State of Tennessee v. Nathan Craig ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                             07/07/2021
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs June 8, 2021
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. NATHAN CRAIG
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Maury County
    No. 25765 Stella L. Hargrove, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. M2020-01124-CCA-R3-CD
    ___________________________________
    Defendant, Nathan Craig, pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to four years,
    suspended to a ten-year sentence of supervised probation. Defendant’s probation officer
    filed a probation violation warrant alleging that Defendant had violated the terms of his
    probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered
    him to serve the remainder of the four-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant
    argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. Following our
    review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial
    court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT
    WILLIAMS, P.J., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., joined.
    Brandon E. White, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, Nathan Craig.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ruth Anne Thompson, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General; Tony Clark, District Attorney General; and Jude Santana,
    Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    Factual and Procedural Background
    On October 3, 2017, Defendant pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to four
    years, suspended to a ten-year sentence of supervised probation. Officer Kristina Hill1,
    who works with probation and parole, supervised Defendant’s probation and testified at
    the hearing regarding Defendant’s supervision history. Defendant’s first violation of his
    probation occurred on April 27, 2018, when he appeared in a photograph posted on
    Instagram with a pistol placed in his waistband. As a result, Defendant’s probation was
    partially revoked, and he was reinstated. Officer Hill reported Defendant had also failed
    to report to the forensic social worker and had failed drug screenings for marijuana on
    January 14, 2019, and April 8, 2019, but no probation violation warrant was sought for
    these infractions.
    On June 27, 2019, prior to a second probation violation warrant being issued against
    him, Defendant was cited in Marshall County for mitigated criminal littering. Defendant
    failed to appear in court as required for this charge on August 20, 2019. Officer Hill was
    unaware of Defendant’s Marshall County charges until March 9, 2020.
    On November 19, 2019, Defendant’s probation officer filed a second probation
    violation report alleging that Defendant had been charged in Maury County with
    shoplifting, driving on a suspended license, and violation of the financial responsibility
    law. The record is unclear on the details of these charges, but it is clear that Defendant was
    ordered to serve a sentence of eleven-months, twenty-nine-days suspended to probation for
    crimes committed in Maury County.
    On November 15, 2019, Defendant was pulled over in Williamson County for
    throwing a cigarette butt out of his vehicle window. During that traffic stop, the officer
    determined that Defendant had an outstanding warrant in Marshall County for the failure
    to appear in court on the littering citation, and that he had an outstanding warrant in Maury
    County for failing to appear in court for a review date. Thus, he was arrested. Defendant
    claims it was then that he first learned about the warrant for his arrest in Marshall County
    for failure to appear. Defendant alleges that he called his probation officer, Manager
    Crystal Gray, from the traffic stop to inform her about these two pending warrants. He
    testified that she instructed him to “come talk to [her] about it” when he bonded out.
    Defendant further testified that he ultimately resolved both warrants without making bond
    and that the littering citation was dismissed.
    On January 7, 2020, at the hearing on Defendant’s second probation violation, the
    trial court revoked Defendant’s probation, ordered him to serve six months, and reinstated
    1
    Officer Kristina Hill was referred to as “Rebecca Hill” and “Officer Hall” in the filed
    briefs; however, Officer Hill’s name is clear in the technical record and we will refer to her
    accordingly.
    -2-
    him to probation. Defendant was released from custody on March 8, 2020. On March 9,
    2020, Defendant reported to probation and met with Officer Hill. He admitted during this
    meeting that he forgot to tell Officer Hill about the Marshall County charges, but stated
    that he had reported the charges to Officer Michael Batstone, who at the time of the second
    probation revocation hearing no longer worked with the probation office. Defendant also
    told Officer Hill that he reported the Marshall County charges to Manager Gray.
    On March 24, 2020, Officer Hill filed a third probation violation report against
    Defendant alleging that he was cited in Marshall County for mitigated criminal littering on
    June 27, 2019; that Defendant failed to appear in Marshall County General Sessions Court
    on August 20, 2019; that a failure to appear warrant was issued based on Defendant’s
    failure to appear in Marshall County General Sessions Court for the littering citation; and
    that Defendant never reported any of his Marshall County charges to any probation officer
    until March 9, 2020.
    At the hearing on the third probation violation, Officer Hill testified that standard
    operating procedures at probation meetings include providing probationers with report
    forms to report and document any encounters with law enforcement, and that any reporting
    would be noted in a probationer’s file. Because there was not a completed form in
    Defendant’s file, nor were there any reports, records, or contact notes regarding any
    conversations or reports of Defendant’s contacts with law enforcement in Marshall County,
    Officer Hill concluded that Defendant did not report his contact to anyone in the State
    probation office. Officer Hill further testified that had Defendant reported his Marshall
    County charges, he would have been sanctioned in accordance with standard operating
    procedures. There was no evidence of sanctions in his file.
    Defendant also testified at this third probation revocation hearing.              He
    acknowledged that he received a littering citation in 2019 in Marshall County, and that he
    “completely forgot,” and failed to attend his court date. He also testified that he forgot to
    pay the $50.00 fine to the Hunter’s Safety Association. Defendant claims that on
    November 15, 2019, he reported the citation to Manager Gray, his probation officer at the
    time. Defendant also claims that he notified Manager Gray when the littering citation was
    retired.
