Taylor v. Campbell ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
September 29, 1999
GENE TAYLOR, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate Court Clerk
Petitioner/Appellant, )
)
) Appeal No.
VS. ) 01-A-01-9812-CH-00638
)
) Davidson Chancery
DONAL CAMPBELL, ) No. 97-711-II
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTION, )
)
Respondent/Appellee. )
APPEALED FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE CAROL L. MCCOY, CHANCELLOR
GENE TAYLOR #75796
Northwest Correctional Complex
Route 1, Box 660
Tiptonville, Tennessee 38079
Pro Se/Petitioner/Appellant
PAUL G. SUMMERS
Attorney General and Reporter
JOHN R. MILES
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0488
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
KOCH, J.
CAIN, J.
OPINION
A prisoner seeking a declaratory judgment to review his prison
sentence asserts that in granting summary judgment to the state, the chancellor
erred by finding that he committed a felony while on work release. Based on a
prior decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals, we find that res judicata bars the
litigation of that issue. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.
II.
Mr. Taylor filed a petition for a declaratory judgment in the
Chancery Court of Davidson County pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225.
He alleged that the only effective sentence under which he was being held was
a twenty years and one day sentence and that he had already served over twenty-
two years. He also alleged that he was entitled to over eleven years of sentence
credits. Therefore, he sought a declaration that he was entitled to an immediate
release from incarceration.
The Commissioner of Correction moved for a dismissal for failure
to state a claim, or for summary judgment. Relying on an opinion of the Court
of Criminal Appeals, the chancellor granted the Commissioner summary
judgment on the question of the sentence Mr. Taylor was serving, but reserved
judgment on the question of the sentence credits.
-2-
After more maneuvering in the chancery court, the Commissioner
moved for summary judgment on the remaining issue of sentence credits. The
chancellor granted that motion, holding that Mr. Taylor was under a life sentence
without the possibility of parole, and that therefore, the issue of sentence credits
was moot.
II.
Although Mr. Taylor raised a number of issues in the chancery
court, the only questions on appeal revolve around whether he previously
committed a felony while on work release. At this point we summarize the facts
recited in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals. In 1975 the Criminal
Court of Washington County sentenced Mr. Taylor to death on a charge of
murder. After the dust settled on an appeal and two commutations by Governor
Blanton, Mr. Taylor was under a life sentence commuted to twenty years and one
day.
While serving the commuted sentence, Mr. Taylor escaped, stole a
car, and robbed a bank. The words of the Court of Criminal Appeals are
particularly pertinent. The court said: “Subsequently, while serving the twenty-
year and one day sentence on a work release program, the Defendant stole a car
and robbed a bank.” Taylor v. Morgan, 909 S.W.2d 17 at 18 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1995)(emphasis supplied). He entered a guilty plea and received an additional
twenty year sentence. The trial court ordered the sentence to run concurrently
with the sentence he was already serving.
-3-
Governor Alexander then revoked the commutation granted by
Governor Blanton and reinstated the life sentence.
In 1994 Mr. Taylor filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Circuit
Court of Davidson County, alleging that the second twenty year sentence was
void because Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-123 required it to run consecutively to
his original sentence. Therefore, since he had served the original twenty-year
sentence, he argued that he was being illegally held.
The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Mr. Taylor’s petition and
held that he was under a valid life sentence. Thus, regardless of the validity of
the second sentence, the court held that Mr. Taylor would not be eligible for
release until he had, at a minimum, served the life sentence.
III.
The issue about which Mr. Turner complains was decided in the
prior case. The res judicata doctrine prohibits him from relitigating that issue
here. See A.L. Kornman Co. vs. Metropolitan Government, 391 S.W.2d 633(Tenn. 1965). Thus, the chancellor correctly based her decision in this case on
the fact that Mr. Taylor had committed a felony while on work release.
The significance of that fact becomes apparent when we consider
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-123(b)(1). That code section provides that any
prisoner convicted of a felony (except escape) committed while on work release
-4-
or other program where the prisoner enjoys the privilege of supervised release
in the community, shall serve the remainder of the term without becoming
eligible for parole.
It is obvious that the two rulings made by the chancellor (that Mr.
Taylor was under a life sentence and that he must serve it without becoming
eligible for parole) were mandated by the law and the uncontroverted facts.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed and the cause is
remanded to the Chancery Court of Davidson County for any further proceedings
necessary. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellant.
_______________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
______________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
______________________________
WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE