G. Perry Guess, of the Estate of C. Charlton Howard v. Elizabeth G. Finlay ( 2012 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    March 7, 2012 Session
    G. PERRY GUESS, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF C. CHARLTON HOWARD
    v. ELIZABETH G. FINLAY
    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County
    No. 08-0884    Jeffrey M. Atherton, Chancellor
    No. E2011-00947-COA-R3-CV-FILED-APRIL 16, 2012
    This case involves1 a dispute between G. Perry Guess (“the Executor”), Executor of the
    Estate of C. Charlton Howard (“the Deceased”), and the Executor’s sister, Elizabeth G.
    Finlay (“the Survivor”), regarding the ownership of funds, following the death of the
    Deceased, in several bank accounts and certificates of deposit. The trial court awarded the
    bank accounts to the Executor and the CDs to the Survivor. The Executor claims he is also
    entitled to the CDs while the Survivor argues that she should have received all of the funds.
    We reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding the bank accounts to the
    Executor. We modify the judgment in favor of the Survivor so as to award to her all of the
    bank accounts as well as the CDs.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
    Reversed in Part; the Unreversed Part of the Judgment is Modified and,
    as Such, is Affirmed; Case Remanded with Instructions
    C HARLES D. S USANO, J R., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. M ICHAEL
    S WINEY and J OHN W. M CC LARTY, JJ., joined.
    C. George Caudle, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, G. Perry Guess.
    Benjamin L. McGowan, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Elizabeth G. Finlay.
    1
    There were two lawsuits in the trial court pertaining to the Deceased’s estate. The Executor sued
    to recover, for the estate, funds in the disputed bank accounts and the CDs (No. 08-0884), and the Survivor
    filed a will contest (No. 09-0022). The cases were consolidated and tried in separate phases on consecutive
    days. At the close of the first phase, the trial court upheld the validity of the Deceased’s will. Trial then
    proceeded regarding the accounts and the CDs. The Survivor did not appeal from the adverse judgment in
    the will contest case. As a result, this appeal only involves issues related to the trial court’s determination
    of ownership of the accounts and the CDs in No. 08-0884.
    OPINION
    I.
    The Deceased died on September 25, 2007. He was survived by many nieces and
    nephews, including the Executor and the Survivor. The Survivor had long been close to the
    Deceased. In his later years, the Deceased, whose eyesight was increasingly poor, primarily
    relied upon the Survivor to transport him and assist him with his medical appointments and
    other personal matters. In August 2007, a little more than a month before the Deceased died,
    he executed a new will replacing one executed in July 2005. Under the new will, the
    Executor was substituted for the Survivor as executor of his estate. The Deceased also
    bequeathed to the Executor the 30% of the residuary estate that previously had been willed
    to the Survivor. By all accounts, the change was prompted by a disagreement between the
    Deceased and the Survivor over whether the Deceased should be moved to an assisted living
    facility.
    At the time of his death, the Deceased held several joint bank accounts and CDs with
    the Survivor, all with SunTrust Bank, which assets totaled approximately $242,000. More
    specifically, there were five items – a checking account, a money market account, and three
    CDs (collectively “the SunTrust accounts”). The bulk of the funds – some $185,000 – were
    invested in the CDs. The Survivor testified that, following the Deceased’s death, she
    withdrew the balance of the funds in the SunTrust accounts on the advice of her attorney.
    At trial, it was undisputed that the Deceased was the source of all of the funds in the
    SunTrust accounts. On some of the accounts, the Survivor’s name had been on the accounts
    from their inception, while on others her name was added later. The Survivor did not
    question the Deceased’s decision and, although she was aware of the joint accounts, the only
    withdrawals she made during the Deceased’s life were for his use or benefit. Much of the
    proof addressed the establishment of the joint accounts. The proof showed that, in 2005, on
    the same day the Deceased gave the Survivor a power of attorney and made her his executor,
    they went to the bank and the Deceased added the Survivor’s name on his existing checking
    account. In April of the following year, the Deceased and the Survivor went to the bank and
    the Deceased deposited $107,869.28 in a new money market account in both of their names.
