State of Tennessee v. Shun M. Ramey ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                        04/24/2020
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SHUN M. RAMEY
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Wilson County
    No. 10-CR-789      Brody Kane, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. M2019-00755-CCA-R3-CD
    ___________________________________
    Defendant, Shun M. Ramey, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct
    an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to
    Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Order of the Trial Court Affirmed Pursuant
    to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20
    TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS T.
    WOODALL and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ. joined.
    Shun M. Ramey, Pro Se, Only, Tennessee.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Clark B. Thornton, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In July 2012, Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony,
    and received an agreed upon forty-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender to be
    served at 100% for a violent offense. The plea agreement and judgment reflect that the
    forty-year sentence is consecutive to all prior sentences. In February 2019, Defendant
    filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The trial court
    summarily denied relief. Defendant now appeals. In response to the filing of the record
    on appeal and Defendant’s brief, the State has filed a motion to affirm the ruling of the
    trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.
    For the reasons stated below, said motion is hereby granted.
    Rule 36.1 permits a defendant to seek correction of an unexpired illegal sentence
    at any time. See State v. Brown, 
    479 S.W.3d 200
    , 211 (Tenn. 2015). “[A]n illegal
    sentence is one that is not authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly
    contravenes an applicable statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a). Our supreme court has
    interpreted the meaning of “illegal sentence” as defined in Rule 36.1 and concluded that
    the definition “is coextensive, and not broader than, the definition of the term in the
    habeas corpus context.” State v. Wooden, 
    478 S.W.3d 585
    , 594-95 (Tenn. 2015). That
    court then reviewed the three categories of sentencing errors: clerical errors (those arising
    from a clerical mistake in the judgment sheet), appealable errors (those for which the
    Sentencing Act specifically provides a right of direct appeal) and fatal errors (those so
    profound as to render a sentence illegal and void). 
    Id.
     Commenting on appealable errors,
    the court stated that those “generally involve attacks on the correctness of the
    methodology by which a trial court imposed sentence.” 
    Id.
     In contrast, fatal errors
    include “sentences imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme, sentences
    designating release eligibility dates where early release is statutorily prohibited, sentences
    that are ordered to be served concurrently where statutorily required to be served
    consecutively, and sentences not authorized by any statute for the offenses.” 
    Id.
     The
    court held that only fatal errors render sentences illegal. 
    Id.
     A trial court may summarily
    dismiss a Rule 36.1 motion if it does not state a colorable claim for relief. Tenn. R. Crim.
    P. 36.1(b)(2).
    Defendant argues the sentence he bargained for is not authorized by statute. He
    also alleges that the State failed to properly file notice of enhancement and that his plea
    was not voluntary. “[A] plea-bargained sentence is legal so long as it does not exceed the
    maximum punishment authorized by the plea offense.” Hoover v. State, 
    215 S.W.3d 776
    ,
    780 (Tenn. 2007). Here, Defendant was charged with first degree felony murder and
    entered a negotiated plea to second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of forty
    years as a Range II, multiple offender. Second degree murder is a Class A felony.
    T.C.A. § 39-13-210(c)(1) (2011). The statutory maximum for a Class A felony is 60
    years, and a Range II sentence for the offense is 25 to 40 years. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-
    111(b)(1) and 112(b)(1). Any sentence for second degree murder is required to be
    imposed at 100%. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-501(i)(1) and 501(i)(2)(B).                 Accordingly,
    Defendant’s plea-bargained forty-year sentence with a release eligibility of 100% is
    specifically authorized by the applicable statutory scheme. Furthermore, Defendant’s
    claims regarding the alleged lack of notice of enhanced sentencing and the voluntariness
    of his plea are not actionable in a Rule 36.1 motion. State v. Michael Scott Bickford, No.
    M2018-01837-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2019 WL 1579198
    , at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2019).
    In light of the discussion above, we conclude Defendant’s sentence is not illegal
    under the terms of Rule 36.1. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying relief.
    The ruling of the trial court is therefore affirmed pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals
    Rule 20.
    -2-
    _________________________
    Judge Timothy L. Easter
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2019-00755-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge Timothy L. Easter

Filed Date: 4/24/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/24/2020