Jim Hudgins v. State of Tennessee ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                            12/22/2020
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs July 29, 2020
    JIM HUDGINS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
    No. 111382 Bobby R. McGee, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. E2019-02173-CCA-R3-PC
    ___________________________________
    The Petitioner, Jim Hudgins, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his
    petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree
    premediated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he
    received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to present
    evidence that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent for premeditation. Based
    upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD
    WITT, JR., and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.
    Gerald L. Gulley, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jim Hudgins.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Assistant
    Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Takisha Fitzgerald,
    Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. Factual Background
    On October 16, 2013, the Petitioner shot and killed the victim, Larry Turner. In
    August 2014, a Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner of first degree premeditated
    murder.
    The Petitioner appealed his conviction to this court, and we have summarized the
    facts from this court’s opinion as follows: The Petitioner and Laura Swaggerty were in a
    relationship sixteen years before the shooting and had a daughter (hereinafter “the
    daughter”). State v. James K. Hudgins, No. E2015-01363-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2016 WL 4413281
    , at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Aug. 18, 2016), perm. app. denied, (Tenn.
    Oct. 19, 2016). Ms. Swaggerty ended her relationship with the Petitioner three months
    after the daughter was born, and Ms. Swaggerty began dating the victim in December 2011.
    
    Id.
     At the time of the shooting, the victim, Ms. Swaggerty, the daughter, and the victim’s
    son lived in a home on Churchwell Avenue. 
    Id.
     The daughter testified at trial that she
    eventually came to regard the victim as a second father, and Ms. Swaggerty testified that
    the Petitioner and the victim “had always interacted peacefully and civilly” prior to the
    shooting. 
    Id.
    On the evening of the shooting, the Petitioner got into a confrontation with the
    victim outside of Ms. Swaggerty’s mother home. See id. at *1-2. Ms. Swaggerty and the
    daughter, who also were outside, testified that the Petitioner appeared to be intoxicated.
    Id. at *1. Some of the Petitioner’s friends pulled him away from the confrontation. Id. at
    *2. The Petitioner and a female companion drove away from the scene, and the Petitioner
    returned to his own home. Id.
    The Petitioner telephoned the victim, and Ms. Swaggerty heard the victim say,
    “‘Hmm, you’re going to kill me. Okay. You know where I’m at.’” Id. During the call,
    the victim handed his telephone to the daughter and asked if he had ever molested her. Id.
    The daughter told the Petitioner that the victim had never molested her. Id. Ms. Swaggerty
    testified that prior to that night, she had never heard the Petitioner allege that the victim
    had molested the daughter. Id. The daughter testified that the victim had never touched
    her inappropriately. Id.
    The Petitioner’s son and mother arrived at the Petitioner’s home while the Petitioner
    was on the telephone with the victim. Id. The Petitioner’s son testified that he heard the
    Petitioner speaking with someone. Id. The Petitioner “‘looked angry’” and said into the
    telephone that he “‘was going to kill [the person].’” Id. After the call, the Petitioner asked
    his mother to drive him to the daughter’s house and said he was “‘going to shoot the bastard
    that molested [his] daughter.’” Id. The Petitioner’s mother began driving the Petitioner
    and the Petitioner’s son to the daughter’s house. Id. The Petitioner’s mother said she
    needed to use the restroom, stopped at a Kroger grocery store, and went inside and called
    the police. Id. The Petitioner and his son remained outside in the vehicle. Id. While they
    were waiting for the Petitioner’s mother to return, the Petitioner told his son that the
    Petitioner was “‘probably going to die with’” the victim and that the Petitioner was going
    to give the victim “‘a one-way ticket to heaven.’” Id.
    Knoxville Police Department Officer Jeremy Moses arrived at the Kroger at 9:12
    p.m., approached the vehicle, and spoke with the Petitioner. Id. at *3. Officer Moses told
    the Petitioner that he had received a call that a person in the vehicle was behaving
    -2-
    suspiciously. Id. Officer Moses said that the Petitioner appeared “quite intoxicated” and
    that he asked the Petitioner how much the Petitioner had had to drink. Id. The Petitioner
    never provided a specific amount and did not say the daughter was being molested. Id.
