State of Tennessee v. Brodie Bowery ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                       10/08/2020
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs September 29, 2020
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BRODIE BOWERY
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County
    No. S67713 James F. Goodwin, Jr., Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. E2019-01645-CCA-R3-CD
    ___________________________________
    Brodie Bowery, Defendant, admitted that he violated the conditions of his probation, and
    the trial court fully revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his
    sentence in confinement. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which and ROBERT
    H. MONTGOMERY, JR. and TIMOTHY L. EASTER JJ., joined.
    Andrew J. Gibbons, District Public Defender, and Wesley A. Mink, Assistant District
    Public Defender, for the appellant, Brodie Bowery.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ruth Anne Thompson, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General; Barry P. Staubus, District Attorney General; and William B.
    Harper, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Defendant was indicted for aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. On
    November 17, 2017, he pled to attempt to commit sexual exploitation of a minor and was
    sentenced, pursuant to a plea agreement, as a Range I Standard Offender to six years to
    be served on split confinement of one year in the county jail followed by supervised
    probation for five years. A probation violation warrant was issued on May 29, 2019. At
    the revocation hearing, Defendant entered a no contest plea of guilty to the violation
    warrant and stipulated that the trial court could consider the facts set forth in the warrant
    as a basis for the finding of a violation.
    The affidavit to the violation report stated:
    Violation of Rule #1: “I will obey the laws of the United States, or any
    State in which I may be, as well as any municipal ordinances.” To wit: On
    or about 5/24/2019, [D]efendant was charged with Obstruction of Justice,
    Resisting Arrest, and Fail[ing] [t]o Stop [f]or Police in Scott County,
    Virginia. Violation of Rule #5: “I will inform my Probation Officer before
    changing my residence or employment. I will get permission of my
    Probation Officer before leaving the state. I will when away from my
    residence, have on my person my probation identification card and will
    present it to the proper authorities.        If I misplace my probation
    identification card I will immediately notify my Probation Officer.” To
    wit: Count 1: On or about 5/24/2019, [D]efendant left the State of
    Tennessee without permission by going to Duffield, Scott County, Virginia.
    Count 2: On or about 05/29/2019, [D]efendant failed to follow lawful
    instructions by establishing contact with another sex offender, David
    Whitson, after being instructed to have no contact with Mr. Whitson due to
    hi[s] having an active warrant.
    Defendant called Teresa Hall as a witness. Ms. Hall testified that she was worried
    about her grandson, D.J. Whitson, due to his eroding mental health. She said that Mr.
    Whitson, who was on probation, cut off his GPS ankle bracelet and fled. She located Mr.
    Whitson at a campground in Clinch River, Virginia. She asked Defendant, who was a
    friend of Mr. Whitson, to go to the campground and get Mr. Whitson and take him to
    Holston Valley Hospital.
    On cross-examination, Ms. Hall denied knowing that Defendant had been
    specifically instructed by his probation officer not to have any contact with Mr. Whitson.
    The State called Dustin Long, Defendant’s probation officer. Officer Long
    testified that, after Mr. Whitson cut off his ankle bracelet and fled, he learned that
    Defendant had been having contact with Mr. Whitson. He told Defendant that he was
    prohibited from having contact with Mr. Whitson because Mr. Whitson was a convicted
    sex offender and a wanted fugitive. He advised Defendant to contact law enforcement
    immediately if he had contact with Mr. Whitson. Officer Long said that Ms. Hall came
    to his office and that he specifically told her that Defendant was not to have any contact
    with Mr. Whitson. He explained to her that Mr. Whitson was a wanted fugitive and that
    she needed to call law enforcement if she located him.
    -2-
    The trial court noted that it “tried split confinement” but that did not stop
    Defendant “from leaving the state or having contact with someone he was told not to
    have contact with” or “from picking up charges in another state.” The court opined that
    Defendant had shown that he was “either unwilling or unable to comply with conditions”
    of release in the community. The trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered
    him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. This timely appeal followed.
    Analysis
    On appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking
    his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement.
    Defendant argues that the trial court’s decision “failed to reflect a proper application of
    the purposes and principles of the sentencing act.” The State argues that the trial court
    properly exercised its discretion in fully revoking Defendant’s probation. We agree with
    the State.
    Upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant has violated a
    condition of his or her probation, a trial court may revoke probation and order the
    imposition of the original sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310, -311 (2019); State v.
    Kendrick, 
    178 S.W.3d 734
    , 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (citing State v. Mitchell, 
    810 S.W.2d 733
    , 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling
    on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Shaffer, 
    45 S.W.3d 553
    , 554 (Tenn.
    2001) (citing State v. Harkins, 
    811 S.W.2d 79
    , 82 (Tenn. 1991)). To establish an abuse
    of discretion, a defendant must show that there is “no substantial evidence” in the record
    to support the trial court’s determination that a violation of probation has occurred.
    Id. In this case,
    Defendant admitted that he violated the conditions of his probation
    and stipulated to the grounds set out in the violation report affidavit. Defendant’s
    admission that he violated the conditions of his probation, alone, constitutes substantial
    evidence to support the revocation of probation. See State v. Christopher Nathaniel
    Richardson, No. M2006-01060-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2007 WL 776876
    , at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    Mar. 15, 2007), no perm. app. filed. The trial court’s oral findings show that the court
    initially imposed an alternative sentence of split confinement and that Defendant violated
    the terms of his probation after his release from confinement. These findings support the
    trial court’s finding that “[m]easures less restrictive than confinement” had “recently
    been applied unsuccessfully.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(C) (2019).
    Upon finding a violation, the trial court is vested with the statutory authority to
    revoke probation and suspension of the sentence and “[c]ause the defendant to commence
    the execution of the judgment as originally entered[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
    311(e)(1)(A) (2019). The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
    -3-
    Conclusion
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ____________________________________
    ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2019-01645-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.

Filed Date: 10/8/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2020