Hunter v. Anderson ( 1997 )

THOMAS W. HUNTER, )
)
Plaintiff/Appellant, )
) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9701-CV-00024
VS. )
) Sumner Circuit
) No. 14826-C
JAMES R. ANDERSON, )
Defendant/Appellee.
)
) FILED
June 18, 1997
COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE Cecil W. Crowson
MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE Appellate Court Clerk
APPEALED FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SUMNER COUNTY
AT GALLATIN, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE THOMAS GOODALL, JUDGE
WILLIAM C. BARNES, JR.
13-14 Public Square
Post Office Box 552
Columbia, Tennessee 38402
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
C. L. ROGERS
ROGERS & MOORE
119 Court Square
Gallatin, Tennessee 37066
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
REVERSED AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
CONCUR:
TODD, P.J., M.S.
KOCH, J.
OPINION
The trial court granted the defendant a summary judgment on the basis
of accord and satisfaction. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that there had been no
accord and satisfaction because he did not agree to finalize the settlement his
attorney worked out for him. We reverse the trial court, because there appear to be
questions of material fact as to whether the attorney had the authority to settle on
behalf of his client, and if he did not, as to whether the plaintiff himself accepted the
settlement before changing his mind.
I.
Thomas W. Hunter was injured when his car was struck from behind by
a car driven by James R. Anderson. Mr. Anderson’s insurance company paid Mr.
Hunter’s medical bills and initiated negotiations to settle the claim. Mr. Hunter’s
attorney agreed to a $2,500 settlement on behalf of his client, and the insurance
company executed a check for that amount. The check and release form were
presented to Mr. Hunter, but he refused to sign the release, and he subsequently filed
suit against Mr. Anderson.
The defendant answered, claiming that the plaintiff had accepted the
settlement offer, thus creating an enforceable contract despite his subsequent refusal
to put his signature on the agreement. The defendant then filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment, asking the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s action on the basis of
the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, or in the alternative to compel the
plaintiff to return the money. No supporting affidavit was attached to the motion.
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The plaintiff’s attorney filed a response to the motion on March 13, 1996,
to which he attached his own affidavit, which reads as follows:
AFFIDAVIT
After being duly sworn William C. Barnes, Jr. disposes
(sic) and states as follows:
1. I am a licensed attorney in the State of
Tennessee.
2. I am representing the plaintiff in the above
reference (sic) matter.
3. Settlement negotiations were carried on
between myself and the Defendants.
4. The Defendants paid seven hundred and twenty
six dollars and ten cents ($726.10) towards the medical’s (sic)
prior to any negotiations.
5. The Defendants forwarded an offer of two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) in settlement of claim.
Said offer was rejected and funds were returned.
Further affiant saith not.
After a hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion, holding
that he “is entitled to a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law based upon accord
and satisfaction or contract of settlement.” No transcript was made of the hearing, but
the record includes a Statement of the Evidence, which was authenticated by the
judge. It reads in its entirety:
STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE
Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 24(d), the following Statement of
the Evidence is hereby submitted by Appellee:
1. At the hearing on March 22, 1996 for Summary
Judgment, Counsel for Plaintiff orally stated to the Court that
Plaintiff had accepted the settlement agreement but then
refused to endorse the check and release when presented,
stating he had changed his mind.
2. The settlement monies had not been returned
to the Defendant as of March 22, 1996.
The foregoing is certified as an accurate account of
the proceedings before the trial court on March 22, 1996, in
addition to the record.
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II.
A party moving for summary judgment carries the burden of proving that
no genuine issue of material fact exists. In ruling on the motion, the trial court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opponent of the motion, and must
deny the motion if, when viewed in that light, the record reveals any genuine issue of
material fact. Taylor v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 573 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. App.
1978). No presumption of correctness attaches on appeal to a trial court’s action in
granting summary judgment, because it involves only questions of law. Gonzales v.
Alman Constuction Co., 857 S.W.2d 42 (Tenn. App. 1993); Roberts v. Roberts, 845
S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. App. 1992).
In the present case, the moving party failed to submit any affidavits to
indicate that Mr. Barnes was authorized to accept an offer on behalf of his client. The
affidavit of Mr. Barnes implies that his agency extended only to communicating the
offer to his client, not to settling on his behalf. This appears to raise an issue of fact
that would be material unless it could be conclusively shown that Mr. Hunter himself
accepted the defendant’s offer.
The Statement of the Evidence indicates that Mr. Barnes admitted that
his client accepted the offer when it was first presented to him, but we note that Mr.
Barnes did not sign the statement. His purported admission also raises the question
as to whom an acceptance must be communicated in order to bind the offeree. The
editors of Am. Jur. 2d state that “[m]utual assent which is essential to the formation
of a binding contract must be manifested by one party to the other.” 17A Am. Jur. 2d
Contracts § 28 (1991).
There also appears to be a possible dispute as to whether the plaintiff
had returned the check that was given to him. Mr. Barnes’s affidavit states that “the
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funds were returned,” while the Statement of the Evidence reported that “the
settlement moneys had not been returned to the Defendant as of March 22, 1996.”
There is no indication in the Statement of the Evidence as to what evidence the court
relied upon to reach that conclusion.
It is possible that the defendant could have proven that he was entitled
to a summary judgment if the facts had been more fully presented at this early stage
of the proceedings. But we are unable to affirm the trial court where so many
dispositive questions appear to be either disputed or unaddressed.
III.
We believe that the defendant failed to carry the burden that was
required in order for him to prevail on his Motion for Summary Judgment. The
judgment of the trial court is reversed. Remand this cause to the Circuit Court of
Sumner County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tax the costs on
appeal to the appellee.
_____________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_______________________________
HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE
MIDDLE SECTION
_______________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE