Timothy Wayne Masse v. Mandy Joe Masse Cottar ( 2016 )


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  •                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    January 28, 2016 Session
    TIMOTHY WAYNE MASSE v. MANDY JO MASSE COTTAR
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Maury County
    No. 12249 Stella L. Hargrove, Judge
    ________________________________
    No. M2015-00822-COA-R3-CV – Filed March 21, 2016
    _________________________________
    Mother and Father were married for eight years and had three children when they
    divorced in 2009. Mother was named the primary residential parent, and each party was
    awarded equal residential time with the children. In 2010 Mother moved from Spring
    Hill, where the parties had lived during their marriage, to Goodlettsville. When Mother
    attempted to remove the children from Maury County schools and enroll them in
    Robertson County schools, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan and to be
    named the primary residential parent. Following a trial, the court found that the parties’
    failure to follow the parenting plan constituted a material change of circumstances and
    that it was in the children’s best interest for the primary residential parent designation to
    change from Mother to Father. Mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RICHARD H. DINKINS
    and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.
    Connie Reguli and Megan Woodson Miller, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellant,
    Mandy Jo Masse Cottar.
    L. Robert Grefseng, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellee, Timothy Wayne Masse.
    OPINION
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Timothy Wayne Masse (“Father”) and Mandy Jo Masse Cottar (“Mother”) were
    married in 2001 and divorced on January 16, 2009. They have three minor children.
    Mother was named the primary residential parent when the parties were divorced, and
    each parent was awarded fifty percent of the residential parenting time. During their
    marriage, the parties lived in Spring Hill. Following the divorce, Mother remarried and
    relocated from Spring Hill, in Maury County, to Goodlettsville, in Robertson County.
    The children continued to attend school in Maury County even after Mother moved to
    Robertson County.
    On July 24, 2014, Father filed a petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan.
    Father asserted that a material change of circumstances had occurred and that it would be
    in the children’s best interest for the primary residential parent designation to be changed
    from Mother to him. Father asked the court to award him 235 parenting days each year.
    The basis for Father’s petition was Mother’s plan to change the children’s schools from
    Maury County to Robertson County, which she announced shortly before school was to
    begin in Maury County. In an email to Father dated July 22, 2014, Mother stated that the
    children were not eligible to attend Maury County schools because she, as the custodial
    parent, no longer lived in Maury County. She wrote, “I will now be enrolling them in
    Robertson County schools since I am the custodial parent and they should be enrolled
    where I live.”
    The trial court held a show cause hearing on July 30, 2014, and entered an order
    specifying that the children were to continue to be enrolled in the Maury County public
    school system unless the parties reached a joint decision to send them elsewhere, as the
    parenting plan provides. Mother then filed an answer to Father’s petition and a counter
    petition to modify the parenting plan. Mother requested that she remain the primary
    residential parent and that the parties maintain their fifty percent residential time with the
    children, but she wanted the court to award her decision making authority for the
    children’s educational and extracurricular activities. The parties engaged in discovery, in
    preparation for trial, and tried their case on February 27, 2015.
    The parties’ testimony showed that Mother works in Brentwood and Father works
    from home, in Spring Hill. A little over six months following the parties’ divorce in
    January 2009, Mother filed a petition to modify the parenting plan because she was
    engaged to a man who lived in Cedar Hill, which is in Robertson County, and she wanted
    to relocate with the children to Cedar Hill. Father did not agree to change the children’s
    schools from Maury County to Robertson County, and the parties went to mediation at
    -2-
    Mother’s insistence. Mother ended up not marrying the man who lived in Cedar Hill, and
    so she dismissed her petition to modify. However, in June 2010 Mother married another
    individual, Addison Cottar, who lived in Goodlettsville, which is in Robertson County.
    Mother then moved to Goodlettsville to live with Mr. Cottar. Mother lived with Mr.