    Both accounts were titled in the names of “MR C. CHARLTON HOWARD OR MRS
    ELIZABETH FINLAY.” (Capitalization2 in original; there is no period after MR and MRS
    in the original.) For each of these two accounts, the bank provided a “Personal Account
    2
    Both names are in capital letters but the Survivor’s name is in a smaller font. There is no testimony
    or other evidence explaining the difference in font size. We conclude that the font difference is not material
    to the resolution of the issues in this case.
    -2-
    Signature Card”3 which was signed by both the Deceased and the Survivor. Below the
    signature lines, the following statement appears:
    It is agreed that all transactions between the Bank and the above
    signed shall be governed by the rules and regulations for this
    account and the above signed hereby acknowledge(s) receipt of
    such rules and regulations . . . . ”
    At the time the Deceased opened the money market account, he also purchased a
    $100,000 CD in his name and the Survivor’s name. Later that month, on two separate dates,
    the Deceased returned to the bank and purchased two more CDs, again in both of their
    names, for $50,000 and $39,936.76 respectively. For each CD, the bank issued a “Time
    Deposit Receipt” that expressly stated that “the above named acknowledges receipt of the
    Rules and Regulations for Deposit Accounts and agrees to be bound by the same.”
    The various account transactions mainly were handled by Mr. Charles Young, a
    SunTrust branch manager, as evidenced by his name or signature on some of the account
    documents. At trial, Mr. Young recalled that the Deceased and the Survivor came to the bank
    when the money market account was opened and, at another time, Mr. Young personally took
    some bonds to the Deceased’s home for him to sign in connection with the purchase of one
    of the CDs. Otherwise, Mr. Young recalled few details of the transactions. His testimony
    was generally limited to explaining the procedure he customarily employed in meeting with
    clients to assist them in opening new accounts and in generating the documents related to
    those accounts.
    Mr. Young testified that, based upon his usual practice, he would have met with the
    Deceased to ascertain what his wishes were with respect to his funds. Then, the various
    types of accounts SunTrust offers would be explained. Once the Deceased had decided on
    a specific type of account, Mr. Young would enter the relevant information into a computer
    to generate the necessary account documents. He explained that the bank did not utilize pre-
    printed form documents to indicate the type of account, but generated the appropriate
    documents according to the type of account selected by the customer. Mr. Young testified
    it was his standard practice to provide the customer with the bank’s rules and regulations
    when a deposit account was opened. He noted that the rules and regulations were also
    included in the new account kit provided when a CD is purchased. Mr. Young could think
    of no reason why he would not have followed his usual practice in his dealings with the
    Deceased, including the purchase of the three CDs. Mr. Young testified that SunTrust treats
    3
    While the document is referred to as a “Card,” it is actually on 8 ½ by 11 inch paper with a good
    deal of printed material.
    -3-
    all joint accounts as being with right of survivorship. He explained that other types of
    accounts are available if a person wants to allow another individual, such as an “authorized
    signer,” to act as the agent of the former with respect to an account but did not want to
    establish a right of survivorship. Mr. Young testified that the Deceased appeared to
    understand what he was doing in opening the accounts; he said he had no reason to believe
    the Deceased was being influenced by the Survivor in the transactions or that the Deceased
    was unaware that the accounts being opened by him were with right of survivorship.
    The proof further indicates that, even after the Deceased changed his will, he never
    took any action or stated any plan to remove the Survivor’s name from the SunTrust
    accounts. In fact, there was testimony indicating that the opposite was true. The Deceased’s
    caregiver testified that she asked the Deceased whether the Deceased also planned to “take
    [the Survivor] off” the accounts, and the Deceased answered to the effect, “No. I took her
    off the will, because I’m mad at her. The [SunTrust] money is hers because she was good
    to me.”
    The Executor sued the Survivor to recover, on behalf of the Estate, all of the
    withdrawn funds. The Executor essentially alleged that the Survivor wrongfully withdrew
    and converted to her own use funds that rightly belonged to the Deceased’s estate. The
    Survivor, on the other hand, maintained that the money came to her as the surviving owner
    of the SunTrust accounts.
    In its bench ruling, the court made the following pertinent findings and conclusions:
    [C]learly [the Deceased’s] intent at the time that he entered into
    these accounts is the simple focus of our hearing today.
    [I]n all candor, based upon the testimony of [the Deceased’s
    caretaker], and even that of [the Executor], it was the
    [D]eceased’s understanding that the money in the bank was his
    alone to give.
