State of Tennessee v. Phillip Harvey Wallace ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                                           01/12/2021
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs November 17, 2020
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. PHILLIP HARVEY WALLACE
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Union County
    Nos. 5263 & 5376    E. Shayne Sexton, Judge
    No. E2020-00532-CCA-R3-CD
    The defendant, Phillip Harvey Wallace, appeals the sentencing decision of the trial court
    that followed the revocation of his probation in case number 5263 and his pleading guilty
    in case number 5376, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to consider a community
    corrections placement and by ordering that the 12-year sentence imposed in case number
    5376 be served consecutively to the remainder of the two-year sentence in case number
    5263. Discerning no error, we affirm.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E.
    GLENN and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.
    Brandon T. Kibert, Middlesboro, Kentucky (on appeal); and Travis D. Patterson,
    Maynardville, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Phillip Harvey Wallace.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Assistant
    Attorney General; Jared Effler, District Attorney General; and Ronald Laffitte, Assistant
    District Attorney General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    The defendant was charged in case number 5263 via information with one
    count of felony evading arrest, one count of the possession of hydrocodone, and one count
    of attempted forgery. On February 8, 2017, the defendant pleaded guilty as charged in
    exchange for a total effective sentence of two years, to be served as 86 days’ incarceration
    followed by probation. A violation of probation warrant issued on March 14, 2017,
    alleging that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation by failing to report
    following his release from jail. An amended violation warrant, issued on July 26, 2017,
    added allegations that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation by committing
    the new offense of theft, absconding from supervision, failing to obtain a drug and alcohol
    assessment, and failing to pay court costs. On December 12, 2017, the trial court revoked
    the defendant’s probation but ordered him returned to probation.
    Another violation warrant issued on February 27, 2018, alleging that the
    defendant had violated the terms of his probation by failing to report and failing to pay
    court costs. On June 1, 2018, the district attorney’s office petitioned the court to revoke
    the defendant’s probation based upon his failure to pay court costs and restitution as
    ordered by the trial court. The trial court passed the case in August and October 2018, and,
    on November 13, 2018, an amended violation warrant issued, alleging that the defendant
    had violated the terms of his probation by committing a slew of new offenses. Another
    amended violation warrant that contained essentially the same allegations issued on
    December 5, 2019. The trial court heard the violation on January 30, 2020, in conjunction
    with the sentencing hearing in case number 5376.
    In case number 5376, the Union County Grand Jury charged the defendant
    with a single count of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000 in
    July 2017. In February 2019, the trial court granted the defendant a furlough “to go to an
    inpatient facility at God’s Place Ministry and Recovery” in Knoxville. The defendant
    entered an open plea to the single charge in the indictment on November 18, 2019. No
    transcript of the guilty plea submission hearing was included in the record on appeal. The
    affidavit of complaint included the following factual summary:
    This offense occurred on or about February 21, 2017, at 175
    Peters Road which is situated within the confines of Union
    County, TN. On said date the defendant removed a working 3
    ton heat pump at the residence by cutting the copper and
    electrical connections with a saw and tobacco knife. A sample
    of blood was collected from the scene that had been left by the
    offender. The defendant was located a short time later on the
    same date attempting to sell the copper and aluminum coil
    from the unit at Buckeye’s Scrap Yard in Luttrell, TN. The
    defendant was bleeding from his hand and temple area. The
    defendant gave consent for a sample of his blood to be taken.
    The rightful owner of the heat pump, Gene Ford, has suffered
    a total loss as a result of this crime which he values at $5,000
    to replace. . . .
    At the January 30, 2020 combined sentencing and revocation hearing, Bart
    Short, a probation officer with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”),
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    testified that he was asked to perform a drug screen on the defendant. Mr. Short said that
    he “was watching [the defendant] pretty closely and noticed that,” although the defendant
    “handed me the cup with the urine in it, I never did see urine come out so I performed a
    search on him.” Mr. Short discovered that the defendant “had this tube wrapped around
    him on his shoulders. It went down through his back. And I guess he kind of squeezed the
    urine in the cup.” Mr. Short said that this incident occurred while the defendant was living
    in a halfway house as part of a rehabilitation program.
    During cross-examination, Mr. Short said that after he “caught him with the
    falsification,” the defendant admitted that he had relapsed.
    Upon questioning by the court, Mr. Short said that the incident occurred at
    the end of 2019 while the defendant was “furloughed . . . out to the halfway house” and
    that the drug screen was performed as part of the preparation of the presentence report.
    The defendant testified that, because he did not have a driver’s license, he
    “had to have a woman that I knowed [sic] in Knoxville to take me” to the appointment for
    the drug screen. He said that he had a headache at that time, so he “asked my driver if she
    had something for a headache,” and she told him to look in her purse. He said that he found
    a pill “in a chewable aspirin bottle” and “swallowed it.” He claimed that, although he “had
    seen Suboxone strips before,” he had “never seen a Suboxone pill.” The defendant insisted
    that “it was purely by accident, but the thing was done.” He insisted that Mr. Short “did
    not do a search and find the hose on me” and that, instead, “I jerked the hose off me because
    I didn’t want to be a liar.”
    The defendant said that, at the time of the incident, he resided at God’s Place
    Ministries, a halfway house where he was completing drug rehabilitation. He said that he
    had submitted to and passed several random drug tests while in the program. He asked the
    court for mercy.
    During cross-examination, the defendant insisted that he did not know that
    he had taken Suboxone but admitted that he took steps to falsify the drug test, saying, “I
    was in a panic.”
    Billy Greenlea, the house director for God’s Place Ministries in Knoxville,
    testified that the defendant had passed a number of drug tests during his time in the
    program. He said that, if the defendant returned to the program, Mr. Greenlea could
    arrange for him to be tested more often. Mr. Greenlea acknowledged that he had never
    seen a device like the one the defendant used to try and falsify the drug test in this case.
