State of Tennessee v. Thomas Dequan Solomon ( 2024 )

10/23/2024
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
Assigned on Briefs October 22, 2024
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. THOMAS DEQUAN SOLOMON
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
No 108635 G. Scott Green, Judge
No. E2024-00457-CCA-R3-CD
The Defendant, Thomas Dequan Solomon, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in
confinement. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by basing its
decision merely on proof of alleged criminal conduct prior to the filing of formal charges
and without considering his history of supervision while on probation. After review, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE AYERS and
TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.
Susan E. Shipley, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Thomas Dequan Solomon.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Jordan Murray and
Carolina Hughes, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of
Tennessee.
OPINION
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 24, 2017, the Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted second degree
murder and aggravated assault. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101; -13-102, -210. In
exchange for his guilty pleas, the Defendant received an effective sentence of ten years to
be served in split confinement, with the balance of the sentence on supervised probation.
On October 13, 2023, a violation of probation warrant was filed alleging that the Defendant
had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by possessing firearm ammunition,
failing to communicate with his probation officer, and failing to report for a scheduled risk
assessment. The violation warrant was amended on November 29, 2023, to add an
additional allegation that the Defendant had committed a new criminal homicide offense.
A revocation hearing was conducted on February 29, 2024, during which the State
introduced proof and both parties argued regarding the then-uncharged homicide
allegation. Tony Pennington testified that on the morning of October 9, 2023, he was
walking along Martin Luther King, Jr. Avenue in Knoxville, Tennessee, between 10:40
and 10:45 a.m. While walking, he saw a Black man, who had dreadlocks and was dressed
in a brown jacket and blue jeans, approach a female pedestrian on the opposite side of the
street from Mr. Pennington. According to Mr. Pennington, the Black male then shot the
woman and got into a white car that drove away from the scene. Mr. Pennington indicated
that he observed the shooting from approximately twenty feet away and that he reported it
to an officer who was parked nearby, at which time he was able to point out the car as it
was driving away. Because the car had tinted windows, Mr. Pennington was unable to see
inside it, but he identified the Defendant in the courtroom as the man he saw approach and
shoot the victim before entering the car. On cross-examination, Mr. Pennington stated that
he believed another person was driving the vehicle because he saw the Defendant get into
the passenger’s side before it drove away.
Detective Jonathan Harris with the Knoxville Police Department testified that he
investigated the shooting and reviewed video surveillance footage of the victim walking
along Martin Luther King, Jr. Avenue on the morning of October 9, 2023. Additional
footage depicted a white car entering and leaving the area of the shooting between 10:42
and 10:45 a.m. From this footage, he obtained a license plate number that identified the
vehicle in question as belonging to the Defendant’s mother. Det. Harris also obtained
footage from a Ring doorbell camera at the Defendant’s home showing the Defendant
entering the car and driving away from the residence at 10:32 a.m., then returning and
exiting the car at 10:55 a.m. In this footage, the Defendant was wearing jeans and a
greenish-brown jacket with a fur-rimmed hood. Det. Harris further testified that the
approximate drive time between the Defendant’s home and the scene of the shooting was
between nine and eleven minutes. He acknowledged on cross-examination that he did not
have any clear video footage of the Defendant stopping or exiting the car at or in close
proximity to the scene of the homicide.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated, “I don’t think there’s any
question in this court’s mind that [the Defendant] is in material violation of the terms and
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conditions of his probation.” The trial court next invited argument from the parties as to
the consequence to impose, stating, “Now the question becomes what do I do[?] What
does the [c]ourt do as far as a sanction[?]” Defense counsel stated that the Defendant’s
“caseworkers who provide him services” were present in the courtroom. According to
defense counsel, the caseworkers were willing to continue working with the Defendant if
they were allowed to do so. The Defendant made additional argument about the sufficiency
of the State’s proof but ultimately asked the trial court to allow the Defendant to continue
in his treatment program and “[k]eep him on a short leash.” The State urged the trial court
to consider the underlying offenses of the Defendant’s probationary sentence and ongoing
concerns about safety to the community. The trial court noted on the record that the
Defendant was on probation for attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault.
After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court remarked that there was “an
eyewitness who has identified [the Defendant] as the shooter and then just almost
incontrovertible proof, direct and circumstantial proof, that [the Defendant was] in close
proximity in [his] mother’s vehicle to where this homicide took place at the time it took
place.” Following this, the trial court observed that it would “be very shocked” if the State
did not seek formal charges against the Defendant given the abundant proof. The trial court
then revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of the
sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction.
The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by revoking his probation
based upon limited proof that the Defendant committed the offense of criminal homicide
prior to the filing of formal charges and because the trial court did not consider his
supervisory history while on probation. The State responds that the trial court properly
revoked the Defendant’s probation based upon its finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Defendant had materially violated the terms of his probation by
committing the offense of criminal homicide. We agree with the State.