    *    *    *
    So it takes us back to the time the accounts were opened. We
    had conversation about [Tenn. Code Ann. §] 45-2-703. But
    clearly the account[s], the bank is not doing what it is obligated
    to do under the statute and that [is] utilize[] account documents
    that enable the depositor in the state of Tennessee to designate
    ownership. If it can provide opportunities to depositors in other
    -4-
    states,4 why can they not reprint their form to provide that same
    opportunity to their depositors in . . . Tennessee to designate the
    type of account? In the Court’s opinion, that is exactly what is
    required under the statute.
    In reviewing this case, however, the Court is also stuck with the
    Roberts v. Roberts decision. It states unequivocally that 45-2-
    703 does not apply to certificates of deposit. So the Court has
    to go back to, well, what was the status of the account when
    opened and what type of accounts when opened?
    The Court is of the opinion that [the Executor] has carried the
    burden of proof in terms of indicating the lack of opportunity to
    designate. The Court is not of the opinion that [the Survivor]
    has carried . . . [her] obligation to present rebuttal by clear and
    convincing evidence.
    That being said, therefore, the checking account, money market
    accounts that are applied to the case belong[ ] to the estate.
    However, as stated in Roberts . . . , the certificates of deposit do
    not.
    (Underlining in original; footnote added.)
    Consistent with its opinion, the trial court awarded judgment in favor of the
    Deceased’s estate in the amount of $57,576.40 – the amount withdrawn from the checking
    and money market accounts – plus prejudgment interest of $18,914.04 and discretionary
    costs. In response to the parties’ post-judgment motions, the trial court made the following
    additional findings of fact and conclusions of law:
    4
    The trial court is talking about the following. At the bottom of the two Personal Account Signature
    Cards signed by the Deceased and the Survivor with respect to the checking and money market accounts,
    there is the following underlined statement: “For residents of Arkansas, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia,
    and Washington, D.C. only.” (Emphasis added.) The verbage that follows the statement explains the
    difference between “with survivorship” and “without survivorship.” It refers the depositor to “the Rules and
    Regulations For Deposit Accounts for additional information.” Below this there are two boxes – one for
    “with survivorship” and one for “without survivorship.” The depositor is directed to “[c]hoose [o]ne.”
    Neither box is checked in this case. There is no suggestion in the record that Tennessee law – unlike the
    apparent law of the identified four states and the District of Columbia – requires that one of these boxes be
    selected by the depositor.
    -5-
    The SunTrust documents relating to the opening of accounts do
    not comply with T.C.A. § 45-2-703 (d) as they did not provide
    the depositor, in this case [the Deceased], the opportunity to
    designate the depositor’s intent concerning the ownership
    interest in a multi-party account.
    [I]t was the intent of the [D]eceased, at the time of the creation
    of the accounts and at all relevant times thereafter, that although
    [the Survivor] may have access to and use of his accounts during
    his lifetime, all of the contents of all of his accounts were to be
    considered his own, without the creation of, conveyance of or
    establishment of a right of survivorship interest in the account
    in or to [the Survivor].
    [I]rrespective of the lack of compliance with T.C.A. § 45-2-
    703(d) by the bank, the presumption provided by . . . § 45-2-
    703(e)(4) applies to the checking account and money market
    accounts, such that [the Survivor] would be presumed to have
    only a power of attorney with respect to those accounts. The
    presumption was not overcome by clear and convincing
    evidence, not only due to the inadequacy of the bank documents
    themselves, but further, the proven intent of the [D]eceased and
    the lack of proof of conveyance of or explanation of the bank’s
    Rules and Regulations (and their creation by default of joint
    accounts with right of survivorship) provided by the bank
    employee, Charles Young, to the [D]eceased, regardless of the
    [D]eceased’s known vision problems.
    The impact of Roberts v. Roberts, 
    827 S.W.2d 788
    , 796 (Tenn.
    App. 1991) on this case is its holding that T.C.A. § 45-2-703
    does not apply to certificates of deposit.5 Therefore, the
    presumptions provided by § 45-2-703(e)(4) do not apply to
    certificates of deposit. Without the application of . . . § 45-2-
    703, Roberts dictates that the language in the bank’s
    documentation, regardless of the depositor’s intent, controls. In
    this case, SunTrust’s “Rules and Regulations” state that a joint
    account is deemed a joint account with survivorship.
