following a hearing. Defendant then filed
    a timely notice of appeal.
    Analysis
    - 23 -
    Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions;
    (2) the trial court erred in excluding evidence supporting the defense theory that a third
    party committed the offenses in violation of Defendant’s right to present a defense; (3) the
    trial court erred in admitting the entire audio recording of Defendant’s interview with
    police and photographs taken of Defendant during the interview; (4) the trial court erred in
    admitting testimony regarding a prior suspect’s willingness to take a polygraph
    examination; (5) the jury improperly considered a lesser included offense for especially
    aggravated robbery in violation of the trial court’s sequential jury instructions; and (6) the
    cumulative effect of the errors deprived Defendant of his right to a fair trial.
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.
    Specifically, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to corroborate the testimony of
    Lauderdale as an accomplice. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to support
    Defendant’s convictions. We agree with the State.
    Our standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, both direct and
    circumstantial, is limited. State v. Dorantes, 
    331 S.W.3d 370
    , 379 (Tenn. 2011). We must
    afford the State “the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences
    that may be drawn therefrom.” State v. Vasques, 
    221 S.W.3d 514
    , 521 (Tenn. 2007) (citing
    State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn. 1978)). The determinative question is
    whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational
    trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). “Because
    a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt,
    the criminal defendant bears the burden on appeal of showing that the evidence was legally
    insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.” State v. Hanson, 
    279 S.W.3d 265
    , 275 (Tenn. 2009)
    (citing State v. Evans, 
    838 S.W.2d 185
    , 191 (Tenn. 1992)). Although we review de novo
    the application of the law to the facts, Jordan v. Knox Cnty., 
    213 S.W.3d 751
    , 763 (Tenn.
    2007) (citing State v. Thacker, 
    164 S.W.3d 208
    , 247-48 (Tenn. 2005)), we cannot substitute
    our own inferences for those drawn by the factfinders at trial, State v. Lewter, 
    313 S.W.3d 745
    , 747-48 (Tenn. 2010). Instead, it is the trier of fact, not this Court, who resolves any
    questions concerning “the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the
    evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence.” State v. Bland, 
    958 S.W.2d 651
    , 659 (Tenn. 1997).
    Criminally negligent homicide is defined as “[c]riminally negligent conduct that
    results in death.” T.C.A. § 39-13-212(a); see State v. Farner, 
    66 S.W.3d 188
    , 199 (Tenn.
    2001). Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-106(a)(5),
    - 24 -
    “[c]riminal negligence” refers to a person who acts with criminal negligence
    with respect to the circumstances surrounding that person’s conduct or the
    result of that conduct when the person ought to be aware of a substantial and
    unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The
    risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
    constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
    would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused
    person’s standpoint[.]
    T.C.A. § 39-13-106(a)(5).
    Especially aggravated robbery is a robbery that is accomplished with a deadly
    weapon and where the victim suffers serious bodily injury. T.C.A. § 39-13-403(a).
    Robbery is defined as “the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of
    another by violence or putting the person in fear.” T.C.A. § 39-13-401(a). “A person
    commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of property, the person
    knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’s effective
    consent.” T.C.A. § 39-14-103(a).
    When the only proof of a crime is the uncorroborated testimony of one or more
    accomplices, the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction as a matter of law. State
    v. Collier, 
    411 S.W.3d 886
    , 894 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Little, 
    402 S.W.3d 202
    , 211-
    12 (Tenn. 2013)). The Tennessee Supreme Court has defined the term “accomplice” to
    mean “one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent with the principal unites
    in the commission of a crime.” 
    Id.
     (citing State v. Bough, 
    152 S.W.3d 453
    , 464 (Tenn.
    2004); Clapp v. State, 
    30 S.W. 214
    , 216 (Tenn. 1895)). The test for whether a witness
    qualifies as an accomplice is “‘whether the alleged accomplice could be indicted for the
    same offense charged against the defendant.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Monts v. State, 
    214 Tenn. 171
    ,
    
    379 S.W.2d 34
    , 43 (1964)). Here, there is no dispute that Lauderdale was an accomplice
    as she was indicted for the same offenses charged against Defendant. The trial court
    instructed the jury that Lauderdale was an accomplice whose testimony must be
    corroborated.