Appellate courts review a trial court’s revocation of probation decision for an abuse
of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness “so long as the trial court places
sufficient findings and the reasons for its decisions as to the revocation and the
consequence on the record.” State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2022). “A trial
court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical
conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies
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reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d
436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). If a trial court fails to state its findings and reasoning for the
revocation on the record, appellate courts may conduct a de novo review if the record is
sufficiently developed, or the appellate court may remand the case for the trial court to
make such findings. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 (citing State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316,
324 (Tenn. 2014)).
Probation revocation is a two-step consideration requiring trial courts to make two
distinct determinations as to (1) whether to revoke probation and (2) what consequences
will apply upon revocation. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 757. No additional hearing is required
for trial courts to determine the proper consequences for a revocation. Id. The trial court’s
findings do not need to be “particularly lengthy or detailed but only sufficient for the
appellate court to conduct a meaningful review of the revocation decision.” Id. at 759
(citing State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 705-06 (Tenn. 2012)).
“The trial judge may enter judgment upon the question of the charges as the trial
judge may deem right and proper under the evidence adduced before the trial judge.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-311(d)(1). “If the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant has violated the conditions of probation and suspension of sentence, then
the court may revoke the defendant’s probation and suspension of sentence, in full or in
part, pursuant to § 40-35-310.” Id. Notwithstanding subdivision (d)(1), the probation
statute provides for two categories of probation violations, technical and non-technical,
with differing penalties for both. State v. Walden, No. M2022-00255-CCA-R3-CD, 2022
WL 17730431, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2022), no perm. app. filed.
The following are classified as non-technical violations: a defendant’s commission
of a new felony or a new Class A misdemeanor, a zero tolerance violation as defined by
the department of correction community supervision matrix, absconding, or contacting the
defendant’s victim in violation of a condition of probation. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-311(e)(2). Once a trial court determines that a defendant has committed a
non-technical violation of probation, the trial court may: (1) order confinement for some
period of time; (2) cause execution of the sentence as it was originally entered; (3) extend
the defendant’s probationary period not exceeding one year; (4) return the defendant to
probation on appropriate modified conditions; or (5) resentence the defendant for the
remainder of the unexpired term to a sentence of probation. See
id. §§ -308(c), -310, -311(e)(2).
We reject the Defendant’s claim that the proof did not “reliably” establish that the
Defendant violated the laws of Tennessee based upon questions left unresolved regarding
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the homicide and the testimony of the witnesses. Here, the trial court found that the
Defendant was in material violation of his probation for committing a new offense,
explaining that there was an eyewitness who identified the Defendant and proof of his
proximity to the homicide. The trial court’s findings, although relatively brief, were
sufficient to communicate its reasoning as to the revocation decision. The trial court
credited witness testimony and video footage as establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Defendant, while on probation, violated the terms of his probation by
committing a homicide, a non-technical violation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(d)(1),
(e)(2).
The Defendant also complains that the prosecution did not present testimony from
his probation officers at the revocation hearing. There is no requirement, however, for the
State to do so. If the Defendant wished to elicit favorable proof from his probation officer,
or any other witness, he could have done so by calling such witnesses himself at the
revocation hearing. Defense counsel noted that caseworkers were present to testify, but
they were not called. As set forth above, the proof in the record is sufficient to show that
the State met its burden in this proceeding, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by revoking the Defendant’s probation based on the proof introduced.
Turning to the second step of Dagnan, the Defendant asserts that the trial court did
not consider any alternatives to incarceration as a consequence for the revocation finding.
Alternatively, the Defendant argues that, if the revocation is upheld, this court should
remand the case back to the trial court for “further inquiry into the second step of a
revocation hearing procedure.”
Here, after determining that revocation was appropriate, the trial court invited
argument from the parties as to the consequence to impose. Both the trial court’s invitation
to the Defendant to make a request as to the sanction and the Defendant’s subsequent
request for continued treatment and supervision indicate that the trial court did in fact
consider alternatives to incarceration. The trial court also heard argument from the State
urging it to consider the underlying offenses of the Defendant’s probationary sentence and
ongoing concerns about safety to the community. The trial court noted on the record that
the Defendant was on probation for aggravated assault and attempted second degree
murder, a consideration that is only appropriate in the second step of a Dagnan analysis.
See Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 n.5.
Ultimately, the trial court ordered the remainder of the Defendant’s sentence to be
served in incarceration but only after allowing both parties to be heard on the consequence
it should impose. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not fail to conduct a proper
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inquiry into the second step of the revocation hearing before imposing judgment, nor that
the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Defendant to serve the balance of his
sentence in incarceration.
III. CONCLUSION
In consideration of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
______________________________
KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE
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