    5
    “Regardless, apparently, of the language contained in § 45-2-703(c) which states ‘including a
    certificate of deposit.’ ”
    -6-
    *    *    *
    [I]n the event the Court is in error concerning its interpretation
    of Roberts and/or the application of T.C.A. § 45-2-703 to this
    case, the evidence would warrant the awarding to the Estate not
    only the money market and checking accounts, but also the
    certificates of deposit. Specifically, should Lowry v. Lowry, 
    541 S.W.2d 128
     (Tenn. 1976) . . . control, the apparent presumption
    that each party has a right of survivorship in the joint accounts
    was rebutted, clearly and convincingly, by the Estate.
    *    *    *
    Alternatively, should the presumption provided by T.C.A. § 45-
    2-703(e)(4) . . . control, [the Survivor] did not carry her burden
    . . . to show that a right of survivorship was created, rather than
    merely a power of attorney with respect to any of the accounts,
    including the certificates of deposit.
    (Footnote in original).
    The Executor appeals. Both parties raise issues regarding the disposition of the
    SunTrust accounts.
    II.
    The Executor presents a single issue for our review. As stated in his brief, it is as
    follows:
    Whether the trial court erred when it held that the provisions of
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703 do not apply to certificates of
    deposit generally and denied the Executor’s claim for the
    recovery of the funds represented by three certificates of deposit
    with SunTrust Bank.
    The Survivor raises the following additional issues taken verbatim from her brief:
    Did the trial court err by disregarding this Court’s controlling
    precedent of Estate of Disa True v. Padgett and ruling, despite
    the identical SunTrust account language, the contracts at issue
    -7-
    did not satisfy Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703 and were not “clear
    and unambiguous” notwithstanding this Court’s explicit rulings
    to the contrary?
    Did the trial court err in ruling, in its Order of additional
    findings of facts and rulings of law, that even if mistaken
    regarding Roberts and the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-
    2-703, that clear and convincing evidence was presented by the
    Estate to rebut the presumptions imposed by Tenn. Code Ann.
    § 45-2-703 and Lowry v. Lowry, of survivorship rights in the
    joint accounts?
    III.
    In this non-jury case, our review is de novo upon the record of the proceedings below;
    but the record comes to us with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s factual
    findings that we must honor “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn.
    R. App. P. 13(d). The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are accorded no such
    presumption. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 
    919 S.W.2d 26
    , 35 (Tenn. 1996); Presley v.
    Bennett, 
    860 S.W.2d 857
    , 859 (Tenn. 1993).
    IV.
    The parties each challenge various aspects of the trial court’s ruling. The basic issue,
    however, is simply this: Who owns the SunTrust accounts following the death of the
    Deceased? The pivotal question becomes whether, under applicable law, the SunTrust
    accounts were with “right of survivorship.” Our inquiry is controlled by Tenn. Code Ann.
    § 45-2-703 (2007). That section governs deposits to bank accounts and also CDs in the
    names of two or more persons. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
    (a) When a deposit has been made or is hereafter made, in any
    bank, in the names of two (2) or more persons, payable to either,
    or survivor, the deposit, or any part of the deposit, or any
    interest or dividend on the deposit, may be paid to either person,
    whether the others are living or not; and the receipt or
    acquittance of the person so paid shall be a valid and sufficient
    release and discharge to the bank for any payment so made.
    *    *     *
    -8-
    (c) As used in subsections (c)-(f), “multiple-party deposit
    account” means a deposit account, including a certificate of
    deposit, established in the names of, payable to, or in form
    subject to withdrawal by two (2) or more natural persons, or any
    of them, including, but not limited to, an account of the type
    described in subsection (a).
    (d)(1) When opening a multiple-party deposit account, or
    amending an existing deposit account so as to create a
    multiple-party deposit account, each bank shall utilize account
    documents that enable the depositor to designate ownership
    interest therein in terms substantially similar to the following:
    (A) Joint tenants with right of survivorship;
    (B) Additional authorized signatory; and
    (C) Other deposit designations that may be acceptable to the
    bank.