    Another officer went into the Kroger and returned with the Petitioner’s mother. Id. At that
    point, the officers learned about allegations that the daughter was being molested and
    learned the daughter’s address. Id. The officers left the Kroger parking lot at 9:35 p.m.
    and went to a home on Churchwell. Id. They knocked on the doors and windows but did
    not receive a response. Id. Meanwhile, the Petitioner’s mother drove the Petitioner and
    his son back to the Petitioner’s residence. Id. The Petitioner and his son went inside, and
    the Petitioner’s mother left. Id.
    The Petitioner’s son testified that the Petitioner was “‘just pacing’” in the living
    room, that he did not speak to the Petitioner because he did not want to upset the Petitioner,
    and that he knew the Petitioner was “emotionally fragile.” Id. The Petitioner told his son,
    who had a learner’s permit, that they should “‘go riding’”; handed his son the keys; and
    suggested that they drive by the daughter’s house to see if anyone was home. Id. at *3.
    The Petitioner’s son drove the Petitioner to the daughter’s residence, and the Petitioner
    attempted to telephone her. Id. at *4. The victim answered the telephone and told the
    Petitioner that the Petitioner could not speak with the daughter because she was sleeping.
    Id. The Petitioner’s son said that the Petitioner went onto the front porch and that the
    Petitioner was “‘obviously mad.’” Id. Ms. Swaggerty heard the Petitioner “‘banging’” on
    the door, heard the victim argue with the Petitioner, and heard the Petitioner accuse the
    victim of molesting the daughter. Id. The daughter testified that she heard the Petitioner’s
    voice and that he did not sound intoxicated. Id. Ms. Swaggerty, the daughter, and the
    Petitioner’s son heard gunshots. Id. The Petitioner’s son testified that he heard “‘five
    pops.’”
    Ms. Swaggerty and the daughter ran outside to check on the victim, and the daughter
    saw the Petitioner “‘walking away.’” Id. Several neighbors also heard the gunshots and
    attempted to help the victim, who appeared to have been shot at least twice in the chest.
    Id. One of the neighbors applied towels to the victim’s wounds to stop the bleeding, but
    the blood stopped flowing and the victim stopped breathing several minutes later. Id.
    The Petitioner’s son drove him from the scene, and the Petitioner said he needed to
    go to Walmart to buy a new charger for his telephone. Id. After buying the charger, the
    Petitioner had his son drive him to the home of friends Dennis and Diane Graves. Id. The
    Petitioner’s son testified that the Petitioner was not intoxicated at that time and that he
    would have known if the Petitioner was “drunk.” Id.
    -3-
    The Petitioner arrived at the Graves home about 1:00 a.m. and told them that he
    “‘did something bad.’” Id. at *5. The Petitioner began crying, and Mr. and Mrs. Graves
    convinced him to turn himself in to the police. Id.
    The medical examiner who performed the victim’s autopsy testified that the victim
    was shot five times and that several shots were fired at close range. Id. A forensic scientist
    for the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation testified about four .40-caliber casings recovered
    from the scene.1 Id. All of the .40-caliber casings were fired from the same handgun, most
    likely a Glock or Smith & Wesson Sigma. Id.
    Dennis Graves and the Petitioner testified for the defense. Id. Mr. Graves testified
    that he talked with the Petitioner twice on the day of the shooting. Id. Mr. Graves said that
    he first spoke with the Petitioner in the afternoon, that the Petitioner sounded “‘[s]mashed’”
    and “‘[d]runk,’” and that the Petitioner “could barely speak and had slurred speech.” Id.
    The Petitioner telephoned Mr. Graves later that evening and sounded “even more
    intoxicated than he did during the first phone call.” Id. Mr. Graves stated that when the
    Petitioner arrived at his home after the shooting, the Petitioner “appeared upset and
    frustrated.” Id. The Petitioner began crying and told Mr. Graves, “‘I’ve done the most
    horrible thing I could. God will never forgive me. . . . I’ve shot a man and I think he’s
    dead.’” Id. Mr. Graves said the Petitioner had overheard a conversation between the
    daughter and two of her friends in which the daughter claimed the victim was molesting
    her. Id.
