State v. Merrian Logan ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
APRIL 1999 SESSION
FILED
July 13, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk
) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9808-CC-00232
Appellee, )
) Lake County
v. )
) Honorable R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge
MERRIAN LOGAN, )
) (Sentencing)
Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
CLIFFORD K. McGOWN, JR. PAUL G. SUMMERS
113 North Court Square Attorney General & Reporter
P. O. Box 26
Waverly, TN 37185 PETER M. COUGHLAN
(On Appeal) Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
G. STEPHEN DAVIS Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
District Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493
208 North Mill Avenue
P. O. Box 742 C. PHILLIP BIVENS
Dyersburg, TN 38025-0742 District Attorney General
(At Trial and Of Counsel on Appeal) P. O. Drawer E
Dyersburg, TN 38025-0220
OPINION FILED: ________________________________
AFFIRMED
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, Merrian Logan, referred herein as the “defendant,” appeals as of right
pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from a judgment of the
Lake County Circuit Court. Upon her plea of guilty to introduction of drugs into a penal
institution, a Class C felony, the trial court imposed a sentence of three years in the
Department of Correction, suspended to six months with the balance to be served on
supervised probation. The defendant presents one appellate issue: whether the trial court
erred in requiring her to serve six months in the Lake County Jail before being placed on
probation.
Upon a review of the entire record, briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 27, 1997, the defendant was arrested by the Lake County Sheriff’s
Department at the Northwest Correctional Complex for introducing marijuana into the
complex. Deputy Sheriff Joseph Vernon, while searching visitors at the complex,
discovered 48.6 grams of marijuana in the defendant’s baby carrier. The defendant was
at the complex to visit her husband, who was incarcerated for the offense of aggravated
robbery. On June 3, 1998, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to unlawfully introducing
a controlled substance, to wit, marijuana, into a penal institution. The trial court was to
determine an appropriate sentence and the defendant’s request for probation. A
presentence report was ordered. At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing on July 21,
1998, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three years as a Range I, standard
offender. The court also ordered, after service of six months in the Lake County Jail, the
remainder of the defendant’s sentence to be served on supervised probation.
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SENTENCING HEARING
Joseph Vernon, deputy sheriff for Lake County and sergeant for the Department of
Correction at the Northwest Correctional Complex for fourteen years, testified that he
arrested the defendant at the complex. During a routine search of visitors, Sergeant
Vernon found 48.6 grams (two ounces) of marijuana in a baby carrier in the defendant’s
possession. The defendant was at the complex to visit her husband. The defendant
initially admitted to bringing the drugs into the complex and then denied it. The defendant
and her companion were arrested. Later, after booking, the defendant signed a waiver of
rights and admitted in a signed statement that the marijuana was hers. Her companion
was then released.
As part of Sergeant Vernon’s duties at the complex, he compiles statistics on drug
use by inmates. Vernon testified that, after monthly random drug screens, twenty-five
percent of the inmates test positive for the presence of illegal drugs. The common form
of entry of drugs into the complex is through visitors. Visitors account for ninety to ninety-
five percent of the illegal entry of drugs into the complex. Thus, Sergeant Vernon testified
that heavy sentences are necessary to deter other visitors from bringing drugs into the
complex.
The defendant testified she is a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee, and has four
children, ages 6, 8, 9, and 10. Her husband is incarcerated for aggravated robbery. At the
time of sentencing, the defendant was employed at Shoney’s and received an AFDC
supplement. The defendant graduated from high school and sought training at a beauty
college, but failed to complete the course. The defendant takes heart medication. The
defendant admitted she pled guilty to carrying marijuana into the prison. However, in the
presentence report, the defendant stated she did not know the marijuana was in the baby
carrier. Then, the defendant testified that her statement to the probation officer was true,
but “[i]t’s really not true because I knew that she had it. Once we had got there, I knew she
had it, but -- I really knew she had it.” The defendant admitted she was willing to “take the
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charge.” As to her written statement to Sergeant Vernon, the defendant testified “[h]e
wrote it, and I just agreed to it.”
During cross-examination, the defendant testified her companion was really Tomeka
Birds, but she was using the alias Iris Gilliland. Birds’s baby was listed on the defendant’s
husband’s visitor list, because her husband felt like a godfather to the baby. The
defendant testified she and Birds had shared an apartment for six months. Birds was at
the complex to see Henry Brooks, but was on Harry Dillard’s visitor list. The defendant
admitted her husband was not the father of any of her children.
The presentence report verifies the defendant has no history of arrests or
convictions. Based upon this evidence, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence, with
supervised probation after serving six months in the Lake County Jail.
SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS
The defendant contends that she is entitled to complete probation and that to
incarcerate her for six months would work an undue financial hardship. She has four
children and a good work history. The state counters that the defendant is not worthy of
full probation on the basis she is unwilling to accept responsibility for her criminal conduct
and a particularized need for deterrence in this case, because it involved a penal
institution.
