State of Tennessee v. Ronnie L. Ingram ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MAY 1998 SESSION
FILED
July 1, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9707-CR-00260
Appellee, )
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JOSEPH B. DAILEY,
RONNIE L. INGRAM, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Burglary)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
A C WHARTON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
TONY N. BRAYTON DOUGLAS D. HIMES
Asst. Public Defender Asst. Attorney General
(On Appeal) John Sevier Bldg.
425 Fifth Ave., North
DIANE THACKERY Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Asst. Public Defender
201 Poplar, Ste. 201 WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
Memphis, TN 38103 District Attorney General
(At Trial)
TERRELL HARRIS
Asst. District Attorney General
201 Poplar Ave., Third Fl.
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY,
Judge
OPINION
The defendant was indicted, charged, and convicted of burglary and
sentenced as a career offender to twelve years imprisonment. In this appeal as of right,
the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for burglary
since the State failed to prove intent to commit theft. Finding no merit in the defendant’s
argument, we affirm.
Around noon on September 7, 1995, David Sugarek was at his home. He
walked through his detached garage, which houses lawn tools, a ladder, and a car, and
he did not notice anything unusual. Both doors to the garage were locked. Shortly
thereafter, he left for a work-related service call. When he returned home at
approximately 2:00 p.m., his cat was acting oddly. He went to the garage, which was
dark, to investigate. While he was inside the garage, someone ran past him and exited
the garage through a hole in the garage wall. The hole had not been there earlier in the
day.
Mr. Sugarek chased the individual on foot for thirty to forty-five minutes,
never losing sight of him. When one of Mr. Sugarek’s friends saw the chase, he began
pursuing the individual. Mr. Sugarek’s friend eventually caught and detained the
individual, whom he identified as the defendant. Mr. Sugarek also identified the
defendant as the individual who had been inside his garage. Apparently nothing was
taken from Mr. Sugarek’s garage.
On appeal, the defendant does not dispute that he entered Mr. Sugarek’s
garage without permission. Rather, the defendant contends that the evidence was
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insufficient to prove his intent to commit theft. When an accused challenges the
sufficiency of the convicting evidence, we must review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution in determining whether “any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). We do not reweigh or re-evaluate the evidence and are
required to afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the proof contained in the
record as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom.
State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).
In the absence of an “acceptable excuse,” a jury may reasonably and
legitimately infer that by breaking and entering a building containing valuable property,
a defendant intends to commit theft. Hall v. State, 490 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tenn. 1973);
accord State v. Avery, 818 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); Bennett v. State, 530
S.W.2d 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975). Although this inference has previously only been
applied to pre-1989 burglary law, we see no reason not to apply this inference to the
current burglary statute. See T.C.A. § 39-14-402.
Here, the defendant was indicted with breaking and entering with the intent
to commit theft. The evidence showed that Mr. Sugarek’s garage contained valuable
property. The defendant admitted he entered Mr. Sugarek’s garage without permission,
but he offered no reason for doing so. Given these circumstances, the jury could have
reasonably inferred that the defendant intended to commit theft when he broke into Mr.
Sugarek’s garage. E.g., Hall, 490 S.W.2d at 496; Bennett, 530 S.W.2d at 790-91.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.
_______________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
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CONCUR:
______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
______________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
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