Jerry Grace v. Mountain States Health Alliance ( 2001 )


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  •                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    July 13, 2001 Session
    JERRY ALLEN GRACE, ET AL. v. MOUNTAIN STATES HEALTH
    ALLIANCE, d/b/a/ JOHNSON CITY MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL, ET
    AL.
    Appeal from the Law Court for Washington County
    No. 20423    Thomas J. Seeley, Jr., Judge
    FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2001
    No. E2000-03031-COA-R3-CV
    In this medical malpractice suit the Trial Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Mountain
    States Health Alliance, d/b/a/ Johnson City Medical Center Hospital and five Doctors. The Trial
    Court overruled the Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend his determination that all Defendants were
    entitled to summary judgment. As to the Doctors, the determination was predicated upon the motion
    to alter or amend not being timely filed, and as to the Medical Center on the grounds that the delay
    in submitting materials accompanying the motion to alter or amend was not justified. We affirm.
    Tenn.R.App.P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed;
    Cause Remanded
    HOUSTON M. GODDARD , P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR.,
    and D. MICHAEL SWINEY, JJ., joined.
    Bob McD Green, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the Appellants, Jerry Allen Grace and wife, Wanda
    Grace
    M. Stanley Givens and Frank H. Anderson, Jr., Johnson City, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Mountain
    States Health Alliance, d/b/a Johnson City Medical Center Hospital
    Jeffrey M. Ward, Greeneville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Rachel Monderer, M.D.
    Richard M. Currie, Jr., Kingsport, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Claude C. Haws, M.D.
    Charles T. Herndon, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Steven C. Hamel, M.D.
    Jimmie C. Miller, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Kenneth Turner, M.D.
    No Brief was filed for the Appellee, James L. Davenport, M.D.
    OPINION
    This is a medical malpractice suit brought by Jerry Allen Grace and his wife, Wanda Grace,
    against Mountain States Health Alliance, d/b/a Johnson City Medical Center Hospital, and Drs.
    Rachael Monderer, Steven C. Hamel, Claude C. Haws, Kenneth Turner, and James L. Davenport.
    Mrs. Grace seeks damages for injuries she received which she alleges were caused by the negligence
    of the Defendants, and Mr. Grace seeks damages for loss of consortium.
    We first note that during oral argument counsel for the Plaintiffs announced that they were
    abandoning their appeal as to Drs. Hamel and Haws.
    As to all Defendants except the Hospital, the Trial Court found that the motion of the
    Plaintiffs to alter or amend a summary judgment granted to them was not timely filed and overruled
    the Plaintiffs' motion.
    The Plaintiffs insist that under the provisions of Tenn.R.Civ.P. 6.05 they are entitled to add
    three days to the time specified, which would make their motion timely.
    With regard to Johnson City Medical Center, although the motion to alter or amend was
    timely, the Trial Court nevertheless found that counsel was not entitled to supplement the evidence
    previously filed bearing on the liability of the Medical Center.
    The Plaintiffs appeal and, as already noted, contend as to the Doctors that their motion to
    alter or amend was timely, and as to the Medical Center the Trial Court erred in refusing to entertain
    the affidavits filed with the motion.
    Unlike most appeals from grants of summary judgment, this appeal as to the Doctors does
    not turn on whether there is a dispute of material fact, but, rather, is a question of law respecting the
    applicability of the Rule hereinbefore referenced to time limitation vis-a-vis motions to alter or
    amend.
    Rule 6.05 provides the following:
    6.05. Additional Time after Service by Mail.-- Whenever a party has the right
    or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period
    after the service of a notice or other paper upon such party and the notice or paper
    is served upon such party by mail three (3) days shall be added to the prescribed
    period.
    The limitation of the period to alter or amend is 30 days. In the present case the order
    granting summary judgment to the Defendant Doctors was entered on August 23, and the motion to
    alter or amend was not filed until September 25, which would be three days beyond the deadline of
    September 22.
    -2-
    The Plaintiffs cite a treatise titled, “Weissenberger’s Tennessee Civil Practice Manual,”
    which supports their insistence relative to the applicability of Rule 6.05. However, there are several
    Tennessee cases--which we believe are controlling--that hold to the contrary. In Houseal v. Roberts,
    