    The Petitioner testified that on day of the shooting, he went to Applebee’s for lunch
    and consumed six double vodkas. Id. About 2:00 or 3:00 p.m., the Petitioner drove home
    “drunk.” Id. The Petitioner then went to a bar with a female friend and consumed seven
    or eight drinks. Id. The Petitioner testified that he was “‘really drunk’” and that he did not
    remember making his second telephone call to Mr. Graves. Id.
    The Petitioner testified that he and his female friend ended up at a home across the
    street from the daughter’s grandmother’s house and that he continued to consume alcohol.
    Id. at *6. The Petitioner went across the street to ask the daughter, who was outside with
    the victim and Ms. Swaggerty, if she was going to spend time with him during the
    upcoming weekend. Id. The Petitioner testified that “‘[she] said that she had plans, but
    when she did she got this kind of smirk on her face, and she glanced over at [the victim],
    and he’s looking back at her, and they kind of pass this look. It was weird. It just wasn’t
    right.’” Id. The Petitioner thought that something was “very ‘wrong’” and thought that
    1
    According to this court’s opinion, five casings were “recovered from the scene”: One Winchester
    .380 casing and four .40-caliber casings. Id. However, our review of the trial transcript shows that the .380
    casing was actually found in the victim’s pocket during the victim’s autopsy.
    -4-
    the daughter was having sex with the victim. Id. The Petitioner accused the victim of
    being “‘nothing but a child molester,’” and the victim did not respond to the Petitioner’s
    statement. Id. The Petitioner’s friends led him away from the scene, and the Petitioner’s
    female friend drove him home because he was too “drunk” to drive. Id.
    The Petitioner testified that he continued drinking alcohol at his home and that he
    telephoned the daughter. Id. The victim answered but would not let the Petitioner speak
    with her. Id. The Petitioner said that the victim did not hand the telephone to the daughter
    and that the daughter never told the Petitioner that the victim was not molesting her. Id.
    The Petitioner’s mother and son arrived at his home, and the Petitioner remembered telling
    the victim that he was going to kill the victim. Id.
    The Petitioner testified that he asked his mother to drive him to the daughter’s home
    and that they left in his mother’s van. Id. The Petitioner testified about stopping at Kroger
    and said he never told his son that he was going to give the victim “‘a one-way ticket to
    heaven.’” Id. The Petitioner talked with police officers in the Kroger parking lot. Id. He
    told them that he thought the daughter was being molested and that the victim threatened
    him. Id. The Petitioner acknowledged that the daughter never told him that the victim was
    molesting her. Id.
    After leaving Kroger, the Petitioner’s mother dropped him off at home, and he
    resumed consuming alcohol. Id. Later that night, the Petitioner had his son drive him to
    the victim’s house so that he could remove the daughter from the victim’s home. Id.
    According to this court’s opinion, the Petitioner “recalled the precise route that they took
    to get to the residence, identifying all of the streets on which they traveled.” Id. The
    Petitioner approached the victim’s house about 11:00 p.m. and had his Glock .40-caliber
    pistol in a holster on his hip. Id. The Petitioner said that he only went to the home to get
    the daughter and that he had his gun “because the victim was much larger than he was.”
    Id.
    The Petitioner testified that he “‘pounded’” on the door. Id. at *7. The Petitioner
    told the victim that he knew what was “‘going on,’” and the victim responded, “‘What if I
    am? . . . Prove it.’” Id. The Petitioner removed his gun from its holster, pointed the gun at
    the victim, and pulled the trigger. Id. The Petitioner said that after the shooting, he realized
    he had “‘just made a terrible mistake’” and that he was so traumatized he could not think
    clearly. Id. Nevertheless, he “agreed that he had been able to explain and recall the events
    and conversations that preceded the killing and that he was able to point out portions of the
    son’s, Ms. Swaggerty’s, and the daughter’s testimony that he believed were inaccurate.”