    Our supreme court has described what is required to establish sufficient
    corroboration as follows:
    [T]here must be some fact testified to, entirely independent of the
    accomplice’s testimony, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference, not
    only that a crime has been committed, but also that the defendant is
    implicated in it; and this independent corroborative testimony must also
    - 25 -
    include some fact establishing the defendant’s identity. This corroborative
    evidence may be direct or entirely circumstantial, and it need not be adequate,
    in and of itself, to support a conviction; it is sufficient to meet the
    requirements of the rule if it fairly and legitimately tends to connect the
    defendant with the commission of the crime charged. It is not necessary that
    the corroboration extend to every part of the accomplice’s evidence.
    State v. Shaw, 
    37 S.W.3d 900
    , 903 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 803). The
    corroborative evidence need not be “overwhelming.” Id. In fact, “[o]nly slight
    circumstances are required to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony.” State v. Griffis, 
    964 S.W.2d 577
    , 589 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Whether sufficient
    corroboration exists is for the jury to determine. Shaw, 
    37 S.W.3d at 903
    .
    We conclude that Lauderdale’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other
    evidence presented at trial, including Defendant’s own statements. See, e.g. State v.
    Quantavious Williams, No. E2019-02266-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2021 WL 1263987
    , at *7 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2021), no perm. app. filed (holding that the accomplice’s testimony
    was “sufficiently corroborated by other evidence in the record, including the defendant’s
    own statement”); State v. Pack, 
    421 S.W.3d 629
    , 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013) (concluding
    that the physical evidence “coupled by the defendant’s statement to police” corroborated
    the accomplice’s testimony). Evidence independent of Lauderdale’s testimony established
    that Defendant knew the victim through Defendant’s grandmother. Multiple witnesses
    testified to seeing Defendant at the victim’s home on prior occasions, and Defendant
    acknowledged purchasing drugs from the victim. The State presented evidence that the
    victim was known to maintain a large amount of cash in his home and that he regularly
    loaned money to others. Defendant’s name was on a list maintained by the victim of those
    who owed him money.
    Mr. Smith, like Lauderdale, testified that Defendant and the three co-defendants
    were at Mr. Smith’s apartment on May 28th. Mr. Smith overheard Defendant stating that
    he had to find a way to make money to take care of Lauderdale, which corroborated
    Lauderdale’s testimony that they discussed ways to make money to purchase drugs and
    served as evidence that Defendant needed money before the robbery. Lauderdale’s cell
    phone records showed that at around 6:27 or 6:28 p.m., her cell phone was used to call the
    victim and that the cell phone utilized a cell tower near Mr. Smith’s apartment corroborated
    Lauderdale’s testimony that Defendant called the victim using her cell phone. Consistent
    with Lauderdale’s testimony, Mr. Smith said he later saw Defendant and the co-defendants
    leave in Ward’s car.
    Lauderdale testified that she, Defendant, Ward, and Hill arrived at the victim’s home
    around dusk. The State corroborated this testimony through evidence that sunset occurred
    - 26 -
    at 8:44 p.m., and through Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan’s testimony that the victim died between
    8:00 and 10:00 p.m. Lauderdale testified that Defendant went to the victim’s door while
    the co-defendants remained in Ward’s car, that he knocked on the door, and that he was
    allowed inside. The State presented evidence that the victim sold drugs only to a select
    group of customers who he knew and that those customers generally were required to call
    before coming to his home. Defendant told the officers that the victim would not come to
    the door otherwise. There were no signs of forced entry at the front door, and Defendant
    admitted to his grandmother that he entered the victim’s home. Lauderdale’s description
    of the tool that Defendant took inside the victim’s home was consistent with Dr. Mileusnic-
    Polchan’s testimony regarding the description of the murder weapon.
