State of Tennessee v. Amy Upton ( 2024 )


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  •                                                                                             10/30/2024
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs October 22, 2024
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. AMY UPTON
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Union County
    No. 6031 Zachary R. Walden, Judge
    No. E2024-00416-CCA-R3-CD
    The Defendant, Amy Upton, pleaded guilty to four counts of drug-related offenses after
    the trial court denied her motion to dismiss the charges or, alternatively, to suppress
    evidence seized on the day of her arrest. The motion pertained to the circumstances of her
    arrest, which occurred in Claiborne County but was effectuated by Union County deputies.
    As part of her plea agreement, she sought to reserve a certified question of law challenging
    the trial court’s decision to deny the motion. Following our review, we conclude that the
    certified question does not clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved
    as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Accordingly, we are
    without jurisdiction to consider the question. The appeal is dismissed.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed
    KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE AYERS and
    TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.
    Patrick L. Dunn, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Amy Upton.
    Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Abigail H. Rinard, Assistant Attorney
    General; Jared Effler, District Attorney General; and Rondeau Laffitte, Assistant District
    Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On January 23, 2023, Union County deputies noticed the Defendant driving her car
    erratically on Sharps Chapel Road, near the boundary line between Union and Claiborne
    Counties. When the deputies eventually stopped the Defendant after she crossed over into
    Claiborne County, they discovered a number of controlled substances in her vehicle. The
    Defendant was arrested, and a Union County grand jury later returned an indictment,
    charging the Defendant with possession with intent to sell and deliver psilocybin (alternate
    counts 1 and 2); possession with intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine (alternate
    counts 3 and 4); possession with intent to sell and deliver Suboxone (alternate counts 5 and
    6); possession of drug paraphernalia (count 7); and failure to maintain one’s lane of travel
    (count 8). See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417
    , -425, -434; 55-8-123.
    The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges or, in the alternative, to
    suppress “evidence seized from the search of the Defendant and/or her vehicle and its
    contents on the day of her arrest[.]” In a memorandum of law supporting her motion, the
    Defendant argued that six grounds entitled her to relief:
    1.      There is a genuine question of whether Union County Criminal Court
    is the proper venue for this action, as the pursuit of the Defendant, her first
    traffic stop, and her second traffic stop all occurred without dispute in
    Claiborne County.
    2.     The stop by deputies of the Union County Sheriff’s Department
    occurring outside of Union County, Tennessee[,] is contrary to statute and
    the holdings of Tennessee courts regarding extra jurisdictional stops and
    detentions by law enforcement; although such stops have been deemed
    proper by Tennessee courts previously, the circumstances in the case at bar
    are materially different with those cases, most significantly but not
    exclusively the notification and involvement of law enforcement from the
    county in which the arrest was made.
    3.      If the “saving” statute of arrest by a private person is considered
    justification for the actions of the arresting officers in this case, the arrest was
    not properly conducted according to applicable statute [sic]; the Defendant
    was not arrested upon her seizure at the first traffic stop on the northbound
    shoulder of Route 33 in Claiborne County; she was not immediately
    informed of the reason for her arrest; she was not immediately taken before
    a magistrate or police officer (in either Claiborne or Union County) but
    unnecessarily detained for a period of, at least, something over an hour at the
    scene of the second, improper detention at Cedar Grove Market/Brogan’s
    BP.
    -2-
    4.     The officers, if acting as private citizens, were not authorized by the
    “citizen’s arrest” statute to search the [D]efendant, search her vehicle, or
    seize or inventory her vehicle; these are activities that are reserved for law
    enforcement officers acting under the authority granted to them by the State
    of Tennessee.
    5.     The officers, if considered to have been acting as law enforcement
    officers, did not take the precautions necessary as prescribed by Tennessee
    courts to allow the Defendant to make proper arrangements for custody of
    her vehicle.
