State of Tennessee v. Palikna Tosiwo Tosie ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                          06/17/2020
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs March 18, 2020
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. PALIKNA TOSIWO TOSIE
    Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
    No. 63CC1-2018-CR-908           William R. Goodman, III, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. M2019-00811-CCA-R3-CD
    ___________________________________
    The Defendant, Palikna Tosiwo Tosie, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and reckless
    endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years to be
    served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it
    denied his request for judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE
    OGLE and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.
    Chase T. Smith, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Palikna Tosiwo Tosie.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Clark B. Thornton, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General; John W. Carney, Jr., District Attorney General; and C.
    Daniel Brollier, Jr., Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of
    Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. Facts
    This case arises from a domestic incident that occurred on June 30, 2018. For this
    incident, officers arrested the Defendant, and the Montgomery County grand jury
    indicted him for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and reckless
    endangerment with a deadly weapon.
    The Defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault and reckless
    endangerment. A transcript of the guilty plea is not included in the record. According to
    the affidavit of complaint:
    Officers with the Clarksville Police Department responded to a
    domestic [incident that had already occurred]. During a domestic dispute
    the suspect, [the Defendant] assaulted the victim . . . with a baseball bat.
    The victim attempted to get away from the [Defendant] by getting in to her
    vehicle and driving away. The [Defendant] got in to his vehicle and chased
    after the victim. The [Defendant] is seen on video surveillance ramming
    the victim’s vehicle causing her vehicle to crash in a ditch. The victim is
    then observed exiting the wreck vehicle and screaming for help. The
    [Defendant] is then seen getting out of his vehicle with a baseball bat
    chasing the victim. The victim was found semiconscious in a neighbor’s
    yard with severe trauma to the head and body. The victim was taken to
    Vanderbilt Hospital by life flight due to the severity of her injuries.
    There is a domestic history. The [Defendant] was arrested for a
    previous domestic assault on 03/27/2018 [sic].
    During the course of the investigation, law enforcement sought the victim’s
    medical records from Vanderbilt Hospital. In the application for a subpoena for the
    medical records, Officer Dominick Sacco swore about the incident that:
    [The victim] stated that she was asleep at her residence . . . . when [the
    Defendant] came home intoxicated. She stated that he began to argue with
    her and [the Defendant] hit her twice with his fist to her face. [The
    Defendant] then grabbed a baseball bat and struck her at least once in the
    thigh. [The victim] was able to get into her vehicle and leave her residence.
    [The Defendant] got into his vehicle and began to follow her. [The
    Defendant] rammed the back of [the victim’s] vehicle causing her to wreck.
    [The victim] then got out of the vehicle and attempted to run away. [The
    Defendant] chased after her with a baseball bat. [The victim] collapsed on
    the ground . . . [and the Defendant] began to punch and kick her while she
    was on the ground. [The Defendant] then began to hit her with the baseball
    bat multiple times in the face and upper body area. [The victim] was
    knocked unconscious and was taken by Life Flight to Vanderbilt Hospital.
    [The victim] was placed in a medically induced coma due to her injures.
    [The victim] had multiple visible injuries to her left thigh, both arms,
    shoulder, neck, and face area.
    -2-
    The Defendant pleaded guilty to Count 2, aggravated assault, and Count 3,
    reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and agreed to be sentenced as a Range II
    Offender. As a Range II Offender, the Defendant’s applicable sentencing ranges were six
    to ten years for Count 2, a Class C felony, and two to four years for Count 3, a Class E
    felony. The parties agreed to allow the trial court to determine the length and manner of
    service of the Defendant’s sentence. In a sentencing memorandum filed with the trial
    court, the Defendant asked that the trial court grant him judicial diversion, noting that he
    had served in the military for twenty-seven years, that he could lose retirement benefits,
    that he had complied with the conditions of his bond, and that he did not have a violent or
    lengthy criminal history.
    At the start of the sentencing hearing, the trial court summarized that the
    Defendant had pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and reckless endangerment as an
    “out-of-range” plea. The trial court noted that the Defendant had applied for judicial
    diversion and that the parties had agreed to allow the trial court to determine the length
    and manner of service of his sentence.
    James Michael Taylor testified that he was a Master Sergeant and combat medic in
    the United States Army and had been deployed previously with the Defendant in Kuwait.
    Sergeant Taylor testified that the Defendant was a “tremendous worker” and very
    reliable. He said that the Defendant had no any disciplinary actions taken against him.
    Mr. Taylor had full confidence and trust in the Defendant. Sergeant Taylor described the
    classes, including alcohol rehabilitation, which the Army had required the Defendant to
    attend as a result of these convictions. He described the Defendant as “remorseful.”
    Raydon Johnson testified that he was also in the military and in the same unit as
    the Defendant. Sergeant Johnson, who had known the Defendant for over two years, said
    that the Defendant handled himself appropriately during the duration of their
    acquaintance. During cross-examination, Sergeant Johnson said that he had never seen
    the Defendant lack self-control.
    The Defendant testified and stated that he was forty-four years old and on active
    duty military, serving in the United States Army for more than twenty-six years. The
    Defendant, who was born on a small island in the Pacific, stated that this incident had
    brought shame to his family, many of whom had still traveled great distances to be at the
    sentencing hearing. Describing his educational history, the Defendant stated that he was
    a high school graduate and also had received an associate’s degree from Columbia
    College. In the army, he had been deployed four times: to Bosnia, Iraq, and twice to
    Kuwait. Some of those deployments involved combat situations.
    -3-
    The Defendant stated that he and the victim had been married for more than
    thirteen years and had two children, ages twelve and ten. He described the events
    surrounding the assault saying that he had consumed “entirely too much” alcohol and
    “disgraced” himself. He said that he regretted his actions daily. He agreed that he had
    injured his wife physically and emotionally and agreed that he could have killed her. The
    Defendant agreed that the two had a negative domestic history. He had been arrested in
    2015 in Kansas for domestic violence against her. In 2007, he was arrested for assault of
    another person, but the altercation stemmed from an argument between the victim and
    him.
    The Defendant testified that he had not had contact with the victim since he had
    been released on bond after his arrest. The Army moved the victim and their children to
    a location undisclosed to him. The Army also offered him classes on enhanced parenting
    skills. The Defendant also filed for divorce in an effort to move forward from this
    situation and regain some visitation with his children. The Defendant said that the Army
    also provided him a twenty-eight-week course on domestic abuse treatment.
    The Defendant said that he and the victim were from the same small island and
    same culture. He said that, if she were present at court, he would sincerely apologize
    because no one deserved what he had done to her.
    During cross-examination, the Defendant testified that this incident occurred early
    in the morning, and he had been drinking all night. He explained that, originally, he
    thought that he and his wife were going to drink together that evening, but, when he
    arrived home, she told him to play cards with his friends and “give her space.” He felt
    insulted and disrespected. He said that the two had never had a “smooth” marriage. The
    Defendant left and played cards. When he returned, he tried to “have his way with her,”
    and she did not reciprocate his affection. The two began arguing, and the victim fled the
    house and got into her car and drove away. He chased her down and rammed her vehicle.
    He then got a baseball bat and beat her with it until she was unconscious. A neighbor
    came outside, and he threatened the neighbor also. The Defendant agreed that he did not
    exercise self-control and that he failed himself.
    The Defendant agreed that he had previously hit the victim. He had been
    convicted of domestic assault in South Carolina in 2015, and he attended domestic assault
    classes as a result. This assault did not involve alcohol. He said that he had not
    consumed alcohol since the most recent domestic assault incident.
    During redirect examination, the Defendant testified that he had also completed
    alcohol and drug abuse classes.
    -4-
    The State offered a victim impact statement. In it, the victim stated that this
    situation was heartbreaking in that it was a horrifying and terrible thing that happened,
    which she had to explain to her children. The victim described her injuries saying that
    she had a cast on her left arm because it was fractured in two places. She said that she
    was still under the care of an occupational therapist and still did not have the full use of
    her wrist. The victim stated that she had tried to be strong emotionally and physically for
    her children but that she was still processing that her “own husband almost took [her]
    life.”
    The trial court considered the evidence and then found:
    The Court has considered the testimony; . . . the pre-sentence report; the
    victim impact statement; and the other exhibits certifying the completion of
    the various courses offered by the United States Army.
    First of[] all let me say, I appreciate the service of [the Defendant],
    as well as the other members of the military, Sergeant Taylor and Sergeant
    Johnson. Their sacrifices are what enable us to enjoy the benefits of living
    in a free society. Living in a free society, part of what we enjoy, is the
    benefit that we have a rule of law that applies, that governs the conduct and
    the way that people are to act.
    This is a situation where there’s no way we’re going to make it right.
    Considering the victim impact statement, it’s just by the grace of God that
    we’re not here today doing a sentencing for murder.