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    The presentence report, which was exhibited to the hearing, established that
    the defendant had previously been charged with over 150 separate offenses that had,
    including traffic offenses, resulted in some 75 prior convictions. The 44-year-old
    defendant’s criminal history, which began with a charge of marijuana possession shortly
    after his 18th birthday, spanned the entirety of his adult life.
    The trial court characterized the defendant’s claim that he came “in with this
    effort to defeat the screen even though he would . . . have been clean but for this unknown
    pill that he popped on his way” as “the most absurd thing that I have ever heard.” The
    court added, “I cannot grasp why [the defendant] or anyone else would think anybody of
    sound mind would believe that, anybody, not just Judges.” The trial court noted that, as a
    career offender with a 12-year sentence for a nonviolent felony, the defendant “technically”
    was eligible for community corrections but that the issue was his “suitability” for such a
    placement. After “reviewing the presentence investigation, the file itself, [and] taking the
    proof” presented at the hearing, including the defendant’s testimony, the trial court found
    that the defendant’s “continued supervision on release would be inappropriate.” The court
    observed that the proof at the hearing was particularly relevant to the defendant’s suitability
    for a sentence involving release into the community and his amenability to correction. The
    court also observed as “most convincing” the fact that the defendant had violated every
    probationary term to which he had been sentenced. The court found that “[t]he question of
    whether or not it reasonably appears the defendant will abide by the terms of probation”
    was “solidly against the defendant” and that, given “that he has a history of violence,”
    confinement was necessary to protect society “from possible future criminal conduct.” The
    court also found that measures less restrictive than confinement had both frequently and
    recently been tried in the defendant’s case without success, saying, “I’ve tried everything
    in my book. Every tool in my box has been thrown at [the defendant], and he’s thrown
    them on the ground.” The court ordered the defendant to serve his 12-year sentence in
    TDOC.
    The court revoked the defendant’s probation in case number 5263 and
    ordered that the defendant serve the 12-year sentence in case number 5376 consecutively
    to the two-year sentence in case number 5263 based upon the defendant’s extensive record
    of criminal activity. The trial court gave the defendant credit against the two-year sentence
    in case number 5263 for all the time he had served in confinement.
    In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court failed to properly
    consider his suitability for a community corrections placement and challenges the
    consecutive alignment of the sentences.
    Our supreme court has adopted an abuse of discretion standard of review for
    sentencing and has prescribed “a presumption of reasonableness to within-range sentencing
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    decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing
    Act.” State v. Bise, 
    380 S.W.3d 682
    , 707 (Tenn. 2012). The application of the purposes
    and principles of sentencing involves a consideration of “[t]he potential or lack of potential
    for the rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant . . . in determining the sentence
    alternative or length of a term to be imposed.” T.C.A. § 40-35-103(5). Trial courts are
    “required under the 2005 amendments to ‘place on the record, either orally or in writing,
    what enhancement or mitigating factors were considered, if any, as well as the reasons for
    the sentence, in order to ensure fair and consistent sentencing.’” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 698-
    99 (quoting T.C.A. § 40-35-210(e)). Under the holding in Bise, “[a] sentence should be
    upheld so long as it is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the
    sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id.
    at 709. The abuse-of-discretion standard of review and the presumption of reasonableness
    also applies to “questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence.” State v.
    Caudle, 
    388 S.W.3d 273
    , 278-79 (Tenn. 2012).
    Alternative Sentencing
    When a trial court orders a fully-incarcerative sentence, it must base the
    decision to confine the defendant upon the considerations set forth in Code section 40-35-
    103(1), which provides:
    (1) Sentences involving confinement should be based on the
    following considerations:
    (A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by
    restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal
    conduct;
    (B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the
    seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly suited
    to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit
    similar offenses; or
    (C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have
    frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the
    defendant; . . . .
    T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1).
    Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, the trial court specifically considered
    his suitability for a community corrections placement. The court initially noted that the
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    defendant “technically” was eligible for community corrections placement but found that
    confinement was necessary to protect society from a defendant with a long history of
    criminal conduct and that measures less restrictive than confinement had frequently and
    recently been applied to the defendant. The record fully supports these findings. The
    defendant outfitted himself with an elaborate apparatus in an attempt to defeat the drug
    screen for his presentence report in case number 5376, at a time when he was on probation
    in case number 5263 and on a furlough in case number 5376 granted for the purpose of his
    obtaining drug and alcohol treatment. We agree with the trial court that there is nothing
    that a community corrections placement could offer the defendant that has not already been
    offered to him.
    Consecutive Sentencing
    The standard of review adopted in Bise “applies similarly” to the imposition
    of consecutive sentences, “giving deference to the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary
    authority to impose consecutive sentences if it has provided reasons on the record
    establishing at least one of the seven grounds listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section
    40-35-115(b).” State v. Pollard, 
    432 S.W.3d 851
    , 861 (Tenn. 2013).
    The trial court based its decision to align the sentences consecutively on the
    defendant’s extensive criminal history. See 40-35-115(b)(2). The record clearly supports
    the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s criminal history was extensive. Additionally,
    we note that the defendant was charged in case number 5263 in January 2017 for offenses
    committed in October and November 2016. He pleaded guilty to those offenses on
    February 8, 2017, and then committed the theft offense in case number 5376 less than two
    weeks later on February 21, 2017. Thus, consecutive sentences were also justified on the
    basis that the defendant was on probation in case number 5263 when he committed the
    offense in case number 5376.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    _________________________________
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
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Document Info

Docket Number: E2020-00532-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.

Filed Date: 1/12/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2021