Patterson v. Amos, et. ux. ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
DOROTHY PATTERSON, ) C/A NO. 01A01-9609-CH-00410
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
)
v. )
) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
) PERRY COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
) Civil Action No. 3570
)
)
GERALD B. AMOS, et ux., )
WILMA J. AMOS, )
) HONORABLE DONALD P. HARRIS,
Defendants-Appellants.) CHANCELLOR
For Appellants: For Appellee:
W. LANDIS TURNER TOMMY E. DOYLE
Keaton, Turner & Spitzer Linden, Tennessee
Hohenwald, Tennessee
FILED
May 21, 1997
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
OPINION
VACATED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
1
This case involves a dispute regarding the ownership of
real property fronting on Tom’s Creek in Perry County. The trial
court granted the plaintiff summary judgment, finding that the
plaintiff’s deed conveyed to her a strip of land fronting 35 feet
on the waters of Tom’s Creek. The defendants, adjacent property
owners, appealed, contending that there are disputed material
facts that make summary judgment inappropriate. We agree.
The plaintiff advanced three theories supporting her
right to the disputed lake frontage. She argued below that she
owned the property in dispute by virtue of a warranty deed dated
May 7, 1965; that she “[had] been in open, continuous, notorious
and adverse possession of the entire strip in question under
color of title for more than seven (7) years”; and that she, to
the exclusion of all others, had paid property taxes on the
subject property “for a period in excess of twenty (20) years.”
If the plaintiff is correct, she owns 35 feet of lake frontage;
if, on the other hand, the defendants are correct, the disputed
lake frontage belongs to them.
The trial court did not address the plaintiff’s
alternative theories of adverse possession and entitlement based
upon payment of the property taxes.1 Be that as it may, we find
facts in the record before us that negate plaintiff’s claim on
each of these two theories. Even though summary judgment was not
granted on either theory, we deem it appropriate to make the
foregoing comment because of the well-established proposition
that a trial court will not be reversed where the correct result
1
See T.C.A. § 28-2-109.
2
has been reached, though predicated on an erroneous reason.
Perlberg v. Jahn, 773 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tenn.App. 1989).
The trial court found that the plaintiff’s deed
established her ownership to the disputed property fronting 35
feet on the lake. It found that these deeds made out a “prima
facie” case and further found that there was no contrary proof.
We cannot agree. For example, there are deeds in the defendants’
chain of title--the earliest of which predates the deed to the
plaintiff--that can be interpreted as reflecting that the
defendants own 100 feet of lake frontage, an interpretation that
appears to be inconsistent with the plaintiff’s ownership of 35
feet of lake frontage. Furthermore, there are two relevant
surveys of the defendants’ property in the record, both of which
were prepared by Surveyor Jay T. Moore.2 One of the surveys
shows that the defendants own 100 feet of lake frontage. The
other survey specifies that the defendants own only 59.83 feet of
frontage. The latter survey clearly reflects that if the
defendants own 100 feet of frontage, the plaintiff cannot own the
35 feet of frontage claimed by her in this lawsuit. In addition,
several witnesses whose depositions are before us testified about
the location of natural points of reference that have long since
disappeared. In this case, their credibility should be tested in
the courtroom.
Summary judgment is not a substitute “for the trial of
genuine and material factual matters.” Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d
2Mr. Moore subsequently disavowed the accuracy of his first survey; but
whether it is accurate or not is a disputed fact to be resolved by the trier
of fact.
3
208, 210 (Tenn. 1993). In this case, there are disputed material
facts on each of the plaintiff’s theories of recovery that
preclude summary judgment. See Rule 56.03, Tenn.R.Civ.P. A
plenary trial is necessary to resolve these disputes.
The judgment of the trial court is vacated. Costs on
appeal are taxed to the appellee. This case is remanded for
trial.
__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
CONCUR:
________________________
Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
________________________
Herschel P. Franks
4