    Id. The Petitioner also agreed “that despite his heavy drinking, he was able to clearly recall
    details that preceded the killing.” Id.
    -5-
    The Petitioner testified that he went to Walmart to buy a new telephone charger so
    that he could report the killing to the police. Id. After purchasing the charger, the Petitioner
    made several telephone calls, including a call to his mother. Id. He disassembled his gun,
    had his son pull over, and threw the gun into a lake. Id. The Petitioner recalled going to
    the Graves home but said he did not tell Mr. Graves that he overheard the daughter tell her
    friends that the victim was molesting her. Id. The Petitioner said the victim was the first
    person he ever accused of molesting the daughter. Id.
    Kellie Martin testified on rebuttal for the State that she worked at Applebee’s, that
    she served the Petitioner on the day of the shooting, and that the Petitioner did not appear
    to be “drunk.” Id. Ms. Swaggerty testified on rebuttal that when the daughter was four or
    five months old, the Petitioner “would call the police and do welfare checks saying [the
    daughter] was being molested.” Id. Finally, the daughter testified on rebuttal that she did
    not have a conversation with her friends about the victim molesting her and that “she did
    not give the victim a look as if she [were] having sexual intercourse with him.” Id. at *8.
    After the jury convicted the Petitioner of first degree premeditated murder, the trial
    court sentenced him to life in confinement. On appeal of his conviction to this court, the
    Petitioner claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, that the trial
    court erred by admitting jailhouse telephone calls between the Petitioner and his mother
    into evidence, and that the trial court erred by permitting testimony that the Petitioner
    previously had accused someone of molesting the daughter. Id. This court affirmed the
    Petitioner’s conviction. Id. at *12. In finding the evidence sufficient, this court explained,
    in pertinent part, as follows:
    The defendant argues that he was so intoxicated that he was incapable
    of premeditation and that he should have been convicted of voluntary
    manslaughter. While voluntary “intoxication itself is not a defense to
    prosecution for an offense,” it “is admissible in evidence, if it is relevant to
    negate a culpable mental state.” [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 39-11-503(a). Whether
    the defendant’s intoxication negated his ability to premeditate and form the
    intent to kill were questions for the jury to consider and resolve. State v.
    Vaughn, 
    279 S.W.3d 584
    , 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Similarly, whether
    a “killing resulted from ‘a state of passion produced by adequate provocation
    sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner’ is a jury
    question.” State v. Williams, 
    38 S.W.3d 532
    , 539 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting
    [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 39-13-211(a)).
    Here, the jury resolved both of these questions against the defendant.
    He contends that the jury unreasonably rejected evidence of the copious
    amount of alcohol that the defendant consumed on the day of the shooting,
    -6-
    including the testimony of several of the State’s witnesses. While the
    defendant testified that on the day of the shooting, he had been drinking all
    day, and while the daughter and Ms. Swaggerty testified that he appeared
    drunk during the confrontation in front of Ms. Swaggerty’s mother’s home,
    there was also evidence to show that the defendant was not so intoxicated
    that he was incapable of premeditation. The son testified that the defendant
    did not appear drunk at the time of the shooting or after the shooting, and he
    testified that he would know if the defendant was drunk. Similarly, the
    daughter testified that the defendant did not sound drunk when he was
    arguing with the victim just before the shooting. Further, the defendant was
    able to recall the events that led up to and followed the shooting in great
    detail, even identifying portions of the testimony that he believed were
    inconsistent with his recollection of the night of the killing. The jury found
    that the defendant’s intoxication did not negate his ability to premeditate and
    form the intent to kill, and the evidence is sufficient to support that finding.
    Similarly, the jury heard evidence that the defendant believed that the victim
    was molesting the daughter. By their verdict of guilty to the charge of first
    degree (premeditated) murder, the jury necessarily rejected the claim that the
    defendant acted in “a state of passion produced by adequate provocation
    sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner.” [Tenn.
    Code Ann.] § 39-13-211(a). This question was in the province of the jury,
    and we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s
    conviction. He is not entitled to any relief.
    Id. at *10.
