State v. Quentin Hall ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
JULY 31, 1998 SESSION August 28, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) NO. 02C01-9802-CR-00040
Appellee, )
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. W. FRED AXLEY,
QUENTIN L. HALL, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
A. C. WHARTON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Shelby County Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
WALKER GWINN PETER M. COUGHLAN
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue, Ste. 201 Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
Memphis, TN 38103-1947 425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
District Attorney General
EDGAR A. PETERSON, IV
Assistant District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Complex
201 Poplar Avenue, Ste. 301
Memphis, TN 38103-1947
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
Defendant, Quentin L. Hall, appeals the order of the Criminal Court of Shelby
County denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea to first degree murder. The
plea was entered pursuant to a plea agreement, and defendant received a life
sentence. Since the judgment became final on the date of entry of the plea of guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement, we conclude the motion to withdraw filed thereafter
was untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 18, 1996, the defendant, pursuant to a plea agreement,
entered a guilty plea to first degree murder and received a sentence of life with the
possibility of parole. The petition for acceptance of the plea, signed by the
defendant, specifically waives the right to appeal. Likewise, the order which
accepted the petition noted the waiver of appeal by the defendant. In accordance
with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant on the same date.
On December 16, 1996, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). He alleged the withdrawal was necessary to
prevent “manifest injustice.” The record reflects that no evidentiary hearing was
conducted. Instead, the parties relied upon the guilty plea transcript and two (2)
prior psychological evaluations.
On January 13, 1998, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to
withdraw. 1 The trial court found nothing in the record to indicate a lack of mental
capacity to enter the plea. This appeal followed.
UNTIMELY FILING OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
The withdrawal of a guilty plea is controlled by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f), which
1
The record is silent as to the reason for the lengthy delay between the filing of the
motion and the order denying the motion.
2
provides as follows:
Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. - A motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty may be made upon a showing by the
defendant of any fair and just reason only before
sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice,
the court after sentence, but before the judgment
becomes final, may set aside the judgment of conviction
and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea.
(emphasis added). Thus, a motion to withdraw is appropriate only prior to
sentencing based upon “any fair and just reason” or after sentence, but before the
judgment becomes final, “to correct manifest injustice.” The Tennessee rule does
not authorize a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after a judgment has become final.
In this case the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and
waived his right to appeal. Upon waiving his right to appeal on the date of entry of
the guilty plea and judgment of conviction, the judgment became final that day. See
Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Warren v. State,
833 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); Lakeith O. Lightfoot v. State, C.C.A.
No. 02C01-9703-CR-00129, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed February 18,
1998, at Jackson).2 There is generally no right of appeal from a guilty plea entered
pursuant to a plea agreement. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b). The only exceptions
are set forth in Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2) (i)-(iv). None of these exceptions applies
here. The plea of guilty, waiver of appeal and sentence, all entered November 18,
1996, made the judgment final that day.
We, therefore, conclude a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is inappropriate
for a guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement except for guilty pleas under
the limited exceptions set forth in Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2) (i)-(iv). Since a
judgment immediately becomes final upon a waiver of appeal, the only avenue of
2
Passarella, Warren and Lightfoot all relate to the finality of judgments for purposes
of calculating the statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions.
3
relief available to a defendant in such a situation is through post-conviction
proceedings. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et seq.3
MANIFEST INJUSTICE
We also will address the motion to withdraw on its merits since the matter
may be appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
Although there was no evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea, the trial court had before it the transcript of the guilty plea. The trial court
concluded that the transcript gave no indication of mental impairment or a lack of
understanding by the defendant. We reach the same conclusion based upon our
review of the transcript.
In addition, the trial court had before it two (2) psychological evaluations.
One evaluation indicated that the defendant functioned within the mildly mentally
retarded range, yet found no evidence to indicate he was committable to an
institution. A subsequent evaluation found that he had the mental capacity to
understand the nature of the legal process, to understand the charges and their
potential consequences, and the capacity to confer with counsel and participate in
his defense. Again, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “there is nothing
. . . to indicate that the defendant executed anything other than a competent,
voluntary waiver.”
3
This motion was not treated as a petition for post-conviction relief by the trial court
nor by the parties. Nor will it be treated as such by this Court. The trial court considered the
motion to withdraw on its merits and did not dismiss it on the basis of untimely filing as
determined by this Court. Furthermore, although the motion was filed in December 1996, the
order of dismissal was not entered until January 1998. As stated, defendant’s only possible
relief is through post-conviction. To complicate matters further, the Public Defender
represented the defendant at the time of the plea, the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and
on this appeal. On this appeal the Public Defender alleges in the brief that “[n]either the
defense counsel [Public Defender] nor the court explained to Hall... that a life sentence with
the possibility of parole would mean a sentence... for at least 51 years under our law.”
(emphasis added). It is, therefore, apparent that the Public Defender should not represent
defendant in any attempt to seek post-conviction relief. We voice no opinion as to any
possible future litigation.
4
In summary, the defendant has not met his burden of establishing that the
plea of guilty should be withdrawn to prevent “manifest injustice.” See State v.
Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
______________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
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