State of Tennessee v. Marvin L. Jones, alias Al Amin Hasson ( 2003 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs June 24, 2003
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MARVIN L. JONES,
    ALIAS AL AMIN HASSON
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
    No. 70889    Ray L. Jenkins, Judge
    No. E2002-02419-CCA-R3-CD
    July 3, 2003
    The defendant, Marvin L. Jones, appeals the trial court's revocation of a community corrections
    sentence. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. The
    judgment is affirmed.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed
    GARY R. WADE, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and NORMA
    MCGEE OGLE , JJ., joined.
    Mark E. Stephens, District Public Defender, and Robert C. Edwards, Assistant District Public
    Defender, for the appellant, Marvin L. Jones.
    Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; David H. Findley, Assistant Attorney General; and
    Jo Helm, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    On September 22, 2000, the defendant entered a plea of guilt to a sale of over one-half gram
    of cocaine. On March 15, 2001, the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence, all of which was to
    be served in the Community Alternatives to Prisons Program (CAPP). As a condition of his
    participation in the program, the defendant was required to comply with all governmental laws,
    refrain from conduct inconsistent with good citizenship, pay the fine and costs, and otherwise abide
    by any terms and conditions required by the probation officer.
    Less than two months after sentencing, the defendant was charged with violating the terms
    of his sentence by possessing or using a controlled substance, by fraternizing with other drug users
    and traffickers, and by failing to make a complete report to his probation officer. Although the
    warrant was eventually resolved without a sentence to the Department of Correction, the defendant
    was required to reside in a halfway house and participate in a drug court program. On July 16, 2002,
    a second violation of probation warrant was issued. The defendant was charged with failing to obey
    state law, failing to make a full and truthful report to his probation officer, failing to report for
    supervision and participation in the community corrections and drug court programs, and
    contracting major debt without prior permission. Before the hearing, the warrant was amended to
    allege that the defendant had failed to complete his community service and failed to make payment
    of his community corrections fees.
    At the hearing, Penny Hayes, the defendant's community corrections case manager, testified
    that the defendant was delinquent in his community service obligations and the fees associated with
    his community corrections sentence. She stated that the defendant had failed to report a speeding
    citation and had failed to seek permission to purchase a vehicle on credit. Ms. Hayes testified that
    the defendant, who she believed had been sober for more than one year during his supervised
    program, had nevertheless failed to report for one or more drug screens. The probation officer stated
    that she confronted the defendant when she learned that he had purchased a car and that he answered
    that he was unaware of his supervision requirements, explaining that he was on drugs at the time he
    signed the agreement. She acknowledged, however, that the defendant had not contracted any debt
    by the purchase of the vehicle. Ms. Hayes also acknowledged that although the defendant was some
    36 hours behind in his community service responsibilities in June, he had made up all but 10 hours
    of his required service time by his arrest in July.
    The defendant, who admitted a 25-year substance addiction, described drug court as very
    helpful. He contended that he was behind in community corrections fees only because he had been
    incarcerated as a result of the violation warrant. He testified that because the speeding citation cited
    by Ms. Hayes had been dismissed, he believed that he had no immediate obligation to report the
    incident. The defendant also testified that he had purchased the car with funds he had received in
    an insurance settlement and had not, therefore, obligated himself to any debt.
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the defendant had violated both
    the laws of this state and certain of the conditions of his alternative sentence. After acknowledging
    that the defendant had "talked himself out of several . . . tight spots," the trial judge observed that
    he had "exhausted [his] patience" before revoking. The defendant was ordered to serve the sentence
    originally imposed.
    In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretionary authority
    because the state failed to present proof of his violating state law by speeding or proof of his
    untruthfulness in reports to his probation officer. While the defendant concedes that he was in
    arrears in community service, he contends that the evidence established that he had made
    considerable progress in reducing the deficiency. Although he acknowledges that he was behind in
    his payment of fees, the defendant contends that he was "catching up." He submits that he has made
    considerable progress through his participation in the drug court program by achieving the longest
    period of sobriety of his adult life.
