State of Tennessee v. William McDaniel ( 2024 )

10/02/2024
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
Assigned on Briefs September 24, 2024
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WILLIAM MCDANIEL
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County
No. 237830 Amanda B. Dunn, Judge
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No. E2024-00141-CCA-R3-CD
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Petitioner, William McDaniel, appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal
sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our
review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.
MCMULLEN, P.J., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., joined.
William McDaniel, Nashville, Tennessee, pro se.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Brooke A. Huppenthal, Assistant
Attorney General; Coty Wamp, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of
Tennessee.
OPINION
Factual and Procedural Background
The procedural history of this case has been previously summarized by this court as
follows:
In April 2001, [Petitioner] engaged in anal, oral, and vaginal intercourse with
a female under the age of thirteen, the daughter of his live-in girlfriend. He
was subsequently indicted for three counts of rape of a child as a Range III
offender. In May 2002, [Petitioner] pled guilty to the offenses as charged
but was sentenced as a Range I offender to [con]current sentences of twenty-
five years. The [judgments] reflect that the term would be served at 100%
because [Petitioner] was a child rapist.
On July 16 and September 12, 2002, [Petitioner] filed pro se Motions for
Reduction of Sentence. The two motions were virtually identical in
language, except one state[d] it [wa]s pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee
Rules of Criminal Procedure. On September 27, 2002, the trial court entered
an order overruling the Motion for Reduction of Sentence. No appeal was
taken of that denial.
Next, on September 12, 2012, [Petitioner] filed the instant pro se “Motion to
Correct Judgment/Sentence or in the Alternative Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea.” Thereafter, on September 17, 2012, the trial court entered an order
overruling the motion, which [Petitioner] never received a copy of. He later
filed a pro se motion for delayed appeal in the trial court alleging his failure
to receive notice of the ruling, and the trial court granted the motion for
delayed appeal on January 28, 2013. In an order noting that the trial court
was without authority to grant that motion, this court, nonetheless, waived
the untimely filing of the notice of appeal in the interests of justice.
State v. McDaniel, No. E2013-00353-CCA-MR3-CD, 2013 WL 5874706, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2013); State v. McDaniel, No. E2015-00680-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL
9255346, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2015).
Thereafter, Petitioner presented two issues for appeal: “(1) whether the trial court
erred in denying his Motion for Reduction of Sentence; and (2) whether the trial court erred
in denying his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea because it was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered.” McDaniel¸ 2013 WL 5874706, at *1. Petitioner argued that his
“sentence should be reduced to reflect service of the sentence at 30%, as a standard Range
I offender,” or alternatively that he was not informed at the time of the plea that a charge
of rape of child required that he serve his sentence at 100% and therefore, his guilty plea
was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Id. This court concluded that a reduction of
Petitioner’s sentence was unwarranted and that a post-conviction petition was the proper
avenue to pursue relief from an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea, “noting that the
statute of limitations to file such a petition had long expired.” McDaniel, 2015 WL
9255346, at *1; McDaniel, 2013 WL 5874706, at *4.
On February 17, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. McDaniel, 2015 WL 9255346, at
*1. He alleged that his sentence was illegal because the trial court “should have imposed
consecutive sentencing and because he pled guilty while believing that he would be subject
to release eligibility after serving thirty percent of his sentence, which rendered his guilty
pleas not knowing or voluntary.” Id. The trial court summarily denied the motion finding
that Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief. Id. This court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. Id. at *2-4.
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On September 15, 2023, Petitioner filed the present Rule 36.1 motion to correct an
illegal sentence arguing that his sentence is illegal and/or unconstitutional because of the
imposition of community supervision for life, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-
524, and that requiring him to register as a sex offender under the Tennessee Sex Offender
Registration Act of 2004 (“SORA”), in particular Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-
39-201, -202, -203, -204, and -211, violated the federal and state constitutional protections
against double jeopardy. Petitioner filed a second Rule 36.1 motion arguing that his
sentence violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because he did
not receive notice of his community supervision for life and that SORA imposed retroactive
punishment. Petitioner filed an amended motion alleging that “[t]he State failed to apply
[Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(I)(1)],” which he asserts would have
permitted him to serve eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed.
The trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s motion finding that neither the
imposition of lifetime community supervision nor the imposition by SORA violated the
Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Tennessee or United States Constitutions.
It is from this summary dismissal that Petitioner now appeals.
Analysis
On appeal, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by denying his Rule 36.1
motion because his sentence is illegal. More specifically, he asserts that his sentence is
illegal because SORA and the imposition of lifetime community supervision violate
principles of double jeopardy and that SORA also violates the prohibition against ex post
facto laws. The State responds that neither of the claims raised by Petitioner are cognizable
under Rule 36.1.
Initially, we note that although there was no hearing on the Rule 36.1 motion and
the order denying the Rule 36.1 motion was not entered until April 25, 2024, Petitioner
filed a notice of appeal in this court on January 18, 2024. While the record does not indicate
how Petitioner became aware of the trial court’s judgment before it was entered, this court
will treat Petitioner’s premature notice of appeal as timely filed pursuant to the Tennessee
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(d) (“A prematurely filed notice of appeal
shall be treated as filed after the entry of the judgment from which the appeal is taken and
on the day thereof.”).
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 permits a petitioner to seek correction
of an unexpired illegal sentence at any time by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence
in the trial court in which the judgment of conviction was entered. Tenn. R. Crim. P.
36.1(a)(1); see State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015). “[A]n illegal sentence
is one that is not authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly contravenes an
applicable statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(2). Our supreme court has interpreted the
meaning of “illegal sentence” as defined in Rule 36.1, concluding that the definition “is
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coextensive with, and not broader than, the definition of the term in the habeas corpus
context.” State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 594-95 (Tenn. 2015).
A trial court may summarily dismiss a Rule 36.1 motion if it does not state a
colorable claim for relief. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b)(2). A “‘colorable claim’ means a
claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the moving party, would
entitle the moving party to relief under Rule 36.1.” Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 593. “[F]ew
sentencing errors render [a sentence] illegal.” Id. at 595. Rather, sentencing errors may be
clerical, appealable, or fatal, and only fatal errors render a sentence illegal. Id.
As to Petitioner’s claim that SORA and the imposition of lifetime community
supervision violate principles of double jeopardy, this court has repeatedly held that such
are not colorable claims for purposes of Rule 36.1. State v. Tucker, No. M2024-00104-
CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4182674, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2024), no perm. app.
yet filed; State v. Johnson, No. M2023-01477-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 2795847, at *1
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2024), perm. app. pending; State v. Langford, No. M2023-
01244-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1886503, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2024), no perm.
app. filed; State v. Everett, No. W2021-00677-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 2196887, at *3
(Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2022), no perm. app. filed; State v. Sargent, No. W2018-00517-
CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 1952881, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2019); State v. Hall,
No. W2016-00915-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1093991, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22,
2017).
Likewise, Petitioner’s claim that SORA violates the prohibition against ex post facto
laws is not a colorable claim for purposes of Rule 36.1. State v. Owens, No. E2022-00852-
CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 6843600, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2023), perm. app
denied (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2024); State v. Ross, W2016-01220-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL
3641776, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2017). Our supreme court has held that SORA
does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws because “requirements imposed
by [SORA] are nonpunitive and that they are therefore a collateral consequence of a guilty
plea.” Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 469 (Tenn. 2010); see also State v. Atwell, No.
E2021-00067-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 601126, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2022),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 3, 2022); Woodson v. State, No. M2018-02153-CCA-R3-
PC, 2020 WL 406855, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2020).1
The record reflects that Petitioner received a statutorily authorized sentence for each
of his convictions, and nothing indicates that his sentences contravene any sentencing
statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s Rule 36.1
motion was proper, and Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
1
In his brief, Petitioner asserts that the trial court failed to advise him that he was subject to mandatory
lifetime community supervision as a result of his guilty plea. However, this requirement is reflected in the
judgment forms as was statutorily required at the time of the guilty plea. State v. Bronson, 172 S.W.3d
600, 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005).
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CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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JILL BARTEE AYERS, JUDGE
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