    Cottar in Goodlettsville from 2010 to sometime in 2013, when she moved back to Spring
    Hill for a few months. She and Mr. Cottar then moved to Cross Plains, which is also in
    Robertson County. At the time of trial, Mother testified that she was in the process of
    getting a divorce from Mr. Cottar and that she had begun dating someone else. She
    testified that she had moved out of the house she had shared with Mr. Cottar and was
    living with her brother, just a quarter mile away, in a house owned by her mother. Each
    of Mother’s houses in Cross Plains was about sixty-eight miles from Father’s house in
    Spring Hill.
    Father remarried in May 2011. His current wife has a child from a previous
    marriage who lives with Father and his wife for eleven months of the year. Father’s wife
    testified that Father is a good parent to his three children as well as to her child and that
    her child gets along well with the parties’ three children when they are all together.
    Father and his wife live in Spring Hill.
    According to the permanent parenting plan the trial court put into effect in 2009,
    when the parties were divorced, Mother and Father were awarded time with the children
    for a full week at a time before delivering them to the other parent. At the time of trial,
    the youngest child was in elementary school and the older two children were in middle
    school. The drive from Mother’s house to Father’s house was approximately one hour.
    Despite the terms of the parenting plan, Mother testified that when she had the children
    with her, she routinely dropped the youngest off with Father in the morning, where the
    child would wait for the school bus to pick him up and take him to school, and Mother
    would drive the older two children to their school. In the afternoon, the children went to
    Father’s house after school, where they would stay until Mother picked them up after her
    work day ended. When they are with Mother, the children spend approximately two
    hours in the car traveling back and forth between Robertson County and Maury County
    on the days they have school, one hour in the morning and another hour in the
    afternoon/evening. Father expressed his concern that the children spend too much time in
    the car during the weeks they are with Mother during the school year. The parties agreed
    that the children’s grades have not suffered as a result of their spending so much time in
    the car during Mother’s weeks.
    The evidence showed that Mother and Father both love and care for their children
    and they are able to work together for the benefit of the children. For example, the
    youngest child plays baseball in Maury County, and on days he has baseball practice,
    Father drives him to practice regardless of whether it is his week or Mother’s week.
    When he has baseball, the parties’ son stays with Father even during the weeks he is
    -3-
    supposed to be with Mother. Mother testified that when the elder daughter was involved
    with the pep band and was playing at a night game, this daughter would stay with Father
    during Mother’s weeks to accommodate Mother’s schedule. The younger daughter
    played soccer in Robertson County, and Mother testified that when she had practice
    during the week, Mother would pick her up from school, drive her to practice, and bring
    her back to school the next day, regardless of whether the practices occurred during
    Mother’s week or Father’s week. Because Father works from home and lives near the
    children’s schools, both parties have agreed that the schools should contact Father during
    the day if an issue comes up with any of the children, even during Mother’s weeks with
    the children.
    Mother testified that she would like to move the children from Maury County
    schools to Robertson County schools. She explained that she has driven the children
    down to Maury County for years and now it is Father’s turn to do the driving. She also
    testified that the school regulations of Maury County provide that the primary residential
    parent is supposed to live in Maury County for the children to be able to attend Maury
    County schools without paying a fee.
    The children attend church with Mother in Robertson County. When they are with
    Mother, they participate in church activities on Wednesday evenings and on Sundays.
    Father testified that if he were designated the primary residential parent, he would be
    willing for the children to continue their participation in the church activities in
    Robertson County during the week on Wednesday evenings.
    Mother and Father both testified that they believe it is important that the children
    spend time with each parent. Each party testified that the other parent is a good parent,
    although both Mother and Father had complaints about the other parent. Father
    complained that Mother told their eldest child, who is not Father’s biological child, but
    who is his adopted child, that Father could never love her as much as Mother does.
    Mother agreed that this is what she believes:
    That’s my feelings. I am her mother. I gave birth to her on August 28,
    2001. I don’t feel he could ever love her as much as I do. And that is not a
    derogatory statement towards Tim.
    Father also complained that Mother has interfered with his ability to communicate with
    his younger daughter by text when she is with Mother and that she threatened to delete
    his wife from his daughter’s Facebook page. Mother complained about some comments
    Father put on his Facebook page that were derogatory towards Mother.
