State of Tennessee v. Robert Willis Chance, Jr. ( 2001 )


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  •           IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    OCTOBER SESSION, 1996
    FILED
    December 4,
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,        )                                     2001
    )    No. 02C01-9605-CC-00178
    Appellee               )                                Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    )    HARDIN COUNTY                Appellate Court Clerk
    vs.                        )
    )    Hon. C. Creed McGinley, Judge
    ROBERT WILLIS CHANCE, JR., )
    )    (Second Degree Murder;
    Appellant              )    Attempted First Degree Murder)
    For the Appellant:              For the Appellee:
    James T. "Jim" Sanderson        Charles W. Burson
    & Associates, P.C.             Attorney General and Reporter
    Stephen L. Hale
    William G. Hatton               William David Bridgers
    Attorneys for Appellant         Assistant Attorney General
    P. O. Box 331                   Criminal Justice Division
    Bolivar, TN 38008               450 James Robertson Parkway
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    G. Robert Radford
    District Attorney General
    John Overton
    Asst. District Attorney General
    601 Main Street
    Savannah, TN 38372
    OPINION FILED:
    AFFIRMED
    David G. Hayes
    Judge
    OPINION
    The appellant, Robert Willis Chance, pled guilty to one count of second
    degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. Pursuant to the
    plea agreement, the sentences were to be served concurrently. The Hardin
    County Circuit Court imposed a sentence of twenty-three years for each
    conviction. In his sole issue, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in
    imposing twenty-three year sentences because of the misapplication of 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210
     (1995 Supp.), regarding the presumptive sentence of a
    class A felony.
    Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    I. Background
    On the night of July 9, 1995, the appellant walked into the woods near his
    family's home armed with an SKS assault rifle and with the intention of
    committing suicide. Later, when his parents could not locate him, they began
    searching the woods. Hidden by the foliage, the appellant heard his father
    "belittling" him to his mother. Inflamed by these remarks, the appellant emerged
    from the woods and stated "Daddy, you've hurt mama around thirty years. And
    you're not going to hurt no [sic] more." The appellant then began firing his
    weapon. His mother was hit once in the leg. His father was shot four times,
    which resulted in his death. Concerned for his mother's welfare, the appellant
    telephoned 911 to obtain assistance. He informed the operator that he and his
    parents were "under fire" by an "unknown" assailant. The appellant later
    abandoned this story and admitted his guilt. The appellant was indicted on one
    count of first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder.
    2
    On December 4, 1995, the appellant pled guilty to one count of second degree
    murder and to one count of attempted first degree murder. A sentencing
    hearing was held on January 11, 1996.
    At the sentencing hearing, the proof revealed that the appellant had a
    troubled relationship with his father that had stemmed from years of physical and
    emotional abuse. Moreover, the appellant's psychiatric history involved chronic
    depression, relationship difficulties, sleeping problems, a variety of neurological
    complaints, "suicidal ideations," and borderline personality disorder. The trial
    court found two enhancement factors and one mitigating factor applicable to the
    appellant's second degree murder conviction and three enhancement factors
    and one mitigating factor applicable to his attempted first degree murder
    conviction.1 To determine the appropriate length of the appellant's sentence, the
    trial court began at the midpoint of the applicable range.2 Applying this
    procedure, the trial court imposed twenty-three year sentences for each
    conviction.
    II. Analysis
    1
    Specifically, the trial court found that (1) the appellant has a history of criminal
    convictions or criminal behavior; (9) the appellant employed a firearm during the commission of
    the offense; and, applicable only to the attempted first degree murder conviction, that (6) the
    personal injuries inflicted upon the victim were particularly great. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114
    (1995 Su pp.). The only mitigating factor applied was Tenn . Code A nn. § 40-35-11 3(8) (1990),
    that the app ellant was s uffering fro m a m enta l cond ition that s ignificantly reduced his cu lpability.
    In his appeal, the appellant does not contest the applicability of these factors.
    2
    The trial court stated,
    As I read the law on a class A sentence, the court is to start with a
    pres um ptive sente nce at the m idpoint of the rang e. . . . That's as opp ose d to
    Class B, C, D, and E where you start at the minimal sentence and work up and
    then down. On a class A felony, the sentence, pursuant to the terms of Section
    40-35-210, Subsection C, the presumptive sentence starts at the midpoint of the
    range. And then the Court applies enhan cing factors and then m itigating factors
    from there.
    . . . And th e m idpoint of his rang e, it wou ld be fifteen to twenty-five. [See
    Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-35-112(a)(1) (1990).] So obviously, the m ath em atic ally
    equation lends itself to a twenty year sentence to start with.
    Neither side entered any objection to this procedure.
    3
    In his only issue, the appellant contends that, in arriving at twenty-three
    year sentences, the trial court misapplied 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210
     by
    setting the presumptive sentence for a class A felony, with applicable
    enhancement and mitigating factors, at the midpoint of the range. He insists that
    the "plain language" of 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210
     directs sentencing courts
    to set the presumptive sentence for a class A felony at the midpoint of the range
    only if there are no enhancement factors and no mitigating factors. The State
    contends that such application of this section leads to a result that is clearly
    contrary to the legislature's intent in amending 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210
    (c).
    We agree.
    