    Lauderdale testified that Defendant returned from the victim’s home with pills and
    money. The State presented evidence that the victim was known to have pills and cash in
    his residence, that the door to the victim’s bedroom was forced open, that the bedroom
    appeared to have been searched, and that the only significant amount of money found in
    the house was in the victim’s pockets, which Investigator Riddle testified would have been
    difficult to search given the victim’s size and the position of his body. Lauderdale testified
    that some of the money that Defendant obtained was secured in small black bands, and the
    State presented evidence that some of the money in the victim’s pockets also was secured
    with a black band.
    Although Mr. Smith overheard Defendant state prior to the commission of the
    offenses that he needed money to care for Lauderdale, the State presented independent
    evidence that Defendant and the co-defendants were in possession of money after leaving
    the victim’s home and had begun spending it. Mr. Smith testified that when Defendant and
    the co-defendants returned to the apartment, Lauderdale gave Mr. Smith money, and they
    asked him about the price of bus tickets to Florida. Lauderdale’s testimony that Defendant
    and the co-defendants went to Walmart where she and Defendant used the victim’s money
    to purchase various items, including two Samsung cell phones, was corroborated by
    evidence that officers seized the Samsung cell phones when they arrested Lauderdale and
    Defendant and Defendant’s statement acknowledging that he and Lauderdale had
    purchased the cell phones from Walmart. The cell tower information for Lauderdale’s cell
    phone supported Lauderdale’s testimony regarding the various places that Defendant and
    the co-defendants visited after leaving the victim’s home. Officers obtained surveillance
    video showing Defendant and the co-defendants at the bus station, and Lauderdale posted
    photographs on Facebook of them at the bus station and in Florida. Investigator Maupin
    spoke to the manager of the motel where Defendant and the co-defendants stayed in Florida
    and obtained documents from the manager, confirming the date of their arrival.
    In Defendant’s brief, he identifies evidence that he maintains is inconsistent with
    Lauderdale’s testimony, including the officers’ failure to locate the murder weapon, the
    - 27 -
    lack of DNA evidence connecting Defendant and the co-defendants to the crime scene, Mr.
    Holder’s testimony regarding the time during which Defendant was at the victim’s home
    on the night of the offenses, and Mr. Ramsey’s statement to the police about seeing the
    victim standing in his doorway on the morning prior to the discovery of the victim’s body.
    Defendant essentially argues that such evidence is more credible and is entitled to greater
    weight than the evidence corroborating Lauderdale’s testimony. However, the jury, and
    not this Court, resolves questions of credibility and the weight and value to be given to the
    evidence. See Bland, 
    958 S.W.2d at 659
    . Rather, we conclude that the evidence, when
    viewed in a light most favorable to the State and independent of Lauderdale’s testimony,
    led to the inference that the offenses were committed and Defendant was implicated in their
    commission. Accordingly, Lauderdale’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other
    evidence presented at trial.
    Right to Present a Defense
    Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in excluding evidence supporting the
    defense theory that Mr. Nichols was the perpetrator in violation of Defendant’s right to
    present a defense. The State responds that the trial court’s rulings did not violate
    Defendant’s right to present a defense. We agree with the State.
    During the cross-examination of the two investigators, defense counsel sought to
    introduce video footage of Mr. Nichols’s call to an unidentified person while alone in the
    interview room prior to his interview with the investigators. During the call, Mr. Nichols
    stated, “Hi. . . . What do you mean? . . . Sit down and calm down. . . . Worried about
    what? . . . Somebody, I guess, either robbed him or I don’t know what and they beat the
    f*** out of him to within an inch of his life. . . . Calm down. He’s alright, and it’s not
    even affecting you.” Defense counsel argued that the recording was evidence that Mr.
    Nichols was aware of details regarding the attack on the victim prior to the investigators’
    disclosing it to him. The trial court found that the evidence was relevant and did not
    constitute hearsay because defense counsel was not seeking to admit the evidence for the
    truth of the matter asserted but as proof of Mr. Nichols’s knowledge. The trial court ruled
    that the evidence was admissible. However, the trial court stated that if defense counsel
    admitted the portion of the recording, the State would be allowed to introduce other
    portions of the recording to show where Mr. Nichols may have gained the information.