    (2) Account documents that enable the depositor to indicate the
    depositor’s intent of the ownership interest in any multiple-party
    deposit account may include any of the following:
    (A) The signature card;
    (B) The deposit agreement;
    (C) A certificate of deposit;
    (D) A document confirming purchase of a certificate of deposit;
    or
    (E) Other documents provided by the bank or deposit institution
    that indicate the intent of the depositor.
    (e) Accounts described in subsection (c) shall establish the
    following interests:
    -9-
    (1) A designation of joint tenants with right of survivorship, or
    substantially similar language, shall be conclusive evidence in
    any action or proceeding of the intentions of all named that title
    vests in the survivor;
    *    *     *
    (4) In the absence of any specific designation in accordance with
    subsection (d), property held under the title, tenancy by the
    entireties, carries a right of survivorship; property held under the
    title, joint tenancy, carries no right of survivorship unless a
    contrary intention is expressly stated. Any other person to whose
    order the accounts or certificate of deposit is subject shall be
    presumed to have power of attorney with respect to the account
    or certificate of deposit and not to be an owner of the account or
    certificate of deposit. The presumptions may be rebutted by
    clear and convincing evidence presented in the course of legal
    or equitable proceedings.
    (f) Without incurring any liability, any bank may, but shall not
    be required to, provide to depositors disclosures in form similar
    to the following:
    (1) JOINT TENANTS WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP.
    This designation means that the deposit account or certificate of
    deposit shall become the property of each owner as joint tenants,
    and that the survivor is entitled to all moneys in the account or
    represented by the certificate even if the first person to die had
    a will specifically directing disposition to someone else. The
    bank may release all moneys in the account or represented by
    the certificate to, or honor checks or orders drawn by, or
    withdrawal requests from, the survivor upon the death of any
    joint tenant. . . .
    (Capitalization in original.)
    -10-
    Also relevant to our review are SunTrust Bank’s “Rules and Regulations for Deposit
    Accounts” applicable to the SunTrust accounts in dispute.6 Pertinent portions include the
    following:
    All Accounts are subject to the signature card or authorizing
    documents and any additional agreements executed by the
    Depositor and the Bank and these rules and regulations….
    *    *     *
    “Joint Account”, also referred to as “Joint Account with
    Survivorship”, is an Account which is owned by two or more
    individuals as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as
    “tenants in common” or “tenants by the entirety.” Upon the
    death of one of the joint owners, the Account will belong to the
    surviving joint owner or joint owners….
    *    *     *
    You are not permitted to change the account ownership to
    anything other than a “joint tenants with right of survivorship,”
    including “tenants by the entirety” or “tenants in common”
    without the Bank’s approval. We will treat all Joint Accounts,
    unless otherwise indicated on the Bank’s records, as “joint
    tenants with right of survivorship” for all purposes, including,
    but not limited to writs, levies, setoffs, and determination of
    ownership upon death.
    (Bold print in original.)
    At trial, the Executor argued that the documents evidencing the establishment of the
    accounts were not in compliance with the statute and, therefore, he reasoned, that the
    Deceased’s intent regarding ownership of the accounts could not be ascertained from those
    documents. According to the Executor, it was the Survivor’s burden to show that the
    Decedent clearly intended for her to receive the account funds at his death. Counsel argued:
    6
    At the time the Deceased added the Survivor’s name to his checking account, the 2005 version of
    the Rules and Regulations was in effect. For ease of reference and the sake of brevity, we quote only from
    the 2006 Rules and Regulations in effect at the time of the remaining transactions, which, as relevant to our
    review, contain essentially identical provisions to those in existence in 2005.
    -11-
    Your Honor, 45-2-803 requires SunTrust to provide account
    documents that give the depositor the option to figure whether
    a multi-party deposit account is to be held as a joint tenant with
    right of survivorship or not. And specific language must be
    used, not some ambiguous language.
    Ambiguous language or lack thereof simply doesn’t comply
    with the statute. The purpose of this statute was to promote
    clarity that these SunTrust documents complied with the statute.
    If not only had the documents, but the way they had ultimately
    been utilized in connection with these accounts, was done in a
    manner that could provide to this Court a clear understanding of
    what [the Deceased’s] intent was, then we wouldn’t be here.
    But they don’t. And the manner in which they were utilized
    certainly doesn’t provide to the Court the sort of clarity that 45-
    2-703 demands.