    After our supreme court denied the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal,
    he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective
    assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to cross-examine witnesses effectively,
    failed to present evidence that would have “countered” the State’s witnesses, failed to
    object to “obviously perjured” testimony, and “did not present any kind of defense at all.”
    The post-conviction court appointed counsel, and post-conviction counsel did not file an
    amended petition.
    At the evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner testified that trial counsel died about two
    months after his trial and that another attorney represented him on direct appeal of his
    conviction. The Petitioner said that trial counsel met with him three or four times before
    trial and that their discussions were “mostly” about trial counsel telling the Petitioner “what
    a great lawyer he was in the Eric McLean case.” The Petitioner told trial counsel he had
    receipts which showed that the Petitioner had been drinking alcohol on the day of the
    shooting. The Petitioner told trial counsel to obtain his bank records, but trial counsel
    -7-
    “didn’t bother doing that.” The Petitioner said that he consumed alcohol at Applebee’s,
    Preservation Pub, and Latitude 35 prior to the shooting and that his bank statements would
    have shown that he spent almost one hundred dollars for alcohol at Preservation Pub and
    Latitude 35. Post-conviction counsel asked the Petitioner, “Do you have those [bank
    records] with you?” The Petitioner said yes, and post-conviction counsel asked to see the
    records. However, post-conviction counsel did not introduce the records into evidence.
    The Petitioner testified that at the time of the shooting, he had been prescribed three
    Opana pills and two hydrocodone pills per day. Moreover, after the Petitioner’s trial, he
    learned that his mother had “drugged” him on the night of shooting by putting “a handful
    of Xanax” into his drink. The Petitioner did not tell trial counsel about being drugged
    because he did not know about it at the time of trial.
    The Petitioner testified that the State offered to let him plead guilty to second degree
    murder. However, trial counsel told the Petitioner, “‘I’m not going to let you take that. . .
    . I can get that at trial just based on your intoxication. . . . We’re going for manslaughter.’”
    The Petitioner asked trial counsel how much “time” he could receive for second degree
    murder, and trial counsel responded, “Well, that doesn’t matter. . . . [W]e’re not taking it.”
    The Petitioner wanted to accept the State’s plea offer because the range of punishment for
    second degree murder was fifteen to twenty-five years, but trial counsel would not let the
    Petitioner accept the offer.
    The Petitioner testified that trial counsel failed to cross-examine “most” of the
    witnesses at trial effectively. For example, Kellie Martin testified that she served the
    Petitioner “six doubles in two hours” at Applebee’s but that he was not intoxicated. Trial
    counsel should have cross-examined Martin about her “server’s license” and how to “spot”
    the effects of alcohol on an intoxicated person. Trial counsel also did not effectively cross-
    examine the State’s ballistics expert, who testified that the Petitioner used hollow point
    bullets to shoot the victim. The Petitioner said he actually used “controlled expansion”
    bullets. The Petitioner explained that hollow point bullets caused “maximum damage and
    death” whereas controlled expansion bullets were designed to “knock down” a victim, not
    kill the victim. The Petitioner said his use of controlled expansion bullets supported his
    testimony that he did not intend to kill the victim.
    The Petitioner testified that the victim was shot five times but that only four .40-
    caliber casings were found at the scene. The Petitioner told trial counsel that the State’s
    facts were not “lining up,” but trial counsel “just dismissed it.” The Petitioner said that he
    did not fire the fifth bullet and that the fifth bullet could have been the bullet that killed the
    victim. Trial counsel never cross-examined the State’s witness about the fact that only four
    bullets were fired from the Petitioner’s gun. Trial counsel also did not argue that fact
    during his closing argument. The “only real argument” trial counsel made during closing
    -8-
    was that the Petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the shooting. However, trial counsel
    failed to obtain the Petitioner’s bank statements or introduce his prescriptions into evidence
    in order to prove his intoxication.
    The Petitioner testified that trial counsel seemed “quite impaired” during the trial,
    that trial counsel was “nodding out,” and that the Petitioner kept having to “nudge” trial
    counsel in order to get trial counsel to pay attention. The Petitioner said trial counsel
    “wasn’t on his A game” and “seemed to completely drop the ball” in the Petitioner’s case.