When a defendant complains of the imposition of his or her sentence, we must
conduct a de novo review with a presumption of correctness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
401(d). Therefore, the burden of showing that the sentence is improper is upon the
appealing party. Id. The presumption that determinations made by the trial court are
correct is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court
considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances. State v.
Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Smith, 898 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn.
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Crim. App. 1994), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1995).
If appellate review reflects that the trial court properly considered all relevant facts,
and its findings of fact are adequately supported by the record, this Court must affirm the
sentence “even if we would have preferred a different result.” State v. Fletcher, 805
S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). In arriving at the proper determination of an
appropriate sentence, the trial court must consider: (1) the evidence, if any, received at
the guilty plea and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of
sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics
of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on
enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any statements the defendant wishes to make in
the defendant’s behalf about the sentencing; and (7) the potential for rehabilitation and
treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-210(a) and (b), 40-35-103; State v. Holland, 860
S.W.2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
From our review of the record, the trial court did consider the sentencing principles
of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, thus our review is with a
presumption of correctness. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). Since
the defendant contends she should not have split confinement for six months, the record
must support the trial court’s judgment. In requiring the defendant to serve six months, the
trial court found confinement necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the crime,
confinement was necessary as a general deterrence, and
[t]he potential for rehabilitation is something that is very
questionable because in this particular situation, we’ve had
three or four different stories that Mrs. Logan has told about
what actually happened. She comes in today and tells even a
different story. With her attorney making every effort possible
to get her to accept responsibility for the situation, she just
refuses to completely do that. Under the circumstances, The
Court feels that some period of incarceration is necessary
although The Court does not feel that the presumptive
minimum of three years total is necessary.
In certain circumstances, a trial court may deny full probation and consider split
confinement based on the seriousness of the offense. To deny an alternative sentence
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based on the seriousness of the offense, “the circumstances of the offense as committed,
must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of
an excessive or exaggerated degree,” and the nature of the offense must outweigh all of
the factors that favor a sentence other than confinement. State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d
370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). We cannot say the facts in this record meet the
standards set forth in Hartley, 818 S.W.2d at 374-75. However, in arriving at a proper
sentence and its imposition, the trial court is entitled to inquire into the nature and
characteristics of the criminal conduct involved. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b)(4); State
v. Hollingsworth, 647 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tenn. 1983). We concur in the trial court’s finding
that some confinement is appropriate for this offense. The defendant made a conscious
decision to smuggle marijuana into a penal institution in a baby carrier and to deliver the
same to her husband. The Government has a legitimate interest in preventing visitors from
smuggling drugs into prisons. Thus, consideration of the seriousness of the offense was
appropriate.
As part of ordering the defendant to split confinement, the trial court was concerned
with deterrence. Before the court considers deterrence, there must be some evidence in
the record that the sentence imposed will have a deterrent effect within the jurisdiction.
State v. Bonestel, 871 S.W.2d 163, 170 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). This Court has
repeatedly held that a finding of a deterrent effect within the jurisdiction cannot be merely
conclusory, but must be supported by proof. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 170. There is
adequate evidence in the record to support the trial court’s determination that deterrence
is applicable in these facts. Sergeant Vernon testified that a random monthly check of
inmates for drugs reveals twenty-five percent of the inmate population tests positive for
drugs, and the main introduction of illegal drugs into the Northwest Correctional Complex
is through visitors. Sergeant Vernon testified that heavy sentences will act as a deterrent
in the prevention of drug smuggling into penal institutions. We find the trial court was
correct in considering this factor.
Furthermore, in imposing the six-month confinement period, the trial court was
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concerned with the defendant’s lack of truthfulness and her potential for rehabilitation.
Credibility is best judged by the trial court, which is in the best position to see and evaluate
the testimony of a defendant. We have held that a defendant’s credibility and willingness
to accept responsibility for the offense are circumstances relevant to determining her
rehabilitation potential. State v. Dowdy, 894 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994);
State v. Anderson, 857 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). We can logically
assume that one who seeks probation and who is less than truthful about her involvement
in the offense would have a poor potential for successful rehabilitation. Such consideration
of truthfulness by the trial court was appropriate under these facts. During the initial
search, the defendant admitted the marijuana was hers, and then denied possession,
resulting in her and Tomeka Birds’s arrests. The defendant explained her written
statement to Sergeant Vernon as “I just agreed to it.” The defendant was equivocal in her
statements to the probation department. Also, in her testimony, the defendant was
equivocal before the trial court. We conclude that the trial court’s consideration of the
defendant’s candor was a relevant factor in determining the imposition of split confinement.
The defendant has failed to establish the trial court’s decision, as to split
confinement, was erroneous. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
________________________________________
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
___________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
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