    The trial court noted that when the investigators went to Mr. Nichols’s home, they made
    statements to him that the victim had been beaten. The trial court also noted that Mr.
    Nichols made statements throughout the interview indicating that he was unaware of what
    occurred and noted his reaction when the investigators informed him of the victim’s death.
    During a subsequent jury-out hearing, defense counsel again argued that the portion
    of the recording was relevant and did not constitute hearsay. The trial court agreed that the
    - 28 -
    portion of the recording was not hearsay and stated, “I’m just saying that it opens the door
    for other things, if you do.” Defense counsel responded, “And I think that’s correct as well,
    your Honor. So I think as a tactical matter I will not be seeking to introduce that through
    cross.”
    Defendant also sought to introduce through the cross-examination of the
    investigators photographs of Mr. Nichols’s cell phone showing a text message exchange
    between Mr. Nichols and “D. Rex” on May 30, 2015. According to the photographs, “D.
    Rex” sent Mr. Nichols a text message on May 30th at 4:49 p.m. stating, “Hydro 10s.” Mr.
    Nichols responded, “Hell no.” “D. Rex” then stated, “Help me get rid of [them].”
    Defendant also sought to introduce the portion of the recorded interview during which the
    investigators questioned Mr. Nichols about the exchange. Defense counsel noted that
    evidence had been presented that Mr. Nichols was a drug addict and argued that the text
    message exchange in which Mr. Nichols declined pills could indicate that he was “pill rich”
    in the days following the offenses against the victim, thus, suggesting that Mr. Nichols
    obtained the victim’s pill supply. Defense counsel argued that even if the text message
    exchange constituted hearsay, the evidence was critical to the defense such that exclusion
    of the evidence would violate Defendant’s right to present a defense. The trial court
    concluded that the text message exchange constituted hearsay and that exclusion of the
    evidence would not violate Defendant’s right to present a defense. The trial court found
    that while the text messages had sufficient indicia of reliability, the evidence was not
    critical to the defense due to the existence of other evidence establishing that Mr. Nichols
    was using pills during that time period.
    The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
    of the United States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to present a
    defense. State v. Brown, 
    29 S.W.3d 427
    , 432 (Tenn. 2000). However, in many situations,
    the defendant’s due process right “‘must yield to other legitimate interests in the criminal
    trial process.’” 
    Id. at 432
     (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 
    410 U.S. 284
    , 295 (1973)).
    “So long as the rules of procedure and evidence are not applied arbitrarily or
    disproportionately to defeat the purposes they are designed to serve, these rules do not
    violate a defendant’s right to present a defense.” State v. Flood, 
    219 S.W.3d 307
    , 316
    (Tenn. 2007). To determine whether a defendant’s due process right to present a defense
    has been violated by the exclusion of evidence, we must consider:
    (1) Whether the excluded evidence is critical to the defense;
    (2) Whether the evidence bears sufficient indicia of reliability; and
    (3) Whether the interest supporting exclusion of the evidence is substantially
    important.
    - 29 -
    
    Id.
     at 316 (citing Brown, 
    29 S.W.3d at 434-35
    ; State v. Rice, 
    184 S.W.3d 646
    , 673 (Tenn.
    2006); State v. Rogers, 
    188 S.W.3d 593
    , 614 (Tenn. 2006)).
    We note that the trial court did not exclude the recording of Mr. Nichols’s cell phone
    call but merely warned defense counsel that the admission of the evidence would open the
    door to allow the State to present other evidence to explain how Mr. Nichols learned of
    some of the details of the attack and to establish that he was unaware of the victim’s death.
    See State v. Vance, 
    596 S.W.3d 229
    , 249 (Tenn. 2020) (explaining that a party “opens the
    door” to evidence by introducing evidence or taking an action that “makes admissible
    evidence that would have previously been inadmissible”) (citations omitted). Defense
    counsel conceded that the trial court’s ruling was correct and made a strategic decision
    against presenting the evidence. On appeal, Defendant does not assert that the trial court’s
    ruling is a misapplication of the opening the door doctrine but argues that the trial court’s
    ruling violated his right to present a defense. However, defense counsel’s strategic decision
    to forgo introducing the recording of Mr. Nichols’s call in order to avoid opening the door
    to more damaging evidence did not violate Defendant’s right to present a defense. See
    State v. Jerry Carter, Sr., No. W2020-00478-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2021 WL 4811943
    , at *19
    (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 10, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 9, 2022) (holding that
    defense counsel’s strategic decision against questioning a witness on a particular topic in
    order to avoid opening the door to the presentation of more damaging evidence did not
    violate the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense or to cross-examine
    witnesses).