    -4-
    II. TRIAL COURT’S RULING
    After the close of evidence, the trial court issued a ruling from the bench granting
    Father’s petition and designating him the primary residential parent. The court issued an
    order on March 16, 2015, that it amended two months later, on June 19. In its amended
    order, the trial court wrote, in pertinent part:
    [T]he Petitioner/Father has met the burden of proof by a
    preponderance of evidence establishing that a material change of
    circumstances has occurred as would warrant a change of custody/primary
    residential status for the parties’ three (3) minor children. Specifically, the
    Court finds that the parties are not fully following the existing parenting
    plan because the Respondent/Mother has relocated and created the distance
    which currently exists between the parents in an apparent attempt to
    maintain two failed relationships with other men in her life. On the other
    hand, the Petitioner/Father had no realistic choice except to capitulate to the
    Respondent/Mother’s relocation in an attempt to maintain the equal/split
    parenting arrangement contemplated in the original divorce decree.
    A material change of circumstances having been established, the
    Court further finds, after consideration of the statutory factors, that it would
    be in the best interest of the three (3) minor children that the
    Petitioner/Father be named the primary residential parent, and further, that
    he be granted the decision making as to all matters except the religious
    upbringing of the minor children. Simultaneously with the entry of this
    Order, the Court is also executing a revised permanent parenting plan
    which incorporates for the most part the Petitioner/Father’s proposed plan
    (130 days to the Respondent/Mother and 235 days to the Petitioner/Father).
    . . . Although both parties may have spoken negatively about the other
    parent, the Court further finds that the statements made to the parties’ eldest
    child . . . as to some supposed superiority of the Respondent/Mother’s love
    and affection were indeed cruel, and that those cruel words pale in
    comparison as to anything the Petitioner/Father may have published on any
    social media. Although the parties contemplated a split-fifty/fifty parenting
    time schedule, the Court finds that because of the Mother’s unilateral
    decisions and actions the Father has played a greater role and has been the
    primary caregiver. Both parents have equal love and affection for the
    children, but all of the children are doing well in school and are involved in
    a number of extra-curricular activities in Maury County, and there is no
    reason to change their involvement in any way by requiring a relocation to
    Robertson County. The parents have attempted to make decisions since the
    Mother moved in the best interests of the children, particularly the Father.
    -5-
    By far, he has been the one to provide continuity, stability, and a
    satisfactory environment for these children. He has capitulated with really
    no other choice, to maintain the stability and security and continuity for
    these children in the face of their mother’s move.
    Mother appealed from this order, claiming that the trial court erred in (a) finding
    there was a material change of circumstances warranting a change in the primary
    residential parent and (b) determining that it was in the children’s best interest for Father
    to be named the primary residential parent.
    III. ANALYSIS
    A. Standard of Review
    Our review is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of
    correctness of the trial court’s findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence
    is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d); Armbrister v. Armbrister, 
    414 S.W.3d 685
    , 692
    (Tenn. 2013); Rigsby v. Edmonds, 
    395 S.W.3d 728
    , 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). We
    review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo, according them no presumption of
    correctness. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692; Rigsby, 395 S.W.3d at 734. A trial court’s
    determinations of whether a material change of circumstances has occurred and where the
    best interests of children lie are factual issues. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692-93; In re
    T.C.D., 
    261 S.W.3d 734
    , 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Appellate courts must, therefore,
    presume a trial court’s factual findings on these matters are correct and not overturn them
    unless the evidence preponderates to the contrary. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693. As
    our Supreme Court has explained,
    Because decisions regarding parenting arrangements are factually driven
    and require careful consideration of numerous factors, Holloway v. Bradley,
    
    230 S.W.2d 1003
    , 1006 (1950); Brumit v. Brumit, 
    948 S.W.2d 739
    , 740
    (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), trial judges, who have the opportunity to observe
    the witnesses and make credibility determinations, are better positioned to
    evaluate the facts than appellate judges. Massey-Holt v. Holt, 
    255 S.W.3d 603
    , 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
    
    Id.