    6.      Considering the circumstances of the traffic stop, such as its initiation
    outside of the county after following the Defendant for at least several miles
    through a stop sign and a left-hand turn onto a busy highway, a first stop also
    on that busy highway, requesting that the Defendant drive her vehicle to a
    second location necessitating a second left-hand turn for an indeterminate but
    apparently not inconsiderable distance, when the officers had reason to
    believe the Defendant was unable to competently operate the vehicle on what
    has been described by the officers as a dangerous road without shoulders and
    at a time when traffic would be expected to be heavy, with a belief that the
    Defendant was intoxicated (but no field sobriety test performed), the lack of
    body or dash camera footage of any of the events or circumstances of the
    observation, hailing, first stop, second stop, arrest, search or inventory of the
    vehicle, lead the Defendant to conten[d] that [] her stop and arrest, and the
    seizure and inventory/search of her vehicle was not only []pretextual but
    showing extreme bad faith, and in violation of the rights guaranteed to her
    by the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.
    A hearing on the Defendant’s motion was held on July 17, 2023. Deputy Derrick
    Rice of the Union County Sheriff’s Department (“UCSD”) testified that he was riding with
    UCSD Detective Daniel Runions1 on January 23, 2023, between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. They
    were driving on Sharps Chapel Road in Union County when they saw a black Jeep on the
    road ahead of them. Later, the officers would identify the Defendant as the vehicle’s driver.
    Deputy Rice testified that, initially, there were “at least two” cars between the officers and
    the black Jeep. Deputy Rice witnessed the Jeep cross the center lines of the road with all
    four tires “two or three” times. However, Deputy Rice testified that he did not feel that it
    would have been safe to conduct a traffic stop on that portion of Sharps Chapel Road due
    to the nature of the road.
    1
    Detective Runions was the charging officer, but he did not testify at the motion hearing.
    -3-
    Deputy Rice and Det. Runions followed the Defendant until she turned left off
    Sharps Chapel Road onto Maynardville Highway, at which point she had crossed into
    Claiborne County. Once the officers turned onto Maynardville Highway, they activated
    their emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. At that point, there were no cars between
    the officers and the Defendant, and the officers had not lost sight of the Defendant’s vehicle
    since they first saw it on Sharps Chapel Road. Though, at first, the Defendant pulled over
    to the right side of Maynardville Highway beside a steep hill, the officers did not feel safe
    there, so they instructed the Defendant to pull up to Cedar Grove Market. Deputy Rice
    stated that Cedar Grove Market was located on the left side of Maynardville Highway in
    Claiborne County and was approximately 500 feet away from the initial stop on
    Maynardville Highway.
    After the Defendant stopped at Cedar Grove Market, the officers went to her vehicle
    and noticed that she had “pinpoint eyes” and was acting nervous. Deputy Rice testified
    that Det. Runions was going to perform a standard field sobriety test, but the officers first
    asked the Defendant to step out of her vehicle. When exiting the vehicle, the officers
    noticed that the Defendant had a glass pipe visible in her right jacket pocket, which Deputy
    Rice stated was consistent with drug paraphernalia. Det. Runions asked the Defendant if
    she had any other drugs or contraband, to which the Defendant replied that she had
    methamphetamine on her person. Det. Runions, upon a pat-down search, located
    approximately one-half ounce of methamphetamine in the Defendant’s pants’ pocket. She
    also had over $900 in cash.
    Upon discovering the contraband, the officers arrested the Defendant and arranged
    for her vehicle to be towed due to the limited amount of parking at the market. Prior to the
    vehicle’s being towed, the officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and located
    a stuffed animal filled with one-and-one-half ounces of methamphetamine and a black box
    filled with mushrooms and Suboxone strips.
    After hearing the proof and arguments, the trial court found that the “moving
    violation” occurred in Union County and that the officers were ultimately justified in
    stopping and arresting the Defendant in Claiborne County in their capacities as private
    citizens. Addressing the Defendant’s argument that the officers lacked the authority as
    private citizens to conduct a search incident to arrest or an inventory search of the
    Defendant’s vehicle, the trial court concluded that a search incident to arrest was necessary
    “for officer safety” and that “[i]t would be terrible public policy to rule otherwise.” The
    trial court further ruled that the inventory search of the vehicle “stem[med] from” the
    -4-
    officers’ authority to search incident to an arrest. The trial court denied the Defendant’s
    motion in all regards.
    Subsequently, on March 3, 2024, the Defendant pleaded guilty to counts 1 through
    4 and received an agreed-upon sentence of eight years to serve in the Tennessee
    Department of Correction. Counts 5 through 8 were dismissed pursuant to the agreement.
    As part of her guilty plea, the Defendant sought to reserve a certified question of law
    pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). In a petition for
    reservation of a certified question of law, defense counsel, the State, and the trial court
    signed “in agreement with the reservation of this certified question of law and agree[d] that
    it would be dispositive of the case.” The judgment forms for counts 1 through 4, as well
    as the petition, contained the following question:
    Was the 8th Judicial District Criminal Court sitting at Maynardville, Union
    County, Tennessee, in error in determining that the Deputies of the Union
    County Sher[if]f’s Department had jurisdiction in the January 23, 2023 arrest
    of the Defendant, Amy Upton, after reviewing evidence and arguments in the
    motion hearing before that Court on July 17, 2023?
    The judgment forms further indicated, “[T]he defense, the state’s attorney, and the court
    agree that this question is dispositive of this matter before the Court.”
    The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
    II.    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss
    or suppress, seeking our review of the certified question memorialized on the judgment
    forms. The State argues that the Defendant has failed to strictly comply with the
    requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 and that her appeal should be
    dismissed. As to this point, the State contends that the Defendant’s certified question is
    overbroad and does not clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved
    because it fails to precisely identify the reasons relied upon to support her motion to dismiss
    or suppress. Alternatively, the State contends that the trial court properly denied the
    Defendant’s motion. For the following reasons, we conclude that we are without
    jurisdiction to review the certified question and therefore dismiss this appeal.
    In relevant part, Rule 3 grants a right of appeal to defendants who plead guilty so
    long as they “explicitly reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law dispositive
    -5-
    of the case pursuant to and in compliance with the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) or (D)
    of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure[.]” Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). Our supreme
    court first set forth the prerequisites for certifying a question of law in State v. Preston, 
    759 S.W.2d 647
    , 650 (Tenn. 1988). In 2002, our legislature amended Rule 37 to expressly
    adopt the Preston requirements. The current version of Rule 37(b) states that a criminal
    defendant may plead guilty and appeal a certified question of law when the defendant has
    entered into a plea agreement under Rule 11(c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and has
    “explicitly reserved—with the consent of the [S]tate and of the court—the right to appeal
    a certified question of law that is dispositive of the case[.]” Rule 37 further imposes the
    following technical requirements that a defendant must follow in order to properly reserve
    a certified question:
    (i) the judgment of conviction or order reserving the certified question that is
    filed before the notice of appeal is filed contains a statement of the certified
    question of law that the defendant reserved for appellate review;
    (ii) the question of law as stated in the judgment or order reserving the
    certified question identifies clearly the scope and limits of the legal issue
    reserved;
    (iii) the judgment or order reserving the certified question reflects that the
    certified question was expressly reserved with the consent of the [S]tate and
    the trial court; and
    (iv) the judgment or order reserving the certified question reflects that the
    defendant, the [S]tate, and the trial court are of the opinion that the certified
    question is dispositive of the case[.]
    Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
    Because these procedural requirements are “explicit and unambiguous,” they must
    be strictly followed. State v. Armstrong, 
    126 S.W.3d 908
    , 912 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting State
    v. Irwin, 
    962 S.W.2d 477
    , 479 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Pendergrass, 
    937 S.W.2d 834
    , 838
    (Tenn. 1996)). In Preston, our supreme court emphasized that the burden is on the
    defendant to ensure that the conditions for properly preserving a question of law pursuant
    to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) have been met:
    [T]he question of law must be stated so as to clearly identify the scope and
    the limits of the legal issue reserved. For example, where questions of law
    -6-
    involve the validity of searches and the admissibility of statements and
    confessions, etc., the reasons relied upon by [the] defendant in the trial court
    at the suppression hearing must be identified in the statement of the certified
    question of law and review by the appellate courts will be limited to those
    passed upon by the trial judge and stated in the certified question, absent a
    constitutional requirement otherwise. . . . No issue beyond the scope of the
    certified question will be considered.