    Defendant sought to introduce the photographs of the text message exchange
    between Mr. Nichols and “D. Rex” and the portion of the recorded interview during which
    investigators questioned Mr. Nichols about the exchange to show that Mr. Nichols was the
    perpetrator based on the theory that Mr. Nichols was a pill addict and would not have
    rejected the pills offered by “D. Rex” unless Mr. Nichols already had the victim’s supply
    of pills. Defendant did not specify in the trial court or in his appellate brief what portion
    of the recording of the almost two-hour interview of Mr. Nichols that Defendant sought to
    admit as related to the text message exchange. Accordingly, Defendant has waived his
    challenge to the trial court’s exclusion of the portion of the recording. See Tenn. Ct. Crim.
    App. R. 10(b) (“Issues which are not supported by . . . appropriate references to the record
    will be treated as waived in this court.”). Furthermore, Defendant’s claim that Mr. Nichols
    rejected the “Hydro 10s” because he was “pill rich” and that he must have obtained the
    pills from the victim is based on pure speculation and requires leaps of logic that are not
    supported by this evidence or any other evidence presented at trial. As noted by the trial
    court, other evidence was presented at trial indicating that Mr. Nichols was a drug addict
    who had previously stolen from the victim. Given the speculative nature of Defendant’s
    argument regarding the relevancy of the evidence and the introduction of other evidence at
    trial relating to Mr. Nichols’s drug use and prior theft, we cannot conclude that the evidence
    - 30 -
    of the text message exchange was critical to the defense. Accordingly, the trial court’s
    exclusion of the evidence did not violate Defendant’s right to present a defense.
    Defendant also asserts that the trial court’s rulings violated his constitutional right
    to effective assistance of counsel. However, Defendant has waived this issue by failing to
    support his claim with argument and citation to authority. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R.
    10(b).
    Admission of Entire Recording of Defendant’s Interview and Photographs of Defendant
    Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the entire audio recording of
    his interview with the police and the two photographs taken of him during the interview.
    Defendant maintains that the portion of the recording after he requested counsel and the
    photographs were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. He also maintains that the
    photographs were cumulative to other evidence presented at trial, including evidence of his
    identity as the interviewee. The State responds that Defendant waived his challenge to the
    admission of the entire audio recording of the interview by failing to make an adequate
    record and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the entire
    recording and the photographs.
    Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is
    relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
    the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
    evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. However, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its
    probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
    the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
    needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Unfair prejudice is
    generally defined as “[a]n undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
    commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” State v. Banks, 
    564 S.W.2d 947
    ,
    951 (Tenn. 1978); see State v. Young, 
    196 S.W.3d 85
    , 106 (Tenn. 2006) (“Prejudice
    becomes unfair when the primary purpose of the evidence at issue is to elicit emotions of
    ‘bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror.’”) (internal citation omitted).
    Questions regarding the admissibility and relevance of evidence generally lie within
    the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate courts will not “interfere with the exercise
    of that discretion unless a clear abuse appears on the face of the record.” State v. Franklin,
    
    308 S.W.3d 799
    , 809 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State v. Lewis, 
    235 S.W.3d 136
    , 141 (Tenn.
    2007)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court (1) applies an incorrect legal
    standard; (2) reaches an illogical or unreasonable decision; or (3) bases its decision on a
    clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. State v. Mangrum, 
    403 S.W.3d 152
    , 166
    (Tenn. 2013) (citing Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 
    312 S.W.3d 515
    , 524 (Tenn. 2010)).