    Trial counsel failed to call any investigators to testify. When the Petitioner expressed
    concern about no investigators testifying, trial counsel told the Petitioner, “‘I know what
    I’m doing. I’ve done 35 murder trials.’” The Petitioner said that if trial counsel had “put
    on investigators,” the defense could have presented evidence that vindicated the Petitioner
    “at least in the eyes of some of the jurors.”
    The Petitioner testified that he never received a psychological examination because
    trial counsel said the Petitioner did not need one. The Petitioner thought he needed an
    examination, explaining, “I don’t know how you can say you’re in the heat of passion or
    you’re, you know, basically temporarily gone insane if you don’t have a professional there
    who can either collaborate or not collaborate.” The Petitioner said he did not intend to kill
    the victim. He said he went to the victim’s house that night because he just wanted to take
    the daughter to the police department so that she could be interviewed in a controlled
    setting without being influenced by the victim or Ms. Swaggerty.
    On cross-examination, the Petitioner testified that on the night of the shooting, he
    went onto the victim’s front porch and yelled through the door that he wanted to see the
    daughter. At some point, the Petitioner called the victim “a child molester.” The Petitioner
    said that he was “holding [onto] the wall” and that his gun was on his hip. The victim came
    outside, and the Petitioner demanded to see the daughter. The victim told the Petitioner
    no, so the Petitioner asked to speak with Ms. Swaggerty. The victim again told the
    Petitioner no. The Petitioner said that “this [went] back and forth” and that he became
    “completely frustrated.” The Petitioner told the victim that he knew the victim was a child
    molester, and the victim responded, “‘Well, what if I am? What are you going to do about
    it?’” The Petitioner shot the victim.
    The Petitioner acknowledged that he testified at trial about the liquor he consumed
    before the shooting. The Petitioner’s mother and son told Ray and Melissa Green about
    the level of the Petitioner’s intoxication, and the Greens could have testified at trial about
    what the Petitioner’s mother and son told them. Ray Green was the “arresting officer” in
    the Petitioner’s case. On redirect examination, the Petitioner testified that his mother was
    unable to testify at the evidentiary hearing because she was deceased. On recross-
    examination, the Petitioner acknowledged that his mother was present during his trial.
    -9-
    The parties chose to forego closing arguments, and the post-conviction court
    announced its ruling. The post-conviction court said that “[t]his Court tried this case” and
    that “there was certainly nothing to indicate that [trial counsel] was impaired in any way.
    The Court would have intervened had that occurred.” The post-conviction court stated that
    trial counsel’s defense strategy was to show that the Petitioner was too intoxicated to
    premeditate killing the victim, which was “about the only strategy available.” The post-
    conviction court noted that the Petitioner’s son testified at trial that the Petitioner “was able
    to walk okay” and was not intoxicated and that the Petitioner’s daughter also testified that
    he did not sound intoxicated before the shooting. The post-conviction court found that trial
    counsel “tried a defense and it didn’t work” and denied the petition for post-conviction
    relief.
    After the post-conviction court announced its ruling, post-conviction counsel
    advised the post-conviction court that the court needed to address the issue regarding trial
    counsel’s refusal to allow the Petitioner to accept the State’s plea offer. The State noted
    that the Petitioner did not introduce any emails or letters about the alleged offer into
    evidence and asserted that the Petitioner’s testimony about the alleged offer was
    “questionable.” The State advised the post-conviction court that the State never made a
    plea offer to the Petitioner, noting that this court could not consider that statement as
    evidence. The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to establish by clear
    and convincing evidence that the State ever made a plea offer to the Petitioner.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, the Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective because, given the
    defense’s strategy, it was “imperative” that trial counsel present all proof available to show
    that the Petitioner was too intoxicated to premeditate the killing.2 The Petitioner contends
    that trial counsel should have obtained the Petitioner’s bank records to show that the
    Petitioner spent almost one hundred dollars on alcoholic beverages prior to the shooting
    and that the bank records would have bolstered the Petitioner’s credibility. The Petitioner
    also contends that trial counsel should have presented proof that the Petitioner had been
    prescribed three Opana pills and two hydrocodone pills daily due to a severe back
    deformity and that trial counsel should have presented proof that his “late” mother told
    several people she “drugged” him with Xanax on the night of the shooting. The State
    argues that the trial court properly denied the petition for post-conviction relief. We agree
    with the State.
