Donald Gwin v. State of Tennessee ( 2023 )


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  •                                                                                            12/11/2023
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    Assigned on Briefs October 3, 2023
    DONALD GWIN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
    No. 15-00010 Jennifer Mitchell, Judge
    No. W2022-01704-CCA-R3-PC
    The Petitioner, Donald Gwin, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
    his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury-trial convictions for aggravated rape,
    aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault, for which he is serving
    an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction
    court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the
    judgment of the post-conviction court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.
    MCMULLEN, P.J., and J. ROSS DYER, J., joined.
    W. Price Rudolph, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Donald Gwin.
    Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
    Attorney General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; Leslie Byrd, Assistant District
    Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    The Petitioner’s convictions relate to his entering the victim’s home while she was
    away and physically and sexually assaulting her when she returned. The Petitioner was
    identified as the victim’s attacker by DNA evidence, a location-tracking ankle monitor he
    wore at the time, and the victim’s in-court identification of him. The trial court ruled that
    the Petitioner’s prior sexual assault would be admissible pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
    Evidence 404(b) if the Petitioner opened the door to its admissibility by offering a consent
    defense. The Petitioner elected not to testify and argued on appeal that the court’s ruling
    essentially foreclosed his opportunity to testify in his defense. The jury found him guilty
    of the charged offenses; this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions; and the supreme
    court denied his application for permission to appeal. See State v. Donald Gwin, No.
    W2016-01783-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2017 WL 2192085
    , at *1-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17,
    2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).
    The Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Counsel was
    appointed and filed an amended petition. The petition and amended petition alleged that
    the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the conviction
    proceedings. As relevant to this appeal, the Petitioner alleged that counsel had been
    ineffective in failing to (1) argue that the sexual assault had, in fact, been a consensual
    encounter, (2) adequately review discovery and anticipate that a police officer would testify
    that he was employed by the Memphis Sexual Offender Registry, and (3) advise the
    Petitioner that he should strongly consider testifying. The Petitioner also alleged that he
    was entitled to relief for the ineffective assistance of counsel because he had been
    prejudiced by the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s multiple instances of deficient
    performance.
    At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he met with the Petitioner
    several times and that he provided the Petitioner with the discovery materials. Counsel
    said his investigator also met with the Petitioner.
    Trial counsel testified that the State filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
    Evidence 404(b) seeking admission of a prior sexual assault, for which the Petitioner was
    on probation. The State sought to introduce this evidence to show the Petitioner’s identity
    as the perpetrator of the crimes on trial, should the Petitioner elect to present a consent
    defense.
    Trial counsel testified that the victim stated in her trial testimony that she did not
    know the Petitioner and had never seen him before the incident. Counsel acknowledged
    that a police report he received in the discovery process stated the victim had said that “the
    suspect was known to her.” The police report was received as an exhibit. In pertinent part,
    it states, “Sex Crime Investigator Sgt. Lee . . . was on the scene and advised that victim . .
    . had been assaulted insider her home by a suspect known to her.” Counsel said he had not
    cross-examined Sergeant Anthony Lee, the officer to whom the report stated the victim
    had made this alleged statement, about the statement. Counsel explained that Detective
    Pickering had prepared the report and that it involved “multiple hearsay.” Counsel said
    that the victim consistently reported to the police and at the trial that she had been attacked
    by a stranger. He said his overriding concern was that evidence the victim knew the
    Petitioner might suggest a consent defense, which would open the door to admissibility of
    evidence of the Petitioner’s prior sexual assault. In his opinion, admission of the prior
    sexual assault evidence “would have been all but a guaranteed conviction.” He said the
    victim from the prior sexual assault “was present and ready to testify.”
    -2-
    Trial counsel agreed that the Petitioner had claimed to have had text message
    communications with the victim before the incident. Counsel said his investigators were
    unable to find any records to support the Petitioner’s assertion when they reviewed cell
    phone records associated with the Petitioner’s name. Counsel was unsure whether
    information about a white cell phone had been in the discovery materials.
    Trial counsel testified that he did not investigate the Petitioner’s report of having an
    encounter with the victim’s father, a Memphis police officer, after the Petitioner’s arrest.
    Counsel said he did not think this was relevant to the case, particularly given the evidence.