    - 31 -
    As the audio recording of Defendant’s interview was being played at trial, defense
    counsel asked to approach the bench. During a bench conference, defense counsel stated,
    “I think that might be through the relevant part. I’m not sure. Is there anything relevant
    after that part?” The prosecutor requested that the entire recording be played and argued
    that the interview was relevant to Defendant’s demeanor and credibility. Defense counsel
    responded, “It’s just him sounding like an a**hole. I mean, it’s just him being aggressive
    on the rest of it.” The trial court ruled that the State could play the entire recording and
    announced to the jury that “we’re going to pick up where we left off.” The record reflects
    that the remainder of the recording was played.
    As noted by the State, the record does not reflect the portion of the recording to
    which defense counsel objected. On appeal, Defendant asserts that defense counsel
    challenged the portion of the recording after Defendant requested counsel and cites to a
    motion to suppress filed before trial. However, the defense sought suppression of this
    portion of the interview pretrial alleging constitutional violations not based on Rules 401
    and 403 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Neither the transcript of the suppression
    hearing nor the trial court’s order addressing the suppression motion are included in the
    appellate record. Accordingly, we cannot rely upon the pretrial motion to suppress in
    determining what portion of the interview that defense counsel challenged at trial as
    irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Furthermore, in light of Defendant’s behavior
    throughout the interview, defense counsel’s statements during the bench conference do not
    serve to narrow the portion of the interview to which he objected at trial.
    “When a party seeks appellate review there is a duty to prepare a record which
    conveys a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to the issues
    forming the basis of the appeal.” State v. Ballard, 
    855 S.W.2d 557
    , 560 (Tenn. 1993).
    Thus, in the absence of a complete record, “the appellate court must conclusively presume
    that the ruling of the trial judge was correct.” State v. Draper, 
    800 S.W.2d 489
    , 493 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. 1990). Because the record does not reflect the portion of the recorded interview
    that defense counsel claimed at trial was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, Defendant has
    failed to establish that he is entitled to relief.
    Defense counsel also objected to the admission of the photographs taken of
    Defendant during the interview as irrelevant and argued that even if the State needed to
    establish that Defendant was the interviewee, the State could have done so without the
    photograph depicting Defendant with both thumbs up. The trial court overruled the
    objection, concluding that the photographs were relevant to show Defendant’s demeanor.
    “A trial court has broad discretion regarding the admissibility of photographs.”
    State v. Davidson, 
    509 S.W.3d 156
    , 198 (Tenn. 2016). Before a photograph is admissible,
    - 32 -
    it must be verified and shown to be relevant, and the trial court must weigh its probative
    value against the danger of unfair prejudice. 
    Id.
     A relevant photograph “may be excluded
    if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” 
    Id. at 198-99
    .
    The photographs depicting Defendant’s demeanor during the interview were
    relevant to allow the jury to assess the credibility of Defendant’s statements during the
    interview and to compare Defendant’s demeanor with evidence of the demeanor of Mr.
    Nichols, who Defendant alleged at trial killed the victim. Because the interview was only
    audio recorded, the photographs were the only visual evidence illustrating Defendant’s
    body language during the interview and, thus, were not cumulative to other evidence
    presented at trial. Furthermore, we cannot conclude that the probative value of the
    photographs is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tenn. R.
    Evid. 403. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
    photographs.
    Admission of Polygraph Evidence
    Defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel’s
    objection to Investigator Maupin’s testimony about Mr. Nichols’s willingness to submit to
    a polygraph examination. Defendant argues that the testimony improperly bolstered Mr.
    Nichols’s credibility and allowed the jury to infer that Investigator Maupin believed
    Defendant was guilty because he did not volunteer to submit to a polygraph examination.
    The State responds that Defendant is not entitled to relief because he failed to take
    reasonably available steps to cure the error.
    The prosecutor asked Investigator Maupin on redirect examination about Mr.
    Nichols’s demeanor during the interview and its effect on the investigator, and Investigator
    Maupin responded:
    Just based on my experience investigating these type crimes and other crimes
    and people want to lie to police and stuff, I felt like he was—wasn’t involved,
    just based on his body language and things he said. He was willing to come
    back next Monday and do a polygraph, just wanted to clear his name and was
    really anxious for us to find the killer.