    The Court of Appeals has noted that trial courts have broad discretion in
    determining which parent should be the primary residential parent and appellate courts
    are reluctant to second guess a trial court’s decision on this issue. Reinagel v. Reinagel,
    M2009-02416-COA-R3-CV, 
    2010 WL 2867129
    , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 21, 2010);
    Scofield v. Scofield, M2006-00350-COA-R3-CV, 
    2007 WL 624351
    , at *2 (Tenn. Ct.
    -6-
    App. Feb. 28, 2007); see Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (opining that trial courts have
    broad discretion to work out details of parenting plans). According to the Armbrister
    Court, a trial court abuses its discretion when it:
    appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the
    case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on
    reasoning that causes an injustice.
    Id. (quoting Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 
    350 S.W.3d 99
    , 105 (Tenn. 2011)).
    B. Material Change of Circumstances
    In his petition, Father sought to have the primary residential parent changed from
    Mother to himself. Modification of a court’s prior order determining which parent should
    be designated the primary residential parent is governed by statute:
    If the issue before the court is a modification of the court’s prior decree
    pertaining to custody, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the
    evidence a material change in circumstance. A material change of
    circumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the
    child. A material change of circumstance may include, but is not limited to,
    failures to adhere to the parenting plan or an order of custody and
    visitation or circumstances that make the parenting plan no longer in the
    best interest of the child.
    
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101
    (a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
    A petition to change the primary residential parent of a child requires the court to
    conduct a two-step analysis. “The threshold question is whether a material change in
    circumstances has occurred since the entry of the prior [custody] order.” Boyer v.
    Heimermann, 
    238 S.W.3d 249
    , 259 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Only if the court finds a
    material change in circumstances has occurred does it proceed to consider whether
    changing the primary residential parent is in the children’s best interest. 
    Id.
    Decisions involving the custody of a child are among the most important decisions
    faced by the courts. Steen v. Steen, 
    61 S.W.3d 324
    , 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The
    party seeking modification of the parenting plan to change the designation of the primary
    residential parent has the burden of proving a material change in circumstances. Taylor
    v. McKinnie, W2007-01468-COA-R3-JV, 
    2008 WL 2971767
    , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
    5, 2008) (citing 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101
    (a)(2)(B)). The Supreme Court has
    explained “[t]here are no hard and fast rules” in determining whether such a material
    change in circumstances has occurred. Kendrick v. Shoemake, 
    90 S.W.3d 566
    , 570
    -7-
    (Tenn. 2002).
    Although there are no bright-line rules for determining when such a change
    has occurred, there are several relevant considerations: (1) whether a
    change has occurred after the entry of the order sought to be modified; (2)
    whether a change was not known or reasonably anticipated when the order
    was entered; and (3) whether a change is one that affects the child’s well-
    being in a meaningful way.
    Cranston v. Combs, 
    106 S.W.3d 641
    , 644 (Tenn. 2003); see also Keisling v. Keisling, 
    196 S.W.3d 703
    , 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (same); see generally Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at
    701-04 (discussing difference required to prove material change in circumstances for
    purposes of changing primary residential parent versus modification of parenting
    schedule); Boyer, 
    238 S.W.3d at 255-257
     (discussing evolution of standard for finding
    material change in circumstances).
    The trial court based its determination that there was a material change of
    circumstances on the fact that the parties were not following the terms of the permanent
    parenting plan that was put into place when the parties were divorced in 2009. Mother
    contends that an Agreed Order that the trial court entered in 2011 constituted a
    modification of the parenting plan, and Mother asserts that she had already moved to
    Goodlettsville before the entry of the Agreed Order. Thus, Mother argues, the children
    have been traveling back and forth from Robertson County to Spring Hill since before the
    time the Agreed Order was entered, and Father cannot show a material change of
    circumstances has taken place following the entry of the Agreed Order.
    The Agreed Order Mother relies on for this argument was entered in January 2011.