    Following the third probation violation hearing, the trial court found that the State
    had carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had
    violated his probation based on Defendant’s admission that he failed to appear in Marshall
    County for his court date. The trial court also found that based on “the totality of the
    circumstances and records ke[pt] in the ordinary course of business,” that the State had
    carried its burden of proof as to Defendant’s failure to report his arrest for failing to appear
    in Marshall County. The trial court then fully revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered
    -3-
    him to serve the remainder of his four-year sentence in confinement. It is from this
    judgment the Defendant now appeals.
    Analysis
    On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by fully
    revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his four-year sentence
    in confinement. The State argues that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when
    it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had violated the terms of
    his probation. We agree with the State.
    The standard of review that applies to an appeal of the length, range, or manner of
    service of a sentence is an abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of
    reasonableness. See State v. Bise, 
    380 S.W.3d 682
    , 708 (Tenn. 2012). This standard also
    applies to probation revocation proceedings. State v. Casey Dupra Drennon, No. M2014-
    02366-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2015 WL 6437212
     (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 23, 2015),
    no perm. app. filed. A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal
    standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous
    assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining
    party. State v. Phelps, 
    329 S.W.3d 436
    , 443 (Tenn. 2010).
    If the trial court revokes a defendant’s probation, the trial court may (1) order
    incarceration; (2) order the sentence into execution as initially entered, or, in other words,
    begin the probationary sentence anew; (3) return the defendant to probation on modified
    conditions as necessary; or (4) extend the remaining probationary period for a period not
    to exceed two years. See State v. Hunter, 
    1 S.W.3d 643
    , 648 (Tenn. 1999) (Before
    appellant could successfully complete his initial two-year probationary term, he repeatedly
    violated the conditions of his probation. The trial court had the authority to revoke
    probation and order service of the original sentence because appellant had failed to
    complete an entire probationary period at the time that the violations occurred.) Moreover,
    an accused who is already on probation is not entitled to a second grant of probation or
    another form of alternative sentencing. State v. Jeffrey A. Warfield, No. 01C01-9711-CC-
    00504, 
    1999 WL 61065
    , at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 10, 1999), perm. app.
    denied (Tenn. June 28, 1999). Revocation may be based on acts committed prior to the
    probationary period which were unknown to the court at the time of the grant of probation.
    State v. Stubblefield, 
    953 S.W.2d 223
    , 225 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
    The credibility of witnesses at a probation revocation hearing is a question to be
    resolved by the trial court. Bledsoe v. State, 
    387 S.W.2d 811
    , 814 (Tenn. 1965). The trial
    court’s findings have the weight of a jury verdict. Carver v. State, 
    570 S.W.2d 872
    , 875
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). The trial court is free to exercise its judgment based on the proof
    in the record supporting a new criminal offense and is not bound by an acquittal. State v.
    -4-
    Delp, 
    614 S.W.2d 395
     (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). If the proof supports a finding that the
    defendant violated probation by engaging in criminal conduct, an acquittal on the same
    conduct does not preclude the trial court from revoking probation for the new criminal
    conduct. Id.; State v. Agee Gabriel, No. M2002-1605-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2004 WL 1562551
    ,
    at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, July 12, 2004) (“[T]he validity of the original
    warrant was not affected by the dismissal of the criminal charges arising from the acts
    alleged in the warrant’), no perm. app. filed.
    Here, Defendant argues that the trial court erred because the violations presented in
    the third probation violation warrant occurred prior to his second probation violation
    warrant and hearing on January 7, 2020, and because those charges were allegedly
    subsequently dismissed. Further, Defendant disagrees with the conclusion of the trial court
    because it credited the State’s witnesses over his testimony. He also argues that the State
    did not call as witnesses the multiple probation officers assigned to Defendant over the
    course of his supervision. Defendant admitted that he received a citation for littering and
    that he failed to appear in Marshall County for court on that charge. The trial court
    accredited the testimony of Officer Hill regarding standard operating procedures and
    probation records kept in the ordinary course of business over the testimony of Defendant
    regarding Defendant’s failure to report the new charges.
    The record clearly supports the trial court’s finding that Defendant violated the
    terms of his probation. Once the trial court has found that a Defendant has violated the
    terms of his probation, it retains discretionary authority, pursuant to Tennessee Code
    Annotated section 40-35-310(b), to revoke the probation and order Defendant to service
    his sentence in confinement. The determination of the proper consequence of a probation
    violation embodies a separate exercise of discretion. Hunter, 
    1 S.W.3d at 647
    . Further, an
    accused who has already been granted probation is not entitled to either a second grant of
    probation, or another form of alternative sentencing. Jeffrey A. Warfield, 
    1999 WL 61065
    ,
    at *2.
    The trial court may revoke probation based on prior committed crimes as soon as
    they are made known to the court. Therefore, the Marshall County charges giving rise to
    the instant revocation, although committed prior to the second probation violation, are a
    sufficient basis for revocation in this case. The trial court credited officer Hill’s testimony
    that Defendant violated his probation, and the evidence supports this finding. Defendant
    was free to call any witnesses in his defense but chose not to do so. He cannot now blame
    the State for not calling witnesses.
    We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its revocation of
    Defendant’s probation. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to relief on this claim.
    -5-
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ____________________________________
    JILL BARTEE AYERS, JUDGE
    -6-