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210
     provides, in parts pertinent to this issue:
    (c) The presumptive sentence for a Class B, C, D, and E felony
    shall be the minimum sentence in the range if there are no
    enhancement or mitigating factors. The presumptive sentence for
    a Class A felony shall be the midpoint of the range if there are no
    enhancement or mitigating factors.
    (d) Should there be enhancement but no mitigating factors, then the
    court may set the sentence above the minimum in that range but
    still within the range.
    (e) Should there be enhancement and mitigating factors, the court
    must start at the minimum sentence in the range, enhance the
    sentence within the range as appropriate for the enhancement
    factors, and then reduce the sentence within the range as
    appropriate for the mitigating factors.
    When read alone, 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210
    (e) sets the presumptive
    sentence for a class A felony, where both enhancement and mitigating factors
    apply, at the minimum sentence within the range. However, when construing the
    meaning of a statutory provision, courts must ascertain and give effect to the
    intent of the legislature. Roseman v. Roseman, 
    890 S.W.2d 27
    , 29 (Tenn. 1994)
    (citation omitted); Lyons v. Rasar, 
    872 S.W.2d 895
    , 897 (citation omitted). To
    determine legislative intent, courts must look to the entire statute and to the
    overall purpose of the legislation. Lyons, 872 S.W.2d at 897; see also West
    4
    American Ins. Co. v. Montgomery, 
    861 S.W.2d 230
    , 231 (Tenn. 1993) (citation
    omitted).
    In 1995, the Tennessee legislature amended 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35
    -
    210(c) by adding that "[t]he presumptive sentence for a Class A felony shall be
    the midpoint of the range if there are no enhancement or mitigating factors." No
    similar change was made to subsections (d) and (e). Thus, applying the
    appellant's "plain language" reading of the statute, a class A felon who commits
    an offense where the trial court finds only enhancement factors or both
    enhancement and mitigating factors applicable may very well receive a shorter
    sentence than a felon committing a class A offense involving no enhancement or
    mitigating factors. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210
    (c), (d), (e). This would
    produce an absurd result. We presume that the legislature did not intend such
    an absurdity in enacting this statute. See McClellan v. Bd. of Regents of State,
    
    921 S.W.2d 684
    , 689 (Tenn. 1996); Epstein v. State, 
    366 S.W.2d 914
    , 918
    (Tenn. 1963). Accordingly, "such a result will be avoided if the terms of the
    statute admit of it by a reasonable construction." Epstein, 
    366 S.W.2d at 918
    .
    (emphasis added).
    With consideration of the public's growing concern over violent crimes,
    defendants committing class A felonies should not be entitled to a presumptive
    sentence at the minimum of the sentencing range. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40
    -
    35-210(c) (retaining the presumptive sentence for class B, C, D, and E felonies
    at the minimum but increasing the presumptive sentence for class A felonies to
    the midpoint of the range). Moreover, it is difficult to conceive that the legislature
    would have intended a longer sentence for a class A felony without an
    enhancement factor than for a class A felony with an enhancement factor.
    Thus, we conclude that the presumptive sentence for all class A felonies is the
    5
    midpoint of the applicable sentencing range.3 Accordingly, the trial court's
    imposition of twenty-three year sentences, in the instant case, are appropriate.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ____________________________________
    DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
    CONCUR:
    ____________________________
    JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
    ____________________________
    PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
    3
    Although this issue has never specifically been addressed by the courts of this state, our
    courts have s tated that, effective July 1, 1995, the presum ptive sentence for all class A felonies
    sha ll be within th e m idpoint in the ra nge . See, e.g., State v. Sm ith, 926 S.W .2d 267, 271 (Tenn.
    Crim . App . 1995); State v. Johnson, No. 01C01-9507-CC-00242 at note 4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
    Na shville, Sept. 30, 1996); State v. Boshears , No. 01C01-9412-CR-00402 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
    Na shville, Nov. 15, 1995).
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9605-CC-00178

Judges: Judge David G. Hayes

Filed Date: 12/4/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014