    In ordering that the Executor should recover the funds in the money market and
    checking accounts, the trial court agreed with the Executor’s position. As set out above, the
    court found that the bank’s documents failed to comply with the requirements of Tenn. Code
    Ann. § 45-2-703. In particular, the court found that the documents did not provide the
    Deceased the opportunity to “designate ownership interest” in the accounts at the time of
    their creation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703 (d)(1). Having concluded that there was no
    designation of the Deceased’s intent, the court applied the statutory presumption in
    subsection (e)(4) of the statute to find that the Survivor held nothing more than power of
    attorney authority over the accounts and that she failed to present sufficient evidence to
    overcome this presumption. As to the CDs, the court expressly found that it was bound by
    prior case law and, accordingly, held that the statute’s provisions do not apply to those
    interests.
    As would be expected, the Executor only challenges the trial court’s determination –
    that Section 45-2-703 does not apply to certificates of deposit, and that, absent the
    application of the statute, SunTrust Bank’s documentation controls the ownership of the
    certificates “regardless of the depositor’s intent.” The gist of the Executor’s argument is that
    the statute does apply to CDs and, as a result, the analysis employed as to the other accounts
    also leads to the conclusion that the CDs belong to the estate. We agree with the Executor
    that the CDs are covered by the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703. We disagree with
    his assertion that the application of that statute supports a holding that the CDs passed to him
    as the Deceased’s personal representative.
    -12-
    The Executor correctly notes that the purpose behind various amendments to Section
    45-2-703 was to bring “clarity, certainty, and a reasonable amount of uniformity” to matters
    of “the existence and nature of joint tenancies in bank accounts. . . .” In re Estate of Paul
    Harris Nelson, No. W2006-00030-COA-R3-CV, 
    2007 WL 851265
     at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App.
    M.S., filed Mar. 22, 2007). On the other hand, the Survivor contends that the SunTrust
    accounts were conclusively created with a right of survivorship. The Survivor relies heavily
    upon this Court’s decision in Estate of True v. Padgett, No. E2005-01584-COA-R3-CV,
    
    2006 WL 2818239
     (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed July 17, 2006).
    In True, the estate of the decedent, Mrs. True, sued the Padgetts for the return of
    monies the Padgetts withdrew from a checking account to which Mrs. True had added their
    names. The account was at SunTrust bank and was opened with a signature card and
    incorporated rules and regulations that are virtually identical to those challenged in the
    present case. The evidence showed that the account signature card was brought to Mrs. True
    at the nursing home where she then resided, it was signed and witnessed, and returned to the
    bank; there was no direct evidence that Mrs. True ever received a copy of the rules and
    regulations for the account. The trial court dismissed the estate’s case based on its
    conclusion that the account created was joint with right of survivorship. This Court affirmed.
    We quote extensively from our opinion:
    In its brief on appeal, the Estate argues, in part, that there is no
    “expressed contract in this case” because “the signature card
    does not specify at all what kind of account it is” and “[t]he
    rules and regulations do not in any way specify the type of
    account was (sic) created by Mrs. True and the Padgetts.”
    (emphasis deleted). Respectfully, the Estate is mistaken.
    Ms. True and the Padgetts executed a signature card for the
    Account that clearly and unambiguously states that “all
    transactions between the Bank and the above signed shall be
    governed by the rules and regulations for this account and the
    above signed hereby acknowledge(s) receipt of such rules and
    regulations….” The Rules and Regs clearly and unambiguously
    provide that SunTrust Bank “will treat all Joint Accounts as
    ‘joint tenants with right of survivorship’ for all purposes,
    including, but not limited to writs, levies, setoffs, and
    determination of ownership upon death.” Further, the Rules and
    Regs clearly and unambiguously provide that SunTrust Bank
    will “not [be] bound by an attempt by you to change the account
    -13-
    ownership to anything other than a ‘joint tenants with right of
    survivorship’. . . .”
    The provisions of the contract created by the signature card and
    the Rules and Regs are clear and unambiguous, and we must
    give effect to the parties’ intent. It is not the role of this Court
    “to make a different contract than that executed by the parties.”
    “In the absence of fraud or mistake, a contract must be
    interpreted and enforced as written even though it contains terms
    which may be thought to be harsh or unjust.” The record on
    appeal reveals no fraud or mistake and, therefore, we must
    interpret and enforce the contract as written.
