Pardue, Jr. v. Metro Gov't ( 1998 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    FILED
    April 15, 1998
    LEON PARDUE, JR.,           )
    )                          Cecil W. Crowson
    Plaintiff/Appellant,   )                         Appellate Court Clerk
    )              Appeal No.
    )              01-A-01-9707-CH-00312
    VS.                         )
    )              Davidson Chancery
    )              No. 96-1232-II
    THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT )
    OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON     )
    COUNTY and the METROPOLITAN )
    EMPLOYEE BENEFIT BOARD,     )
    )
    Defendant/Appellee.    )
    APPEALED FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
    AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
    THE HONORABLE CAROL L. McCOY, CHANCELLOR
    ANN BUNTIN STEINER
    STEINER & STEINER
    214 Second Avenue North
    Suite 203
    Nashville, Tennessee 37201-1644
    Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
    JAMES L. MURPHY, III
    Director of Law
    Department of Law of the Metropolitan
    Government of Nashville and Davidson County
    CHRISTI E. PEARSON
    204 Metropolitan Courthouse
    Nashville, Tennessee 37201
    Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
    AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    TODD, P.J., M.S.
    KOCH, J.
    OPINION
    In this appeal of the Metropolitan Benefit Board’s denial of a disability
    pension, the petitioner asserts that the decision is unsupported by substantial and
    material evidence, that the Board should have given more weight to the treating
    physician’s testimony, and that the reviewing court should have conducted a de novo
    review of the Board’s decision. The Chancery Court of Davidson County conducted
    a limited review and dismissed the petition. We affirm.
    I.
    Leon Pardue, Jr., an employee of the Metropolitan Public W orks
    Department, applied for a medical pension in November of 1994.              His claim,
    supported by the opinion of his treating physician, was that a degenerative joint
    disease and chronic pain syndrome rendered him unable to perform his duties as a
    loader and driver of a chipper truck. The Metropolitan Benefit Board referred Mr.
    Pardue to independent medical and psychological specialists, and the specialists
    reported that they could find no objective basis for work restrictions. On August 14,
    1995, the Board denied the disability application.
    From August of 1995 until February of 1996 the question bounced from
    one committee to another, to the Board and back to the committees. The record was
    periodically supplemented with other medical evidence, and at one point the pension
    committee recommended that the Board reconsider its prior action and grant Mr.
    Pardue a pension retroactive to September of 1994. The motion failed in a tie vote
    before the Board. On February 26, 1996, the Board voted for a final time and refused,
    by a vote of four to three, to reconsider its prior denial.
    II.
    -2-
    On appeal Mr. Pardue argues that the Board’s action should be
    reviewed under the Tennessee Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-
    5-101, et seq. The Board, however, is an agency of the Metropolitan Government of
    Nashville and Davidson County, and the Administrative Procedures Act does not
    cover “county and municipal boards, commissions, committees, departments or
    offices.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-106(a). The proper method of reviewing a
    decision denying a pension to a civil servant is by the common law writ of certiorari.
    Kendrick v. City of Chattanooga, 
    799 S.W.2d 668
     (Tenn. App. 1990); Tenn. Code
    Ann. § 27-9-114.
    Under the common law writ our review of the evidence is severely
    limited. We only examine the record to see if there is any material evidence to
    support the Board’s action. Watts v. Civil Service Bd., 
    606 S.W.2d 274
     (Tenn. 1980);
    Lansden v. Tucker, 
    321 S.W.2d 795
     at 797 (Tenn. 1959). In this case there is
    evidence in the record from which the Board could conclude that Mr. Pardue was not
    disabled. More than one examining physician rendered an opinion that Mr. Pardue
    could return to work.
    III.
    In a related argument, Mr. Pardue contends that in weighing the
    evidence before it, the Board should have given greater weight to the testimony of his
    treating physician. The cases cited for that proposition, however, do not support the
    argument. In Crossno v. Publix Shirt Factory, 
    814 S.W.2d 730
     (Tenn. 1991), a
    worker’s compensation case decided by a trial judge, the Supreme Court said:
    When the medical testimony differs, the trial judge must
    obviously choose which view to believe. In doing so, he
    is allowed, among other things, to consider the
    qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their
    examination, the information available to them, and the
    evaluation of the importance of that information by other
    experts.
    -3-
    814 S.W.2d at 731. While the trial judge did give more weight to the treating
    physician’s testimony in that case, the rule announced by the Supreme Court
    concerns the credibility of the witnesses rather than whether the witness was a
    treating or a consulting physician.
    The Board’s authority is derived from section 3.28.060 of the
    Metropolitan Code. That section provides:
    The board shall have the exclusive authority to determine
    the disability and continuation of disability of a disabled
    member . . . An applicant for a disability pension shall
    furnish to the board a “disability report,” as provided in this
    section, and such other medical or other information as
    may reasonably be required by the board for the purpose
    of establishing disability.       The board may secure
    additional medical or other evidence as it deems
    necessary and appropriate. On the basis of the disability
    report, medical and other information as the board has
    assembled, the board shall thereupon determine whether
    or not the applicant is a disabled member. . . .”
    This provision does not require the Board to give more weight to any
    particular part of the evidence before it. We think that the Board has the power to
    make its own decision with respect to the credibility of the witnesses.
    IV.
    Finally, Mr. Pardue argues that the courts should review the record de
    novo under section 12.07(h) of the Metropolitan Charter. That section, applicable only
    to a review of a decision by the Civil Service Commission, provides for a de novo
    review of a decision dismissing an employee from the service.
    In Bush v. Employee Benefit Board, 
    792 S.W.2d 932
     (Tenn. App. 1990),
    we held that the Benefit Board of the Metropolitan Government and the Civil Service
    Commission are distinct and separate boards exercising discrete functions prescribed
    -4-
    by the Metropolitan Charter.     The charter provisions affecting one board or
    commission do not apply to the other. Therefore, the de novo review provisions
    affecting the Civil Service Commission do not apply to the Benefit Board.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The cause is remanded to
    the Chancery Court of Davidson County for any further proceedings necessary. Tax
    the costs on appeal to the appellee.
    ____________________________
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    _______________________________
    HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE
    MIDDLE SECTION
    _____________________________
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01A01-9707-CH-00312

Filed Date: 4/15/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014