    709 S.W.2d 580
     (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984), this Court, in addressing Rule 6.05, the context of an appeal
    from a ruling of the Commissioner of the Department of Safety ordering the forfeiture of certain
    money received, which appeal is initiated by filing a petition of review within 60 days after the entry
    of the adverse administrative ruling, found that the Rule in question was not applicable, using the
    following language:
    The appellants argue that because they were apprised of the decision of the
    Department of Safety through the mail they should have been allowed three extra
    days to file the petition as Rule 6.05 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure
    provides. However, we note that the three day extension is applicable only to
    those situations where a party "is required to do some act or take some
    proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper
    upon him." Tenn.R.Civ.P. 6.05 (Emphasis supplied). The statute which imposes
    the sixty day limitation on the appellants in this case provides that the period runs
    from the date of the entry of the agency's final order. T.C.A. § 4-5-322 (1982).
    Notice is not mentioned in the statute. Id. Therefore, we believe Rule 6.05 is
    inapposite.
    Two later cases, Cheairs v. Lawson, 
    815 S.W.2d 533
     (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), (also involving
    the petition of review for a forfeiture order of the Department of Safety) and Begley Lumber
    Company, Inc. v. Trammell, 
    15 S.W.3d 455
     (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), (a Rule 3 appeal) construed the
    Rule, as did the Houseal Court.
    In accordance with the foregoing authority, we find the motions as to the Defendant Doctors
    was not timely and that the Trial Court’s action in denying the motion was appropriate.
    As to the motion insofar as it concerns the Medical Center, the Trial Court made the
    following finding:
    As to defendant, Mountain States Health Alliance, d/b/a Johnson City Medical
    Center, the Court found that there was no evidence of justification for the delay
    of submission of an expert affidavit by plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs were aware
    of the alleged wrong medication being administered since the filing of the first
    Complaint and should have, with due diligence, earlier obtained an expert
    affidavit relative to this issue.
    In Harris v. Chern, 
    33 S.W.3d 741
     (Tenn. 2000), released on December 8, 2000, the Supreme
    Court in addressing a Rule 54.02 motion said the following:
    -3-
    We granted this appeal to determine the standard to be applied in ruling
    upon a Tenn.R.Civ.P. 54.02 motion to revise a grant of partial summary judgment
    based upon evidence beyond that which was before the court when the motion was
    initially granted. For the reasons stated below, we reject the newly discovered
    evidence rule applied by the trial court and set forth in Bradley v. McLeod, 
    984 S.W.2d 929
     (Tenn.Ct.App.1998). We adopt a test requiring the trial court to
    consider, when applicable: 1) the movant's efforts to obtain evidence to respond
    to the motion for summary judgment; 2) the importance of the newly submitted
    evidence to the movant's case; 3) the explanation offered by the movant for its
    failure to offer the newly submitted evidence in its initial response to the motion
    for summary judgment; 4) the likelihood that the nonmoving party will suffer
    unfair prejudice; and 5) any other relevant factor. Accordingly, we reverse the
    judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for application of
    this standard.
    Although Harris by its very language applies to Rule 54.02 motions, this Court has twice
    used the factors set forth in Harris when considering a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend. See
    King v. City of Gatlinburg, E2000-00734-COA-R3-CV, 
    2001 WL 483419
     at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
    May 8, 2001) (“This Section of this Court recently adopted the reasoning applied in the Supreme
    Court decision of Harris v. Chern . . . in reviewing the denial of a Rule 59.04 motion. See Smith v.
    Haley, 
    2001 WL 208515
     (Tenn. Ct. App. March 2, 2001).
    In light of the Trial Judge’s finding of fact relative to delay in submitting an affidavit, we
    cannot find that he abused its discretion in so doing.
    For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed and the cause remanded
    for collection of costs below. Costs of appeal are adjudged against Jerry Allen Grace and his wife,
    Wanda Grace, and their surety.
    _________________________________________
    HOUSTON M. GODDARD, PRESIDING JUDGE
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2000-03031-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge Houston M. Goddard

Filed Date: 7/13/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014