    -2-
    Once a defendant violates the terms of his community corrections program, the trial court
    may revoke the sentence and impose a new one:
    The court shall also possess the power to revoke the sentence imposed at any
    time due to the conduct of the defendant or the termination or modification of the
    program to which the defendant has been sentenced, and the court may resentence the
    defendant to any appropriate sentencing alternative, including incarceration, for any
    period of time up to the maximum sentence provided for the offense committed, less
    any time actually served in the community-based alternative to incarceration.
    
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106
    (e)(4).
    In State v. Harkins, 
    811 S.W.2d 79
     (Tenn. 1991), our supreme court ruled that a community
    corrections sentence is so similar to a probationary sentence as to require the application of the same
    standard of review. Our general law provides that a trial court may revoke a sentence of probation
    upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated the conditions of
    his release. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311
    (e). On appeal, a revocation will be upheld absent an
    abuse of discretion. In order to establish that the trial court has abused its discretion, the defendant
    must show that there is no substantial evidence to support the determination that he violated his
    probation. Harkins, 
    811 S.W.2d at 82
    . Relief can be granted only when the trial court's logic and
    reasoning were improper when viewed in the light of the factual circumstances and the legal
    principles involved. State v. Shaffer, 
    45 S.W.3d 553
    , 555 (Tenn. 2001). The trial judge is not
    required to find that a violation of the terms of probation has occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Stamps v. State, 
    614 S.W.2d 71
    , 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
    Although the state alleged that the defendant had violated the terms of his community
    corrections sentence in a number of ways, the evidentiary hearing was limited. Most of the charges
    were unsubstantiated and yet the defendant acknowledged that he had not performed his community
    service obligations on a timely basis, as required, and that he had not paid a portion of the program
    fees despite his apparent ability to do so. There was no proof that the defendant had been speeding
    other than the acknowledgment of his arrest, a charge that was ultimately dismissed. The evidence
    that the defendant had not timely reported his arrest was disputed and the record does not indicate
    any particular guidelines in that regard. What is apparent is that the supervising officer was
    dissatisfied. The state was unable to establish that the defendant had incurred significant debt
    without prior approval. There was no proof that the defendant had either possessed alcohol or any
    controlled substance or had fraternized with those who trafficked illegal substances. Nevertheless,
    the purpose of the Community Corrections Act of 1985 was to provide an alternative means of
    punishment for "selected, nonviolent felony offenders in front-end community based alternatives to
    incarceration." 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-103
    (1). Even though a defendant meets the minimum
    requirements for participation in a community corrections program, that does not mean that he or
    she is entitled to be sentenced under the Act as a matter of law or right. See State v. Taylor, 
    744 S.W.2d 919
    , 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Because the program is a "last chance," opportunity for
    those who would otherwise be incarcerated in a correctional institution, trial courts must be given
    -3-
    substantial discretionary authority in order to weigh legitimate societal aims against a potential
    benefit to the defendant. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106
    (a); State v. Griffith, 
    787 S.W.2d 340
    ,
    342 (Tenn. 1990). This court, with its limited scope of review, cannot substitute its judgment for
    that of the trial judge even if our result might have been different.
    This record establishes that one prior revocation warrant had been filed before the warrant
    at issue. The trial court had granted some leniency in that instance and, even though the defendant
    had made progress during his time in the program, did not abuse its discretionary authority by
    entering an order of revocation on the second warrant. As indicated, the defendant had failed to
    timely perform his community service obligations, had failed to pay the fees associated with
    participation in the program, had failed to appear for drug screens, and, according to some of the
    testimony, had demonstrated a resistance towards complete candor with his probation officer.
    Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
    ___________________________________
    GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2002-02419-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade

Filed Date: 7/3/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021