    Trial counsel did not recall the first plea offer the State made but said the Petitioner
    “was pretty consistent that he was not interested in any offers” and “consistently wanted to
    try to fight the case.” Counsel said he advised the Petitioner that the Rule 404(b) motion
    regarding the prior sexual assault would be “extremely important” to the Petitioner’s
    decision-making process. Counsel said that he called the prosecutor on the Sunday before
    the trial and that she extended an eight-year offer. Counsel said he went to the jail that day
    and spoke with the Petitioner, who declined the offer. Counsel said, “I told him we didn’t
    have much of a defense in the case.” Counsel noted that the State’s evidence included
    identification of the Petitioner’s DNA, GPS monitoring information about the Petitioner’s
    location at the time of the crimes, and the victim’s identification of the Petitioner from a
    photograph lineup.
    Trial counsel testified that, in view of the facts of the case, the only viable defense
    theory was to argue reasonable doubt. Counsel said he had been willing to “allude to
    consent without ever trying to make that clear out of concern for [the trial court’s] ruling
    [on the Rule 404(b) issue].” Counsel said he commented in his closing argument that the
    victim’s demeanor at the trial was not consistent with that of a sexual assault victim.
    Trial counsel testified that he and the Petitioner discussed several times whether the
    Petitioner would testify. Counsel said the Petitioner wanted to testify that he and the
    victim, whom he said he knew, had a consensual sexual encounter. Counsel said he advised
    the Petitioner of a “small chance” of prevailing by arguing reasonable doubt but that
    introduction of the prior sexual assault evidence would “almost certainly” result in a
    conviction. Counsel advised the Petitioner that the Petitioner had the right to choose
    whether to testify.
    Trial counsel testified that he moved for a mistrial when Memphis Police Sergeant
    Dorning testified that he worked for the Sexual Offender Registry (SOR) Unit. Counsel
    said the court denied the motion but offered to give a curative instruction, which counsel
    declined because he did not know how many of the jurors “picked up on it” and did not
    want to call additional attention to the evidence. Counsel said Sergeant Dorning’s SOR
    Unit “was not spelled out to” him before the trial and that he did not think “it dawned on”
    -3-
    him until the trial. He acknowledged that if this information were in the discovery
    materials, he would have read it. When shown a document which referred to “SOR
    Sergeant Doring,” he acknowledged the document had been with the discovery materials.
    Counsel agreed that Sergeant Doring testified at the trial that he was currently assigned to
    the SOR Unit and that Sergeant Doring did not testify that the Petitioner was being
    monitored by the unit. Counsel agreed that the State did not offer evidence about the reason
    the Petitioner was being tracked with an ankle monitor at the time of the crimes. Counsel
    said no basis existed for exclusion of evidence that the Petitioner wore an ankle monitor at
    the time of the crimes because the evidence showed that during the incident, the Petitioner
    pointed to the ankle monitor made reference to the police.
    Trial counsel testified that he raised the Rule 404(b) issue in the motion for a new
    trial and on appeal. He said he also raised an issue in the motion for a new trial regarding
    a news report about the previous sexual assault victim. Counsel said the trial court denied
    the motion on the news report issue based upon the trial court’s previous voir dire
    questioning of the prospective jurors. Counsel said that, in order to preserve the issue for
    appellate review, he had made an offer of proof at the trial consisting of the Petitioner’s
    testimony about having had consensual sex with the victim.
    Trial counsel testified that the Petitioner never expressed doubts about the
    Petitioner’s ability to obtain a fair trial in the trial judge’s court. Counsel said the Petitioner
    never complained of the judge making “statements toward [the Petitioner] or being angry
    at him previously.”
    The Petitioner testified that he became dissatisfied with his original attorney and
    that the Petitioner filed a lawsuit against the attorney after the trial judge refused to appoint
    new counsel. The Petitioner testified that trial counsel began representing him shortly
    before the State’s Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) motion. The Petitioner said counsel
    explained Rule 404(b) to him and told him that if the court permitted the prior sexual assault
    evidence to be admissible, there “would be no way [counsel] could put [the Petitioner] on
    the stand because it would be overly prejudicial.” The Petitioner said he told counsel
    repeatedly that the Petitioner did not foresee a favorable verdict for the defense unless the
    Petitioner testified. He said he told counsel that he wanted to testify, despite any ensuing
    prejudice. The Petitioner said that counsel visited him “a few” times “because [of] how
    the [Rule 404(b)] hearing went” but that they did not discuss trial strategy. The Petitioner
    said he told counsel that if he could not “speak consent that’s got to deal with aggravated
    rape” and that they had the remaining charges to “defend against.” The Petitioner said that
    he wanted to testify about his having known the victim and having been an invited guest
    in her home and that “it’s not all about consent.” The Petitioner stated that he had argued
    with the victim, who took his cell phones, that he grabbed her purse when she would not
    return his cell phones, and that a physical altercation ensued, in which he choked the victim.