    SunTrust Bank complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703 by
    providing a signature card and a deposit agreement, the Rules
    and Regs, that enabled the depositor, Ms. True, to designate
    ownership interest in the Account when Ms. True changed the
    Account from an individual account to a multiple-party deposit
    account, a joint account. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703
    (e)(1) the designation of the Account as joint tenants with right
    of survivorship “shall be conclusive evidence in any action or
    proceeding of the intentions of all named that title vests in the
    survivor.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703 (e)(1) (2000). We note
    that our holding is supported by the uncontradicted testimony of
    Ms. Garren that Ms. Garren “pulled out the rules and regs…"
    when explaining to Ms. True that if Ms. True added the
    Padgetts’ names, that “they would have equal ownership of this
    account….” Given this, we hold that the Trial Court correctly
    held that the Account was owned by Ms. True, William Bryant
    Padgett, and Wende Padgett as joint tenants with right of
    survivorship.
    Our resolution of the Estate’s first issue pretermits the necessity
    of considering its second issue as the Estate was attempting to
    use . . . excluded evidence to prove that Ms. True did not have
    the intent to create a joint account with right of survivorship. As
    discussed fully above, the conclusive evidence establishes that
    Ms. True intended to create and did so create an account as joint
    tenants with right of survivorship.
    -14-
    Id. at * 5-6 (internal citations omitted).
    The Executor, we think, tangentially attempted to cut off any reliance on True by
    requesting the trial court to further find as follows:
    [T]he Executor moves the Court, . . . to make an additional
    finding of fact . . . that any provision in the SunTrust Bank
    Rules and Regulations that purports to treat the accounts held by
    [the Decedent] as joint accounts with right of survivorship is
    unenforceable due to a lack of mutual consent and is otherwise
    invalid.
    Contrary to the Executor’s position and much of the trial court’s reasoning, the statute, as
    interpreted by us in True, compels a holding in the present case that the documentary
    evidence before us is “conclusive evidence . . . of the intentions of all named [i.e., the
    Deceased and the Survivor] that title vests in the survivor.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-
    703(e)(1).
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(d)(1) requires banks to “utilize account documents that
    enable the depositor to designate ownership interest” in any joint account. We observed in
    Nelson that,
    [a]s we read this provision, a ‘designation’ on an account
    document must include ‘joint tenants with the right of
    survivorship’ or, as noted in the statute, another substantially
    similar expression . . . to specify that type of ownership interest.
    If it does not, then subsection (e)(4), which governs accounts
    lacking designations, will control.
    Nelson, 
    2007 WL 851265
     at *11. The statute expressly provides that “[a]ccount documents
    that enable the depositor to indicate the depositor’s intent of the ownership interest in any
    multiple-party deposit account” include signature cards, deposit agreements, and CDs, the
    very documents utilized in the present case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(d)(2)(A)-(C).
    Pursuant to the incorporated Rules and Regulations governing the SunTrust accounts, a
    “multiple-party deposit account” such as the ones in this case carries with it a right of
    survivorship and such designation conclusively establishes that this was the Deceased’s
    intent. In our view, this ends our inquiry regarding ownership of all of the SunTrust
    accounts. There is much testimony in the record regarding the Deceased’s intent, or lack
    thereof, to establish a right of survivorship in the SunTrust accounts. This evidence is
    immaterial to our analysis of the application of the statute to the SunTrust accounts. This is
    -15-
    because, under the clear language of the statute, the Deceased’s intent to establish the
    SunTrust accounts with right of survivorship is conclusively established.
    The trial court faults SunTrust for failing to “provide . . . [the Deceased], the
    opportunity to designate the depositor’s intent concerning the ownership interest in a multi-
    party account.” With all due respect to the trial court, we disagree with its characterization
    of what happened in this case. We find that the bank acted in a way that did afford the
    Deceased this opportunity.
    The trial court reads the statute – and particularly subsection (d)(1) – as requiring a
    bank to provide a form on which a depositor can expressly designate by a signature the type
    of account that he or she wishes to open. Since the “Personal Account Signature Card” and
    the “Time Deposit Receipt” in this case do not have a place on which a depositor can indicate
    the type of account he or she is opening, the trial court reasoned that the bank failed to
    comply with the edict of the statute. We believe the trial court has read the statute too
    narrowly.