    Now, for the proof, it’s pretty much [un]contradicted that after the
    [victim’s] vehicle was run off the road, as a result of the collision, that the
    Defendant took a baseball bat and further inflicted injuries. And we have
    had cases in this Court where people got killed by utilization of a baseball
    bat.
    And while recognizing the service and sacrifice of these individuals,
    from which we receive a benefit, we still have to come back to the point
    where we can feel secure in society in which we live. That we can feel
    secure in Montgomery County, Tennessee.
    Now, the legislature provides guidance or actually direction as to
    what is to be considered, and I have considered that.
    -5-
    Under mitigating factors as set forth in Mr. Smith’s pre-hearing
    memorandum, under T.C.A. 40-35-113, the fact that [the Defendant] has
    entered a plea of guilty to these charges and accepted responsibility for
    them, I find that to be a mitigating factor.
    As it relates to enhancement factors under T.C.A. Section 40-35-
    114, under Subsection (6); the personal injuries inflicted upon or the
    amount of damage to property sustained by or taken from the victim was
    particularly great.
    I understand that she has survived. But according to the victim
    impact statement, she still suffers some degree of disability, as a result of
    the injuries. I find that to be an enhance[ment] factor.
    ....
    The Court is given further direction under T.C.A. 40-35-102; the
    Court is directed to consider alternatives, other than incarceration.
    And, specifically, under T.C.A. 40-35-103; sentences involving
    confinement should be based on the following consideration: Confinement
    is necessary to protect society by restraining the Defendant who has a long
    history of criminal conduct, and I find that to be applicable; confinement is
    necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense; previous
    measures less restrictive than confinement have . . . been unsuccessful[].
    I do not find that there is anything that prohibits the Defendant from
    continuing his life. I don’t know about what’s going to happen with him
    and the Army.
    This is a very serious offense and it’s conduct that we simply cannot
    tolerate in our society. And I do think that Subsection (B); confinement is
    necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of this offense.
    Therefore, consideration being given to the enhancement factor, as
    well as the mitigation factor, I’m going to deny the request for diversion.
    ....
    -6-
    By agreement as a Range II, . . . as to Count Two, is a sentence of
    not less than [six], no[r] more than [ten] years. I’m going to sentence him
    to [six] years on Count Two.
    Count Three, a sentence range is Range II, not less than two, no[r]
    more than four. I sentence [him] to two years in Count Three.
    Count Three will run concurrent[ly] with Count Two. This sentence
    will be suspended, except for 15 days [which he has already served].
    It is from that judgment that the Defendant now appeals.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his
    request for judicial diversion. He contends that the record does not contain any findings
    upon which the trial court relied in denying his request. While he concedes that the
    circumstances of the incident do not weigh in favor of diversion, he asks this court to
    conduct a de novo review or remand the issue for reconsideration. The State counters
    that the omission of the transcript of the guilty plea hinders the Defendant’s assertion but
    concedes that the record is sufficient for our review. It then posits that, while the
    Defendant is a favorable candidate in some regards, the circumstances of the offense are
    so egregious that this factor outweighs all other factors and supports the trial court’s
    denial of judicial diversion. After review, we agree with the State.
    “Judicial diversion,” provided for in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-
    313(a), is the trial court’s deferring proceedings in a criminal case. See T.C.A. § 40-35-
    313(a)(1)(A) (2019). Although judicial diversion is not a sentence, pursuant to such
    diversion, the trial court places the defendant on probation “without entering a judgment
    of guilty.”
    Id. To be
    eligible or “qualified” for judicial diversion, the defendant must
    plead guilty to, or be found guilty of, an offense that is not “a sexual offense . . . or a
    Class A or Class B felony,” and the defendant must not have previously been convicted
    of a felony or a Class A misdemeanor. T.C.A. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(B)(i)(a),(c),(d).
    Diversion requires the consent of the qualified defendant. T.C.A. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(A).
    “[A] ‘qualified’ defendant is not necessarily entitled to diversion. Whether to grant
    judicial diversion is left to the discretionary authority of the trial courts.” State v. King,
    
    432 S.W.3d 316
    , 326 (Tenn. 2014). Following a determination that the defendant is
    eligible for judicial diversion, the trial court must consider:
    (a) the accused’s amenability to correction, (b) the circumstances of the
    offense, (c) the accused’s criminal record, (d) the accused’s social history,
    -7-
    (e) the accused’s physical and mental health, and (f) the deterrence value to
    the accused as well as others. The trial court should also consider whether
    judicial diversion will serve the ends of justice - the interests of the public
    as well as the accused.