    -4-
    The Petitioner testified that although he maintained his desire to testify, trial counsel
    tried to convince him otherwise. The Petitioner acknowledged that counsel advised him of
    his right to testify and that counsel said the prior sexual assault evidence would be
    admissible if the Petitioner testified.
    The Petitioner testified that he told trial counsel that after the Petitioner had asked
    for his first attorney to be removed from the case, the Petitioner thought the trial judge
    “was kind of mad at” him. The Petitioner said that he asked counsel to have the case
    “moved to a different courtroom” but that counsel would not do this because counsel could
    not predict who the new judge might be.
    The Petitioner testified that he met with the defense investigator. The Petitioner
    said that he asked the investigator “numerous times” to speak with a friend who had picked
    up the Petitioner from the victim’s home “in one instance” but that the investigator always
    said he had been unable to contact the friend.
    Regarding defense strategy, the Petitioner testified that trial counsel said he was
    going to “allow all the evidence to get in” and argue that the State had not proven its case
    beyond a reasonable doubt. The Petitioner said that after the victim testified that a cell
    phone recovered as evidence was not hers, he told counsel to impeach the victim about
    whether she owned the cell phone. The Petitioner claimed the victim had lied because the
    cell phone contained text messages between the Petitioner and her. The Petitioner said
    counsel did not impeach the victim on this point. The Petitioner said counsel did not
    conduct long cross-examinations of any of the State’s witnesses.
    The Petitioner acknowledged that the victim’s personal property had been recovered
    from his car or his person. He said he had wanted to explain to the jury why he took the
    victim’s belongings and choked her.
    After being shown various documents, Memphis Police Sergeant Anthony Lee
    testified that he spoke with the victim on the night of the incident and that she had stated
    she did not know her attacker. He said that when he showed the victim a photograph lineup,
    she identified the Petitioner as the perpetrator. He said Officer Pickering’s report which
    attributed a statement to Sergeant Lee “about the victim and the suspect” bore a time stamp
    that was later than the time recorded on the photograph lineup from when the victim
    identified the Petitioner.
    After receiving the evidence, the post-conviction court denied relief in a written
    order. This appeal followed.
    -5-
    The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying relief on his ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims. The State contends that the court did not err in denying relief.
    We agree with the State.
    Post-conviction relief is available “when the conviction or sentence is void or
    voidable because of the abridgement of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of
    Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2018). A
    petitioner has the burden of proving his factual allegations by clear and convincing
    evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f) (2018). A post-conviction court’s findings of fact are binding
    on appeal, and this court must defer to them “unless the evidence in the record
    preponderates against those findings.” Henley v. State, 
    960 S.W.2d 572
    , 578 (Tenn. 1997);
    see Fields v. State, 
    40 S.W.3d 450
    , 456-57 (Tenn. 2001). A post-conviction court’s
    application of law to its factual findings is subject to a de novo standard of review without
    a presumption of correctness. Fields, 
    40 S.W.3d at 457-58
    .
    To establish a post-conviction claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel in
    violation of the Sixth Amendment, a petitioner has the burden of proving that (1) counsel’s
    performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 
    506 U.S. 364
    , 368-72 (1993). The Tennessee Supreme Court has applied the Strickland standard to
    an accused’s right to counsel under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. See
    State v. Melson, 
    772 S.W.2d 417
    , 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).
    A petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail in an
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Henley, 
    960 S.W.2d at 580
    . “[F]ailure to prove
    either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective
    assistance claim.” Goad v. State, 
    938 S.W.2d 363
    , 370 (Tenn. 1996). To establish the
    performance prong, a petitioner must show that “the advice given, or the services rendered
    . . . are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”
    Baxter v. Rose, 
    523 S.W.2d 930
    , 936 (Tenn. 1975); see Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 690
    . The
    post-conviction court must determine if these acts or omissions, viewed in light of all of
    the circumstances, fell “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”
    Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 690
    . A petitioner “is not entitled to the benefit of hindsight, may
    not second-guess a reasonably based trial strategy by his counsel, and cannot criticize a
    sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision.” Adkins v. State, 
    911 S.W.2d 334
    , 347 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. 1994); see Pylant v. State, 
    263 S.W.3d 854
    , 874 (Tenn. 2008). This deference,
    however, only applies “if the choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation.”
