Penny Carol Fletcher Morgan v. Benjamin Loyal Morgan ( 2005 )


Menu:
  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    June 9, 2005 Session
    PENNY CAROL FLETCHER MORGAN v. BENJAMIN LOYAL MORGAN
    Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
    No. CT-006931-00     Donna M. Fields, Judge
    No. W2004-02452-COA-R3-CV - Filed July 20, 2005
    This appeal arises from the trial court’s order designating Mother the primary residential parent of
    the parties’ minor child and awarding Father less than equal parenting time. We affirm.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; and
    Remanded
    DAVID R. FARMER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, J. and HOLLY
    M. KIRBY , J., joined.
    Stuart M. Breakstone, Zachary M. Moore and Kathy D. Baker, Memphis, Tennessee, for the
    appellant, Benjamin Loyal Morgan.
    Jeffrey Jones, Bartlett, Tennessee, for the appellee, Penny Carol Fletcher Morgan.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    This appeal arises from a divorce action. The parties, Penny Carol Fletcher Morgan (Ms.
    Morgan) and Benjamin Loyal Morgan (Mr. Morgan) were married on January 26, 1997. One child
    was born of the marriage in 1998. In November 2000, Ms. Morgan filed a complaint for divorce in
    Shelby County Circuit Court. Between November 2000 and May 2003, however, the parties
    separated and reconciled at least three times before permanently separating in the spring of 2003.
    1
    Rule 10 of the Tennessee Court of Appeals provides:
    This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
    or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have
    no precedential value. W hen a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated
    "MEMORANDUM O PINION", shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any
    reason in any unrelated case.
    In June 2003, Ms. Morgan filed a petition to establish custody and seeking designation as the
    primary residential parent. Between the time the parties separated in 2003 and June 2004, when the
    matter was heard in the trial court, the parties had equal parenting time with their minor child and
    both participated in their child’s school events and activities. Following the June hearing, and after
    considering the recommendations of two psychologists and the guardian ad litem, the trial court
    prepared its own parenting plan. By order of August 26, 2004, the trial court granted the parties a
    divorce upon stipulation of grounds and designated Ms. Morgan as primary residential parent. The
    court awarded Mr. Morgan visitation every Wednesday from after school until 7:30 p.m. and from
    Thursday after school until 7:30 p.m. on Sunday every other week during the school year. The trial
    court further ordered that the parties would alternate residential custody weekly during the summer,
    and that they would share decision-making responsibilities, with Ms. Morgan having final decision-
    making authority subject to mediation in case of disagreement. Mr. Morgan filed a timely notice of
    appeal raising the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to properly compare the relative
    fitness of the parties or act in the best interests of the child by awarding unequal parenting time.
    Standard of Review
    We review the trial court's determination of child custody under an abuse of discretion
    standard, affording the trial court great deference. Herrera v. Herrera, 
    944 S.W.2d 379
    , 385 (Tenn.
    Ct. App.1996). This Court will not interfere with the trial court's determination absent a palpable
    abuse of discretion or unless the judgment is against the great weight of the evidence. Id. at 386.
    This deferential review is premised on the assumption that the trial court first considered the best
    interests of the child in making the custody determination and did not act arbitrarily. Id. In making
    a custody determination, the trial court must engage in a comparative fitness analysis of the parents.
    Gaskill v. Gaskill, 
    936 S.W.2d 626
    , 630 (Tenn. Ct. App.1996). In so doing, it must consider the
    factors outlined by the legislature as codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106. Id. Custody
    determinations are thus based on a combination of subtle factors, and require a factually based
    inquiry. Id. The trial court is in the best position to weigh the facts presented to it, and to assess the
    credibility of the parties. Id. Similarly, the details of visitation arrangements are within the
    discretion of the trial court. Hogue v. Hogue, 
    147 S.W.3d 245
    , 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
    Although the trial court’s discretion is not without limit and its determinations must be based on the
    evidence and appropriate legal principles, we will not disturb the trial court’s determinations absent
    an abuse of discretion. Id.
    Discussion
    On appeal, Mr. Morgan does not assert that the trial court erred in designating Ms. Morgan
    as primary residential parent. Rather, he contends the trial court erred in awarding unequal
    parenting/visitation time and asserts the shared parenting schedule followed during the pendency of
    the divorce, whereby the minor child spent alternate weeks with each parent, is in the child’s best
    interest.
    -2-
    Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the parties both appear to love
    their minor child. Further, although we do not find it necessary or relevant to review either party’s
    rather serious patterns of negative behavior here, we agree with the trial court that both parties have
    “issues” which they need to address. We cannot say, however, that the trial court abused its
    discretion by awarding Mr. Morgan visitation every Wednesday evening, every other weekend from
    Thursday after school until Sunday evening during the school year, and alternate holidays and weeks
    during the summer.
    Contrary to Mr. Morgan’s assertion in this Court, we believe the trial court sought to act in
    the child’s best interest by establishing a visitation schedule that would address some of the apparent
    stress caused by the prior alternating residential arrangement and which would cause the least
    amount of disruption as the child began first grade. The trial court considered the recommendations
    of two psychologists and the guardian ad litem and, in light of those recommendations, found that
    it is in the best interests of the child to have one primary home setting during the school year. The
    two psychologists and the guardian ad litem agreed that the alternating residential schedule was a
    cause of stress to the child and that one primary home would be in his best interests, particularly
    during the school year.
    Upon review of the record, we cannot say the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s
    findings and find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of visitation. Accordingly, we
    affirm the judgment of the trial court. Further, we join the trial court in urging these parties to seek
    assistance in dealing with their behavioral and communication issues and to conduct themselves in
    a manner that is in the best interests of their child. Ms. Morgan’s request for attorney’s fees on
    appeal is denied. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Benjamin Loyal Morgan, and his
    surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
    ___________________________________
    DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: W2004-02452-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge David R. Farmer

Filed Date: 7/20/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021