    Id. (quoting State
    v. Parker, 
    932 S.W.2d 945
    , 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)). “Further,
    the trial court must weigh the factors against each other and place an explanation of its
    ruling on the record.”
    Id. (citing State
    v. Electroplating, Inc., 
    990 S.W.2d 211
    , 229
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)).
    Although judicial diversion is not a sentence, our supreme court determined that
    the standard of review first expressed in State v. Bise, applies to “appellate review for a
    trial court’s sentencing decision to either grant or deny judicial diversion.”
    Id. at 325.
    Importantly, however, the court emphasized that the adoption of the Bise standard of
    review “did not abrogate the requirements set forth in Parker and Electroplating, which
    are essential considerations for judicial diversion.”
    Id. at 326.
    The trial court need not provide a recitation of all the applicable “factors when
    justifying its decision on the record in order to obtain the presumption of
    reasonableness,” but “the record should reflect that the trial court considered the Parker
    and Electroplating factors in rendering its decision and that it identified the specific
    factors applicable to the case before it.” 
    King, 432 S.W.3d at 327
    . When the trial court
    considers each of the factors enumerated in Parker and weighs them against each other,
    placing its findings in the record, as required by Electroplating, Inc., we “apply a
    presumption of reasonableness,” per Bise, and will “uphold the grant or denial so long as
    there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision.”
    Id. When “the
    trial court fails to consider and weigh the applicable common law factors, the
    presumption of reasonableness does not apply and the abuse of discretion standard . . . is
    not appropriate.”
    Id. Instead, “the
    appellate courts may either conduct a de novo review
    or, if more appropriate under the circumstances, remand the issue for reconsideration.
    “The determination as to whether the appellate court should conduct a de novo review or
    remand for reconsideration is within the discretion of the reviewing court.”
    Id. at 328.
    The State agrees that the trial court did not specifically list the required factors but
    posits that the case need not be remanded as the record is sufficient for our de novo
    review. We agree and conclude that, although the trial court did not expressly address all
    of the relevant factors, the record is sufficient for a de novo review. See 
    King, 432 S.W.3d at 328
    . The record herein contains the circumstances of the offense, the
    presentence report, the transcript of the sentencing hearing, and the victim impact
    statement.
    -8-
    We first note that the Defendant is “qualified” for judicial diversion under the
    requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313(a)(1)(B) (2019). We
    therefore turn to discuss the factors enumerated in Parker and Electroplating. The
    Defendant appears to be amenable to correction in that he has completed multiple courses
    offered to him by the Army, has not had contact with the victim, has an exemplary
    military career, and has expressed remorse. This factor weighs in favor of granting
    judicial diversion. Weighing against the Defendant, however, are the circumstances of
    this offense, and the Defendant’s prior criminal record. The Defendant by his own
    admission became incensed when his wife refused his sexual advances. She fled their
    marital home in a car, leaving her two young children behind. The Defendant got into his
    vehicle, ran her car down, and then rammed it. He then got out a baseball bat and beat
    the victim with the bat. The victim suffered serious bodily injury and continued up to the
    time of sentencing to suffer physical impairments as a result of the injuries the Defendant
    inflicted. Additionally, this was not the first time that the Defendant committed an act of
    violence against the victim. The Defendant was convicted in 2015 of misdemeanor
    domestic assault against this victim, and he went to classes as a result of his conviction.
    The Defendant has a good social history, evidenced by supported from many family
    members at the hearing. The record also evinces that he appeared to be in good physical
    and mental health, serving active duty in the military. We find, as did the trial court, that
    “this is a very serious offense and it’s conduct that we simply cannot tolerate in our
    society.” The deterrence value to the accused as well as to others to avoid depreciating
    the seriousness of this offense weighs against granting the Defendant judicial diversion.
    Having weighed the aforementioned factors, we conclude that the circumstances
    of the offense, the Defendant’s criminal history of violence against this victim, and the
    need for deterrence weigh heavily against granting the Defendant judicial diversion.
    Based upon our de novo review of the record and applicable factors, we conclude that the
    ends of justice would not be served by granting the Defendant’s request for judicial
    diversion. Therefore, even though the trial court did not adequately consider all of the
    necessary factors, the record supports the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion.
    II. Conclusion
    In accordance with the aforementioned reasoning and authorities, we affirm the
    trial court’s judgment.
    ____________________________________
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2019-00811-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer

Filed Date: 6/17/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021