    Cooper v. State, 
    847 S.W.2d 521
    , 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). To establish the prejudice
    prong, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,
    
    466 U.S. at 694
    . “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
    confidence in the outcome.” 
    Id.
    -6-
    I
    Failure to Present Consensual Sex Defense
    The Petitioner contends that, despite a defense based upon the victim’s alleged
    consent to sexual activity with the Petitioner being “the only reasonable or sound legal
    strategy” for trial counsel to have pursued at the trial, counsel was ineffective in failing to
    pursue this defense. The Petitioner “acknowledges the hazard he would face based on the
    trial court’s [Tennessee Rule of Evidence] 404(b) ruling,” but he nevertheless argues that
    counsel’s decision merely to “allude to consent was not a reasonable or viable defense
    theory.”
    In denying relief on this basis, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner
    “presented no evidence that trial counsel’s failure to argue consent was a result of lack of
    preparation and not a strategic choice.” The court noted counsel’s testimony that he
    decided, based upon the trial court’s Rule 404(b) ruling, to avoid a consent defense and to,
    instead, merely allude to consent in order to avoid “opening the door” to evidence of the
    prior sexual assault. The court noted that it would not second-guess counsel’s strategic
    decisions.
    Trial counsel’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing showed that he did not want
    to do anything to trigger admissibility of the evidence of the Petitioner’s prior sexual
    assault of another victim. In counsel’s view, evidence of the prior sexual assault would be
    highly prejudicial. The hearing evidence showed that the prior victim was present at the
    trial and prepared to testify in the event consent was raised as a defense. The Petitioner
    and trial counsel both testified at the hearing that counsel advised the Petitioner against
    testifying and that the Petitioner made the decision not to testify. At the hearing, the
    Petitioner said he disagreed with trial counsel’s choice of strategy because the Petitioner
    thought his testimony would have been useful to establish a defense to the aggravated
    robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault charges. Counsel testified at the
    hearing that he investigated the Petitioner’s claim that he had exchanged text messages
    with the victim before the offenses, but in counsel’s investigation, the cell phone records
    did not corroborate the Petitioner’s account. The record supports the post-conviction
    court’s determination that counsel made a strategic decision not to present a consent
    defense. The record demonstrates that the decision was an informed one and based upon
    adequate preparation. See Cooper, 
    847 S.W.2d at 528
    . The court did not err in declining
    to second-guess counsel’s strategy. See Adkins, 911 S.W.2d at 347; see also Pylant, 
    263 S.W.3d at 874
    . The evidence does not preponderate against the court’s findings, and its
    findings support its conclusions. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.
    -7-
    II
    Failure to Review Discovery and to Anticipate Sergeant Dorning’s Testimony
    The Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to review
    discovery in order to anticipate that Sergeant Dorning would testify about his employment
    in the SOR Unit. The Petitioner argues that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial when it
    was admitted at the trial.
    The post-conviction court found that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing
    to anticipate Sergeant Lee’s testimony but that the Petitioner failed to prove he was
    prejudiced by counsel’s inaction. The court noted that, at the time of Sergeant Dorning’s
    trial testimony, the jury had already heard the victim’s testimony that the Petitioner (1) had
    told her that if she reported the rape, he would return to her home to kill her boyfriend and
    children, (2) had told her that he had served time in prison, and (3) had showed her his
    ankle monitor. The court concluded that, in view of this evidence, the Petitioner failed to
    establish that the result of the proceeding would have been different in the absence of
    Sergeant Dorning’s identification of the SOR Unit as his assignment.
    Upon review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-
    conviction court’s determinations. See Henley, 
    960 S.W.2d at 578
    ; see also Fields, 
    40 S.W.3d at 456-57
    . Trial counsel acknowledged that he likely had not recognized in
    advance of the trial that Sergeant Dorning was assigned to the SOR Unit, despite having
    received discovery documents which included a reference to “SOR Sergeant Dorning.”
    Counsel testified that he moved for a mistrial when Sergeant Dorning testified about his
    job assignment and that he declined the trial court’s offer of a curative instruction in order
    to avoid emphasis on the evidence. Counsel said that, although the State offered trial
    evidence that the Petitioner wore an ankle monitor, no evidence was offered which showed
    that the Petitioner was being monitored by the SOR Unit. See Donald Gwin, 
    2017 WL 2192085
    , at *5 (noting that Sergeant Dorning did not testify about any connection between
    the Petitioner’s monitoring and the SOR Unit). Again, the State’s evidence was
    overwhelming. The court’s findings support its conclusion that the Petitioner was not
    prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on
    this basis.