    2
    We note that the Petitioner did not raise the issue regarding the plea offer in his appellate brief.
    - 10 -
    To be successful in a claim for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove the
    factual allegations contained in the post-conviction petition by clear and convincing
    evidence. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110
    (f). “‘Clear and convincing evidence means
    evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the
    conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” State v. Holder, 
    15 S.W.3d 905
    , 911 (Tenn. Crim.
    App. 1999) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 
    833 S.W.2d 896
    , 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992)).
    Issues regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be accorded their
    testimony, and the factual questions raised by the evidence adduced at trial are to be
    resolved by the post-conviction court as the trier of fact. See Henley v. State, 
    960 S.W.2d 572
    , 579 (Tenn. 1997). Therefore, the post-conviction court’s findings of fact are entitled
    to substantial deference on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against those findings.
    See Fields v. State, 
    40 S.W.3d 450
    , 458 (Tenn. 2001).
    A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. See
    State v. Burns, 
    6 S.W.3d 453
    , 461 (Tenn. 1999). We will review the post-conviction
    court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption that those findings are correct. See
    Fields, 
    40 S.W.3d at 458
    . However, we will review the post-conviction court’s conclusions
    of law purely de novo. 
    Id.
    When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance
    of counsel, “the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel’s performance was
    deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. State, 
    938 S.W.2d 363
    ,
    369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984)). To
    establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was
    below “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Baxter v. Rose,
    
    523 S.W.2d 930
    , 936 (Tenn. 1975). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that
    “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
    the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
    sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 694
    . Further,
    [b]ecause a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove
    either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the
    ineffective assistance claim. Indeed, a court need not address the
    components in any particular order or even address both if the [petitioner]
    makes an insufficient showing of one component.
    Goad, 
    938 S.W.2d at
    370 (citing Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 697
    ).
    Turning to the instant case, the Petitioner claims that trial counsel should have
    introduced the Petitioner’s bank records and prescriptions into evidence at trial. However,
    the Petitioner failed to introduce the bank records or prescriptions into evidence at the
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    evidentiary hearing. We note that the Petitioner brought the bank records to the evidentiary
    hearing but that post-conviction counsel did not introduce the records into evidence. The
    Petitioner also did not have any witnesses testify at the hearing about his mother’s drugging
    him with Xanax on the night of the shooting. This court may not speculate as to the content
    of a witness’s testimony. See Black v. State, 
    794 S.W.2d 752
    , 757 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1990). Therefore, the Petitioner has failed to show that trial counsel was deficient for
    failing to present the evidence at trial.
    Regardless, several of the State’s witnesses at trial, including the Petitioner’s
    daughter, testified that the Petitioner was intoxicated at some point on the day of the
    shooting. Mr. Graves also testified for the Petitioner that the Petitioner was intoxicated.
    The proof showed, though, that in the hours leading up to the victim’s death, the Petitioner
    made several declarations of intent to kill the victim. Even the Petitioner’s own son
    testified that the Petitioner said he was going to kill the victim. Moreover, the Petitioner’s
    son said that the Petitioner was angry but not intoxicated at the time of the shooting. On
    direct appeal of the Petitioner’s convictions, this court noted that the Petitioner was able to
    recall at trial the “precise” route that he and his son took to get to the victim’s residence.
    Likewise, we note that although the shooting occurred more than six years before the
    evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner was able to recall what occurred on the victim’s front
    porch prior to the shooting. Therefore, we also conclude that the Petitioner has failed to
    demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any deficiencies by trial counsel. Accordingly, the
    post-conviction court properly denied the petition for post-conviction relief.
    III. Conclusion
    Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-
    conviction court.
    _________________________________
    NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE
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