    Defense counsel objected, arguing that “[e]veryone in the room is well aware that
    polygraphs aren’t supposed to be mentioned in the court of law.” The trial court overruled
    the objection, and the prosecutor announced that she was “not going any further with that.”
    The prosecutor continued questioning Investigator Maupin about Mr. Nichols’s demeanor
    but did not mention the offer to submit to a polygraph examination.
    - 33 -
    On recross-examination, defense counsel asked Investigator Maupin, “Just one
    thing, since the cat’s out of the bag anyways, the question where you managed to get the
    word ‘polygraph’ out, that was a question about his demeanor right?” The prosecutor asked
    permission to approach the bench. During a bench conference, the trial court stated that it
    mistakenly believed that Mr. Nichols’s interview with police had already been entered into
    evidence and that the court likely would have sustained the objection otherwise. The
    prosecutor suggested a curative instruction. The trial court acknowledged that “[i]t’s my
    fault” and asked defense counsel whether he wanted a curative instruction or would rather
    address the issue on cross-examination. Defense counsel responded, “I’d rather just cross
    on it, your Honor. It’s in the room now. You can’t unring a bell.”
    In response to questioning by defense counsel, Investigator Maupin testified that a
    polygraph examination was never administered to Mr. Nichols. Investigator Maupin stated
    that he was aware that he was not to testify about a polygraph examination as it related to
    a defendant or the results of a polygraph examination. Investigator Maupin said he was
    unaware that he was prohibited from making any mention of a polygraph examination. He
    explained that he used it as a tool to ascertain Mr. Nichols’s reaction when it was suggested
    to him. The prosecutor announced that the State conceded that polygraph evidence is not
    admissible in Tennessee courts. Defense counsel stated that he did not want anyone to be
    left with the impression that Mr. Nichols passed a polygraph examination, and the trial
    court responded, “We know. It wasn’t taken.”
    “‘Tennessee courts have held repeatedly that polygraph test results, testimony
    concerning such results, and testimony concerning a defendant’s willingness or refusal to
    submit to a polygraph test are inadmissible.’” State v. McCaleb, 
    582 S.W.3d 179
    , 189
    (Tenn. 2019) (quoting State v. Damron, 
    151 S.W.3d 510
    , 515 (Tenn. 2004)). “‘Because
    polygraph evidence is not considered reliable, it is irrelevant.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Damron, 
    151 S.W.3d at 515-16
    ). This court also has held that evidence of a witness’s willingness to
    take a polygraph test is inadmissible. See State v. Randall Kenneth Reed, No. E2015-
    01638-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2017 WL 1959497
    , at *6-8 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017)
    (holding that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify that he agreed to take a
    polygraph examination and that the defendant refused to take one); State v. Adkins, 
    710 S.W.2d 525
    , 529 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that “in the absence of unusual
    circumstances we cannot now anticipate, it is not relevant evidence whether a defendant, a
    victim, or a witness was willing to take a polygraph test …”).
    We note that the prosecutor did not solicit the initial testimony about Mr. Nichols’s
    willingness to submit to a polygraph examination and did not revisit the testimony after the
    trial court overruled Defendant’s objection. Once the trial court acknowledged that it erred
    in overruling the objection, Defendant did not request a mistrial and declined the trial
    - 34 -
    court’s offer to issue a curative instruction. See State v. Brian Larice Cureton, No. M2002-
    00835-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2003 WL 22303084
    , at *13-14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2003)
    (recognizing that a potential error resulting from unsolicited testimony about inadmissible
    evidence, such as polygraph evidence, may be cured by instructing the jury to disregard
    the comment), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004). Tennessee Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 36(a) states that “[n]othing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be
    granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was
    reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” The Advisory
    Comments clarify that “[t]he last sentence of this rule is a statement of the accepted
    principle that a party is not entitled to relief if the party invited error, waived an error, or
    failed to take whatever steps were reasonably available to cure an error.” Tenn. R. App. P.