    The Deceased signed a document – the “Personal Account Signature Card” – in which
    he acknowledged “receipt of [SunTrust’s] rules and regulations.” Those rules and
    regulations advised him that if he opened an account with another person – as he did – that
    SunTrust would “treat [it] unless otherwise indicated on the Bank’s records, as ‘joint tenants
    with right of survivorship’ for all purposes, including, . . . determination of ownership upon
    death.” (Emphasis added.) We hold that, in the absence of fraud, the providing of these
    rules and regulations to the Deceased, and his signing of the signature card along with
    another, i.e., the Survivor, to set up the SunTrust accounts with language acknowledging
    receipt of the bank’s rules and regulations, shows that SunTrust unambiguously advised the
    Deceased what his options were in opening a “multiple-party deposit account” or in
    amending such an account. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(d)(1). When he failed to
    designate a contrary intent on the bank’s records, he became subject to the “default” position,
    i.e., the establishment of a joint account with right of survivorship. This brings into play
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703(e)(1) which, for emphasis, we quote again:
    A designation of joint tenants with right of survivorship, or
    substantially similar language, shall be conclusive evidence in
    any action or proceeding of the intentions of all named that title
    vests in the survivor.
    (Emphasis added.) The same analysis applies to the CDs and the “Time Deposit Receipt”
    furnished by the bank as a part of the transactions involving the CDs. In the absence of fraud,
    there is nothing more that needs to be said in resolving this aspect of the appeal. Under the
    -16-
    record before us, there is conclusive evidence that the Deceased intended to open a joint
    account with right of survivorship.
    Given our holding, we are required to address language in Roberts v. Roberts, 
    827 S.W.2d 788
    , 796 (Tenn. App. 1991), providing that “[t]he statute does not apply to
    certificates of deposit which require no signature card and provide no withdrawal until
    maturity. . . .” Understandably, the trial court was reluctant to rule in direct opposition to a
    published decision of this Court. Following Roberts, it ruled that the CDs were not to be
    analyzed under Section 45-2-703 despite statutory language indicating otherwise.
    Simply put, we think that, on this point, Roberts was wrongly decided. In the present
    case, we decline to ignore the plain language of the statute extending its application to
    “multiple-party deposit account[s]” expressly including “a certificate of deposit, established
    in the names of, payable to, or in form subject to withdrawal by two (2) or more natural
    persons. . . .” Following the language of Section 45-2-703, we conclude that the CDs were
    owned by the Deceased and the Survivor with right of survivorship.
    V.
    The Survivor also challenges the trial court’s additional finding that:
    The impact of Roberts v. Roberts, 
    827 S.W.2d 788
    , 796 (Tenn.
    App. 1991) on this case is its holding that T.C.A. § 45-2-703
    does not apply to certificates of deposit. Therefore, the
    presumptions provided by § 45-2-703(e)(4) do not apply to
    certificates of deposit. Without the application of . . . § 45-2-
    703, Roberts dictates that the language in the bank’s
    documentation, regardless of the depositor’s intent, controls.
    (Footnote omitted.) As discussed, we have already determined that Section 45-2-703 does
    apply to the CDs and that the bank’s documents utilized to amend or open the SunTrust
    accounts properly designated them as being with right of survivorship. Upon the death of
    the Deceased, the Survivor, as the survivor of the two, by operation of law, became the sole
    owner of the CDs.
    VI.
    In the concluding paragraph of her brief, the Survivor requests an order directing that
    the court costs and discretionary fees imposed against her by the trial court be remitted to her
    by the Executor. Our decision, favorable to the Survivor on all points, makes her the
    -17-
    prevailing party. On remand, the trial court is directed to enter an order taxing court costs
    at the trial court level to the Executor and awarding such discretionary costs to the Survivor
    as the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, determines to be appropriate.
    VII.
    That portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding the Executor the bank accounts
    is reversed. We modify the judgment in favor of the Survivor to award her all of the bank
    accounts as well as the CDs. As modified, the judgment in favor of the Survivor is affirmed.
    Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, G. Perry Guess, Executor of the Estate of C.
    Charlton Howard. This case is remanded to the trial court with instructions.
    _______________________________
    CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
    -18-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2011-00947-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.

Filed Date: 4/16/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014