    759 S.W.2d at 650. Failure to properly reserve a certified question of law will result in the
    dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 838; see
    also State v. Walton, 
    41 S.W.3d 75
    , 96 (Tenn. 2001).
    Here, the Defendant’s certified question asks only whether the trial court erred in
    determining that the “Deputies of the Union County Sher[if]f’s Department had jurisdiction
    in the . . . arrest of the Defendant[.]” From a reading of the certified question, this court
    should be able to precisely discern the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, the
    reasons relied upon by the Defendant in the trial court, and the trial court’s reasoning for
    denying the motion. See State v. Van Garrett, No. E2018-02228-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2020 WL 1181805
    , at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2020). No additional analysis of the appellate
    record (including hearing transcripts, exhibits, briefs, and pleadings) should be required to
    ascertain such information. Id.; see also State v. Potts, No. M2020-01489-CCA-R3-CD,
    
    2021 WL 4714716
    , *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2021) (concluding that a certified
    question does not comply with Preston if it requires the appellate court “to ‘comb the
    record’ to discern” the reasons advanced by the defendant and trial court (quoting Van
    Garrett, 
    2020 WL 1181805
    , at *3)).
    We conclude that the scope and limits of the legal issue as reserved by the Defendant
    are not discernable from the certified question without further analysis of the record. The
    Defendant’s certified question as reserved in the judgment forms, at best, merely hints at
    the issue of the officers’ jurisdiction to stop and arrest the Defendant in Claiborne County
    despite the vast realm of legal issues relating to the officers’ jurisdiction to arrest generally.
    We cannot ascertain from that question alone what the scope and legal limits of the issue
    before us would be. See, e.g., Potts, 
    2021 WL 4714716
    , at *5 (noting that the court would
    have to look outside the question to identify the scope and legal limits of the question and
    declining to “conduct a thorough analysis of [F]ourth [A]mendment search and seizure law
    and a comprehensive review of the suppression hearing”).
    Moreover, we stress that a defendant’s certified issue must identify, among other
    things, (1) “the reasons relied upon by defendant in the trial court” to advance the motion;
    -7-
    and (2) the reasons “passed upon by the trial judge” in denying the motion. Preston, 759
    S.W.2d at 650. In her motion, the Defendant posited at least six grounds for dismissal or
    suppression. Yet, noticeably lacking from the certified question is the Defendant’s
    relied-upon reasoning relevant to the issues raised in the motion to dismiss or suppress.
    See, e.g., State v. Elliott, No. M2022-00789-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2023 WL 2727587
    , at *7 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2023) (dismissing a portion of the appeal where the certified question
    did not identify the defendant’s reasons relied upon in advancing his motion to
    dismiss), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 28, 2023); State v. Rickman, No. W2019-00778-
    CCA-R3-CD, 
    2020 WL 1894693
    , at *2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2020) (dismissing
    for lack of jurisdiction where the certified question “[did] not clearly state the reasoning
    that the [d]efendant employed during the suppression hearing, nor [did] the question state
    the reasoning the trial court employed in denying the [d]efendant’s motion to suppress”).
    In addition, the Defendant’s certified question does not include the trial court’s reasoning
    for denying her motion. See State v. Cates, No. E2022-01667-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2023 WL 5213937
    , at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2023) (citing Elliott, 
    2023 WL 2727587
    , at
    *8), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 13, 2024).
    The certified question here does not meet the threshold requirement for this court to
    consider a certified question under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A).
    Therefore, the question was not properly reserved.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing, we are without jurisdiction to review the Defendant’s
    certified question. This appeal is dismissed.
    ______________________________
    KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2024-00416-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge Kyle A. Hixson

Filed Date: 10/30/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2024