    That order was very limited and modified only the start time of holidays and school-free
    days for determining what time the children would be transferred from one parent to the
    other; the transportation arrangements for holidays and school-free days; and Father’s
    child support obligation. No other changes were made. As the Tennessee Supreme Court
    has interpreted 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101
    (a)(2)(B), the material change of
    circumstances must occur “after the entry of the order sought to be modified.” Rigsby,
    395 S.W.3d at 735 (quoting Kendrick v. Shoemake, 
    90 S.W.3d at 570
    ) (itself quoting
    Blair v. Badenhope, 
    77 S.W.3d 137
    , 150 (Tenn. 2002))). This is because “[a] custody
    decision, once final, is res judicata upon the facts in existence or reasonably foreseeable
    when the decision was made.” Scofield v. Scofield, M2006-00350-COA-R3-CV, 
    2007 WL 624351
    , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2007).
    As Father points out, the Agreed Order did not address either the primary
    residential parent designation or the number of days the children spend with each parent,
    and Father sought to change each of these aspects of the permanent parenting plan
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    through his petition. Moreover, the order Father sought to modify when he filed his
    petition was the permanent parenting plan dating from 2009, when the parties were
    divorced, not the Agreed Order that was entered in 2011. Thus, so long as there was a
    material change of circumstances after the entry of the permanent parenting plan in 2009,
    the trial court did not err in conducting a best interest analysis to determine whether a
    change in the primary residential parent was warranted.
    Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B) states that the parties’
    failure to adhere to the parenting plan may constitute a material change of circumstances
    when a party seeks to modify a court’s prior decree pertaining to the designation of the
    primary residential parent. The issues Father is most concerned about and that led him to
    file the petition to modify are the number of hours the children spend in the car on school
    days during Mother’s weeks and Mother’s attempts to change the children’s schools from
    Maury County to Robertson County. Courts are authorized to modify a parenting plan
    designating the primary residential parent “when required by unanticipated facts or
    subsequently emerging conditions.”         Scofield, 
    2007 WL 624351
    , at *4 (citing
    Adelsperger v. Adelsperger, 
    970 S.W.2d 482
    , 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)).
    When the parties were divorced, Mother was living in the marital home, and
    Father was living in Columbia, in a house that was located in the Spring Hill school
    district. Mother did not move to Robertson County until sometime after the parties were
    divorced. Thus, it was not until after the 2009 parenting plan was put into effect that (1)
    Mother moved to Robertson County and the children began spending more time in the car
    driving back and forth from school (or from Father’s house) to Mother’s house in Spring
    Hill or that (2) Mother began trying to remove the children from their schools in Spring
    Hill to enroll them in schools in Robertson County. In addition, it was also not until after
    the 2009 parenting plan went into effect that Mother began dropping the youngest child at
    Father’s house in the morning before school during her weeks or that the children went to
    Father’s house after school to wait for Mother to pick them up before driving up to
    Robertson County. The parenting plan does not contemplate that Father will take care of
    the children during Mother’s weeks. We find that these facts are sufficient to constitute a
    material change of circumstances that affects the children in a meaningful way for
    purposes of 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101
    (a)(2)(B).