    III
    Failure to Advise Regarding the Defendant’s Testifying at the Trial
    The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his
    claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise the Petitioner adequately about
    the pros and cons of testifying at the trial and in failing to advise him to testify. The
    -8-
    Petitioner argues that counsel never advised him of the advantages of testifying and that a
    reasonable probability exists that the jury would have acquitted him of all of the charged
    offenses except aggravated assault after having heard his testimony that he and the victim
    had consensual sex and that he choked her after an argument.
    In denying relief on this claim, the post-conviction court found that trial counsel
    made an informed, strategic decision to advise the Petitioner not to testify after the
    Petitioner told counsel the substance of his proposed testimony. The court found that
    counsel advised the Petitioner of his right to testify and explained to the Petitioner that it
    would be dangerous for him to do so because it could open the door to evidence of the prior
    sexual assault that counsel had worked to have excluded.
    Upon review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-
    conviction court’s determinations. See Henley, 
    960 S.W.2d at 578
    ; see also Fields, 
    40 S.W.3d at 456-57
    . The post-conviction evidence demonstrated that trial counsel was
    concerned about the strength of the State’s evidence, which would have only been
    amplified by evidence of the Petitioner’s prior sexual assault of another victim. The
    evidence of the prior sexual assault, for which the Petitioner had a conviction, would have
    undermined any advantage the Petitioner theorizes might exist if the jury had heard his
    testimony about a consensual sexual encounter. Counsel’s investigation showed that no
    evidence existed to corroborate the Petitioner’s claim of text message exchanges between
    the Petitioner and the victim before the crimes. The evidence does not preponderate against
    the post-conviction court’s findings, and its findings support its conclusions. The
    Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.
    IV
    Cumulative Deficiencies of Performance
    In his final issue, the Petitioner contends that even if none of his individual claims
    of deficient performance require relief, their cumulative effect resulted in prejudice to him
    in the conviction proceedings.
    In the context of a trial proceeding, the cumulative error doctrine requires relief
    when “multiple errors [are] committed in the trial proceedings, each of which in isolation
    constitutes mere harmless error, but which when aggregated, have a cumulative effect on
    the proceedings so great as to require reversal in order to preserve a defendant’s right to a
    fair trial.” State v. Hester, 
    324 S.W.3d 1
    , 76-77 (Tenn. 2010) (internal citations omitted);
    see State v. Jordan, 
    325 S.W.3d 1
    , 79 (Tenn. 2010) (“‘[T]he combination of multiple errors
    may necessitate . . . reversal . . . even if individual errors do not require relief.’”) (quoting
    State v. Cribbs, 
    967 S.W.2d 773
    , 789 (Tenn. 1998)).
    -9-
    In contrast, in a post-conviction case, “when an attorney has made a series of errors
    that prevents the proper presentation of a defense, it is appropriate to consider the
    cumulative impact of the errors in assessing prejudice” of an ineffective assistance of
    counsel allegation. Timothy Terell McKinney v. State, No. W2006-02132-CCA-R3-PD,
    
    2010 WL 796939
    , at *37 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug.
    25, 2010); see State v. Taylor, 
    968 S.W.2d 900
     (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). More than one
    instance of deficient performance, when considered collectively, can result in a sufficient
    showing of prejudice pursuant to Strickland. Timothy Terell McKinney, 
    2010 WL 796939
    ,
    at *37; see Taylor, 
    968 S.W.2d at 909
    . The question is whether counsel’s deficiencies
    “cumulatively prejudiced . . . the right to a fair proceeding and undermined confidence in
    the outcome of the trial.” Timothy Terell McKinney, 
    2010 WL 796939
    , at *37. Counsel’s
    failure to conduct adequate pretrial preparation and investigation may establish prejudice
    pursuant to Strickland. 
    Id.
    The post-conviction court found that trial counsel performed deficiently in a single
    instance: by failing to anticipate Sergeant Dorning’s testimony about his assignment to the
    SOR Unit. In our analysis, we have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate
    against the post-conviction court’s findings and that its findings support its conclusions as
    to all of the individual allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the
    Petitioner proved but a single instance of deficient performance, there are not multiple
    deficiencies of performance to support relief on a claim of prejudice accruing from the
    cumulative effect of multiple deficiencies. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this
    basis.
    In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the
    post-conviction court is affirmed.
    _____________________________________
    ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE
    -10-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: W2022-01704-CCA-R3-PC

Filed Date: 12/11/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/11/2023