    36(a), Advisory Comm’n Cmts. By failing to request a mistrial or agree to a curative
    instruction, Defendant did not take reasonably available steps to cure the error. Rather,
    Defendant chose to question Investigator Maupin on cross-examination about the
    polygraph examination, thus potentially compounding the error. Accordingly, Defendant
    is not entitled to relief regarding this issue.
    Jury’s Consideration of Lesser Included Offenses
    Before the jury retired for deliberations, the trial court instructed the jury regarding
    the elements of each charged offense and the applicable lesser included offenses, including
    facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery as lesser included
    offenses of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court also issued a sequential jury
    instruction, informing the jury that it could not consider a lesser included offense until it
    unanimously acquitted Defendant of the immediately preceding greater offense.
    During deliberations, the jury submitted a question, asking whether the language in
    the instruction that “the alleged victim suffered serious bodily injury” as an element of
    aggravated robbery” meant that Defendant caused the victim to suffer serious bodily injury.
    After consulting with the prosecutor and defense counsel, the trial court provided the jury
    with a supplemental instruction. The jury later requested a revised verdict form for count
    two, the especially aggravated robbery charge, because the form did not list the correct
    victim. The trial court provided a corrected verdict form. The jury subsequently returned
    a verdict, convicting Defendant of criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included
    offense of felony murder as charged in count one and especially aggravated robbery as
    charged in count two in the indictment. Once the jury foreperson read the verdict, the trial
    court asked the jurors to signify whether that was their individual verdict by raising their
    right hands. The trial court noted for the record that all twelve jurors raised their right
    hand.
    - 35 -
    Defendant asserts that the jury’s question constitutes evidence that the jury
    considered a lesser included offense in count two of the indictment and then either (1) voted
    to acquit Defendant of the charged offense of especially aggravated robbery and changed
    their minds after receiving the corrected verdict form; (2) considered the lesser included
    offenses in violation of the sequential jury instruction; or (3) incorrectly marked the verdict
    form when the revised form was provided. Defendant maintains that “[r]egardless of the
    specific explanation, the jury’s question coupled with the jury’s acquittal on the first-degree
    felony murder charge, where the underlying felony was robbery, casts doubt on the validity
    of the jury’s verdict and undermines the public’s confidence in the verdict and the trial
    process.”
    Although Defendant asserts that the jury failed to abide by the trial court’s
    sequential jury instruction, we must presume that the jury followed all instructions given
    by the trial court “‘with commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all
    that has taken place at trial [that is] likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting.’” State v.
    Knowles, 
    470 S.W.3d 416
    , 426 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting Boyde v. California, 
    494 U.S. 370
    ,
    381 (1990)). “To overcome this presumption, the defendant must show by clear and
    convincing evidence that the jury failed to follow the trial court’s instruction.” State v.
    Harbison, 
    539 S.W.3d 149
    , 163 (Tenn. 2018) (citing State v. Newsome, 
    744 S.W.2d 911
    ,
    915 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)). The fact that the jury had a question about an element of
    one of the lesser included offenses, without more, does not constitute clear and convincing
    evidence that the jury disregarded the trial court’s instructions and deliberated improperly.
    Defendant’s claim that the jurors may have voted to acquit him of especially aggravated
    robbery and then changed their minds is nothing more than speculation. Finally,
    Defendant’s claim that the jury incorrectly marked the verdict form upon receiving the
    revised verdict form is not supported by the record, which reflects that each juror affirmed
    the verdict after it was read. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to establish that he is
    entitled to relief on this issue.
    Cumulative Error
    Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of errors committed by the trial court
    entitles him to relief. The cumulative error doctrine applies to circumstances in which
    there have been “multiple errors committed in trial proceedings, each of which in isolation
    constitutes mere harmless error, but when aggregated, have a cumulative effect on the
    proceedings so great as to require reversal in order to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair
    trial.” State v. Hester, 
    324 S.W.3d 1
    , 76 (Tenn. 2010). However, Defendant has failed to
    establish any error entitling him to relief when considered either individually or
    cumulatively.
    - 36 -
    Conclusion
    Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, and the applicable
    law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    __________________________
    TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE
    - 37 -