    C. Best Interest Analysis
    After finding a material change in circumstances has occurred, the trial court must
    determine whether changing the primary residential parent is in the children’s best
    interest using the factors enumerated in 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106
    (a). These factors
    include the following:
    (1) The strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each
    -9-
    parent, including whether one (1) parent has performed the majority of
    parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child;
    (2) Each parent’s or caregiver’s past and potential for future performance of
    parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of
    the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing
    parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents,
    consistent with the best interest of the child. In determining the willingness
    of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and
    continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the
    child’s parents, the court shall consider the likelihood of each parent and
    caregiver to honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements and
    rights, and the court shall further consider any history of either parent or
    any caregiver denying parenting time to either parent in violation of a court
    order;
    (3) Refusal to attend a court ordered parent education seminar may be
    considered by the court as a lack of good faith effort in these proceedings;
    (4) The disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing,
    medical care, education and other necessary care;
    (5) The degree to which a parent has been the primary caregiver, defined as
    the parent who has taken the greater responsibility for performing parental
    responsibilities;
    (6) The love, affection, and emotional ties existing between each parent and
    the child;
    (7) The emotional needs and developmental level of the child;
    (8) The moral, physical, mental and emotional fitness of each parent as it
    relates to their ability to parent the child. . . .;
    (9) The child’s interaction and interrelationships with siblings, other
    relatives and step-relatives, and mentors, as well as the child’s involvement
    with the child’s physical surroundings, school, or other significant
    activities;
    (10) The importance of continuity in the child’s life and the length of time
    the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment;
    - 10 -
    (11) Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other
    parent or to any other person. The court shall, where appropriate, refer any
    issues of abuse to juvenile court for further proceedings;
    (12) The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or
    frequents the home of a parent and such person’s interactions with the
    child;
    (13) The reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or
    older. . . .;
    (14) Each parent’s employment schedule, and the court may make
    accommodations consistent with those schedules; and
    (15) Any other factors deemed relevant by the court.
    
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106
    (a).
    The trial court stated in the Amended Order that it had considered all of the
    statutory factors. It found that Mother’s statement to the eldest child that Father could
    never love her as much as Mother was especially cruel and did not compare to anything
    Father posted on social media about Mother and that Father has played a greater role as
    caregiver due to Mother’s “unilateral decisions and actions.” The trial court found both
    parents “have equal love and affection for the children” and that both parents have
    worked to make decisions in the children’s best interest since Mother has moved.
    However, the court found that “Father has been the one to provide continuity, stability
    and a satisfactory environment” for the children throughout Mother’s moves.
    Additionally, and perhaps most important, the trial court found that the children are doing
    well in the Spring Hill school district, that they are involved in extra-curricular activities
    in Maury County, and that there is no reason for them to relocate to Robertson County, as
    Mother has sought to have them do.
    Based on the totality of evidence in the record and the deferential treatment we are
    to accord the trial court’s decision, we conclude that Mother has not established that the
    evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings that (a) Father proved by a
    preponderance of the evidence that there was a material change of circumstances or that
    (b) it is in the children’s best interest that the primary residential parent designation
    change from Mother to Father. We note that as the children get older and are required to
    spend more time on homework or at school participating in extra-curricular activities, it
    will become more important that they reside closer to school and not spend so much time
    - 11 -
    driving back and forth from home to school each day.1
    In modifying the permanent parenting plan, the trial court awarded Father sole
    authority to make educational decisions for the children. Mother contends the trial court
    erred in this regard and should have given her this decision making authority. Mother has
    made it clear that if she is able to decide where the children go to school, she will move
    them from Maury County to the Robertson County school system. As discussed above,
    however, the trial court found the children should not be removed from the Maury
    County school district, where they are thriving. Mother fails to convince us the trial court
    abused its discretion in giving Father the authority to decide where the children go to
    school.2 As a result, we affirm the trial court’s decision awarding Father this decision
    making authority.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all respects. Costs of this appeal shall be
    assessed against the appellant, Mandy Jo Masse Cottar, for which execution shall issue if
    necessary.
    _________________________
    ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE
    1
    We acknowledge the trial court’s accommodation to Mother permitting her to take the children
    with her to her church on Wednesday evenings so they can continue their participation in her church’s
    activities. However, we also recognize that this accommodation will terminate, according to the trial
    court’s order, if the children’s grades drop below a B or if Mother is unable to get the children to school
    on time the following morning.
    2
    Moreover, we note that the 2009 parenting plan gave the parties joint decision making authority
    over the children’s education. Despite this joint authority, however, Mother made the unilateral decision
    to remove the children from Maury County schools and enroll them in Robertson County schools without
    discussing the issue with Father, which is what led Father to file his petition to modify. This unilateral
    action by Mother further convinces us that the trial court did not err in giving Father sole authority to
    make future educational decisions for the children.
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